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**JAGANNĀTHA PANDITA**

BY

*Mīmāṃsakaratna*

*Veda-Mīmāṃsā Śiromaṇi, Mīmāṃsā Viśārada*

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THE KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI  
RESEARCH INSTITUTE  
MADRAS-4

Dedicated

TO

Dr. Rajah Sir Annamalai Chettiar of Chettinad,  
Kt., LL.D.,

FOUNDER-PRO-CHANCELLOR OF THE  
ANNAMALAI UNIVERSITY

A GREAT PIONEER OF ENLIGHTENED MUNIFICENCE  
IN THE CAUSE OF EDUCATION  
AND A GREAT PATRON OF ORIENTAL STUDIES  
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## PREFACE

JAGANNĀTHA Paṇḍita is perhaps the last great luminary in the galaxy of post-rhetoricians. His *magnum opus*, the *Rasagaṅgādhara*, not only expounds in detail the most important topics in the field of literary criticism but also systematizes them by reviewing the views of his predecessors who are authorities in the field and finally giving his opinions thereon. To an advanced student of *Alaṅkāraśāstra* well-versed in the *navya-nyāya* terminology the study of his work gives great solace in so far as it affords precise, accurate and in the main correct information regarding many leading questions in Literary Criticism.

It was my ardent desire for long to publish a monograph on Jagannātha Paṇḍita in English, but before venturing on it, I published in the Annamalai University Journal articles on his date and life-history, on his poetry and on his contributions to Literary criticism. Appreciative notes from several scholars suggesting that the publication of a monograph on Jagannātha Paṇḍita, a great but 'formidable' writer, would be quite welcome have encouraged me on to this task. I have subjected to a careful and thorough revision the articles that had appeared in the Annamalai University Journal and supplemented them with fresh matter before incorporating them in this monograph as different chapters. To this material which forms chapters II—VII I have added two chapters, one on Jagannātha Paṇḍita's Contemporaries and another on Jagannātha Paṇḍita as a Grammarian.

The Sanskrit commentaries on Jagannātha's works and other critical treatises confine themselves to comments or criticisms of his theories. This work attempts for the first time to make a critical and comprehensive study of Jagannātha Paṇḍita in all aspects. Within the short compass of this work it has not been possible to give a full elucidation of all the doctrines that our author has so ably and elaborately discussed in his *Rasagaṅgādhara*. The most important topics discussed in the first *ānana* of the *Rasagaṅgādhara* with the omission of the details regarding the *vyabhicāribhāvas* and those in the former half of the extant second *ānana* to the end of *paryāyokta* excepting some figures of speech in the middle, have been carefully dealt with in this work. Since a major section of the *Rasagaṅgādhara* contains criticisms of other writers on the *Alaṅkāraśāstra*, particularly Appayya Dikṣita, one long chapter has been devoted to the explanations of other's views and Jagannātha's criticism thereon. As far as possible, Nāgeśabhaṭṭa's effective replies to Jagannātha's criticisms on Appayya Dikṣita's views are also explained and commented on, so that a careful student can easily judge the comparative merits of these two great writers.

It is now my duty to acknowledge here my indebtedness to several persons who have helped me in the publication of this monograph. To my revered Professor Mahāmahopādhyāya Vidyāvācaspati Darśana-kalānidhi Kulapati, S. Kuppuswami Sastriar Avl., M.A., I. E. S. (Retired), I hasten to express my thankfulness. I can only acknowledge but can never adequately express my gratitude for his valuable suggestions in drawing up the general plan of the work and for his careful scrutiny and correction of the proofs. I am sincerely thankful to my friend

- Sri R. Satyanatha Iyer, M.A., L.T., Lecturer in History, Annamalai University, for the help he has rendered in the preparation of this work, particularly of Chapters I, II and III dealing with the age of Jagannātha, his life-history and his poetry. I also thank my friends, Sri P. Panchapagesa Sastriar, Vedānta-Sāhitya Śiromaṇi, M.O.L., of the Sanskrit Department, and Sri A. C. Subrahmanya Iyer, M.A., L.T., of the English Department, of the Annamalai University for having helped me in reading the proofs of this work.

I am ever grateful to the great patron of learning whose name this University bears—Rajah Sir Annamalai Chettiar, Founder-Pro-Chancellor—for having permitted me to dedicate this work to him. I thank most sincerely the Rt. Hon'ble V. S. Srinivasa Sastri, P.C., C.H., LL.D., the Ex-Vice-Chancellor, and the Syndicate of this University for having sanctioned the publication of this work. To Rai Bahadur Sir K. V. Reddi Naidu, the present Vice-Chancellor, who takes a good deal of interest in my work, I also express my sincere thanks.

My thanks are also due to the Superintendent of the St. Joseph's Industrial School Press, Trichinopoly, for the neat and excellent printing and get up of this work.

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V. A. RAMASWAMI SASTRI.

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# JAGANNĀTHA PAṆḌITA — A STUDY —

## CHAPTER I

### *The Age of Jagannātha Paṇḍita*

To appreciate the literary milieu in which Jagannātha Paṇḍita was born and his genius developed we may broadly survey the intellectual activities of his contemporaries, which should have acted as a stimulus to his intellect even if they had not moulded his thoughts and positively contributed to the make-up of his views. Those contemporary literary celebrities may be classed under three main heads: (a) elder contemporaries, (b) close contemporaries and (c) younger contemporaries, though we are uncertain about their exact dates.

#### (a) *Elder Contemporaries*

1. At Benares, the centre of Indian intellectual life, flourished Khaṇḍadevamīśra, the Mīmāṃsā teacher of Perubhaṭṭa, the father of Jagannātha Paṇḍita. He is the celebrated author of the *Bhāṭṭakaustubha*, the *Bhāṭṭadīpikā* and the *Bhāṭṭarahasya* and the leading exponent of the navya school in the History of the Pūrvamīmāṃsāśāstra.<sup>1</sup> He is said to have died in 1665.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Vide V. A. Ramaswami Sastri's edition of the *Tattvabindu* (Annamalai University Sanskrit Series, No. 3) Introduction, Part I, pp. 116-122.

<sup>2</sup> P. V. Kane's paper on the *Pūrvamīmāṃsāśāstra*, p. 19.

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2. In Bengal lived Jagadīśatarkālāṅkāra, a great Naiyāyika of this period belonging to the navya school started by Gaṅgeśopādhyāya and developed by Raghunātha Śīromaṇi. His works—the *Tarkāmṛta*, a short manual in Nyāya; the *Bhāṣyasūkti*, a commentary on the *Vaiśeṣikabhāṣya* of Praśastapāda; the *Tattvacintāmaṇi-dīdhiti* (a commentary on the *Dīdhiti*) commonly known as *Jāgadīśi* and the *Śabdaśakti-prakāśikā*, an independent treatise on the speculative semantics of Nyāya and other works like the *Tattvacintāmaṇimayūkha*—speak of his ability as a Nyāya dialectician. A manuscript of his *Tarkāmṛta* gives 1631 as its date; so he belonged to the former half of the Seventeenth century.<sup>1</sup>

3. From Eastern Bengal came Gadādharaḥṭṭācārya, the great master and champion of navyanyāya dialectics. He settled at Nadia (Navadvīpa) as the greatest exponent of navyanyāya. Just like Jagadīśatarkālāṅkāra, he wrote an exhaustive commentary on the *Dīdhiti*, select portions of which every student of navyanyāya in South India studies with great care. He wrote original commentaries on certain parts of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* for which the *Dīdhiti* is not available and on Udayana's *Ālmatattvaviveka*. He also composed fifty-two independent works of which the *Vyutpattivāda* and the *Śaktivāda* throw a flood of light on many knotty problems in the vast field of speculative semantics—*Śābdabodhapaddhati*. A manuscript of

<sup>1</sup> MM. Prof. S. Kuppuswami Sastri, *A Primer of Indian Logic* (Madras, 1932), Introduction, p. 50; Dr. Satishchandra Vidyabhushan, *A History of Indian Logic* (Calcutta, 1921), pp. 469-70; Dr. Das Gupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, pp. 306-8.

the *Vyutpattivāda* gives 1625 as its date; so he flourished in the former half of the Seventeenth century.<sup>1</sup>

4. Probably in the Maharashtra country lived Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita, a bitter literary antagonist of Jagannātha Paṇḍita and he came to South in his later days to study Advaita Vedānta under Appayya Dikṣita. Besides being the author of the *Advaita-tattvakaustubha*, he became an unequalled authority on Sanskrit Grammar by his solid contributions in his three great works—the *Śabdakaustubha*, an exhaustive commentary on the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* on the model of the *Mahābhāṣya*; the *Siddhāntakaumudī*, a short but analytical commentary on Pāṇini's sūtras, which tolled the knell of the *Kāśikāvṛtti* in the South, and the *Praudhamanoramā*, a critical commentary on the *Siddhāntakaumudī*, criticising now and then the views of the Prācīnas such as the *Kāśikāvṛttikāras* and their commentators and of his own teacher Śeṣa-śrī-Kṛṣṇa, the author of the *Prakriyāprakāśa*, the latter of whom Jagannātha tries to vindicate in his *Manoramākucamardana*. Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita's seventy-four kārikās, with his nephew Koṇḍabhaṭṭa's commentary, the *Bhūṣaṇa*, with his abridgment of it, the *Bhūṣaṇasāra*, occupy a high place in the *śābdabodha* section in Vyākaraṇa.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Prof. S. Kuppuswami Sastri, *op. cit.* p. 50; S. Vidyabhushan, *op. cit.* pp. 481-2.

<sup>2</sup> Dr. S. K. Belvalkar, *Systems of Sanskrit Grammar*, pp. 46-48; A. V. Gopalachari's introduction to the *Yādavābhyudaya* (Srirangam, 1909), Vol. II, Introduction, pp. 11 and 12.

5. As a contemporary of Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita may be mentioned the famous poet-scholar of Malabar, Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa who inherited high Śāstraic traditions from his father and Mīmāṃsā teacher Mātrigupta. That he was a versatile scholar and poet is well evidenced by his works—the Māna section of the *Mānameyodaya*, dealing with the six pramāṇas of the Bhāṭṭamīmāṃsakas and the *Tantravārttikānibandhana*, a commentary on the *Tantravārttika*, in the Pūrvamīmāṃsā Śāstra; the *Prakriyāsarvasva* in Vyākaraṇa, a commentary on the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* on the model of the *Prakriyākaumudī*, and the *Dhātukāvya*, a grammatical poem dealing with the various formations of nearly 3000 roots in the Sanskrit language; and the great devotional lyric, the *Nārāyaṇīya* based on the *Bhāgavatapurāṇa* and many Prabandhas on puranic themes suitable for staging in temples by the Cākyars of Malabar.<sup>1</sup>

6. Nilakaṇṭha Dikṣita, the grandson of Āccān Dikṣita (the younger brother of Appayya Dikṣita) and a disciple of Venkaṭeśvara Dikṣita (son of Govinda Dikṣita) was, according to tradition, a *protégé* and minister of Tirumalanāyaka of Madura. He was both a poet and an art-critic. Of his seven minor poems, three contain witty and satiric observations, two deal with supreme quietitude and two others are marked for their devotional tone. His two mahākāvyas, the *Śivalilārṇava* (in 22 cantos) and the *Gaṅgāvataraṇa* (in 8 cantos) testify to his descriptive power true to nature. His *Nilakaṇṭhaviṇaya Campū* marks the culmination of his achievement as a poet and critic.

<sup>1</sup> V. A. R. Sastri's edition of the *Tattvabindu*, *ibid.* pp. 107-11.

• His *Nalacaritanātaka* and a commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya* are his important works in dramatic and grammatical literature. The *Nilakaṇṭhaviṇaya Campū* gives 1637-8 as the date of its composition. So he lived in the former half of the 17th century.<sup>1</sup>

7. At the court of Raghunātha Nāyaka of Tanjore flourished Rājacūḍāmaṇi Dikṣita, son of Ratnakheṭa Śrinivāsa Dikṣita and a disciple of Venkaṭeśvara Dikṣita. He was a prolific writer. He mentions twenty-seven works of his in his *Kāvyaadarpaṇa*. His *Tantrasikhāmaṇi*, a commentary on the Pūrvamīmāṃsā Sūtras and the *Saṅkarṣamuktāvali* on the *Saṅkarṣakāṇḍa* (the supplement to the *Dvādaśalakṣaṇi*); the *Maṇisāra* in Nyāya; the *Kāvyaadarpaṇa* in Alaṅkāraśāstra and many poetical and dramatic works like the *Rukmiṇīpariṇayakāvya* and the *Kamalinīkalahamsanāṭikā*—bespeak his deep erudition in all śāstras and his position as a great poet of his age. His *Tantrasikhāmaṇi* gives 1636 as the date of its composition. Hence he is assigned to the former half of the 17th century.<sup>2</sup>

8. A contemporary of Nilakaṇṭha Dikṣita and Rājacūḍāmaṇi Dikṣita was Venkaṭādhvarin, a descendant of the famous Tātācārya, the Vaiṣṇava teacher of King Venkaṭapati I. of Vijayanagar. He was a sound scholar in four śāstras—Nyāya, Vedānta, Mīmāṃsā and Vyākaraṇa. His *Viśvayajñādarśacampū*

<sup>1</sup> Prof. S. Kuppuswami Sastri's introduction to the *Nilakaṇṭhaviṇaya Campū*, Bālaṃanoramā edition, (Madras, 1924), pp. 6-12.

<sup>2</sup> Dr. T. R. Chintamani's introduction to the Adyar Library edition of the *Rukmiṇīpariṇayakāvya*, 1929, pp. 30-36.

is a great literary work in that it is written in a very lucid style, describing many places of interest in South India from various standpoints.<sup>1</sup>

9. Cokkanātha Makhin, the mīmāṃsā-disciple of Veṅkaṭeśvara Dikṣita, lived at the Pudukkotta and Tanjore courts. He is the author of three works in Grammar—the *Bhāṣyaratnāvali*, the *Dhāturatnāvali* and the *Śabdaratnāvali*, the popularity of which is proved by the appreciative references of the contemporary poet-critic, Nilakanṭha Dikṣita.<sup>2</sup>

10. At the village Velaṅguḍi near Kumbakonam lived Dharmarājādhvarindra, the author of the popular and authoritative primer of Advaita Śāstra, the *Vedānta Paribhāṣa*, dealing with the six pramāṇas and many chief tenets of Advaita Philosophy. He is also a great Naiyāyika who wrote the *Tarkacūḍāmaṇi*, a review of earlier commentaries on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*.<sup>3</sup>

11 & 12. At the Court of Raghunātha Nāyaka of Tanjore flourished two authoresses, Rāmabhadraṁbā, one of the mistresses of the king, and Madhuravāṇi. The former is the author of the historical kāvya, the *Raghunāthābhyudaya*, on the achievements of her patron

<sup>1</sup> Sanskrit introduction to the *Viśvagunādarśa Campū*, Nirnaya Sagara edition, 1915, p. 6; V. A. R. Sastri's edition of the *Tattvabindu*, *ibid.* pp. 124-5.

<sup>2</sup> *Journal of Oriental Research*, Madras, Vol. IV, 1930, pp. 261-6.

<sup>3</sup> *Vide* the introductory verses of the *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*; MM. N. S. Ananthakrishna Sastri's edition of the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, (Calcutta, 1927) introduction, p. 6.

and the latter translated into Sanskrit Raghunātha's Telugu version of the *Rāmāyana*.<sup>1</sup>

### (b) Close Contemporaries

1. Kavindrācārya Sarasvatī, as a *protégé* of Shah Jahan, was perhaps acquainted with Jagannātha. He was a great scholar who received many titles from the Mughal emperor—Ācārya, Vidyānidhāna, etc. He is even said to have initiated Dara Shukoh into the mysteries of Yoga and Vedānta philosophies. He became extremely popular after he had led a deputation with success to Shah Jahan for the abolition of the Hindu pilgrim tax at Benares and Prayag. Subsequently Shah Jahan conferred upon him the title of *Sarvavidyānidhāna*.<sup>2</sup> He is said to have "interviewed His Majesty (Shah Jahan) at Lahore and received Rs. 1,500 in reward on the 2nd Zilqada 1062 A.H."<sup>3</sup>

He was a sanyāsin with the name Nṛsimhāśrama. That he was a great literary celebrity of his age is shown by his works on diverse subjects: the *Manoramākhaṇḍana* and the *Kāśikāsaṅgraha* in Vyākaraṇa; a commentary on the *Tantravārttika* in the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā Śāstra; and the *Kavindrakalpadruma* in which he is said to have referred to Jagannātha

<sup>1</sup> Dr. T. R. Chintamani's edition of the *Raghunāthābhyudaya* (Bulletin of the Sanskrit Dept., No. 2, University of Madras, 1934), introduction, pp. 1 and 2.

<sup>2</sup> Dr. Ganganath Jha's Foreword to '*Kavindrācārya's List*', Gaekwad Oriental Series, XVII; Dr. K. R. Qanungo's *Dara Shukoh*, p. 384.

<sup>3</sup> *Journal of Indian History*, Vol. VIII (1929), p. 51.

Paṇḍita. His *Yogavāsisṭhasāra*, a Hindi summary of the *Yogavāsisṭha* in Sanskrit, was prepared for the use of Dara Shukoh and his *Kavīndrakalpalatā* is a eulogy on Shah Jahan. The first page of MS. No. 3947 of the *Kavīndrakalpadruma* preserved in the India Office Library, London, gives its date as 1650. So he belonged to the former half of the Seventeenth Century.

It is not without significance that Kavindrācārya, Jagannātha Paṇḍita and Cakrapāṇi Paṇḍita, all contemporaries, and at least two of them connected with the Mughal court, were unsparing critics of Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita, as is evident from their *Manoramākhaṇḍana*, *Manoramākucamardana* and *Manoramāvīmardana* respectively, the last of which was highly praised by Kavindrācārya.<sup>1</sup>

2. In Bengal flourished Mahāmahopādhyāya Viśvanāthapañcānana, one of the foremost naiyāyikas of this age. He was one of the literary celebrities at Benares who sent a congratulatory message to Kavindrācārya on his bold and successful appeal to the Mughal emperor (already mentioned).<sup>2</sup> His chief and very popular work in Nyāya is the *Kārikāvali* or the *Bhāṣāpariccheda* with his own commentary, *Siddhāntamuktāvali*. His other works in Nyāya are: (1) a gloss on the *Nyāyasūtras* and (2) a commentary, called the *Padatattvavivēka*, on Raghunātha's *Padārthakhaṇḍana*. In *Alaṅkāra Śāstra* and *Chandas* he is said to have composed two separate treatises.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> R. Ananthakrishna Sastri's edition of *Kavindrācārya's List* (G. O. S. XVII).

<sup>2</sup> *ibid.* Ganganath Jha's foreword, pp. 4 and 5; Qanungo's *Dara Shukoh*, pp. 139 f. n.; 202-3 f. n.; 212 f. n.

<sup>3</sup> Prof. S. Kuppuswami Sastri, *op. cit.*, introduction, p. 52; Vidyabhushan, *op. cit.* pp. 479 and 480.

### (c) Younger Contemporaries

1. Rāmabhadra Dikṣita, the son-in-law and a disciple of Cokkanātha Makhin, may be regarded as a younger contemporary of Jagannātha. He says in his *Śṛṅgāratilakabhāṇa* that he was a disciple of Nīlakaṇṭha Dikṣita as well. His devotional lyrics—the *Rāma-karṇarasāyanastava*, the *Varṇamālāstotra*, the *Rāma-prasādestava*, the *Rāmāṣṭaprasastava*, the *Viśvagarbha-stava*, the *Rāmacitrastava*, the *Rāmacāpastava*, and the *Rāmabāṇastava*, and his *Ācāryastavarājabhūṣaṇa*, etc.; his popular drama, the *Jānakīpariṇaya*; his *Śṛṅgāratilakabhāṇa*; and the *Patañjalicaritakāvyā* of very little historical value—all these works make him one of the great poets of his age. That he was a great grammarian is clear from his title—*Pratyagrapatañjali*—and from the *Paribhāṣāṣṭṭītyākhyā* and the *Uṇādimatadīpikā*. He was also the author of the *Saḍdarśana-siddhāntasaṅgraha*, a compendium of the doctrines of the Six Systems of Indian Philosophy.<sup>1</sup>

2. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, a great Advaita writer, may be assigned to the seventeenth century as a younger contemporary of Jagannātha. His deep and critical erudition, his clear nyāya dialectic skill and his able advocacy of the Advaita view-point have won for him a very high place in the history of Advaita Vedānta Śāstra. His great work is the *Advaitasiddhi* which is a treatise dealing with advaita tenets and refuting the views of the dualists, chiefly Vyāsarāyasvāmin, the author of the

<sup>1</sup> R. Krishnaswami Sastri's introduction to the *Stavamaṇimālikā*, Sarasvatī Vilas Series, No. 6, Tanjore, 1932.

*Nyāyāmṛta*. Next to the *Advaitasiddhi* comes his *Siddhāntabindu*, an exhaustive commentary on Śaṅkarācārya's devotional and highly philosophical lyric, the *Daśuśloki*, elucidating all Advaita siddhāntas contained in this short poem. Another commentary of his is that on the *Śivamahimmasstotra*. Next to Śaṅkarācārya's *bhāṣya*, his *Gūḍhārthadīpikā* is the best of the extant Advaita commentaries on the *Bhagavadgītā*. His commentary on the *Saṅkṣepaśūrīraka* is brief and very suggestive. His *Advaitaratnarakṣaṇa* and *Vedāntakalpalatikā* are two independent treatises on Advaita Vedānta. Besides, his *Ānandamandākinī*, a devotional lyric of 102 verses on Lord Kṛṣṇa, shows his great poetic talent.<sup>1</sup>

The age of Jagannātha Paṇḍita was thus prolific in literary output, and his achievements can be viewed in proper perspective only if the great works of his contemporaries are borne in mind. He was only one among many stars of great magnitude in the literary firmament of India in the seventeenth century.

<sup>1</sup> Vide J. O. R. Vol. II, 1928, pp. 97-104; for other views see P. C. Divanji's edition of the *Siddhāntabindu*, (G. O. S. No. 64, 1933), introduction, pp. XIII-XXV.

## CHAPTER II

### Jagannātha's Life-history

JAGANNĀTHA Paṇḍita was a *tailiṅga*<sup>1</sup> (Telugu) brahmin of Vēgināḍ<sup>2</sup> or Veṅgināḍu whose parents were Perubhaṭṭa or Peramabhaṭṭa and Lakṣmī.<sup>3</sup>

**Jagannātha's Parentage & Education.** He received instruction in all branches of knowledge except in Sanskrit Grammar under his father to whom he refers in glowing terms:—

पाषाणादपि पीयूषं स्यन्दते यस्य लीलया ।

तं वन्दे पेरुमट्टाख्यं लक्ष्मीकान्तं महागुरुम् ॥<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Vide the *Prāṇābharaṇa*, Kāvya-mālā Series I, 1886, p. 90, the first half of the 52nd verse:—

तैलङ्गान्वयमङ्गलालयमहालक्ष्मीद्यालालितः

श्रीमत्पेरुमट्टसूनुनिशं विद्वल्लालान्तपः ।

Pt. Durgaprasad's edition of the *Rasagaṅgādhara*, (Bombay, 1916), introduction, foot-note (6), p. 2, *Āsaphavilāsa* :—

तैलङ्गकुलावतंसेन पण्डितजगन्नाथेनासफविलासाख्येयमाख्या-यिका निरमीयत ।

L. R. Vaidya's edition of the *Bhāminīvilāsa*, Bombay, 1887, introduction, p. 12.

<sup>2</sup> Vide B. G. Bal's edition of the *Bhāminīvilāsa*, 1895, the com. *Bhāminīvilāsa* *bhūṣaṇa*, the colophon, p. 122:

इति श्रीमदखिलाधि ? (न्ध्र) वेगीयनाड्यककुलावतंसजगेश्वरसूरि ? पुत्रेण पण्डितराजाख्यसूरिणा विरचिते भाषिनीविलासे . . . . .

Here Jagannātha's father's name is given as Jāgeśvarasūrin, but it may be another name of Perubhaṭṭa or Peramabhaṭṭa. vide *ibid.* introduction (the poet's life), p. 2; L. R. Vaidya's edition of the *Bhāminīvilāsa*, introduction, p. 11 f.-n. and Preface, p. 1.

<sup>3</sup> See ante p. 11, 1 f.-n. <sup>4</sup> *Rasagaṅgādhara*, *ibid.* p. 2.



In Sanskrit grammar he acquired proficiency under the efficient tuition of Śeṣavīreśvara<sup>1</sup> who had taught that subject to his father. That Jagannātha was able to study most of the śāstras under his father was a great advantage to him,<sup>2</sup> whereas his father had to learn different subjects under different teachers. One of the introductory verses of his *Rasagaṅgādhara* gives the names of his father's teachers:—

श्रीमज्ज्ञानेन्द्रमिशोरधिगतसकलमहाविद्याप्रपञ्चः

काणादीराक्षपादीरपि गहनगिरो यो महेन्द्रादवेदीत ।

देवादेवाध्यगीष्ट स्मरहरनगरे शासनं जैमिनीयम्

शेषाङ्कप्राप्तशेषामलभणितिरभूत्सर्वविद्याधरो यः ॥<sup>3</sup>

Perubhaṭṭa studied Vedānta śāstra under Jñānen-drabhikṣu and Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems under Mahendra. He received instruction in the Pūrvamīmāṃsāśāstra at Benares from one Deva who is, on the authority of Nāgeśabhaṭṭa,<sup>4</sup> identified with Khaṇḍadevamīśra. He studied Sanskrit grammar under Śeṣa (Śeṣavīreśvara),<sup>5</sup> a classmate of Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita and a pupil and son of Śeṣa-Śrī-Kṛṣṇa, the author of the *Prakriyāprakāśa*.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.* introduction, pp. 3 and 4—

सा च (मौढमनोरमा) प्रक्रियाप्रकाशकृतां पौत्रैरखिलशास्त्रमदार्णव-  
मन्थाचलायमानमानसानां अस्मद्गुरुपण्डितवीरेश्वराणां तनयैर्दूषितापि  
स्वमतिपरीक्षार्थं पुनरस्माभिर्निरीक्ष्यते । (मनोरमाकुचमर्दनम्)

<sup>2</sup> *Vide* Nāgeśabhaṭṭa's remark on the term  
महागुरुम् in the third verse of the R. G.—

सर्वविद्यानामेकस्मादेव लाभात्तत्र महत्त्वम् ।

*Gurumarmaparakāśikā, ibid. p. 2.*

<sup>3</sup> *Vide* R. G. verse 2, *ibid.* p. 2.

<sup>4</sup> *ibid.* *Gurumarmaparakāśikā*, p. 2—

देवादेव । एव = प्रसिद्धौ । खण्डदेवादेवेत्यर्थः ।

<sup>5</sup> *ibid.* G. M. P. p. 2—

शेष इत्यङ्क उपनाम यस्य तस्माद्वीरेश्वरपण्डितात्प्राप्ता ।

<sup>6</sup> See *ante* p. 12, 1 f.n.

According to a tradition, Jagannātha, after completing his studies under his father, went one day to the King of Āndhradeśa who did not then receive him well. Thereupon, he composed some verses expressive of the remorse he felt at his rejection and tried to present them to the king; but it was of no avail. He left his native province probably also on account of its chaotic political conditions after the great civil war of Vijayanagar subsequent to the death of Veṅkaṭa I. in 1614. He reached Jayapura (in Rajputana) where he founded a new school under his own management. He met there a *Kazi* from the Mughal court who was well-versed in Persian and possessed a deep knowledge of Islam. After studying the Muslim works he engaged him in serious discussions and finally overpowered him in a debate; and the Persian scholar went back to Delhi in dejection and spoke in glowing terms to his imperial master of the unrivalled scholarship of Jagannātha. This roused the curiosity of the emperor who invited the latter to his court. Since then, Jagannātha settled there as a recognised scholar.<sup>1</sup>

At the end of his *Bhāminīvilāsa* Jagannātha says that, during his middle age (*navinavayas*), he enjoyed the benevolent patronage of the Delhi emperor—

दिल्लीवल्लभपाणिपल्लवतले नीतं नवीनं वयः ।<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Vide* B. G. Bal's edition of the B. V., introduction, pp. 2 and 3; Pt. Durgaprasad's edition of the R. G., introduction, p. 1.

<sup>2</sup> L. R. Vaidya's edition of B. V., p. 106; B. G. Bal's edition, p. 122. But the *Nirnaya Sagara* edition with Acyutarāya's commentary does not contain this verse.

This Delhi emperor or emperors referred to might be either Jahangir or his son, Shah Jahan, or both,<sup>1</sup> since Jagannātha eulogises both specifically. In the verse—

इयमं यज्ञोपवीतं तव किमिति मयीसङ्गमात्कुल जातः  
सोऽयं शीतांशुकन्यापयसि कथमभूत्तज्जलं कजलाक्तम् ।  
व्याकुल्यन्नूरदीनक्षितिरमणरिपुश्रोणिभूषणमलाक्षी-  
लक्षार्क्षणाशुभारासमुदितसरितां सर्वतः सङ्गमेन ॥<sup>2</sup>

he praises the military achievements of *Nūradīna* who is identified with Nuruddin Muhammad Jahangir. It is believed that Jagannātha eulogises Shah Jahan and Dara Shukoh or Dara Shukoh only in his panegyric *Jagadābharana*.<sup>3</sup> Two verses specifically

<sup>1</sup> Both L. R. Vaidya and B. G. Bal have discarded as unhistorical the tradition that Jagannātha flourished at the court of Akbar who at his request gave his daughter *Lavaṅgī* to him in marriage. See their editions of B. V., pp. 9 and 10 and p. 5.

<sup>2</sup> R. G. p. 521.

<sup>3</sup> Most scholars are of opinion that the *Jagadābharana* is a eulogy of Dara Shukoh. See Pt. Durgaprasad's edition of R. G., introduction, p. 3; P. V. Kane's edition of the *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, (1923), introduction, the *History of Aṭaṅkāra Literature*, Part I, p. 133; L. R. Vaidya's edition of B. V., introduction, p. 17; B. G. Bal's edition of B. V., introduction, p. 6. But P. M. Paranjape conjectures (in his introduction to his edition of the *Bhāminīvilāsa*) that the poem is an encomium of Jagatsimha, the Rajput prince, who came to power in 1628. But this view does not find any support among scholars.

- referring to Shah Jahan and Dara Shukoh may be quoted here—

भूमीनाथ ! शहाबदीन ! भवतस्तुल्यो गुणानां गणै-  
रेतद्भूतभवप्रपञ्चविषये नास्तीति किं ब्रूमहे ।  
धाता नूतनकारणैर्यदि पुनस्तुष्टिं नवां भावये-  
न्न स्यादेव तथापि तावक्तुलालेशं दधानो नरः ॥<sup>1</sup>  
माहात्म्यस्य परोऽवधिर्निजगृहं गम्भीरतायाः पिता  
रत्नानामहमेक एव भुवने को वा परो मादृशः ।  
इत्येवं परिचिन्त्य मा स्म सहसा गर्वान्धकारं गमो  
दुग्धाब्धे ! भवता समो विजयते दिल्लीधरावल्लभः ॥<sup>2</sup>

Most probably therefore Jagannātha had access to the Mughal court at the time of Jahangir and enjoyed his patronage and subsequently that of Shah Jahan and Dara Shukoh. It is noteworthy that the conditions of literary patronage during the reign of Jahangir under the influence of Asaf Khan were more encouraging than during the early part of the reign of Shah Jahan when he was under the influence of Mumtaz Mahal. Further, Jagannātha says in his *Āsaphavilāsa*, a eulogy of Asaf Khan, which he wrote at the instance of Rāyamukunda, that he received the title of *Paṇḍitarāja* from Shah Jahan.<sup>3</sup> The title of this work indicates

<sup>1</sup> See the R. G. p. 210.

<sup>2</sup> See *ibid.* p. 496.

<sup>3</sup> अथ सकललोकविस्तारविस्तारितमहोपकारपरम्पराधीनमानसेन प्रति-  
दिनमुद्यदनवद्यगद्यपद्यानेकवद्यावियोऽतेतान्तःकरणैः कविभिरुपास्यमानेन कृत-  
युगीकृतकलिकालेन कुमतिवृणजालसमाच्छादितवेदवनमार्गविलोकनाय समुदी-  
पितसुतर्कदहनज्वालाजलेन मूर्तिमतेव नञ्वाभासफखानमनःप्रसादेन  
द्विजकुलसंवाहेवाकिवाञ्जनःकायेन माथुरकुलसमुद्रेन्दुना रायमुकुन्दे-  
नादिष्टेन सार्वभौमश्रीशाहजहांप्रसादादधिगतपण्डितराजपदवी-  
विराजितेन तैलङ्गकुलावतंसेन पण्डितजगन्नाथेनासफविलासा-  
क्येयमाख्यायिका निरभीयत । सेयमनुग्रहेण सहृदयानामनुदिनमुक्तासिता  
भवता ॥ *ibid.* introduction, p. 2.

that Asaf Khan was a patron of Jagannātha. He was the brother of Nur Jahan and father-in-law of Shah Jahan and held a high position in the councils of the empire, during the reigns of Jahangir and Shah Jahan. He was a man of letters and a lover of the beautiful.<sup>1</sup> Jagannātha naturally therefore found in Asaf Khan a sympathetic patron during his stay at the Mughal court. Asaf Khan died in 1641 and Jagannātha records his death in most pathetic terms—

युक्तन्तु याते दिवमासफेन्दौ तदाशितानां यदभूद्विनाशः ।  
इदन्तु चित्रं भुवनावकाशे निराश्रया कोकति तस्य कीर्तिः ॥<sup>2</sup>

'It is but natural, now that Asaf Khan is dead, that his dependents should perish; but it is a wonder how his fame sports unsupported in the wide expanse of the earth!'

Thus, in another place, he writes of his patron—

सुधेव वाणी वसुधेव मूर्तिः  
सुधाकरश्रीसदृशी च कीर्तिः ।  
पयोधिकल्प मतिरासफेन्दोः  
महीतलेऽन्यस्य न हीति मन्ये ॥<sup>3</sup>

'I believe there is none on earth to equal Asaf Khan; his words are like nectar; his person resembles the earth crested with jewels; his fame is like unto the brilliance of the nectar-rayed moon; his wisdom is deep as the ocean.'

<sup>1</sup> Vide Beniprasad, *History of Jahangir*, p. 189 (1922).

<sup>2</sup> R. G. p. 457.

<sup>3</sup> *ibid.* p. 166.

- Even after the death of Asaf Khan in 1641 Jagannātha continued as one of the literary stars of the Mughal court and produced almost all his works including the *Rasagāṅādhara* and the *Citramīmāṃsā-khaṇḍana*. Mr. P. V. Kane says that an earliest manuscript of the latter gives 1652-3 as its date and that his literary career may therefore be between 1620 and 1660.<sup>1</sup>

Jagannātha's *Prāṇābharāṇa*<sup>2</sup> testifies to the fact that he enjoyed the high favour of His Life in Prāṇanārāyaṇa who has been referred to in that work as *Kāmarūpeśvara*<sup>3</sup> and Assam. *Kamatādhipa*.<sup>4</sup> He might therefore have lived for a few years at the court of Prāṇanārāyaṇa in Assam, if he had left Delhi about 1650.<sup>5</sup>

Many scholars are of the opinion that the *Jagadābharāṇa* and the *Prāṇābharāṇa* contain the same verses, in some of which the names and titles of the patrons only are different.<sup>6</sup> If this view is tenable and if the date of an earliest manuscript of the *Citramīmāṃsā-khaṇḍana*, viz., 1652-3 is reliable, Jagannātha in all

<sup>1</sup> Vide *A History of Alankāra Literature*, p. 133.

<sup>2</sup> *Kāvya-mālā* Series I, pp. 79-90 (1886).

<sup>3</sup> See verses 2, 15 and 22.

<sup>4</sup> See verses 32 and 52.

<sup>5</sup> See Jagannātha's date (below) pp. 25-27.

<sup>6</sup> See Pandit Durgaprasad's edition of the *Rasagāṅādhara*, introduction p. 3; Th. Aufrecht's *Catalogus Catalogorum*, Vol. I, pp. 194 and 361. Dr. Qanungo's *Dara Shukoh*, Vol. I, pp. 418 and 419; Dr. Hardatta Sarma's edition of the B. V. (Poona, 1935) introduction, p. 10.

probability, composed the *Jagadābharāṇa* to eulogise the Mughal emperor and then used the same poem to praise Prāṇanārāyaṇa, substituting the latter's name and titles for those of the former. Most probably the *Jagadābharāṇa* is a lengthy panegyric on the Mughal emperor and the *Prāṇābharāṇa* is only an adaptation of some verses from the former.

Jagannātha's stay at the court of Prāṇanārāyaṇa after 1650 might have continued till 1660 or 1665 even. Prāṇanārāyaṇa's reign between 1633-66 was 'an era of great prosperity and happiness.'<sup>1</sup> He was very ambitious, energetic and tactful and so he was called 'the worthy successor of Nara Nārāyaṇa,'<sup>2</sup> his great grand-father. When the war of succession broke out in 1657, he betrayed the emperor and declared independence in his kingdom.<sup>3</sup> He raised an army against the Mughal *faujdar* of Kamrup and Hajo and drove him to Gauhati.<sup>4</sup> But Mir Jumla, the governor of Bengal, enraged by Prāṇanārāyaṇa's revolt, wanted to capture him and seeing that the Raja of Koch Bihar had fled away to Bhutan, he left the place, leaving a mighty garrison to watch the Raja's capital.<sup>5</sup> After some time Prāṇanārāyaṇa returned, drove away the Muhammadan garrison from his capital and became king in 1661.<sup>6</sup> In 1664 the Mughal attacks were renewed more vigorously and Prāṇanārāyaṇa, owing

<sup>1</sup> Vide Surendranath Bhattacharya, *A History of Mughal North-east Frontier Policy*, 1929, pp. 252 & 253.

<sup>2</sup> *ibid.*, p. 253.

<sup>3</sup> *ibid.*, p. 298.

<sup>4</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 300-1.

<sup>5</sup> *ibid.*, p. 305.

<sup>6</sup> *ibid.*, p. 309.

- to his 'sickness and internal dissensions,' finally submitted to the Mughal emperor, with a great war-indemnity to the Bengal Viceroy.<sup>1</sup> It is therefore probable that Jagannātha lived in Assam till 1665.

Jagannātha's acquaintance with Appayya Dikṣita has traditionally come down to us and in this connection are narrated some stories of his *liaison* with a Muhammadan beauty. It is said that during his stay at the Mughal court he fell in love with a Muslim lady, married her and spent his days in happiness. During his old age he went to Benares, quite disgusted with worldly cares and pleasures. But, there, he was condemned and excommunicated by the orthodox Brahmins led by Appayya Dikṣita on the ground that he had been polluted by his connection with the Muhammadan woman. Afterwards, sitting on the banks of the Ganges in despair, he composed some devotional verses on the sacred river. When his voice reached the highest pitch of pathos and devotion, the waters of the Ganges swelled up and carried him away.<sup>2</sup>

On this point there is another version. Jagannātha had a love-intrigue with a Muslim lady, who, after giving birth to a child, passed away all on a sudden. Sunk in misery, quite alone and helpless in his old age, he went to the Ganges, gave free vent to his grief, praised the river with his famous *Gaṅgālaharī* and at last drowned himself in the current on a wintry

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 309-310.

<sup>2</sup> Vide Pandit Durgaprasad's edition of R. G., introduction, p. 1.

day. It is also said that his misery was accentuated by the sudden death of his son<sup>1</sup> which he expresses in elegant pathos—

अपहाय सकलबान्धवविन्तामुद्रास्य गुरुकुलप्रणयम् ।

हा तमय ! विनयसालिन् ! कथमिव परलोकपथिकोऽभूः ॥<sup>2</sup>

'Abandoning cares for all kinsmen and discarding affection for his family, parents, etc., how have you, Oh devoted son! become a guest of the other world!'

To support Jagannātha's *liaison* with a Muslim lady and to bring out his maddened erotic sentiment, some verses are cited—

यवनी नवनीतकोमलाङ्गी

शयनीये यदि नीयते कदाचित् ।

अवनीतलमेव साधु मन्वे

न वनी माधवनी विमोदहेतुः ॥

यवनी रमणी विपदश्शमनी

कमनीयतमा नवनीतसमा ।

उहि ऊहिवचोऽमृतपूर्णमुखी

स सुखी जगतीह बद्धगता ॥

इयं सुस्तनी मस्तकन्यस्तकुम्भा

कुसुम्भाख्या चारुवेलावसाना ।

अरम्भासमानापि रम्भासमाना

लवङ्गी कुरङ्गीदृगङ्गीकरोतु ॥<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 1 and 2.

<sup>2</sup> R. G. p. 35.

<sup>3</sup> *Vide* Pt. Durgaprasad's edition of R. G. p. 1, f.-n. The third verse is studied by him with a half completely altered thus—

न याचे गजालिं न वा बाजिराजिं न वितेषु चितं मदीयं कदापि ।

इयं सुस्तनी मस्तकन्यस्तद्वस्ता लवङ्गी कुरङ्गी दृगङ्गी करोतु ॥

See also L. R. Vaidya's edition of the B. V., introduction, p. 3, f.-n.

But these verses are not found in any one of his well-known works. In the *Śṛṅgārasamullāsa* of his *Bhāminivilāsa*, however, he depicts his *Bhāminī* in all aspects of *sambhoga śṛṅgāra* and on her death he bursts out in pathos in the *Karuṇasamullāsa*. As there is no direct reference to any Muslim beauty in this work, it is doubtful whether he had been intimate with a Muslim lady. The stanzas cited might be the productions of his enemies whom he had not spared and, in revenge, were probably fathered upon him.

It may be remembered, in this connection, that Shah Jahan interdicted Hindu-Muhammadan marriages in Kashmir. Therefore it is unlikely that he tolerated his *protégé* Jagannātha's marriage with a Muslim lady.

Modern criticism has advanced two different dates for Appayya Dikṣita (1) between 1520 and 1593<sup>1</sup> and (2) between 1553 and 1626.<sup>2</sup> If we accept the first, which is more reliable than the second, since the former is based on epigraphical and literary evidences,<sup>3</sup> Jagannātha (c. 1590-1660) could have never met Appayya Dikṣita. If we accept the second, he would have been a man of 30 or 35 in the last days of Appayya Dikṣita.

<sup>1</sup> *Vide* the *Journal of Oriental Research*, Madras, Vol. II, (1928), p. 237.

<sup>2</sup> *Vide* A. V. Gopalachari's introduction to the *Yādavābhyudaya*, (1909) Vol. II, pp. 4-17.

<sup>3</sup> *Vide* J. O. R. Vol. II, pp. 230-237.

There is another tradition to the effect that Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita, one of the Vedānta disciples of Appayya Dikṣita, condemned Jagannātha as a *mleccha* in an assembly of pandits.<sup>1</sup> From the introductory note to the *Manoramākucamardana* it is clear that Jagannātha was very much enraged at Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita's vehement criticism in his *Praudhāmanoramā* of some views of Śeṣa-Śrī-Kṛṣṇa. On this ground Jagannātha called Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita a *gurudrohin* in the introductory verse of his *Manoramākucamardana*—

लक्ष्मीकान्तपदाम्भोजमानस्य श्रेयसा पदम् ।

पण्डितेन्द्रो जगन्नाथः स्वति नर्षी गुरुद्रोहाम् ॥<sup>2</sup>

In another work *Śabdakaustubhaśāntottejana* attributed to Jagannātha,<sup>3</sup> he condemns the encouragement given by Appayya Dikṣita to Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita thus—

अप्ययदुर्ग्रहविचेतितचेतनाना-

मार्यद्रुहामयमहं शमयेऽबलेषान् ।

<sup>1</sup> Vide A. V. Gopalachari's introduction to the *Yādavābhyudaya*, Vol. II, pp. 13 and 14.

दृष्ट्वाविडुष्टदुर्ग्रहवशांम्लष्टं गुरुद्रोहिणा

यन्मलेच्छेति बचोऽविचिन्त्य सदसि प्रौढेऽपि भट्टोजिना ।

तत्सत्यापि तमेव धैर्यनिधिना यत्सव्यमृदात्कुचम्

निर्बध्यास्य मनोरमामवशयन्नप्यप्ययाद्यास्थितान् ॥

<sup>2</sup> See Pt. Durgaprasad's edition to R. G., introduction, p. 3.

<sup>3</sup> Vide A. V. Gopalachari's introduction to the *Yādavābhyudaya*, Vol. II, p. 14.

In the *Sāsisenā* also attributed to him, he characterises Appayya Dikṣita as the destructive forest-fire of *Sāhitya*, which he (Jagannātha) has to revive.<sup>1</sup> It is therefore probable that Jagannātha's strong prejudice against Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita extended also to his Vedānta-teacher, Appayya Dikṣita; and this may be the true explanation of Jagannātha's antipathy to Appayya Dikṣita as evidenced by the *Rasagaṅgādhara* and the *Citramūmāmsākhaṇḍana*.<sup>2</sup>

It is said that Jagannātha is referred to in the *Padshahnama* as a 'kalāwant' (musician). His identity with other Jagannāthas examined. It is also said that on the 22nd Rabi-us-sani, A. H. 1044, Jagannātha *Kalāwant* presented to the emperor twelve literary pieces composed in the name of His Majesty (Shah Jahan). The latter became so pleased that the former was weighed against silver and the whole amount Rs. 4,500 was presented to Jagannātha. He was awarded first the title of *Kavirāy* and after some time that of *Mahākavirāy*. He is also known to have headed the list of authors at the Mughal court. Dr. Qanungo identifies unhesitatingly Jagannātha *Kalāwant* with the author of the *Rasagaṅgādhara* and the *Āsaf-laharī* (*Āsaphavilāsa*).<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, p. 14.

अप्ययदीक्षितदवानलदग्धशेषं साहित्यमकुरयते सरसीर्निबन्धैः ॥

<sup>2</sup> There are other traditions which speak of Jagannātha's contemporaneity with Hari Dikṣita, the grandson of Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita. See Dr. Har Datt Sarma's edition of the *Bhāminivilāsa* (1935), introduction, p. 6.

<sup>3</sup> See Dr. Qanungo's paper on 'Some Side-lights on the Character and Court-life of Shah Jahan', *Journal of Indian History*, Madras, Vol. 8 (1929), pp. 49 and 50.

In his History of Dara Shukoh, Dr. Qanungo says that Jagannātha who received the title of *Mahākavirāy* translated the Arabic 'Almagist' into Sanskrit under the title—the *Siddhāntasārakaustubha* and compiled another work on astronomy called *Samrātsiddhānta*.<sup>1</sup> But he assigns no reasons for his assertions. This astronomer Jagannātha was evidently a different person from our author. Th. Aufrecht says in his *Catalogus Catalogorum* that one Jagannātha wrote in 1730 for Jayasimha, King of Jayapura (1699–1743), the *Rekhā-gaṇitakṣetravyavahāra* and the *Siddhāntasārakaustubha*, the latter otherwise known as the *Samrātsiddhānta*.<sup>2</sup> He cites more than forty authors with the name of Jagannātha,<sup>3</sup> all of whom are different from our author. At Tanjore flourished three or four authors with the name of Jagannātha towards the close of the seventeenth century or in the beginning of the eighteenth century. One Jagannātha, the son of Nārāyaṇa, is the author of an allegorical kāvya, the *Jñānavilāsa*.<sup>4</sup> Another is the author of the *Ratimanmathanāṭaka* and the *Śarabharājvilāsakāvya*, the latter composed in 1722.<sup>5</sup> Yet, another, the author of the *Anaṅgaviṇayabhāṇa* and the *Śṛṅgāratarāṅgiṇī*, is the son of Śrinivāsa Paṇḍita.<sup>6</sup> Some more Jagannāthas, Pandit Durgaprasad mentions with their works, as different from our author.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See the *Dara Shukoh*, p. 382 f.-n.

<sup>2</sup> *Catalogus Catalogorum*, p. 196. See also the introduction, pp. 41–44 of K. P. Trivedi's edition of the *Rekhāgaṇita*, Bombay Sanskrit Series, No. 61, 1901.

<sup>3</sup> *ibid.*, p. 195–6.

<sup>4</sup> *T. M. S. S. M. Library Sanskrit MSS. Catalogue*, Vol. VI, pp. 2758–60.

<sup>5</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. VIII, p. 3490–94.

<sup>6</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. VIII, pp. 3570–74.

<sup>7</sup> *Vide* introduction to R. G. f.-n. pp. 4 and 5.

At the end of the *Bhāminivilāsa*, Jagannātha refers to his *navīnavayas* (middle age about between 25 and 50) spent at the C. 1590–1665. Mughal court under the benevolent patronage of the Delhi emperor.<sup>1</sup> It is therefore reasonable to suppose that, before his visit to the Mughal court for patronage, he had finished his education and become a full-fledged scholar when he was twenty-five or thirty (*i.e.*) before 1620. So his early life may be between 1590 and 1620.

The second period may be between 1620 and 1650, during which period he enjoyed the patronage of Jahangir, Shah Jahan and Dara Shukoh.<sup>2</sup> His first introduction to the Mughal court in Jahangir's reign was, probably, before 1622 in which year Nur Jahan's undisputed sway came to a close. His *Āsaphvilāsa*, his verses lamenting the death of Asaf Khan<sup>3</sup> in 1641 and his reference to the royal patron as the emperor at Delhi<sup>4</sup> which became the Mughal capital only in 1648 suggest his stay at the Mughal court till 1648 or 1650. As an earliest manuscript of the *Citrāmīmāṃsākhaṇḍana*, a compilation from the *Rasagaṅgādhara*, gives 1652–3 as its date<sup>5</sup> and as all his poetical works (except the *Bhāminivilāsa*) are

<sup>1</sup> See ante p. 13.

<sup>2</sup> See ante p. 14.

<sup>3</sup> See ante p. 16. L. R. Vaidya says that he might have seen 'the latter end' (*sic*) of Jahangir's reign. See his introduction p. 10.

<sup>4</sup> दिल्लीवल्लभपाणिपल्लवतले नीतं नवीनं वयः ।

B. V. IV: V. 44 (L. R. V.'s edn.)

<sup>5</sup> See ante p. 17.

referred to in the *Rasagaṅgādhara*,<sup>1</sup> it may be said that he wrote almost all his works at the Mughal court. So his life at the Mughal court may be between 1650 and 1650.

The third and last period of Jagannātha's life may be between 1650 and 1665, during which period he had occasion to stay at the court of Prāṇanārāyaṇa, whose reign between 1633 and 1666 is said to be 'the golden age in the annals of Koch Bihar.'<sup>2</sup> His compilation of the panegyric, the *Prāṇābharaṇa*, bears testimony to the patronage he had received from Prāṇanārāyaṇa, King of Koch Bihar, a scholar and patron of Hindu culture,<sup>3</sup> with whom may be identified Jagannātha's Prāṇanārāyaṇa, the lord of Kamatā and Kāmarūpa.<sup>4</sup> No doubt, Prāṇanārāyaṇa was not the king of modern Kamrup, though he, at the breaking out of the Mughal war of succession in 1657, occupied for some time this region by defying the imperial authority.<sup>5</sup> But the Kāmarūpeśvara may be regarded

<sup>1</sup> Jagannātha's five *laharīs* are quoted in the R. G. p. 109—मन्त्रिमिताश्च पञ्च लहरी भवन् । [His *Sudhā-laharī* is quoted on pp. 20, 135 and 245; his *Karuṇālaharī*, on pp. 36, 98 and 484; his *Gaṅgālaharī*, on pp. 140, 204, 210, 243, 366, 386, 467, 468 and 512.] His *Yamunāvarṇanākhyāyikā* is quoted on pp. 19, 47, 128, 287 and 293.

<sup>2</sup> Vide S. N. Bhaṭṭācharya, *A History of Mughal North-east Frontier Policy*, p. 311.

<sup>3</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 253 and 255.

<sup>4</sup> See *ante* p. 17, f.-n. 3 and 4.

<sup>5</sup> Vide S. N. Bhaṭṭācharya, *A History of Mughal North-east Frontier Policy*, pp. 298-300.

as identical with the Kamateśvara.<sup>1</sup> Modern Kamrup is only a part of the medieval Kamatā and the ancient Kāmarūpa,<sup>2</sup> and Jagannātha, probably, eulogised his patron with his ancestral titles—Kāmarūpeśvara and Kamatādhipa. So 1665 may provisionally be regarded as the last year of Jagannātha's life.

Nāgeśabhaṭṭa, a commentator on the *Rasagaṅgādhara*, flourished under the patronage of Rāma, king of Śrīngiverapura.<sup>3</sup> He is said to have been invited by Jayasing, the king of Jayapur, to preside over the Aśvamedha (horse-sacrifice) performed by him in 1714; but Nāgeśabhaṭṭa refused the invitation on the ground that he had taken a vow to remain at Benares—  
'अहं क्षेत्रसन्यासं गृहीत्वा काश्यां स्थितोऽस्मि । अतस्तां परित्यज्याम्यत्र गन्तुं न शक्नोमि ।'<sup>4</sup> This story would place Nāgeśabhaṭṭa towards the close of the seventeenth century and the beginning of the eighteenth century.

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, p. 67 f.-n. .... 'the Kamarupa King,..... obviously a variant of *Kamateswara* or Lord of Kamatā.'

<sup>2</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 47-51.

<sup>3</sup> Vide Nāgeśa's introductory verse on his commentary on the R. G.—

याचकानां कल्पतरोररिकक्षुताशनात् ।

नागेशः शृङ्गिवेशरामतो लब्धजीविकः ॥


<sup>4</sup> Vide B. G. Bal's introduction to B. V. p. 3 and also Pt. Durgaprasad's introduction to R. G. p. 6.



This date of Nāgeśabhaṭṭa has the further support of his *guruparamparā*<sup>1</sup> according to scholars like Pandit Durgaprasad,<sup>2</sup> Mr. P. V. Kane,<sup>3</sup> Dr. S. K. Belvalkar<sup>4</sup> and Dr. S. K. De,<sup>5</sup> which allows an interval of two generations between him and Jagannātha. The date of Nāgeśabhaṭṭa does not therefore conflict with the period to which we have assigned Jagannātha Paṇḍita.

Thus Jagannātha, a South Indian by birth, spent the best part of his life in North India and by his merit rose to the highest position open to authors at the Mughal court. This striking success of Jagannātha in a Muslim environment was due to the patronage of Dara Shukoh, the favourite son of Shah Jahan and of Prāṇanārāyaṇa, the great king of Koch Bihar.

<sup>1</sup> The Guruparamparā is as follows:—



<sup>2</sup> Vide his introduction to R. G. p. 6.

<sup>3</sup> Vide his *History of Alankāra Literature*, p. 134.

<sup>4</sup> Vide his *Systems of Sanskrit Grammar*, p. 48.

<sup>5</sup> Vide his *History of Sanskrit Poetics*, Vol. I, p. 280 f.n. (1923).

## CHAPTER III

### As a Poet

JAGANNĀTHA Paṇḍita is not one of the greatest poets of India. He has not written and left to posterity any mahākāvya of the *Raghuvamśa* or the *Kirātārjunīya* type or any drama like the *Śakuntala* or the *Uttararāmacarita*. His poems are his minor works where he had not much scope either for weaving an intricate plot, or for the delineation of a great character or for the full development of a Rasa. But he is one of the great poets of the modern era. Most of his poems, especially his five *Laharīs*, abound in picturesque descriptions of nature. He is one of those who have revived the famous *Vaidarbhī* style of Kālidāsa, Daṇḍin and others, though he is an adept of other styles also. He is often given to verbal jugglery, yet his happy alliterations and suggestive figures of speech do not obscure the central ideas or the leading Rasas in his poetry. His simple yet majestic and forcible style, his mellifluous diction, his clear and pointed expressions, his weaving out poetry from Śāstraic ideas and above all, his wide and deep erudition coupled with his poetic imagination have won for him the position of a great poet in Sanskrit Literature.

All the *Laharīs* of Jagannātha exhibit his intense devotion to the Almighty. The chief suggestion of *bhāva*<sup>1</sup>—the *Īśvararati* or *bhakti* as it is called—would group these poems under the *uttama* or *uttamottama* variety

<sup>1</sup> vide R. G. p. 109—‘महिमिताय पद्म लहरीं भावय ।’

of *Kāvya* (poems *par excellence*), though there is no *rasadhvani* suggested therein. In addition to this *śhavadhvani* we see in these *Laharis* Jagannātha's poetic imagination at its best and he paints pictures of real interest with a tone of exaggeration characteristic of him and other poets.

Jagannātha's *Sudhālaharī*, a short lyrical *muktaka* poem of thirty stanzas in *Sragdharā*

1. *Sudhālaharī* metre, from which two are quoted in the extant *Rasagāṅgādhara*,<sup>1</sup> is full of brilliant descriptions of the Sun-god. All stanzas except the first contain the author's prayer to the Sun-god or to His rays. The first stanza—

उल्लासः फुल्लपङ्केरुहपटलपतन्मसतुष्यन्धवानाम्

निस्तारः शोकदावानलविकलहृदां कोकसीमन्तिनीनाम् ।

उत्पातस्तामसानामुपहतमहसां चक्षुषां पक्षपातः

सङ्घातः कोऽपि धाम्नामयमुदबगिरिमान्ततः प्रादुरासीत् ॥

which Jagannātha quotes in his *Rasagāṅgādhara* as an illustration of a variety of *madhyama kāvya* where *śabdacitra* and *arthacitra* are equally prominent, gives us a fine picture of the Rising Sun. The sudden rise of an extraordinary collection of luminous rays from the Udaya mountain; the humming bees' hope of enjoyment of the sweet honey in the newly blossomed lotus flowers; a happy termination of the heart-burning separation of the *Koka* birds in the night; a total disappearance of the all-pervading darkness and a sweeping change of the world from the invisible to the visible—such fine pictures painted in golden colour mark Jagannātha's poetry. He devotes twelve

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, verse 1, pp. 20 and 21; and p. 245; verse 5, p. 135.

- of the succeeding stanzas to the description of the Sun,<sup>1</sup> fourteen to that of His rays<sup>2</sup> and three to that of His lustre,<sup>3</sup> yet the leading ideas contained in all these are mostly the same.

The Sun or His rays are described as the friend of the lotuses;<sup>4</sup> the enemy of the lilies which are saved from total ruin by the moon;<sup>5</sup> the saviour of the *koka* birds;<sup>6</sup> the remover of the thick darkness which pervades all over the world;<sup>7</sup> the bestower of light on this universe;<sup>8</sup> the protector of the world;<sup>9</sup> the annihilator of all diseases including heart-ache, consumption and leprosy;<sup>10</sup> the destroyer of all kinds of sins;<sup>11</sup> the purifier; the child of fortune of the eastern quarter;<sup>12</sup> the *Kalpavṛkṣa* of devotees;<sup>13</sup> the all-pervading power;<sup>14</sup> the worshipper of *Śrī* in

<sup>1</sup> *Kāvyamālā* Series I, pp. 16-22. Verses 8, 11, 12, 14, 15, 18, 20, 21, 23, 25, 26 and 30.

<sup>2</sup> *ibid.*, verses 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 13, 17, 19, 22, 24, 27, 28 and 29.

<sup>3</sup> *ibid.*, verses 9, 10 and 16.

<sup>4</sup> *ibid.*, verses 1, 2, 3, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 23 and 28.

<sup>5</sup> *ibid.*, verses 1, 11, 15 and 36.

<sup>6</sup> *ibid.*, verses 1, 4 and 25.

<sup>7</sup> *ibid.*, verses 1, 2, 4 and 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 19, 20 and 25.

<sup>8</sup> *ibid.*, verses 1, 7, 12, 20 and 25.

<sup>9</sup> *ibid.*, verses 3, 4, 11, 16, 19, 23 and 27.

<sup>10</sup> *ibid.*, verses 3, 17, 22, 28 and 29.

<sup>11</sup> *ibid.*, verses 3, 11, 12, 19 and 22.

<sup>12</sup> *ibid.*, verse 12.

<sup>13</sup> *ibid.*, verse 3.

<sup>14</sup> *ibid.*, verse 4.

lotuses;<sup>1</sup> the possessor of red hue which is transmitted to others in contact with the Sun;<sup>2</sup> the ornament of the world;<sup>3</sup> the deity worshipped by all especially by the Brahmins every morning and evening;<sup>4</sup> the Supreme God whose manifestation is the whole circle of time (*Kalacakra*);<sup>5</sup> the enjoyer of rest in the ocean, leaving all responsibility to the Fire-God at sunset;<sup>6</sup> the life-giver of all who suffer from physical and mental inertia;<sup>7</sup> the father of two planets—Moon and Jupiter; a great lustre rising from the ocean;<sup>8</sup> the saviour of the vedic and other rituals; and the *akṣipuruṣa* described in the *Kāpyāśruti*.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, verse 6.

<sup>2</sup> *ibid.*, verse 24.

<sup>3</sup> *ibid.*, verses 12 and 19.

<sup>4</sup> *ibid.*, verses 11 and 15.

<sup>5</sup> *ibid.*, verse 21.

<sup>6</sup> *ibid.*, verses 9 and 23.

<sup>7</sup> *ibid.*, verses 9 and 18.

<sup>8</sup> *ibid.*, verse 10.

<sup>9</sup> *ibid.*, verse 30.

In this verse the Sun-God is described as the all-pervading force, the Upaniṣadic *akṣipuruṣa* whom the Vedas call *ut* since he is above all sins, whose eyes they describe as resembling red lotuses, whose joints are nothing but *ṛk* and *sāman* and whose body is full of golden hair.

ऊर्ध्वं पापाबलिभ्यः स्थित इति जगदे यस्य वेदैरुदाहृत्य

निन्युकेऽप्यासनार्थं (?) (निन्ये कप्यासनान्तं) स्रुतं सहचरतां नेत्रयोः  
पुण्डरीकम् ।

ओष्ठा (?) (गेष्णा) वृक्षसाम यस्य हुतकनकनिभश्मश्रुकेशाखिलाङ्गः

सोऽयं सर्वान्तरात्मा तद्बुद्धिस्तुतरां वासवेशः शिवानि ।

—Kāvya-mālā Series I, p. 21.

In stanza 26 the Sun is compared to the Kalpadruma (divine tree), whose basin is *śuddhabrahman*, whose wide boughs are the golden rays, whose sprouts are the shining red-hue, whose family of bees is the blue sky, whose ripe fruits are dharma, artha, kama and mokṣa<sup>1</sup>—such a Kalpadruma, Jagannātha fancies, is capable of bestowing on the world all the things desired by it.

This Lahari is a successful imitation of Mayūra's *Sūryaśataka* in that the former preserves the latter's brightness (*aujvalya*).<sup>2</sup> Many ideas such as

Compare the passages in the *Chāndogyaopaniṣad*, I-VI, 6-8—

अथ यदेवैतदादित्यस्य शुक्लं भाः सैव साय यन्नीलं परः कृष्णं यदम-  
स्तत्सामाथ य एषोऽन्तरादित्ये हिरण्यमयः पुरुषो दृश्यते हिरण्यश्मश्रुर्हिरण्यकेश  
आ प्रणखात्सर्व एव सुवर्णः ॥ ६ ॥

तस्य यथा कप्यासं पुण्डरीकमेवमक्षिणी तस्योदिति नाम स एव सर्वेभ्यः  
पाप्मभ्य उदितः उदेति ह वै सर्वेभ्यः पाप्मभ्यो य एव वेद ॥ ७ ॥

तस्यैव साम च गेष्णौ तस्मादुद्गीथस्तस्मात्स्वेवोद्गीतैतस्य हि गाता स एष  
ये चामुष्मात्पराश्चो लोकास्तेषां चेष्टे देवकामानां चेत्यधिदैवतम् ॥ ८ ॥

<sup>1</sup> शुद्धं ब्रह्मालवालं प्रकृतिशबलितं यस्य मूलं करास्त-

द्वाधिष्ठस्वर्णशाखा विकसदरुणिमा पल्लवानां विलासः ।

नीलं व्योमालिमाला सरसफलभरो धर्मकामार्थमोक्षाः

स श्रीमान्वाञ्छितार्थं वितरतु सततं सूर्यकल्पद्रुमो वः ॥

—Kāvya-mālā Series I, pp. 21 and 22.

<sup>2</sup> Compare verses in the *Sudhālahari* with those in the *Sūryaśataka*—

जीवातुर्जाज्यजालाधिकजनितरुजां तप्तजाम्बूनदाभम्

अङ्गालं जाङ्गिकानां जलधिजठरतो जृम्भमाणं अगत्याम् ।

जीवाधानं जनानां जनकमथ रुचो जीवजैवातुकादेः

उद्योतिर्जाज्यजमानं जलजहितकृतो जावतां वो जयाय ॥

Kāvya-mālā Series I. V. 18.

the 'destroyer of darkness', 'protector and purifier', 'possessor of red-hue', 'sole abode of splendour', 'bestower of beauty and life on lotuses', 'overlord of planets', etc., are in the *Sūryaśataka* and the *Sudhālaharī* conveyed with great emphasis.

Mayūra in the penultimate verse of his work mentions the chief attributes of the Sun-God with a note that, though the nature of the Sun-God cannot be exactly determined in all instances, He can be said always to be the bestower of good things on the world—

देवः किं बान्धवस्त्याग्रियसुहृदश्चाचार्य आहोस्त्रिदयो  
रक्षाचक्षुर्दीपो गुरुस्त जनको जीवितं बीजमोजः ।  
एवं निर्णीयते यः क इव न जगतां सर्वथा सर्वदासौ  
सर्वाकारोपकारी दिशतु दशशताभीषुरभ्यर्हितं वः ॥<sup>1</sup>

Mayūra's range of description is indeed wider and deeper. In addition to the description of the Sun, His rays and His disc, he devotes nearly 30 verses to His chariot, the seven horses and the charioteer

शीर्णघ्राणांघ्रिपाणीन्त्रणिभिरपघनैर्धर्धराव्यक्तधोषान्  
दीर्घाघ्रातानघौघैः पुनरपि घटयत्येक उल्लाघयन्त्यः ।  
घर्माशोस्तस्य वोऽन्तर्द्विगुणघनघृणानिघ्ननिर्विघ्नवृत्तेः  
दत्तार्घाः सिद्धसङ्घैर्विदधतु घृणयः शीघ्रमङ्गोविधातम् ॥

[Quackenbo's edition of the *Sanskrit Poems of Mayūra*, (Indo-Iranian Series, Vol. 9, 1917) p. 114]. In the former the repetition of consonants j, gh, etc., does not make it very difficult for recitation but in the latter the harsh and gurgling sound of gh, though it heightens the *ojo-guṇa*, makes it completely devoid of *prasāda*. (See *ibid.*, notes, pp. 115 and 116).

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, p. 224.

- Aruṇa.<sup>1</sup> Jagannātha is curiously silent on them.<sup>2</sup> Mayūra, it must be said, bases many of his descriptions on the mythological accounts<sup>3</sup> found in the *Purāṇas* and *Itihāsas*. But many of Jagannātha's verses in this *Laharī* are based on his rich observation also. His description of the Sun-God as the Upaniṣadic *akṣipuruṣa*,<sup>4</sup> his weaving out of a full metaphor of the *Sūrya-kalpadruma* and his portrayal of the rising Sun as the Supreme God and the only agent shedding the light of supreme knowledge, bespeak Jagannātha's ultimate leanings towards Advaita Philosophy.

In this *Laharī* Jagannātha has developed a particular style suitable to his theme. The Sun is a very bright and powerful deity with golden rays spread all over the world; and they are associated with three *guṇas* (poetic merits)—brightness (*kānti*), vigour (*ojas*) and clearness or lucidity (*prasāda*)—, and are couched in poetic expressions possessing these three *guṇas*. The constant employment of compounds and anuprāsas (alliterations) in each verse heightens particularly *ojas*; and the careful selection of expressions with clear meanings gives *prasāda* and the arrangement of sounds in a particular setting adds to *kānti*; these bear ample evidence to the maturity of the author's poetic art.

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, introduction, pp. 84 and 85. Whether Jagannātha, the commentator on the *Mayūraśataka*, is identical with our author is still a matter of uncertainty. *ibid.*, introduction, p. 7.

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, p. 31.

<sup>3</sup> Quackenbo's edition of the *Sanskrit Poems of Mayūra*, introduction, p. 86.

<sup>4</sup> See *ante*, p. 32 and foot-note (9).

*sataka*<sup>1</sup> which is mostly characterised by rigidity in expression and in structure. Mayūra's style abounds in *kānti* and *ojas* while Jagannātha's is a happy mixture of those two, the rigidity of which is often tempered by *prasāda* (lucidity and clearness).<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Sudhālaharī*, verse 3. <sup>2</sup> *ibid.*, verse 9.

<sup>3</sup> *ibid.*, verse 17. <sup>4</sup> ओजः कान्तिमती गौडीया । 1-2-12.

<sup>5</sup> Quackenbo's edition of the *Sanskrit Poems of Mayūra*, introduction, p. 89.

<sup>6</sup> *Vide the Rasagaṅgādhara*, p. 21—

‘अत्र वृत्त्यनुप्रासप्राचुर्यादोजोगुणप्रकाशकत्वाच्च शब्दस्य प्रसादगुणयोगादनन्तरमेवाधिगतस्य’ etc.,

Though this has been said in reference to the first verse of this *Laharī*, yet it is applicable to the whole poem. For the definitions of *ojas* and *prasāda*, see the *Gurumarmaparakāśikā*, p. 21.

*Kavya* into which the subtle beauties of nature are woven by the poet. One of the extracts given in the *Rasagaṅgādhara*—

यथा यमुनावर्णने— तनयमैनाकगवेषणलम्बीकृतजलधिजठरप्रविष्ट-  
हिमगिरिभुजायमानाया भगवत्या भागीरथ्यास्सखी ।<sup>3</sup>

—beautifully describes the confluence of the Jumna with the Ganges which again falls into the ocean and as such, looks like the mighty arm of the Himālaya stretched out into the depths of the sea in search of his son Mount Maināka. This description is truly pictorial and no painter could have given a different picture altogether.

<sup>1</sup> *Kāvyamālā* Series I (1886) pp. 99-101.

<sup>2</sup> *Rasagaṅgādhara*, pp. 19, 47, 128, 287 and 293.

<sup>3</sup> *ibid.*, p. 19.



To heighten the *ojo-guṇa* this *Laharī* abounds in *śabdālāṅkāras*, sometimes echoing the sense:—

त्रातामीवार्तलक्षाः प्रतिदिनविहितानेकगीर्वाणरक्षाः

भक्तानां कल्पवृक्षाः स्फुरदनलगतस्वर्णभासां सदक्षाः ।<sup>1</sup>

Here the last syllable of each phrase is repeated in rhythm.

सा नो भानोः प्रभा नो नयनसरणितो दूरतो जातु यातु ।<sup>2</sup>

Here there are repetition and variety.

गाहं गाहं गुहालीरगतिकगदितं गन्धमन्तो गदातिं

ग्लानिं ग्रामं ग्रसन्तां ग्रहरुचिगुरवो गोपतेर्गोविलासाः ।<sup>3</sup>

Here the first sound of each word is repeated.

The style (*rīti*) of this *Laharī* is *gaudī*, which is described by Vāmana,<sup>4</sup> as possessing the two *guṇas*—*ojas* and *kānti*; but it may not stand in full comparison with the *gaudī* style of Mayūra's *Sūrya-śataka*<sup>5</sup> which is mostly characterised by rigidity in expression and in structure. Mayūra's style abounds in *kānti* and *ojas* while Jagannātha's is a happy mixture of those two, the rigidity of which is often tempered by *prasāda* (lucidity and clearness).<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Sudhālaharī*, verse 3. <sup>2</sup> *ibid.*, verse 9.

<sup>3</sup> *ibid.*, verse 17. <sup>4</sup> ओजः कान्तिमती गौडीया । 1-2-12.

<sup>5</sup> Quackenbo's edition of the *Sanskrit Poems of Mayūra*, introduction, p. 89.

<sup>6</sup> *Vide* the *Rasagaṅgādhara*, p. 21—

‘अत्र वृत्त्यनुप्रासप्राचुर्यादौजोगुणप्रकाशकत्वाच्च शब्दस्य प्रसादगुणयोगादनन्तरमेवाधिगतस्य’ etc.

Though this has been said in reference to the first verse of this *Laharī*, yet it is applicable to the whole poem. For the definitions of *ojas* and *prasāda*, see the *Gurumarmaparakāśikā*, p. 21.

- The *Amṛtalaharī* is Jagannātha's another devotional poem<sup>1</sup> wherein the author extols the extraordinary virtues of the sacred river Jumna. It contains only ten stanzas of the *śārdūlavikrīḍita* metre and one śloka at the end, which is merely the author's colophon—

अयं पण्डितराजेन श्रीजगन्नाथशर्मणा ।

स्तवः कलिन्दनन्दिन्या निर्मलो निरमीयत ॥

We have heard of another work from the same pen on the Jumna called the *Yamunāvarṇanākhyāyikā*, of which nothing is known in detail except some stray passages quoted in the *Rasagaṅgādhara*.<sup>2</sup> As the whole work is not yet discovered, nothing can be definitely said about its character. As the title of the work is *Yamunāvarṇanākhyāyikā*, it may be affirmed that, unlike the five *Laharīs*, it is only a *gadya-kāvya* into which the subtle beauties of nature are woven by the poet. One of the extracts given in the *Rasagaṅgādhara*—

यथा यमुनावर्णने—तनयमैनाकगवेषणलम्बीकृतजलधिजठरप्रविष्ट-  
हिमगिरिभुजायमानाया भगवत्या भार्गीरथ्यास्सखी ।<sup>3</sup>

—beautifully describes the confluence of the Jumna with the Ganges which again falls into the ocean and as such, looks like the mighty arm of the Himālaya stretched out into the depths of the sea in search of his son Mount Maināka. This description is truly pictorial and no painter could have given a different picture altogether.

<sup>1</sup> *Kāvya-mālā* Series I (1886) pp. 99-101.

<sup>2</sup> *Rasagaṅgādhara*, pp. 19, 47, 128, 287 and 293.

<sup>3</sup> *ibid.*, p. 19.

The *Aṃṭalaharī* is, on the other hand, a small piece of devotional poetry where the poet surrenders himself to the sacred waters of the Jumna for the eternal purification of his soul. First he revels in the sight of the Kālindī, whose blue diamond-decked form would naturally remind all of Kṛṣṇa's lovely body which resembles the dark cloud in the sky.<sup>1</sup> The waters of the Jumna are naturally gifted with the immortal and wonderfully combined form of Hari and Hara by their blue external surface and by their bright interior full of precious gems.<sup>2</sup> They also possess the divine power of purifying the sinners and blessing them with choicest gifts even when they (the sinners) utter the name of Kālindī in a sportive tone; but how wonderful and miraculous would be the result when the people in contact with the sacred river are great devotees (like Jagannātha), who immerse themselves every day in her nectar-like water!<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Aṃṭalaharī*, *ibid.*, verse 1—

मातः ! पातकपातकारिणि ! तव प्रातः प्रयातस्तदम्  
यः कालिन्दि ! महेन्द्रनीलपटलस्निग्धां तनुं वीक्षते ।  
तस्यारोहति किं न धन्यजनुषः स्वान्तं नितान्तोल्लस-  
न्नीलाम्भोधरवृन्दवन्दितरुचिर्देवो रमावल्लभः ॥

<sup>2</sup> *ibid.*, verse 4—

अन्तर्माँक्तिकपुञ्जमञ्जिमवहिः स्निग्धेन्द्रनीलप्रभम्  
मातर्मे मुदमातनोतु करुणावत्या भवत्याः पयः ।  
यद्रूपद्वयधारणादिव नृणामाचूडमामज्जताम्  
तत्कालं तनुतेतरां हरिहराकारामुदारां तनुम् ॥

<sup>3</sup> *ibid.*, verse 6—

कालिन्दीति कदापि कौतुकवशात्त्वन्नामवर्णानिमा-  
न्यस्तानालपतां नृणां यदि करे खेलन्ति संसिद्धयः ।  
अन्तर्ध्वान्तकुलान्तकारिणि तव क्षिप्तामृते वारिणि  
स्नातानां पुनरन्वहं स महिमा केनाधुना वर्ण्यते ॥

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Again, Jagannātha, as a great devotee, expresses his wonder at the potency of the Jumna. How marvellous are the natural achievements of the waters of the Jumna when they work out by mere contact the purification of the worst sinners who commit the five *mahāpātakas*—stealing gold, etc.,—and thus render nugatory all śāstraic purificatory rituals (*prāyaścittas*) and also by elevating the sinners to Heaven root out the howling pride of the King of the Dead;<sup>1</sup> for, he has the unquestionable power of putting the sinners to many a severe torture! How inexpressible and inimitable is the power of the Jumna! on account of natural affection and great regard for her, the Lord of the Dead, her brother, bears the contempt and disrespect displayed by the dying person in her holy (sin-removing) waters; and for whose immeasurable, inborn affection, her father, the Sun-God, endures the unbearable pain caused by the sudden break of his disc, when the passing virtuous souls leave behind their mortal bodies and flee away to Heaven through the disc of the Sun (*Sūryamaṇḍala*)!<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, verse 7—

स्वर्णस्तेयपरानपेयरसिकान्पाथः कणास्ते यदि  
ब्रह्मघ्नान्गुरुतल्पगानपि परित्रातुं गृहीतव्रताः ।  
प्रायश्चित्तकुलैरलं तदधुना मातः परेताधिप-  
प्रौढाहङ्कृतिहारिहुंकृतिमुचामग्रे तव स्रोतसाम् ॥

<sup>2</sup> *ibid.*, verse 9—

मातर्वारिणि पापहारिणि तव प्राणप्रयाणोत्सवम्  
संप्राप्तेन कृतां नरेण सहतेऽवज्ञां कृतान्तोऽपि यत् ।  
यद्वा मण्डलभेदनादुदयिनीश्वण्डयुतिर्वेदना-  
श्वित्रं तत्र किमप्रमेयमहिमा प्रेमा यदौत्पत्तिकः ॥



To heighten the *ojo-guṇa* this *Laharī* abounds in *śabdālāṅkāras*, sometimes echoing the sense:—

त्रातामीवार्तलक्षाः प्रतिदिनविहितानेकगीर्वाणरक्षाः

भक्तानां कल्पवृक्षाः स्फुरदनलगतस्वर्णभासां सदक्षाः ।<sup>1</sup>

Here the last syllable of each phrase is repeated in rhythm.

सा नो भानोः प्रभा नो नयनसरणितो दूरतो जातु यातु ।<sup>2</sup>

Here there are repetition and variety.

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अयं पण्डितराजेन श्रीजगन्नाथशर्मणा ।

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We have heard of another work from the same pen on the Jumna called the *Yamunāvarṇanākhyāyikā*, of which nothing is known in detail except some stray passages quoted in the *Rasagaṅgādhara*.<sup>2</sup> As the whole work is not yet discovered, nothing can be definitely said about its character. As the title of the work is *Yamunāvarṇanākhyāyikā*, it may be affirmed that, unlike the five *Laharīs*, it is only a *gadya-kāvya* into which the subtle beauties of nature are woven by the poet. One of the extracts given in the *Rasagaṅgādhara*—

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हिमगिरिभुजायमानाया भगवत्या भार्गीरथ्यास्सखी ।<sup>3</sup>

—beautifully describes the confluence of the Jumna with the Ganges which again falls into the ocean and as such, looks like the mighty arm of the Himālaya stretched out into the depths of the sea in search of his son Mount Maināka. This description is truly pictorial and no painter could have given a different picture altogether.

<sup>1</sup> *Kāvya-mālā* Series I (1886) pp. 99–101.

<sup>2</sup> *Rasagaṅgādhara*, pp. 19, 47, 128, 287 and 293.

<sup>3</sup> *ibid.*, p. 19.



Above all

पायं पायमपायहारि जननि ! स्वादु त्वदीयं पयो  
नायं नायमनायनीमकृतिनो मूर्ति दशोः कैशवीम् ।  
स्मरं स्मारमपारपुण्यविभवं कृष्णेति वर्णद्वयं  
चारं चारमितस्तव तटे मुक्तो भवेयं कदा ॥<sup>1</sup>

—this pathetically poetic outburst, quite characteristic of Jagannātha, suggests his special reason for having settled in his last days on the banks of the Jumna. The very blue appearance of the river Kṛṣṇā which, though quite inaccessible to ordinary men, would in deep and unbroken meditation enable him to realise what is inviolable in nature—the Supreme Brahman—expressed as in a nut-shell in the syllables of the word *Kṛṣṇa*. That the Jumna was one of His close associates especially in His younger days when He was roaming through the Bṛndāvana along with cows and cowherds, would have naturally at the very sight of her given rise in Jagannātha's reflective mind to the deep devotion to his Lord. This kind of indirect reference to things to be described is one of the chief characteristics of Jagannātha's devotional lyrics which can as well be found in the first benedictory verse of the *Rasagaṅgādhara* (found also in his *Bhāminīvilāsa*)<sup>2</sup>—

‘स्मृतापि तरुणातपं करुणया हरन्ती नृणा-  
मभङ्गुरतनुत्विषां बलयिता शतैर्विद्युताम् ।  
कलिन्दगिरिनन्दिनीतटसुरदुमालम्बिनी  
मदीयमतिचुम्बिनी भवतु कापि कादम्बिनी ॥’

‘Let the wonderful line of clouds taking its stand on the divine trees on the banks of the Jumna, the daughter of

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, verse 8.

<sup>2</sup> *Śāntasamullāsa*, verse 3.

- Kalinda mountain; encircled by hundreds of lightnings of permanent lustre and removing the fresh troubles of men through compassion even when only remembered—be the object of my contemplation'; and in another verse found in the *Rasagaṅgādhara*<sup>1</sup> and the *Bhāminīvilāsa*<sup>2</sup>—

‘सन्त्येवास्मिन्नगति बहवः पक्षिणो रम्यरूपाः

तेषां मध्ये मम तु महती वासना चातकेषु ।

यैरध्यक्षैरथ निजसखं नीरजं स्मारयद्भिः

चित्तरूढं भवति किमपि ब्रह्म कृष्णाभिधानम् ॥’

‘There are many beautiful birds in this world; of them all I am greatly attached to the *cātaka*; for it is through him that, by being reminded of the cloud, his friend, the indescribable Brahman, which goes by the name *Kṛṣṇa*, finds its way into my mind.’ That the very sight of the *cātaka* bird reminds him of the row of clouds, the saviours of their life, which again calls to his mind the charming and lovely form of Lord Kṛṣṇa shows the wealth of his poetic fancy, as also his intense devotion to the commonly inaccessible feet of God. Finally he expresses his faith in the Jumna as capable of purifying all people from their sins if they, while immersing themselves every day in her water, worshipping her with the seven names—*Samjñākāntasūtā*, *Kṛtāntabhaginī*, *Śrī-Kṛṣṇa-nityapriyā*, *Pāponmūlinī*, *Puṇyadhātṛī*, *Yamunā* and *Kālindī*.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> p. 221. <sup>2</sup> *Śāntasamullāsa* verse, 11.

<sup>3</sup> *Amṛtalahari*, *ibid.*, verse 10.

संज्ञाकान्तसुते कृतान्तभगिनि श्रीकृष्णनित्यप्रिये

पापोन्मूलिनि पुण्यधात्रि यमुने कालिन्दि तुभ्यं नमः ।

एवं स्नानविधौ पठन्ति खलु ये नित्यं गृहीतव्रताः

तानामन्त्रितसंख्यजन्मजनितं पापं क्षणादुज्झति ॥

Jagannātha's *Lakṣmī-laharī*<sup>1</sup> is another devotional poem in praise of Lakṣmī, the Goddess of Wealth. It contains forty-one verses in the *Śikharīṇī* metre, of which one verse (with some alteration) has been quoted in the *Rasagaṅgādhara*.<sup>2</sup> In this *laharī* is described the lovely form of Lakṣmī from Her foot to head in a highly artistic diction. The first five verses describe the captivating power of Her *apāṅga* (eye-corner) by which She creates, protects and destroys the entire world. Her naturally reddish feet;<sup>3</sup> Her shining nails more overwhelming in splendour than even the nectar-rays of the moon;<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Kāvya-mālā Series II (1886), pp. 104-111.

<sup>2</sup> *Lakṣmī-laharī*, *ibid.*, verse 30—

अमृदप्रत्यूहः सकलहरिदुल्लासनविधि-  
विलीनो लोकानां स हि नयनतापोऽपि कमले ।  
तवास्मिन्पियूषं किरति वदने रम्यवदने  
कुतो हेतोश्चेतो विधुरयमुदेति स्म जलधेः ॥

This verse with some alteration is quoted in the *Rasagaṅgādhara*, p. 421 and also in the *Bhāminīvilāsa*, Śṛṅgārasamullāsa, verse 137 (Vaidya's edition)—

अमृदप्रत्यूहः कुसुमशरकोदण्डमहिमा  
विलीनो लोकानां सह नयनतापोऽपि तिमिरैः  
तवास्मिन्पियूषं किरति परितस्तन्वि वदने  
कुतो हेतोः श्वेतो विधुरयमुदेति प्रतिदिनम् ॥

<sup>3</sup> *Lakṣmī-laharī*, *ibid.*, verses 6-8 and 11.

<sup>4</sup> *ibid.*, verse 12.

Her fully decorated ankles;<sup>1</sup> Her thighs surpassing the trunks of elephants in softness and the golden plantain trees in lustre;<sup>2</sup> Her buttocks clad with an orange silk circled by a well-decked girdle that dims even the Sun-disc;<sup>3</sup> Her slender waist;<sup>4</sup> Her deep and round navel which is the great source of attraction for Hari's eyes;<sup>5</sup> Her full and symmetrical breasts;<sup>6</sup> Her lotus-like heart, the ocean of sympathy;<sup>7</sup> Her four hands surpassing the lotus-stalk in lustre,<sup>8</sup> with a lotus in one hand ready to bless the needy and afflicted;<sup>9</sup> Her garland, the source of accumulation of wealth and recreation for the eyes of Hari, the remedy for the sufferings of Her devotees and the destructive force of all worldly perils;<sup>10</sup> Her fingers of dazzling brightness;<sup>11</sup> Her neck surpassing Hari's conch in its beauty;<sup>12</sup> Her bright face always shedding ambrosia and brightening all quarters;<sup>13</sup> Her teeth shining with smile in the lotus-like face;<sup>14</sup> Her nose breathing out sweet fragrance surpassing even musk;<sup>15</sup> Her cheeks with falling curls possessing a pearl lace looking like a digit of the moon drawn up by a column of darkness;<sup>16</sup> Her bright eyes and penetrating looks capable of warding off the effects of chill penury;<sup>17</sup> Her ears ever busy in hearing the virtues of Lord Nārāyaṇa and the burning grievances of the suffering world;<sup>18</sup> Her pair of ear-rings (*tāṭaṅkas*) with red

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, verse 14.

<sup>2</sup> *ibid.*, verse 15.

<sup>3</sup> *ibid.*, verse 16.

<sup>4</sup> *ibid.*, verses 17 and 18.

<sup>5</sup> *ibid.*, verses 19 and 20.

<sup>6</sup> *ibid.*, verses 21 and 22.

<sup>7</sup> *ibid.*, verse 23.

<sup>8</sup> *ibid.*, verse 24.

<sup>9</sup> *ibid.*, verses 25 and 26.

<sup>10</sup> *ibid.*, verse 27.

<sup>11</sup> *ibid.*, verse 28.

<sup>12</sup> *ibid.*, verse 29.

<sup>13</sup> *ibid.*, verse 30.

<sup>14</sup> *ibid.*, verse 31.

<sup>15</sup> *ibid.*, verse 32.

<sup>16</sup> *ibid.*, verse 33.

<sup>17</sup> *ibid.*, verses 34 and 35.

<sup>18</sup> *ibid.*, verse 36.



dazzling splendour of the rising sun and bestowing power on Viṣṇu to protect the world at the time of deluge;<sup>1</sup> Her long diamond-decked lock of hair, looking like a thick row of dark clouds, the fragrance of which is coveted by bees;<sup>2</sup> Her two elephants on either side raising their trunks and pouring crystal water on Her body<sup>3</sup>—these portrayals in poetic lavishness and exaggeration naturally heighten Jagannātha's intense devotion and piety to the Goddess Lakṣmī.

Most of the verses in this *Laharī* contain Jagannātha's prayer to Lakṣmī to save him from peril, both temporal and spiritual. The last two verses express his sentiment that he is a helpless child in the hands of Lakṣmī to be looked after and fondled by Her soft hands.

In the tenth verse—

शरौ मायावीजौ हिमकरकलाक्रान्तशिरसौ  
विधायोर्ध्वं बिन्दुं स्फुरितमिति बीजं जलधिजे ।  
जपेद्यः स्वच्छन्दं स हि पुनरमन्दं गजघटा-  
मदभ्राम्यद्भृङ्गैर्मुखयति वेश्मानि विदुषाम् ॥

he describes, in the technical language of the Hindu Mantraśāstra, a *Lakṣmīmantra*—‘ॐ’ ‘श्री’—the constant and concentrated utterance of which will bring one immense wealth and great respect among the learned.

The style of this *Laharī* is simple and sublime in that each verse brings home to the readers the author's deep devotion to Lakṣmī, the Hindu Goddess of wealth and prosperity.

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, verse 37. <sup>2</sup> *ibid.*, verse 38. <sup>3</sup> *ibid.*, verse 39.

- The *Karuṇālaharī* and the *Gaṅgālaharī* are the best of Jagannātha's devotional lyrics.
4. The *Karuṇā Laharī* The *Karuṇālaharī*<sup>1</sup> or the *Viṣṇulaharī*<sup>2</sup> expressly indicates his sole reliance on the mercy of Viṣṇu, the protector of the world. The author's tone in this *Laharī* is one of elegant pathos which the poet has clothed in forty-three beautiful verses in the famous *Vīyoginī* metre.<sup>3</sup> The very opening stanzas,<sup>4</sup> twelve in *Vamśastha* metre, bear evidence to his utter disgust with the material enjoyments that are transitory and unreal. In this *Laharī* he looks for spiritual guidance from the all sympathetic and graceful visage of Lord Viṣṇu. His pathetic appeals to His mercy are realistic and very touching. His loud complaints against God exemplify

<sup>1</sup> *Kāvya-mālā Series II*, 1886, pp. 55-61.

<sup>2</sup> *ibid.*, p. 61 foot-note—

‘इमां वै विष्णुलहरीं जगन्नाथेन निर्मिताम् ।

यः पठेत्तस्य सर्वत्र जायन्ते जयसम्पदः ॥’—अयं फलश्रुतिश्लोकोऽप्यार्यमित्रपुस्तके वर्तते ।

<sup>3</sup> Three verses—16, 25 and 55 are quoted in the *Rasagaṅgādhara*, pp. 98, 387 and 510 respectively.

<sup>4</sup> The third verse is found in the R. G. p. 390. After the fifty-fifth verse there are five verses of which the first four are also found in the *Bhāminīvilāsa* (IV-5; IV-6; IV-8; IV-1) and the last one undoubtedly belongs to the *Karuṇālaharī*, though some editions of B. V. give it as the thirteenth verse of the *Śāntasamullāsa*. Cf. Jagannātha's remark in his R. G. p. 36—‘इदं च पद्यं (सुरस्रोतस्विन्याः . . . . . नवनभस्याम्बुदरुचिम्) मन्त्रिर्मितायां भगवद्भक्तिप्रधानायां करुणालहरीमुपनिबद्धमिति तत्प्रधान-भावप्राधान्यमेवाहति ।’

his great devotion to God Viṣṇu. To take liberties with God and accuse Him of refusing his request in spite of oft-repeated prayers and sacrifices, is one of the chief characteristics of all great devotees; and in this respect, Jagannātha can be regarded as one of the foremost. This fact comes out clearly from even a cursory glance of a few stanzas of this Laharī in *Vijoginī* metre—

‘अयि ! दीनतरं दयानिधे !  
दुरवस्थं सकलैस्समुज्झितम् ।  
अधुनापि न मां निभालयन्  
भजसे हा ! कथमश्मचित्ताम् ॥  
(Verse 13)

सुमहान्ति जगन्ति बिभ्रतः  
तव यो नाविरभून्मनागपि ।  
स कथं परमाप्तदेहिनां  
परमाणोर्मम धारणे श्रमः ॥  
(V. 14)

न धनं न च राज्यसंपदं  
न हि विद्यामिदमेकमर्थये ।  
मयि धेहि मनागपि प्रभो !  
करुणाभङ्गितरङ्गितां दशम् ॥  
(V. 16)

अयमत्यधमोऽपि निर्गुणो  
दयनीयो भवता दयानिधे !  
वसतां फणिनां विषानलं  
किमु नानन्दयिता हि चन्दनः ॥  
(V. 17)

अयि ! गर्तमुखे गतश्शिशुः  
पथिकेनापि निवार्यते जवात् ।  
जनकेन पतन्भवार्णवे  
न निवार्यो भवता कथं विभो ॥  
(V. 26)

अयि ! शैशवलालितः शिशुः  
प्रतिबुद्धो जनकेन ताड्यते ।  
न कदापि च लालितस्त्वया  
किमु ताड्यो भगवन् ! कुकर्मभिः ॥  
(V. 32)

अहमेव हि दोषदूषितो  
भगवंस्त्वा समुपालभे मुधा ।  
रमणीविरहज्वरज्वल-  
न्नमृतांशुं कुमतिर्विनिन्दति ॥  
(V. 33)

कटु जल्पनमल्पकस्य मे  
न हि ते कल्पयतु कुधं विभो !  
कुपितानुरवालभापितं  
किमु गृह्णन्ति मनाद्वाहाशयाः ॥  
(V. 35)

Just like a weeping child, Jagannātha resigns himself to divine mercy for the purification of his soul, raises his voice of prayer to the highest pitch and bursts out into his highly pathetic and emotional poetry until at last his voice falls down in the worship and meditation of God in his supremely divine form. He describes in a *kulaka* of fourteen verses the body of Viṣṇu, from head to foot, taking rest under the divine tree in the *Maṇimaṇḍapa* of the beautiful Bṛndāvana.<sup>1</sup> This divine form possesses a lovely lock of hair hanging from His crowned head decked with diamonds and peacock-feathers; a fore-head with round falling curls;<sup>2</sup> a face, like the autumn moon, with eyes resembling blossomed lotuses, with reddish lips and white teeth;<sup>3</sup> with ears having two diamond rings of dazzling splendour brightening the cheeks;<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Karuṇālaharī*, *ibid.*, verse 40.

<sup>2</sup> *ibid.*, verse 41.

<sup>3</sup> *ibid.*, verse 42.

<sup>4</sup> *ibid.*, verse 43.



a neck adorned with a garland of pearls and with a *vanamālā* extending to the feet with more brilliance than that of lightning; a chest, the seat of Lakṣmī, with unequalled brightness;<sup>1</sup> the lotus-hands with beautiful wristlets bent on elevating the down-trodden;<sup>2</sup> the diamond-ringed fingers ever engaged in playing on the flute and captivating the eager minds of the people;<sup>3</sup> a *lomarāji* (line of hair) sprung up from the deep navel that attracts the eyes of the damsels of the cowherds;<sup>4</sup> two thighs clad in yellow silk and two knees brightened by the lustre shooting forth from the anklets;<sup>5</sup> two ankles of highly attractive form;<sup>6</sup> two reddish soles with symbols of *kuliśa*, *ankuśa*, *kambu*, *ambuja*, *dhvaja*, *cakra*, etc.;<sup>7</sup> two feet capable of destroying all sufferings and beautiful by the lustre of the gems on the crowns of Brahman, Śiva and other Devas prostrating before Hari;<sup>8</sup>—such a lovely form of Hari, Jagannātha used to worship for his own eternal purification and ultimately for His choicest blessings.

‘द्वारं निर्वृत्तिसन्नो विजयते कृष्णेति वर्णद्वयम्’<sup>9</sup>

—To Jagannātha the true significance of the word *Kṛṣṇa* is that it is the gateway of the abode of salvation—the Supreme Bliss.

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, verses 44 and 45.

<sup>2</sup> *ibid.*, verse 46.

<sup>5</sup> *ibid.*, verse 49.

<sup>3</sup> *ibid.*, verse 47.

<sup>6</sup> *ibid.*, verse 50.

<sup>4</sup> *ibid.*, verse 48.

<sup>7</sup> *ibid.*, verse 51.

<sup>8</sup> *ibid.*, verse 52. Compare verses 40–52 with Vedānta Deśika’s *Devanāyakaṇḍaśat*, verses 16–48. All these verses contain a description of Viṣṇu’s body from head to foot.

<sup>9</sup> *ibid.*, verse 58 (fourth foot).

The style of this *Laharī* is very simple and many verses are reminiscent of Yāmunācārya’s *Śōtrarātna* in ideas and metre:—

निरासकस्यापि न तावदुत्सहे  
महेश ! हातुं तव पादपङ्कजम् ।

रूपा निरस्तोऽपि शिशुः स्तनन्धयः

न जानु मातुश्चरणौ जिहासति ॥

(Verse 26)

अपराधसहस्रभाजनं पतितं भीमभवार्णवोदरे ।

अगतिं शरणागतं हरे ! कृपया केवलमात्मसात्कुरु ॥ (V. 48)

तदहं त्वदृते न नाथवान् मदृते त्वं दयनीयवान्न च ।

विधिनिर्मितमेतमन्वयं भगवन् ! पालय मा स्म जीहपः ॥

(V. 51)

तव दास्यसुखैकसङ्गिनां भवनेष्वस्त्वपि कीटजन्म मे ।

इतरावसथेषु मा स्म भूदपि मे जन्म चतुर्मुखात्मना ॥<sup>1</sup>

(V. 55)

<sup>1</sup> Compare verses in the *Karuṇālaharī*—

विधीदता नाथ विषानलोपमे

विषादभूमौ भवसागरे विभो !

परं प्रतीकारमपश्यताधुना

मयायमात्मा भवते निवेदितः ॥

Verse 1 and verse 26 cited above, p. 46.

Also see verses 30 and 35—

पतितोऽप्यतिदुर्गतोऽपि स-

न्नकृतज्ञो निखिलागसां पदम् ।

भवदीय इतीरयस्त्वया

दयनीयस्त्रपयैव केवलम् ॥

प्रणिपत्य हरे ! भवन्तमद्वा !

विनिवद्धाञ्जलिरेकमेव याचे ।

जनुरस्तु कुले कृषीवलाना-

मपि गोविन्दपदारविन्दभावः ॥

Jagannātha's *Gaṅgā-laharī* or *Pīyūṣa-laharī*<sup>1</sup> is one of the most popular devotional poems in the domain of Sanskrit lyric poetry. It contains 52 verses<sup>2</sup> containing the author's prayer to Goddess Gaṅgā and one śloka at the end which contains a *phalaśruti*—

‘इमां पीयूषलहरीं जगन्नाथेन निर्मिताम् ।

यः पठेत्तस्य सर्वत्र जायन्ते सुखसम्पदः ॥’

It is recited by people in North India when they worship the Sacred Ganges. It is a traditional belief that Jagannātha, while helplessly sitting on the steps of the banks of the Ganges and reciting this *Laharī*, was washed off by the current rising step by step and śloka after śloka, and carried away to the God's abode.<sup>3</sup> Therefore tradition attributes this phenomenon to his supernatural power and believes that he took permanent shelter in the bosom of Goddess Ganges. It is beyond doubt that the pathetic and devotional element in this poem is boundless and beyond expression.

Many verses in this *Laharī* clearly express the author's helplessness at the hands of other deities and of all lords of the earth who are not accessible alike to him and other people.<sup>4</sup> Just like a child he surrenders to the Ganges from whom he demands sympathetic treatment when he is helpless, guidance

<sup>1</sup> Lucknow Printing Press, Huzrutgunj, 1898.

<sup>2</sup> Some more verses in praise of Gaṅgā (which are not found in the printed text of the *Gaṅgālaharī*) are quoted in the *Rasagaṅgādhara*: pp. 271, 484, 485, etc.

<sup>3</sup> Pandit Durgaprasad's edition of the *Rasagaṅgādhara*, introduction, pp. 1 and 2; Dr. Har Dutt Sarma's edition of the *Bhāminīvilāsa*, introduction, pp. 4 and 5.

<sup>4</sup> *Gaṅgālaharī*, *ibid.*, verses 4 and 19.

• to reach the holy regions when he falls a prey to great sins, cure when he is suffering from any ailment and supply of nectar when his heart is eternally thirsty.<sup>1</sup> To him and to his co-devotees the waters of the Ganges appear to be the crest of earthly splendour and power; the wonderful creation of Lord Khaṇḍa-parāśu, the great essence of all Revelations;<sup>2</sup> the living embodiment of all piety and purity;<sup>3</sup> the contributor to the deliciousness of the divine nectar;<sup>4</sup> the destroyer of the poverty and sins of the afflicted;<sup>5</sup> the exterminator of *Avidyā* (Ignorance) and its effects;<sup>6</sup> the off-spring of the lotus-feet of Viṣṇu, the Lord of Lakṣmī;<sup>7</sup> the permanent occupant of the matted hair of Śiva, the enemy of Cupid;<sup>8</sup> the deliverer of the world from all its sufferings;<sup>9</sup> an effective cure to the mental and physical deformities of mankind—ignorance, blindness, lameness, dumbness, etc.;<sup>10</sup> a perennial fountain of bliss surpassing even the *nirvāṇapada*;<sup>11</sup> the contributor to mental calmness and peace;<sup>12</sup> a great source of dharma; a means of accumulating imperishable wealth; the creator of new pleasures;<sup>13</sup> the support of the three worlds and of the whole

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, verse 24.

<sup>2</sup> *ibid.*, verse 1.

<sup>3</sup> *ibid.*, verses 1, 13 and 25.

<sup>4</sup> *ibid.*, verses 1 and 6.

<sup>5</sup> *ibid.*, verses 2, 5, 8, 13 and 26.

<sup>6</sup> *ibid.*, verses 2 and 18.

<sup>7</sup> *ibid.*, verse 21.

<sup>8</sup> *ibid.*, verses 3, 12, 14, 21, 22 and 27.

<sup>9</sup> *ibid.*, verse 25.

<sup>10</sup> *ibid.*, verse 15.

<sup>11</sup> *ibid.*, verse 6.

<sup>12</sup> *ibid.*, verses 8 and 18.

<sup>13</sup> *ibid.*, verse 18.



burden of *brāhmāṇḍa*;<sup>1</sup> a supreme deity accessible to all devotees and elevating them all alike to Heaven, though She is formless, eternal, inconceivable and inexpressible,<sup>2</sup>—such are the waters of the Ganges that Jagannātha had recourse to for the eternal purification of his soul.

As regards the literary worth of this *Laharī*, many stanzas are simple, graceful and full of vigour, and fifteen or more verses are quoted in the *Rasagāṅgādhara*,<sup>3</sup> of which one may be cited here—

‘कृतक्षुद्रावौघानथ सपदि सन्तसमनसः  
समुद्रर्तुं सन्ति त्रिभुवनतले तीर्थनिवहाः ।  
अपि प्रायश्चित्तप्रसरणपथातीतचरिता-  
न्नरानूरीकर्तुं त्वमिव जननि ! त्वं विजयसे ॥’<sup>4</sup>

‘There are in the three worlds many sacred waters to purify the ordinary sinners who begin to repent all at once; but to purify those whose actions are inexpressible, You, Oh Mother! are alone powerful.’

His boundless devotion can be noticed from his firm belief in the Ganges to bestow on him permanent happiness, both temporal and spiritual, as described in the verse—

‘कियन्तः सन्त्येके नियतमिह लोकार्थघटकाः  
परे पूतात्मानः कति च परलोकप्रणयिनः ।

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, verses 18 and 27. <sup>2</sup> *ibid.*, verses 10 and 11.

<sup>3</sup> *R. G.*—

Page	Verse	Page	Verse	Page	Verse	Page	Verse	Page	Verse
243	1	512	14	491	21	451	24	472	37
468	4	243	15	210	22	467	28	140	47
467	13	204	17	59	23	366	32	386	50

<sup>4</sup> *Gāṅgālaharī*, *ibid.*, verse 17. *R. G.* p. 204. ‘कृतक्षुद्रे-  
नस्कानथ’ is another reading.

सुखं शेते मातस्तव खलु कृपातः पुनरयम्  
जगन्नाथः शश्वत्त्वयि निहितलोकद्वयपरः ॥’<sup>1</sup>

‘There are many who have secured worldly benefits without fail, (through your grace); Many others are there who seek the spiritual path and have themselves purified (in your sacred waters); but here is Jagannātha who, Oh mother! rests in peace, leaving to you all his burdens of this and the other world’.

His faith in the Ganges as the only benefactor of the helpless can be understood from the verse—

‘अविश्रान्तं जन्मावधि सुकृतजन्मार्जनकृताम्  
सतां श्रेयः कर्तुं कति न कृतिनः सन्ति विबुधाः ।  
निरस्तालम्बानामकृतसुकृतानां तु भवतीं  
विनामुष्मिँल्लोके न परमवल्लोके हितकरम् ॥’<sup>2</sup>

‘There are many gods to bestow happiness on the virtuous in return for their deeds; but I do not see anybody except you to bless in the other world the helpless (like myself) who have done no good’.

His final wish to repose in the bosom of the Ganges is expressed in a tone full of pathos and devotion—

‘पयः पीत्वा मातस्तव सपदि यातः सहचरैः  
विमूढैः संरन्तुं कचिदपि न विश्रान्तिमगमम् ।  
इदानीमुत्सङ्गे मृदुपवनसञ्चारशिशिरे  
चिरादुन्निद्रं मां सद्यहृदये शायय चिरम् ॥’<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, verse 36.

<sup>2</sup> *ibid.*, verse 45.

<sup>3</sup> *ibid.*, verse 46.

'I had no mental rest anywhere, by merely drinking your water and enjoying the company of friends. Oh mother of sympathetic heart! allow me, sleepless so long, now to sleep on your lap which is cool by soft winds'.

The style of this Laharī is simple and majestic, and in it, as in the *Amṛtalaharī*, the poetic imagination soars on such a high plane that it creates many a charming picture of the water-element in Nature, clothed rather in an ornamented, handsome and fine garment.

Of the three panegyrics the *Jagadābharāṇa* may be said to be a eulogy of Shah Jahan and Dara Shukoh. P. M. Paranjape (b) Three Panegyrics: however conjectures, on the support of a manuscript reading of some verses and a colophon of the work, that it is a panegyric of the Rajput Prince Jagatsimha, son of Rāṇakṛṣṇasimha of Udaipur (the latter of whom died in 1628) and remarks that the title *Jagadābharāṇa* is suitable to Jagatsimha rather than to Dara Shukoh.<sup>1</sup> But what led Jagannātha to eulogise Jagatsimha in a poem is not known.

But many scholars are of opinion that the *Jagadābharāṇa*<sup>1</sup> is devoted to the praise exclusively of Dara Shukoh.<sup>2</sup> If the verses 'भूमीनाथ शहावदीन०', etc. and

<sup>1</sup> Paranjape's edition of the *Bhāminīvilāsa*, (Poona, 1895) introduction, p. XXV. f.-n.

<sup>2</sup> Pt. Durgaprasāda's edition of the *Rasagaṅgādhara*, introduction, p. 3; *Catalogus Catalogorum*, I. pp. 196 and 361; Dr. Qanungo's *Dara Shukoh*, pp. 418 and 419; Dr. Har Dutt Sarma's edition of the *Bhāminīvilāsa*, introduction, p. 10.

• 'माहात्म्यस्य परोऽवधिः . . . . दिल्लीधरावल्लभः', etc., are taken to be the verses of the *Jagadābharāṇa*, then the poem should be a eulogy of Shah Jahan and his son Dara Shukoh and not of the latter only.

Pandit Durgaprasad mentions a manuscript of the *Jagadābharāṇa* and says that the poem is identical with the *Prāṇābharāṇa* substituting the name Dārāśāha (Dara Shukoh) for Prāṇanārāyaṇa.<sup>1</sup> Th. Aufrecht also holds the same view.<sup>2</sup> But in the light of the evidence made available, no definite opinion can be pronounced on the alleged identity of the two poems in question. Moreover, Jagannātha composed many impromptu verses, as the need for illustration arose in the *Rasagaṅgādhara*;<sup>3</sup> and the very compilation of those verses into a casket of poetry with the title *Bhāminīvilāsa*<sup>4</sup> indicates the author's intention that posterity should not be left in the lurch in tracing out the sources of his verses. The *Bhāminīvilāsa* in four samullāsas does not contain many such verses found in the *Rasagaṅgādhara*. It is not therefore improbable that Jagannātha took from the *Jagadābharāṇa* those verses in the *Rasagaṅgādhara* that refer to a king in general and are not found in the *Prāṇābharāṇa*.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Rasagaṅgādhara*, *ibid.*, introduction, p. 3.

<sup>2</sup> *Catalogus Catalogorum*, pp. 196 and 391.

<sup>3</sup> *Vide* the *Rasagaṅgādhara*, introductory verse 6. निर्माय नूतनमुदाहरणानुरूप काव्यं मयात्र निहितं न परस्य किञ्चित् ।

<sup>4</sup> *Vide* the last verse—

दुर्दत्ता जारजन्मानो हरिष्यन्तीति शङ्कया ।

मदीयपद्यरत्नानां मञ्जूषया कृता मया ॥

<sup>5</sup> *Vide* the *Rasagaṅgādhara*, pp. 245 and 246—

विज्ञत्वं विदुषां गणे . . . देवत्वमेको भुवि ॥

p. 246— अविरल . . . त्वं सार्वभौमोऽसि ॥

p. 273— अर्थिनो दातुमेवेति . . . देवं जानते ॥ etc., etc.



Whether the *Jagadābharāṇa* is different from the *Prāṇābharāṇa* or not, it is, like the latter, a *muktaka* kāvya in that each verse is independent and is set in a fresh context. Three verses, of which one refers to the Delhi emperor in general, one to Shah Jahan and another to Dara Shukoh may be quoted here—

‘सुराणामारामादिह झगिति झन्झानिखुहताः

पतेयुः शाखीन्द्रा यदि तदखिलो नन्दति जनः ।

किमेभिर्वा कार्यं शिव शिव विवेकेन विकलै-

श्विरं जीवन्नास्तामधिधरणि दिल्लीनरपतिः ॥’<sup>1</sup>

‘If the Divine trees, uprooted by a storm, fall down from the celestial garden, the entire world would rejoice; but what good are these lifeless trees? May the Delhi emperor live long in this world!’

‘भूमीनाथ शहाबुद्दीन ! भवतस्तुल्यो गुणानां गणै-

रेतद्भूतभवप्रपञ्चविषये नास्तीति किं ब्रूमहे ।

धाता नूतनकारणैर्दधि पुनः सृष्टिं नवां भावये-

न्न स्यादेव तथापि तावकतुल्यलेशं दधानो नरः ॥’<sup>2</sup>

‘Oh King Shahabuddin! It goes without saying that there is none to equal you in virtue. Even if the Creator should create a new world afresh, there will be none comparable to you!’

‘माहात्म्यस्य परोऽवधिः निजगृहं गम्भीरतायाः पिता

रत्नानामहमेक एव भुवने को वाऽपरो मादशः ।

इत्येवं परिचिन्त्य मा स्म सहसा गर्वान्धकारं गमो

दुग्धाब्धे ! भवता समो विजयते दिल्लीधरावल्लभः ॥’<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Rasagāṅgādhara*, p. 421.

<sup>2</sup> *ibid.*, p. 210.

<sup>3</sup> *ibid.*, p. 496.

‘Oh milky ocean! do not be vain and conceited at the thought that you are the unique creation of God gifted with boundless greatness, depth of heart and many invaluable gems; for there is the emperor of Delhi, Dara Shukoh, to equal you.’

The three verses found in the extant *Prāṇābharāṇa*

(1) द्विनेल इव वासवः . . . . . जयति कामरूपेश्वरः ;<sup>1</sup>

(2) सृष्टिः सृष्टिकृता . . . . . विदितः श्रीकामरूपेश्वरः ;<sup>2</sup>

and (3) माहात्म्यस्य परोऽवधिः . . . . . विजयते श्रीप्राणनारायणः.<sup>3</sup>

are quoted in the *Rasagāṅgādhara* with the alterations

(1) जयति कोऽपि भूमीपतिः<sup>4</sup> (2) विदितो दिल्लीधरावल्लभः;<sup>5</sup>

and (3) विजयते दिल्लीधरावल्लभः.<sup>6</sup> Forty-eight<sup>7</sup> verses of

the former are given in the latter for illustrative

purposes without mentioning the source. All these

citations are in all probability from the *Jagadābharāṇa*,

if the *Prāṇābharāṇa* is merely an adaptation of some verses from the *Jagadābharāṇa*.

<sup>1</sup> *Kāvyamālā* edition, *ibid.*, verse 22.

<sup>4</sup> *Rasagāṅgādhara*, pp. 291 and 292.

<sup>2</sup> *ibid.*, verse 15.

<sup>5</sup> *ibid.*, p. 405.

<sup>3</sup> *ibid.*, verse 5.

<sup>6</sup> *ibid.*, p. 496.

<sup>7</sup> *R. G.*—

Verse	Page	Verse	Page	Verse	Page	Verse	Page	Verse	Page
4	56	12	475	21	275	33	183	43	351
„	405	13	48	22	291	34	313	44	321
5	496	„	378	23	274	35	211	45	319
6	498	14	305	24	234	„	354	46	273
7	367	15	405	25	234	36	312	47	234
8	378	16	479	26	409	37	277	48	275
„	417	17	265	27	306	38	358	49	184
„	490	18	135	28	498	39	318	50	499
9	453	„	179	29	358	40	233	51	444
10	417	19	212	30	349	41	449	53	216
11	328	20	216	31	351	42	321	...	...



The *Prāṇābharāṇa* containing fifty-three verses in diverse metres (as the *Kāvya-mālā* Series I goes),<sup>1</sup> is a eulogy of *Prāṇanārāyaṇa* who is referred to in this poem as *Kamatēśvara*<sup>2</sup> (or *Kamatādhīpa*) and *Kāmarūpeśvara*.<sup>3</sup> The first two stanzas indicate the poet's satisfaction in finding out a hero for eulogy who is regarded by him as above all the vices that spoil kings generally. In the succeeding verses he is described as a king of world-wide fame;<sup>4</sup> a seat of greatness and magnanimity and a mine of rare and invaluable qualities;<sup>5</sup> a living force to create terror among enemies;<sup>6</sup> an unrivalled knight whose valour surpasses even that of the Sun and as such is known in all quarters and in heaven;<sup>7</sup> the non-hurter of the innocent, except the Sun-god who suffers much when the dead enemies of *Prāṇanārāyaṇa* pass through His disc to heaven;<sup>8</sup> the remover of the world's adversity and the maker of its prosperity;<sup>9</sup> a living ornament of the earth;<sup>10</sup> the best of God's creations;<sup>11</sup> a great lover of learning, a good poet and a dialectician and a benevolent patron of poets;<sup>12</sup> a speaker of truth, a man of high reputation, righteous in action and god-fearing;<sup>13</sup> covetous of dharma<sup>14</sup> and the lover of *śatruśrī*;<sup>15</sup> and unkind only to enemies.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>1</sup> 1886, pp. 79-90.

<sup>2</sup> *ibid.*, verses 32 and 52.

<sup>3</sup> *ibid.*, verses 2, 15 and 22.

<sup>4</sup> *ibid.*, verses 6, 9, 37, 43 and 48.

<sup>5</sup> *ibid.*, verses 5 and 51.

<sup>6</sup> *ibid.*, verses 4, 17, 18, 20, 21, 26, 34, 38 and 39.

<sup>7</sup> *ibid.*, verses 8 and 15.

<sup>8</sup> *ibid.*, verse 10.

<sup>9</sup> *ibid.*, verses 9, 21, 23, 31 and 40.

<sup>10</sup> *ibid.*, verse 11.

<sup>11</sup> *ibid.*, verses 19 and 35.

<sup>12</sup> *ibid.*, verses 11, 16 and 23.

<sup>13</sup> *ibid.*, verses 21, 23 and 27.

<sup>14</sup> *ibid.*, verse 23.

<sup>15</sup> *ibid.*, verse 26.

<sup>16</sup> *ibid.*, verses 7, 17, 21, 23 and 29.

In the seventh verse—

आवध्नास्यलकात्रिरस्यसितमां चोलं रसाकाङ्क्षया

लङ्कायावशतां तनोपि कुरुषे जङ्गललाटक्षतम् ।

प्रत्यङ्गं परिमर्दनिर्दयमहो चेतः समालम्बसे

वामानां विषये नृपेन्द्र ! भवतः प्रागल्भ्यमत्यद्भुतम् ॥

Te

*Prāṇanārāyaṇa*'s invasion of the kingdoms—Alakā, Cola, Laṅkā, Lāṭa and Aṅga—is *indirectly* referred to; but the historicity of these conquests is extremely doubtful.

*Prāṇanārāyaṇa* is known from other sources as 'a worthy descendant of Nara Narayan' of the Koch dynasty. His long reign for 1633-56 'is memorable in the annals of Koch Bihar' for its having contributed 'prosperity and happiness' to the state and also for regaining its 'long-lost independence.' The Koch chronicles record that he was 'deeply religious, an unrivalled scholar, expert in music and dancing, a great builder of temples, roads and bridges, in short, a good and great ruler, capable and industrious, under whom there was all-round peace, prosperity and happiness.' He was a very popular king, a man of daring initiative, energy and ambition and well-versed in administration and not at all an "indolent voluptuary", as some historians call him. As a loyal vassal, he readily helped in person all Mughal campaigns against the Assamese and the chief of Kamrup; so his relation to the Mughals during the early part of his reign is characterised by 'peace, amity and good-will.'

For nearly twenty years until the Mughal War of Succession broke out, *Prāṇanārāyaṇa* was engaged in 'building activities and variegated cultural pursuits'. In 1657 he declared himself as an independent king of Koch Bihar by the non-payment of tribute to the Mughal emperor and he strove hard for territorial



expansion by occupying the 'long-lost Kamrup.' The Mughal *faujdar* could not successfully fight against the usurper; so he had to leave Kamrup to the free occupation of the two contending parties—the Kochs and the Ahoms. The Ahoms were stronger than the Kochs and the former drove away the latter from Kamrup. Thus Prāṇanārāyaṇa's dream to regain the long-lost Kamrup was dispelled.

To make matters worse, in 1659 the new Bengal viceroy, Mir Jumla, got the imperial orders 'to punish the lawless Zamindars of the province' and determined to capture first Koch Bihar with its king. The latter saw his helplessness and sent an envoy to the former, 'craving pardon for his disloyalty and open hostility.' But Mir Jumla, as a very strong man, wanted to avenge the insult by capturing him. So he imprisoned the envoy and marched with a mighty army to Koch Bihar. Prāṇanārāyaṇa fled to the Bhutan hills. Thus Koch Bihar fell into the hands of Mir Jumla without any opposition. He then demanded the Bhutan King to hand the fugitive over to him, but the Bhutan king did not yield. As Mir Jumla's cavalry could not march to Bhutan, he went on an expedition to attack the Ahoms, after making elaborate arrangements for a peaceful administration of Koch Bihar under a separate *faujdar*. Thus the Koch Bihar campaign and its administration by Mir Jumla was a great 'military success', yet its political results were short-lived. Some changes in the land-assessment were however introduced by the Mughal officers against whom the people of Koch Bihar rose in rebellion, as a sign of protest. Mir Jumla was absent in Assam, and so he could not help the Mughal officer in Koch Bihar who was thus forced to leave that place immediately.

Prāṇanārāyaṇa returned to his capital and once more became an independent king of Koch Bihar in 1661. Mir Jumla died in 1663. This was welcomed by Prāṇanārāyaṇa, but in 1644 his successor Shaista Khan came to complete the campaign of Koch Bihar started by Mir Jumla. Prāṇanārāyaṇa had then to prefer his submission to the Mughal viceroy to another Mughal invasion, owing to his ill-health and internal troubles. He also offered to pay a sum of five and a half lakhs as war-indemnity in a few instalments. These terms were accepted by the Mughal viceroy; and all the Mughal forces were withdrawn from Koch Bihar when two money-payments were made. This settled Koch Bihar's position as a Mughal vassal state. Prāṇanārāyaṇa died in 1666.

Whatever might be the final result of Prāṇanārāyaṇa's ambitious plans against the Mughals and Ahoms, his name deserves honourable mention in the history of Koch Bihar. In the whole line of Koch kings, Naranārāyan and Prāṇanārāyaṇa are the two names worth-mentioning as great kings; and both from the standpoint of internal development as well as foreign relation, Prāṇanārāyaṇa's reign was regarded as the 'golden age in the annals of Koch Bihar.'<sup>1</sup>

Thus Prāṇanārāyaṇa's grand achievements explain Jagannātha's extravagant eulogy of his royal patron, Prāṇanārāyaṇa, as an extraordinary monarch comparable only to a divine or semi-divine being, not tainted by an iota of sin or vice.

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<sup>1</sup> S. N. Bhaṭṭācārya, *A History of Mughal North-east Frontier Policy*, 1929, pp. 253, 255; 299-311.



Of the *Āsaphavilāsākhya*, only its introductory passage<sup>1</sup> and two verses<sup>2</sup> are known. From them it is understood that Jagannātha enjoyed the patronage of Asaf Khan, the very influential official during the reigns of Jahangir and Shah Jahan and that he won the title of *Paṇḍitarāja* from Shah Jahan in recognition of his greatness as a man of letters; that he wrote the *Āsaphavilāsa* at the instance of one Rāyamukunda of Mathurā (of whom nothing is known), that he found in Asaf Khan not only a benevolent patron but also a man of many noble and lovable qualities and that Āsaf Khan's death was a fatal blow to him, which he records in most pathetic poetry.

A few passages of the *Āsaphavilāsa*<sup>3</sup> and the *Yamunāvarṇanākhya*<sup>4</sup> make it clear that his prose is generally characterised by lucidity (*prasāda*), though at times obscured by long compounds with overwhelming alliterations and other figures of speech.

<sup>1</sup> See *ante*, p. 15, f.-n. 3.

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, p. 16.

<sup>3</sup> Vide the *Rasagaṅgādhara*, *ibid.*, p. 312—

प्रतिखुरनिकरशिलातलसङ्घट्टसमुच्छलद्विचुद्वल्लीकृतविस्फुल्लिच्छटापटलानां  
वाजिनाम् ॥ This passage is in all probability from the *Āsaphavilāsa*.

<sup>4</sup> Vide *ibid.*, pp. 19 and 287—यथा यमुनावर्णने—तनय-  
मैनाक०—see *ante*, p. 37; p. 47—यथा मन्निर्मितायामाख्या-  
यिकायां कण्वाश्रमगतस्य श्वेतकेतोर्महर्षेः शान्तिरसप्रधाने वर्णने प्रस्तुते ।  
'किमिदमनाकलितपूर्वरूपम्, कोऽयमानर्वाच्यो वचनरचनाया महिमा';  
p. 128—यथा यमुनावर्णने—रविकुलप्रीतिमावहन्ती न रविकुलप्रीति-  
मावहति । अवारितप्रवाहा सुवारितप्रवाहा; p. 293—'महागुरुकलिन्दमही-  
धरोदरविदारणाविर्भवन्महापातकावलिबलनादिव श्यामलिता' ॥

His style is far inferior to that of Bāṇabhaṭṭa, the father of prose literature in Classical Sanskrit.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bāṇabhaṭṭa flourished in an age when the Sanskrit language was growing rapidly in various aspects—poetry, prose and drama. Kālidāsa, Bhāravi and other poets enriched both the content and style of Sanskrit poetry. Subandhu, the author of the *Vāsavadattā*, by his contribution to prose literature in Sanskrit, won an unequalled reputation as a writer of paronomastic prose. Kālidāsa and King Harṣa (the patron of Bāṇabhaṭṭa) were already shining stars in the firmament of Sanskrit Drama. And Bāṇabhaṭṭa found it very difficult to hold his banner up as a poet and he turned all his attention towards prose-writing, which is highly praised by all critics—गद्यं कवीनां निकषं वदन्ति—prose is the touch-stone of poets. Prose-writing was made by him an art to be constantly practised only by master-hands and we see in each section of the *Kādambarī*, especially in the *Pūrvabhāga*, masterly descriptions of the *Vindhyaṭṭavī* and such other wild but beautiful features of Nature. The *Mahāśvetā* episode and the *Śakanāsopadeśa* are master-pieces in the *Kādambarī*. In spite of the natural flow and grace of his style, he made the art of prose-writing in Sanskrit very difficult and even formidable by the introduction of certain rules or conventions in the choice of words, phrases and constructions also. His master-genius has established for himself once for all a unique name as the greatest prose-writer in Sanskrit. The over-study and the over-popularity of his historical romance the *Harṣacarita* and of his less artificial *Kādambarī* created many authors in later era to sedulously ape him. One of the partially successful attempts we find



Another well-known work of Jagannātha is the *Bhāminīvilāsa* which, Nāgeśabhaṭṭa says, (c) *Bhāminīvilāsa*. the poet composed specially before he wrote the *Rasagaṅgādhara* in order to provide illustrations for that work.<sup>1</sup> This view, however, is not correct. The fact of the matter seems to be that Jagannātha made impromptu verses as the need for illustration arose in writing his

in Vāmanabhaṭṭabāṇa's *Vemabhūpālacarita* and after that, no author is found forthcoming with enough courage and conviction either to successfully imitate him or to beat him. When this was the state of Sanskrit prose after 700 A.D., writers like Trivikramabhaṭṭa of tenth century, the author of the *Nalacampū* and king Bhoja of Dhar of about eleventh century developed the Campū with prose and poetry, which is one of the most popular kinds of literature in Sanskrit. Though the style of the ākhyāyikā or kathā systematised by Bāṇabhaṭṭa was the ideal in the view of these later writers, their over-enthusiasm to imitate Bāṇa and Subandhu in introducing *double entendres*, etc., has only marred the beauty of the style in which they are supposed to be masters.

Thus it is no wonder that Jagannātha Paṇḍita, an author of the seventeenth century, was not successful in writing his historical romance '*Āsaphavilāsa*', on the model of Bāṇabhaṭṭa's *Harṣacarita*. As far as one can see from the few passages of the *Āsaphavilāsa* which are now available, the prose-style adopted in this work should be said to have suffered from unduly long compounds, overwhelming alliterations and forced figures of speech.

<sup>1</sup> See *ante*, p. 55, f.-n. 3.

*Rasagaṅgādhara*. Afterwards he collected them, lest they should be plagiarised—

दुर्वृत्ता जारजन्मानो हरिष्यन्तीति शङ्कया ।  
मदीयपद्यरत्नानां मञ्जूषेयं कृतिर्मम ॥<sup>1</sup>

It is not clear whether this work relates to any particular lady.

S. M. Paranjape advances a different theory:<sup>2</sup>

(a) the original of the *Bhāminīvilāsa* contains many verses (in all Samullāsas) which are not found in the *Rasagaṅgādhara* and are in all probability composed long before the *Rasagaṅgādhara*; (b) except three verses found in the *Rasagaṅgādhara*, all verses in the *Karuṇasamullāsa* might have originally been written by the poet, long before the composition of the *Rasagaṅgādhara*, to bemoan the death of his *bhāminī* (probably his wife) and not for the illustrative purpose in the *Rasagaṅgādhara* and the verses in the *Śṛṅgārasamullāsa* might have consequently been composed long before the verses in the *Karuṇasamullāsa* to describe the various aspects of his love with the *bhāminī* before her death, and (c) the improptu verses written by the poet for the illustrative purpose in the *Rasagaṅgādhara* might have been later on incorporated by himself into the text of the *Bhāminīvilāsa*. But since the extent of the *Rasagaṅgādhara* is not definitely known (*i. e.*) whether Jagannātha has left it unfinished in the middle of *uttarālaṅkāra*, as the printed text shows, or whether he has continued it, nothing can be decisively said about the correctness of this theory.

<sup>1</sup> See *ante*, p. 55, f.-n. 4.

<sup>2</sup> See his edition of the *Bhāminīvilāsa* (1895), introduction, pp. III-XII.



The poem is divided into four parts—*anyokti* or *prāstāvika*, *śṛṅgāra*, *karuṇa* and *śānta* samullāsas. There is some disagreement in its various editions with regard to the number of verses in each samullāsa, as the following table will show—<sup>1</sup>

EDITIONS	Anyo- kti or Prās- tāvika	Śrī- gāra	Karu- ṇa	Śānta	Total No. of verses
M. A. Bergaigne's edition, Paris, 1872	127	182	19	46	374
Prof. Taranatha's edition, Calcutta, 1872	126	102	18	46	292
L. R. Vaidya's edi- tion, Bombay, 1887 and	129	183	19	45	376
Mr. Seshadri's edi- tion, (no date)					
S. M. Paranjape's edition, Poona, 1895.	101	102	19	33	255
B. G. Bal's edition, Bombay, 1895.	101	101	19	33	254
Nirnaya Sagara edi- tion, Bombay, Third edn., 1933.	101	102	19	32	254
Dr. Har Dutt Sar- ma's edition, Poona, 1935.	101			33	

<sup>1</sup> See L. R. Vaidya's edition of the *Bhāminīvilāsa*, preface, p. 2. B. G. Bal in his edition gives in addition to 101 verses of the *anyoktisamullāsa*, one verse between the twentieth and twenty-first verses, three verses between the seventy-fourth and seventy-fifth, one verse between the eightieth and eighty-first and twenty-three verses at the end; in the *Śṛṅgāra-samullāsa*, three verses are given as *prakṣiptas* just

- The *Bhāminīvilāsa* is, as said above, a collection of the illustrative verses in the *Rasagaṅgādhara* not found in any one of Jagannātha's well-known poetical works; yet there are many verses more in the latter that cannot be traced in any of his works.

The *anyoktisamullāsa* contains 101 or more verses many of which are *anyāpadeśas* describing something non-contextual that would lead to the happy suggestion of some contextual idea. This kind of literature is found very popular in India from ancient times; and the most popular *anyāpadeśas* date from the time of Bhallaṭa<sup>1</sup> whose *śataka* is one of the best of its kind. The didactic motif behind these verses is brought to light by the figures like *aprasutapraśamsā*. The oft-quoted verse from the *Bhallaṭaśataka*—

‘परार्थे यः पीडामनुभवति भङ्गेऽपि मधुरो  
यदीयः सर्वेषामिह खलु विकारोऽप्यभिसृतः ।  
न संप्रसो वृद्धि यदि स भृशमक्षेत्रपतितः  
किमिदोर्दोपोऽसौ न पुनरगुणाया मरुभुवः ॥’<sup>2</sup>

describes a sugar-cane in a desert. It undergoes

before the seventy-fourth, sixty verses (as *prakṣiptas*) just before the seventy-fifth and one verse just before the ninety-fifth; in the *Śāntasamullāsa* are given five verses as *prakṣiptas* after the fourth, one stanza after the sixth, four stanzas after the fifteenth and one stanza after the thirtieth, the last *prakṣipta* being found as the opening stanza in the *Kāvyamālā* edition of the *Prāṇābharaṇa*. S. M. Paranjape also gives in his edition an appendix of verses—twenty-one for *Vilāsa* I, seventy-nine for *Vilāsa* II and eleven for *Vilāsa* IV.

<sup>1</sup> For his date and other details see Dr. A. B. Keith's *A History of Sanskrit Literature*, 1928, pp. 231 and 232.

<sup>2</sup> *Kāvyamālā* Series IV, verse 56.

many kinds of sufferings for the good of others; it is sweet when cut to pieces; any transformation of it is welcome to people; if it does not grow in a desert, is it its fault and not of the infertile field? This suggests the idea that a great, noble and selfless man will be always of service to others, and that if he does not thrive in a bad environment, it is not his fault.

In this Samullāsa are found many verses of *anyāpadeśa*. The second verse<sup>1</sup>

पुरा सरसि मानसे विकचसारसालिस्खल-  
त्परागसुरभीकृते पयसि यस्य यातं वयः ।  
स पल्लवतलेऽधुना मिलदनेकभेकाकुले  
मरालकुलनायकः कथय रे कथं वर्तताम् ॥

describes a king-swan who was destined to live in a dirty lake full of frogs, after having enjoyed many years in the Mānasa lake the water of which would be fragrant with the dust of the newly-blossomed lotuses. This is full of pathos and suggests the troubles suffered by fallen nobility.

That one, even at the time of adversity, should not desert one's sole dependent is suggested by the request of a person to a lake not to forsake the fish that ever depends upon it in the times of prosperity and adversity. In times of prosperity (*i.e.*), when the lake was full to its brim, many birds and bees were living in it, and they all left it when it became dry; but the fish had to remain in the muddy soil inside the lake even in summer.

<sup>1</sup> The number here is given according to Nirnaya Sagara edition.

‘आपेदिरेऽम्बरपथं परितः पतङ्गा  
भृङ्गा रसालमुकुलानि समाश्रयन्ति ।  
सङ्कोचमञ्चति सरस्वयि दीनदीनो  
मीनो नु हन्त ! कतमां गतिमभ्युपैतु ॥’<sup>1</sup>

That charity should not be shown to undeserving persons is suggested in the verse—

द्वदहनजटालज्वालजालाहतानां  
परिगलितलतानां म्लायतां भूरुहाणाम् ।  
अयि ! जलधर ! शैलश्रेणिशृङ्गेषु तोयं  
वितरसि बहु कोऽयं श्रीमदस्तावकीनः ॥<sup>2</sup>

The poet condemns the vanity of the cloud which showers in plenty on the tops of mountains and not on the trees and creepers which are actually burnt away by forest-fire.

Many verses explain rules of conduct and maxims of truth, without any *anyāpadeśa*. The verse—

परार्थव्यासङ्गादुपजहदथ स्वार्थपरता-  
मभेदैकत्वं यो वहति गुणभूतेषु सततम् ।  
स्वभावाद्यस्यान्तः स्फुरति ललितो दातृमहिमा  
समर्थो यो नित्यं स जयति तत्रां कोऽपि पुरुषः ॥<sup>3</sup>

explains the character of the ideal man who will always be bent upon doing good to others, even neglecting his own work, maintains equality among all and extends charity to the needy. This verse echoes

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, I, verse 16.

<sup>2</sup> *ibid.*, I, 34.

<sup>3</sup> *ibid.*, I, 74.



the idea expressed by Bhartṛhari in the first foot of his verse—

एते सत्पुरुषाः परार्थवदकाः स्वार्थान्परित्यज्य ये<sup>1</sup>

That a wicked man, though well-versed in Vedantic lore, never becomes virtuous is explained by the verse—

निष्णातोऽपि च वेदान्ते साधुत्वं नैति दुर्जनः ।  
चिरं जलनिधौ मज्जो मैनाक इव मर्दवम् ॥<sup>2</sup>

This verse is reminiscent of Bhartṛhari's verse—

दुर्जनः परिहर्तव्यो विद्ययालङ्कृतोऽपि सन् ।  
मणिना भूषितः सर्पः किमसौ न भयङ्करः ॥<sup>3</sup>

Equally reminiscent is the verse—

हालाहलं खलु पिपासति कौतुकेन  
कालानलं परिपुञ्चिष्यति प्रकामम् ।  
व्यालाधिपं च यतते परिरब्धुमन्दा  
यो दुर्जनं वशयितुं तनुते मनीषाम् ॥<sup>4</sup>

of Bhartṛhari's verses in the Mūrkhapaddhati like the following—

प्रसह्य मणिमुद्धरेन्मकरवक्त्रदंष्ट्रान्तरा-  
त्समुद्रमपि सन्तरेत्प्रचलदूर्भिमालाकुलम् ।  
भुजङ्गमपि कोपितं शिरसि पुष्पवद्धारये-  
न्न तु प्रतिनिविष्टमूर्खजनचित्तमाराधयेत् ॥<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Subhāṣitatriṣatī*, Nitiśataka, verse 64.

<sup>2</sup> *Bhāminīvilāsa*, Nirṇaya Sagara edition, *ibid.*, I, verse 82.

<sup>3</sup> *Subhāṣitatriṣatī*, *ibid.*, verse 42.

<sup>4</sup> *Bhāminīvilāsa*, *ibid.*, I, 90.

<sup>5</sup> *Subhāṣitatriṣatī*, *ibid.*, verse 3. For other parallels see *ibid.*, verses 4 and 5.

\* So also the three verses 48, 49 and 101<sup>1</sup> explain the same idea contained in the three verses of Bhartṛhari's *Nitiśataka*—21, 22 and 30, that mighty beings like the lion, even though they suffer much, do not attack anybody unequal to them and that it is but natural that they face their foes bravely whenever they find an opportunity. These parallels in the earlier authors do not much diminish Jagannātha's poetic capacity; novel turns in expression and in setting (*saṅghaṭanā*) give no doubt a special charm to his poetry.

Again, the verse—

गीर्भिर्गुरुणां परुषाक्षराभि-  
स्तिरस्कृता यान्ति नरा महत्त्वम् ।  
(अलब्धशाणोत्कपणा नृपाणां  
न जातु मौलौ मणयो वसन्ति ॥)<sup>2</sup>

expresses the poet's confidence that even the harsh words of elderly people (or patrons) would result in

<sup>1</sup> जठरज्वलनज्वलता-

प्यपगतशङ्कं समागतापि पुरः ।

करिणामरिणा हरिणा

हरिणाली हन्यतां नु कथम् ॥

(Verse 48)

येन भिन्नकरिकुम्भविस्खल-

न्मौक्तिकावलिभिरश्विता मही ।

अथ तेन हरिणान्तिके कथं

कथ्यतां नु हरिणा पराक्रमः ॥

(V. 49)

गर्जितमाकर्ण्य मनागङ्ग मातुर्निशार्धजातोऽपि ।

हरिशिशुरुत्पतितुं द्रागङ्गान्याकुञ्च्य लीयतेऽतिभृशम् ॥ (V. 101)

<sup>2</sup> *Bhāminīvilāsa*, *ibid.*, 71.



one's prosperity and renown; and the verse containing the line—

‘पिशुनजनं च विभर्ति यत्क्षितीन्द्रः’<sup>1</sup>

contains the poet's warning to kings who are surrounded only by tale-bearers.

The *Śṛṅgārasamullāsa* also contains more than 100 verses, all dealing with various phases of śṛṅgāra. The first fifteen verses describe the nāyaka's eager admiration of the beauty of his love; he portrays her as his very life and her limbs as very charming and attractive. When he meets her, he is rather vexed to see his love attending on her elders;<sup>2</sup> and when she is alone, his unreserved action is remonstrated by her;<sup>3</sup> but he turns her round in his favour through her companions.<sup>4</sup> When she has found signs of his love-intrigue with some other woman, she casts down her face in great indignation and dejection.<sup>5</sup> His position becomes precarious. All his learning did not rescue him at this juncture.<sup>6</sup> All her companion's persuasions to convert her have not borne any desirable fruit.<sup>7</sup> The separation purifies their love and effects reunion. Both the nāyaka and nāyikā, while advanced in their age and experience, realise their life-long responsibility and they behave as counterparts to each other.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, I, 72 (the last foot).

<sup>2</sup> *ibid.*, II, 18.

<sup>3</sup> *ibid.*, II, 19.

<sup>4</sup> *ibid.*, II, 20-22.

<sup>5</sup> *ibid.*, II, 30.

<sup>6</sup> *ibid.*, II, 33 and 38.

<sup>7</sup> *ibid.*, II, 52 and 54.

<sup>8</sup> *ibid.*, II, 48.

Love in separation is also described in various ways. The conduct of a *mugdhā* portrayed in the verse—

वाचो माङ्गलिकीः प्रयाणसमये जल्पत्यनल्पं जने

केलीमन्दिरमारुतायनमुखे विन्यस्तवक्त्राम्बुजम् ।

निःश्वासग्लपिताधरं परिपतद्वाष्पाद्द्रवक्षोरुहा

बाला लोलविलोचना शिव शिव प्राणेशमालोकेते ॥<sup>1</sup>

is very touching. Her tender age and over-modesty prevented her from exchanging words when parting from her husband, when all other relatives bade farewell to him. She only looked at him through a window with eager eyes, in the midst of sobs and tears. The verse—

पाटीरद्रुमुजङ्गपुङ्गवमुखायाता इवातापिनो

वाता यान्ति दहन्ति लोचनममी ताम्रा रसालद्रुमाः ।

एते हन्त किरन्ति कूजितमयं हालाहलं कोकिला

बाला बालमृणालकोमलतनुः प्राणान्कथं रक्षतु ॥<sup>2</sup>

describes the sad condition of a nāyikā in separation which becomes unbearable to her by the breeze blowing from the sandal woods, by the reddish mango trees and by the musical notes of cuckoos. The condition of *gopikās* including the much dignified Rādhā in times of separation is described in the verse—

आविर्भूता यद्वधि मधुस्यन्दिनी नन्दसूनोः

कान्तिः काचिन्निखिलनयनाकर्षणे कर्मणज्ञा ।

श्वासो दीर्घस्तद्वधि मुखे पाण्डिमा गण्डमूले

शून्या वृत्तिः कुलमृगदृशां चेतसि प्रादुरासीत् ॥<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, II, 55.

<sup>2</sup> *ibid.*, II, 57.

<sup>3</sup> *ibid.*, II, 63.

The lovely form of Lord Kṛṣṇa is so afresh in their minds that it produces a telling effect upon them; they breathe heavily, their cheeks become pale and their mental state is reduced to voidness.

Many verses in this *saṃullāsa* describe nāyikās and nāyakas in their various types. All these descriptions are mostly conventional. The verse—

शयिता सविधेऽप्यनीश्वरा  
सफलीकर्तुमहो ! मनोरथान् ।  
दयिता दयिताननाम्बुजं  
दरमीलनयना निरीक्षते ॥<sup>1</sup>

gives the picture of the union of a mugdhā with her husband, whose desires she could not all at once fulfill on account of her modesty, high birth and natural restraint. The descriptions of the nāyikā's eyes as a mixture of nectar with poison in that they attract the youths indiscriminately,<sup>2</sup> show the wealth of the poet's imagination in the conventional field. Most of the verses in this *saṃullāsa* are simple, sweet and lucid as the various phases of śṛṅgāra—first meeting of the lovers, courting, union, jealousy and reconciliation—require simple diction generally.

The *Karuṇasaṃullāsa* contains nineteen elegiacal verses lamenting the untimely death of a lady—Bhāminī—who, some believe,<sup>3</sup> was the poet's own wife.

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, II, 100. This has been quoted in the *Rasagāṅgādhara* (p. 10) as an illustration of Rasadhvani, an *uttamottamakāvyā*.

<sup>2</sup> *ibid.*, II, 76. Similar ideas are described in verses 73-79.

<sup>3</sup> See B. G. Bal's edition of the *Bhāminīvilāsa*, preface, p. 2.

Whatever may be the fact, it is beyond question that the author's delineation of pathos in all its elegance is realistic. The first verse—

दैवे पराग्वदनशालिनि हन्त जाते  
याते च संप्रति दिवं प्रति बन्धुरत्ने ।  
कस्मै मनः कथयितासि निजामवस्थां  
कः शीतलैः शमयिता वचनैस्तवाधिम् ॥

contains a pathetic outburst recording the death of an important person in his family, most probably his wife, if the whole *saṃullāsa* is autobiographical. Fate is adverse and no consoling words could relieve the speaker of his mental agony at the irreparable loss sustained by the death of the *bandhuratna*. Though she disappeared from the midst of her relations, she left behind her deep impressions especially in the reflective mind of her husband who was reminded of her every now and then.<sup>1</sup> It pained him much to think that when she was, during her marriage, assured her long life along with her husband, she went to the other world alone leaving her husband to mourn her loss.<sup>2</sup> He, in the company of his beloved wife, composed poetry describing various emotions she then possessed; but it is a pity that his poetry also was dead along with her.<sup>3</sup> It is a mystery for him, he adds, for which place she was bound to choose a new husband, when he had known well that she would not dare to meet a second husband even in a dream.<sup>4</sup> These pathetic pictures Jagannātha clothes in a simple and telling style, and his simplicity and elegance in the delineation of pathos are particularly charming in that no hindrance either in language or in thought is felt by the readers while reading these verses.

<sup>1</sup> *Bhāminīvilāsa*, *ibid.*, III, 3. <sup>3</sup> *ibid.*, III, 10.

<sup>2</sup> *ibid.*, III, 5.

<sup>4</sup> *ibid.*, III, 17.



The *Śāntasamullāsa* is mainly marked by the poet's tone of resignation from the worldly bondages, so naturally effected in him by the death of his wife (if the *Karuṇa* and *Śānta samullāsas* are autobiographical). So in this respect it is a continuation of the *Karuṇasamullāsa*. The first verse—

विशालविषयावलीमलयलग्नदावानल-  
प्रसृत्वरशिखावलीविकलितं मदीयं मनः ।  
अमन्दमिलिदिन्दिरे निखिलमाधुरीमन्दिरे  
मुकुन्दमुखचन्दिरे चिरमिदं चकोरायताम् ॥

contains a prayer that the poet's (or the speaker's) mind may permanently settle (on the bank of the Jumna) in the meditation of Lord Kṛṣṇa for his permanent tranquillity, after having wandered in this world so long in vain.

In addition to autobiographical interest, this poem *Bhāminīvilāsa* maintains at a high level the poet's usual felicity of expression, his power of emotional appeal and his wealth of poetic imagery. To appreciate his poetry in general, its native gracefulness and artistic charm, its lucidity of style and simplicity of diction, its decorative elements free from poetic flaws and full of poetic merits, we may cite in conclusion the closing stanzas of the last *samullāsa* in this poem, wherein he applauds his poetry as graceful and delicious, sweet and tasteful to all sahrdayas who are naturally gifted with the element of responsiveness.

मद्वाणि ! मा कुरु विषादमनादरेण  
मात्सर्यभग्नमनसां तरसा खलानाम् ।  
काव्यारविन्दमकरन्दमधुव्रताना-  
मास्येषु धास्यतितमां कियतो विलासान् ॥<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, IV, 28.

मधु द्राक्षा साक्षादमृतमथ वामाधरसुधा  
कदाचित्केपांचिन्न खलु विदधीरन्नपि मुदम् ।  
ध्रुवं ते जीवन्तोऽप्यहह मृतका मन्दमतयो  
न येषामानन्दं जनयति जगन्नाथभणितिः ॥  
धुर्यैरपि माधुर्यैर्द्राक्षाक्षीरेक्षुमाक्षिकसुधानाम् ।  
वन्द्यैव माधुरीयं पण्डितराजस्य कवितायाः ॥<sup>1</sup>

In these stanzas Jagannātha assures us that his poetry is fine; that though it may not give pleasure to those who are jealous of his greatness, yet it is delightful to those who incessantly, like bees, suck out the sweet honey-like Rasa of his blossomed flower-like poetry. Again, he affirms that his poetry is of such a delicious taste as the sweet wine, the divine ambrosia or the nectar on the rosy lips of a young damsel. To whom, in what time, he questions, does it not cause excessive joy? Such is his confidence in his poetry that he finally declares that all those who do not find any element of charm and sweetness in his poetry, are surely blockheads. He believes that his poetry is divine, sweeter and more delicious than the ordinary delicious things—wine, milk, sugar-cane, honey and so on. But a modern critic of unbiassed judgment may not endorse all his opinions on his poetry on the ground that they are pronounced in a tone of vanity and self-appreciation—qualities not at all generally desirable in a learned man like Jagannātha Paṇḍita.

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, IV, 29 and 31.

## CHAPTER IV

### *As a Literary Critic*

IN the galaxy of Sanskrit rhetoricians, Jagannātha Paṇḍita is a luminary of the greatest magnitude. He is the last in the series of original writers on Sanskrit literary criticism started by Introduction. Bharatamuni, the author of the *Nāṭya-śāstra*. In the post-dhvani period of the history of Alaṅkāra Śāstra, Jagannātha is one of the ablest exponents of the doctrine of *dhvani*, already established as the soul of poetry by Ānandavardhana and systematised by Abhinavagupta. His *magnum Opus*, the *Rasagaṅgādhara*, bears ample testimony to the influence on him of the *navyanyāya* dialectics of his age, with the result that most of his explanations of poetical theories in this work are characterised by clarity and precision both in thought and language, though at times they suffer from the complications of hair-splitting logic-chopping.

The introductory stanzas in the *Rasagaṅgādhara* form a fitting prelude to his independence as a controversialist. His qualifications for this task are, as he says, that he had his scholastic training under his well-known father Perubhaṭṭa, 'whose sportive glances make even stones shed nectar,'<sup>1</sup> and that he is fully confident that he reaped the maximum advantage from his father's instruction and training. In the *Rasagaṅgādhara* he is just like a pilot in the midst

<sup>1</sup> पाषाणादपि पीयूषं सन्दत्ते यस्य लीलया । (R. G., V. 3, p. 2)

of the ocean of knowledge, steering his boat clear of dialectic shoals and finally reaching his destination of literary appreciation and true interpretation of poetry.<sup>1</sup> His comparison of himself to the *Mandara* mountain that churned the milky ocean in the midst of waves and disturbances caused by the aquatic animals bespeaks the imperturbable nature of the man.<sup>2</sup> His extraordinary independence in quoting his own poetry for suitable illustrations and his disregard of other's verses look like the power of the musk-deer to produce *kastūri*, when it naturally looks contemptuously at the lovely and odorous flowers.<sup>3</sup> Diving deep in the troubled waters of logical arguments and refutations, he has gained and exhibited to the highly cultured public—*sahṛdayas*—the Jewel of the *Rasagaṅgādhara* which is capable

<sup>1</sup> निमग्नेन क्लेशैर्मननजलधेरन्तरुद्धरं  
मयोन्नीतो लोके ललितरसगङ्गाधरमणिः ।  
हरन्तन्तर्ध्वान्तं हृदयमधिरूढो गुणवता-  
मलङ्कारान्सर्वानपि गलितगर्वान् रचयतु ॥  
(R. G., V. 4, p. 2)

<sup>2</sup> परिष्कुर्वन्तर्वर्थांसहृदयधुरीणाः कतिपये  
तथापि क्लेशो मे कथमपि गतार्थो न भविता ।  
तिमीन्द्राः सङ्क्षोभं विदधतु पयोधेः पुनरिमे  
किमेतेनायासो भवति विफलो मन्दरगिरेः ॥  
(R. G., V. 5, p. 3)

<sup>3</sup> निर्माय नूतनमुदाहरणानुरूपं  
काव्यं मयात्र निहितं न परस्य किञ्चित् ।  
किं सेव्यते सुमनसां मनसापि गन्धः  
कस्तूरिकाजननशक्तिभृता मृगेण ॥  
(R. G., V. 6, p. 3)



of illuminating the human mind and removing completely the pride of some of his rival rhetoricians.<sup>1</sup> Thus his innate independence in the treatment of the subject-matter, his clear and powerful logic and above all, his original illustrations—these echo and reverberate the self-confident challenge of the famous poet-critic Bhavabhūti in his *Mālatīmādhava*—

ये नाम केचिदिह नः प्रथयन्त्यवज्ञां  
जानन्ति ते किमपि तान्प्रति नैष यत्नः ।  
उत्पश्यते मम तु कोऽपि समानधर्मा  
कालो ह्ययं निरवधिर्विपुला च पृथ्वी ॥<sup>2</sup>

The first topic Jagannātha takes up for elucidation in his *Rasagaṅgādhara* is the definition of *Kāvya* (poetry). He defines it thus—  
'रमणीयार्थप्रतिपादकः शब्दः काव्यम्', Sound expressing beautiful ideas, which is nothing but an amplification of Daṇḍin's *kāvyaśarīra*—इष्टार्थव्यवच्छिन्ना पद-  
वली,<sup>3</sup> a group of words expressing pleasing ideas. Poetic charm (*ramaṇīyatā*) arises from an idea which causes impersonal and transcendental pleasure (*lokot-tarāhlāda*) to trained and cultured people. This pleasure is of a peculiar kind, not commonly met with in life. When a man is told 'a son is born to you' or 'you have come by a fortune', he derives great pleasure;

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, verses 4 and 7—

मननतरितीर्णविद्यार्णवो

जगन्नाथपण्डितनरेन्द्रः ।

रसगङ्गाधरनाम्नी

करोति कुतुकेन काव्यमीमांसाम् ॥

<sup>2</sup> *Mālatīmādhava*, prologue, verse 6.

<sup>3</sup> *Kāvyaśarīra*, I, 10.

but this is of the personal kind and therefore no poetic charm is found in these sentences.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The final explanation of the definition of *Kāvya* runs thus—

चमत्कारजनकभावनाविषयार्थप्रतिपादकशब्दत्वम्—

*Kāvya* is that śabda expressive of an idea the meditation of which produces joy of an extraordinary character—लोकोत्तराह्लादः. This form of definition introduces भावना instead of ज्ञान as given in the original definition. The utility of it is explained thus: a *saṃūhālambanajñāna* comprising two co-ordinate thoughts, of which one may be रमणीय and another, अरमणीय, can be taken as चमत्कारजनकज्ञान; and the statement like काको रटति expressing an अरमणीयार्थ may be called a *Kāvya* when it becomes the object of the cognitive jumble—समूहालम्बनज्ञान, along with a रमणीयार्थ—a beautiful idea. So to exclude cases like काको रटति, *bhāvanā* is inserted in the place of *jñāna*. *Bhāvanā* is a chain of cognitions (पुनःपुनरनुसन्धानम्). It is possible to say that the first is *saṃūhālambanā*; but the succeeding cognitions cannot be so in that they, under special circumstances, present only beautiful objects. Hence, there is no *ativyāpti*.

Two more amended forms of this definition are also given by Jagannātha—(1) यत्प्रतिपादितार्थविषयकभावनात्वं चमत्कृतिजनकतावच्छेदकं तत्त्वम्; (2) स्वविशिष्टजनकतावच्छेदकार्थप्रतिपादकतासंसर्गेण चमत्कारत्ववत्त्वमेव वा काव्यत्वम् ॥ Of these, the first is better than the definition already noted above in that it obviates *ativyāpti* in a *bhāvanā*, the succeeding cognitions of which present under

The definition of poetry is one of the vexed problems of literary criticism; and Jagannātha, the last original writer on Sanskrit Poetics, criticises the theories of some of his predecessors. He closely follows the tenets of the important schools headed by Ānandavardhana, because of his firm logical conviction and not merely from blind imitation. His amplification of Daṇḍin's definition of Kāvya is a striking instance of his harmonization of old theories with the new currents of thought.

In the description of Kāvyaśarīra whether *sound* and *sense* together constitute Kāvya or sound or sense by itself, is a disputed question among the ancient and modern literary critics. In his *Kāvyaaprakāśa* Mammaṭabhaṭṭa expressly says—

‘तदोपौ शब्दार्थौ सगुणवचनलङ्घनी पुनः कापि’<sup>1</sup>

that both sound and sense devoid of poetic demerits and full of poetic merits and with or without poetic embellishments constitute a Kāvya. Against this, Jagannātha says that a mere reference to the experiences of Saṅkṛdayas that ‘Kāvya is read aloud’; ‘from Kāvya meaning is understood’; ‘Kāvya is heard but meaning is not known’, would convince us that the import of the term *Kāvya* is only sound (*śabda*) and not sense (*artha*); and that there are no valid

different circumstances both *ramaṇīyārtha* and *aramaṇīyārtha*, while the second explains practically the same in a simpler and more convenient form by adopting the *anugama* method.

<sup>1</sup> *Kāvyaaprakāśa*, Ullāsa I, verse 4, Ānandāśrama edition (1921), p. 6.

universal experiences (*viśvajānīnavyavahāras*) capable of proving that Kāvya means both sound and sense. Hence the primary meaning of the term *Kāvya* is *sound* and *not sense* nor *both*. The same explanation, Jagannātha applies to terms like *Veda* and *Purāṇa*.

Similarly, he finds fault with definitions like—*आस्वादोद्बोधकं काव्यम्*, *रसोद्बोधकं काव्यम्*, and *(वाक्यं) रसवदेव काव्यम्*.<sup>1</sup> According to Jagannātha, any expression that becomes the real source of aesthetic pleasure is *Kāvya*, be it suggestive of *rasa*, of *bhāva*, of *vastu* or of *alaṅkāra*. The presence of poetic merits, the absence of the poetic blemishes and the abundance of poetic embellishments also are not characteristics of poetry, though these help much to beautify poetry. Jagannātha contends that there are thousands of instances of genuine Kāvya like ‘उदितं मण्डलं विधोः’ and ‘गतोऽस्तमको भातीन्दुः’ suggestive of a good number of beautiful ideas but devoid of any *guṇas* and *alaṅkāras*.

Those who define Kāvya as *आस्वादोद्बोधकम्* or *रसोद्बोधकम्*—that which is conducive to the realisation of unalloyed pleasure—accept that both sound and sense constitute *Kāvya*; and their position becomes worse when they give so wide a definition as to include within its scope *non-Kāvyas* like musical tones and various accompaniments in a dramatic performance which are in a way capable of producing a *thrill* in the audience. Hence these definitions are

<sup>1</sup> The last one is only a paraphrase of the definition found in the *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, I Pariccheda, verse 3 (Kane's edition, Bombay, 1923), p. 5.



overlapping. To show further the logical absurdity of the view that sound and sense together constitute Kāvya, Jagannātha discusses at length whether *Kāvya* rests on sound and sense together or separately. The first alternative is untenable, since it would mean that neither sound alone nor sense alone is to be called Kāvya and that the admittedly invalid cognition that a beautiful verse in the form of a sentence is not Kāvya should be treated as valid like the cognition—‘one is not two’. The second alternative is also unacceptable because of the fact that it would lead us to accept sound and sense, each by itself, as genuine Kāvya. The definition ‘(वाक्यं) रसात्मकं काव्यम्’ is acceptable in as much as it views vākya—combination of words—as Kāvya, but it is too narrow in that it excludes many poetic descriptions of nature like current of water, which do not in the main develop any Rasa.

The next important topic in the *Rasagāṅgādhara* is *pratibhā*. Even before Jagannātha, His view on Rudraṭa and other Ālaṅkārikas had *Pratibhā*. spoken at length on this subject. Rudraṭa defines it thus:—

‘मनसि सदा सुखमाधिनि  
विस्फुरणमनेकधाभिधा ।  
अङ्कितानि च पदानि  
विभान्ति यस्यामसौ शक्तिः ॥’<sup>1</sup>

Bhaṭṭatauta says—

‘प्रज्ञा नवनवोन्मेषशालिनी प्रतिभा मता ।’<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Rudraṭa's *Kāvyaālaṅkāra*, N. S. edition, 1886, I. 15, p. 6.

<sup>2</sup> P. V. Kane's *History of Alankāraśāstra* (1923), p. 76.

Abhinavagupta develops the same in his *Locana*—

‘प्रतिभा अपूर्ववस्तुनिर्माणक्षमा प्रज्ञा ।’<sup>1</sup>

‘शक्तिः प्रतिभानं वर्णनीयवस्तुविषयनूतनोल्लेखशालित्वम् ।’<sup>2</sup>

Vāgbhaṭa also amplifies the same (in his *Vāgbhaṭālaṅkāra*)—

‘प्रसन्नपदनव्यर्थव्यवयुद्धोषविधायिनी ।

स्फुरन्ती सत्कवेर्बुद्धिः प्रतिभा सर्वतोमुखी ॥’<sup>3</sup>

This *pratibhā* is identified with *śakti* by all these critics. Bhartṛhari calls it an instinct of man.<sup>4</sup> Only

<sup>1</sup> *Locana* (N. S. edn. 1911), p. 29.

<sup>2</sup> *ibid.*, p. 137.

<sup>3</sup> *Vāgbhaṭālaṅkāra* (Kāvya-mālā 48, 1916), I. 4, p. 5.

<sup>4</sup> विच्छेदग्रहणेऽर्थानां प्रतिभान्यैव जायते ।  
वाक्यार्थ इति तामाहुः पदार्थैरुपपादिताम् ॥  
इदं तदिति सान्येषामनाह्येया कथञ्चन ।  
प्रत्यात्मवृत्तिसिद्धा सा कर्त्रापि न निरूप्यते ॥  
उपश्लेषमिवार्थानां सा करोत्यविचारिता ।  
सार्वरूप्यमिवापन्ना विषयत्वेन वर्तते ॥  
साक्षाच्छब्देन जनितां भावनानुगमेन वा ।  
इतिकर्तव्यतायां तां न कश्चिदतिवर्तते ॥  
प्रमाणत्वेन तां लोकः सर्वस्वमनुपश्यति ।  
समारम्भाः प्रतीयन्ते तिरश्चामपि तद्वशात् ॥  
यथा द्रव्यविशेषाणां परिपाकैरयलजाः ।  
मन्दादिशक्तयो दृष्टाः प्रतिभास्तद्वतां तथा ॥  
स्वरवृत्तिं विकुरुते मधौ पुंस्कोकिलस्य कः ।  
जन्तवादयः कुलायादिकरणे केन शिक्षिताः ॥

(*Vākya-padīya*, Kāṇḍa II, verses 145-151)

Rājaśekhara labours to find out some difference between *śakti* and *pratibhā*. He remarks in his *Kāvyamīmāṃsā*—

‘विप्रसृतिश्च सा (शक्तिः) प्रतिभाव्युत्पत्तिभ्याम् ।

शक्तिकर्तृके हि प्रतिभा व्युत्पत्तिकर्मणी ।’<sup>1</sup>

*Śakti* is the root-cause of *pratibhā*. The instinctive power of human beings to learn and appreciate beautiful objects is the root-cause of the imagination of poets. Jagannātha does not labour much in explaining the import of the word *pratibhā*. He follows simply the popular definition—‘नवनवोन्मेषशालिनी बुद्धिः’ ।

Jagannātha is very particular in saying that *pratibhā* is the only indispensable factor to all good and genuine poetry. In this point, he may be said to have followed Rājaśekhara, Vāgbhaṭa, etc., who regard *pratibhā* as the sole equipment of a poet to produce good and genuine poetry—

‘सा (शक्तिः) केवलं काव्ये हेतुरिति यायावरीयः ।’<sup>2</sup>

‘प्रतिभैव च कवीनां काव्यकरणकारणम्, व्युत्पत्त्यभ्यासौ तस्या एव संस्कारकारकौ न तु काव्यहेतुः ।’<sup>3</sup>

In this connection, he criticises the view of Mammaṭa-bhaṭṭa who says

‘शक्तिर्निपुणता लोकशास्त्रकाव्याद्यवेक्षणात् ।

काव्यज्ञशिक्षयाभ्यास इति हेतुस्तदुद्भवे ॥’<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Kāvyamīmāṃsā*, Gaekwad Oriental Series, No. I (1924), p. 11.

<sup>2</sup> *ibid.*, p. 11.

<sup>3</sup> Vāgbhaṭa's *Alaṅkāratilaka*, p. 2; see also the *Vāgbhaṭālaṅkāra*, *ibid.*, I. 3, p. 5.

<sup>4</sup> *Kāvyaprakāśa*, *ibid.*, I. 3, p. 5.

that *śakti* otherwise known as *pratibhā*, *vyutpatti* (erudition) and *abhyāsa* (practice) constitute the real cause of poetry. Though this view has got the support of earlier eminent *Ālaṅkārikas* like Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin and Rudraṭa,<sup>1</sup> Jagannātha refutes it on the evidence of facts. He cites two clear instances where *pratibhā* becomes different according to the different causes—*देवतामहापुरुषप्रसादादिजन्यादृष्टम्* and *विलक्षणव्युत्पत्त्यभ्यासौ* and he adds that in no case is good poetry produced without *pratibhā*. There are no doubt certain poets who have been inspired by divine blessing as in the case of Mūkakavi. Similarly there are many who have become poets through great labour, like Māgha, who are no doubt authors of deep erudition and vast experience. In the former case the poet's *pratibhā* is the result of *devatā-prasāda* while in the latter it results from the author's *vyutpatti* and *abhyāsa*. Hence in all cases of poetry *pratibhā* is indispensable and all others—*vyutpatti*, *abhyāsa*, *devatāprasāda*, etc. are only contributory to *pratibhā*.<sup>2</sup>

Next comes the important subject—the classification of *Kāvya*. Traditionally, we have a three-fold classification—*uttama* or *vyāṅgyapradhāna*, *madhyama* or *guṇībhūtavyaṅgya* and *adhama* or *citra*.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Vide Bhāmaha's *Kāvyālaṅkāra*, I. V. 5 and 10; Daṇḍin's *Kāvyādarśa*, I. 103; Rudraṭa's *Kāvyālaṅkāra*, I. 14.

<sup>2</sup> *R. G.*, pp. 8 and 9.

<sup>3</sup> Vide the *Dhvanyāloka*, (N. S. edn. 1911, p. 220) III Udyota, Kārikā 42—

प्रधानगुणभावाभ्यां व्यङ्ग्यस्यैवं व्यवस्थिते ।

काव्ये उभे ततोऽन्यद्यत्तच्चित्रमभिधीयते ॥



This may look alright; but when we group instances of some beautiful *guṇībhūtavyaṅgyas* like

‘अनुरागवती सन्ध्या दिवसस्तत्पुरस्सरः ।  
अहो ! देवगतिः कीदृक् तथापि न समागमः ॥’

under the *madhyama* variety and instances of ordinary *vastudhvani*—

‘सुवर्णपुष्पां पृथिवीं चिन्वन्ति पुरुषास्त्रयः ।  
शूरश्च कृतविद्यश्च यश्च जानाति सेवितुम् ॥’

under the *uttama* variety, we feel that our estimate is not just. A true *sahṛdaya* is sure to realise the beautiful pathos contained in the stanza—‘अनुरागवती सन्ध्या’ etc., though it is a little affected by the prominence of *vācyārtha*. So also the treatment in one and the same manner of *citrakāvya* containing *arthālaṅkāras* and *śabdālaṅkāras* and the grouping of them under the main variety of *adhama* are wholly unscientific; for, many instances of *samāsokti*, *aprasutaprasāmsā*, etc., stand on a par with good and genuine specimens of poetry in that they are real sources of poetic charm.

Jagannātha has fully realised the incongruous and unsatisfactory nature of the traditional classification of *kāvyas*. He has, therefore, improved upon it by suggesting one more variety—*uttamottama*—which comprises all genuine types of *dhvani*. The *uttama* covers the beautiful varieties of *guṇībhūtavyaṅgya* like ‘अनुरागवती सन्ध्या’ which, though subordinated to the *vācyārtha*, he describes as the chief source of pleasure by the fitting analogy of a captive queen slaving through misfortune—‘दुर्दैववशतो दास्यमनुभवद्राजकलत्रमिव’<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> R. G., p. 17.

Similarly, he places some of the best types of *citrakāvyas* where *samāsokti* and such other *alaṅkāras* beautify the primary sense, under the *madhyama* variety, while some *śabdālaṅkārakāvyas* are grouped under the *adhama* variety. Finally, he lays down *camatkāra* as a great principle in the classification of *kāvyas* and regards the compositions without any beauty except in verbal puns and alliterations as unworthy of the name *kāvya*.

Of the four varieties of the *kāvya*, the first kind—*uttamottama*—is defined thus—शब्दार्थो  
Uttamottama. यत्र गुणीभावितात्मानौ कमप्यर्थमभिव्यङ्कः तदाद्यम्<sup>1</sup>  
—that which suggests a beautiful idea with *śabda* (sound) and *artha* (expressed sense) as subordinate to the main idea suggested. This variety comprises all *dhvani-kāvyas*—*Rasadhvani*, *Bhāvadhvani*, etc. Jagannātha illustrates it by the verse—

‘शयिता सविधेऽप्यनीश्वर  
सफलीकर्तुमहो ! मनोरथान् ।  
दयिता दयिताननाम्बुजं  
दरमीलनयना निरीक्षते ॥’

<sup>1</sup> In this definition *कमपि* means *चमत्कृतिभूमिम्*—that which contributes to aesthetic pleasure. This excludes from the scope of the *uttamottamakāvyas* the *atigūḍhavyaṅgyakāvyas* in which the suggested sense is to be known with great difficulty and *atisphuṭavyaṅgyakāvyas* in which the suggested sense is on a par with the expressed idea. The genuine suggested sense is neither of these two. The adjunct *गुणीभावितात्मानौ* excludes from the scope of the *uttamottama* the varieties of *guṇībhūtavyaṅgya*, *aparāṅgavyaṅgya* and *vācyasiddhyāṅgavyaṅgya*, in which the suggested sense would be subordinate to *artha*.



‘Though lying by her husband’s side, a lovely woman, unable to fulfill all desires, looks at his lotus-face with her eyes a bit closed’.

Here the *ālambanavibhāva* of the *nāyikā*’s love is the *nāyaka*, her husband; the *uddīpanavibhāva* is the lonely place indicated by her lying close by her husband; her looks with her eyes closed a bit are the *anubhāvas* and the modesty, eagerness to satisfy her desires, etc. are the *vyabhicāribhāvas*—these help in the suggestion of *Śṛṅgārārāsa* of the *sambhoga* type. Jagannātha lays down a general rule that the main suggested sense should be of that type which does not in any way fall under the category of expressed ideas. The desire of the *nāyikā* in the present instance is expressed by the word *manoratha* in a general way. So it cannot be the main suggested idea. The argument that though the desire is already made known in a general manner by the word *manoratha*, it may be suggested in its special feature or form, *viz.*, the desire for kissing, falls to the ground, since the suggested idea, when it is affected in a way by direct expression, ceases to be a genuine suggested sense and a source of literary appeal. Similarly the suggestion of the modesty of the *nāyikā* cannot be taken as the main suggestion of the verse. No doubt, it is suggested by the expression—*दरमीलन्नयना*, yet it occupies only a subordinate position as the delimiting adjunct of *anuvādyatā* (*anuvādyatāvacchedaka*), within the sphere of the subject. The main suggestion should fall within the sphere of the predicate (*vidheya*) *viz.*, *nirīkṣaṇa*, the *nāyikā*’s looking at the *nāyaka*. If the looking of the *nāyikā* with her half-closed eyes is taken to be the predicate, then modesty becomes a part of the main suggested sense; yet it would be more happy to say that the suggestion of *ratī* (the *sthāyibhāva* of *Śṛṅgāra*)

is effected by her looking at the *nāyaka* with her half-closed eyes (*दरमीलन्नयनात्त्वविशिष्टनिरीक्षणम्*). If the suggestion of modesty is taken to be the main *Vākyaārtha*, then the description of *nirīkṣaṇa* will have no significance. Even the reverse that *nirīkṣaṇa* is an adjunct of the idea—*दरमीलन्नयनात्*—and that the suggestion of the first idea, *viz.*, *ratī*, is only an adjunct of the suggestion of the second, *viz.*, *trapā* (modesty) cannot be maintained, in view of the fact that *nirīkṣaṇa*, the meaning of the root *īkṣ* with *ni*, is the leading concept of the verbal cognition arising from this verse or is the *viśeṣya* of the idea *दरमीलन्नयनात्त्वम्*. Hence, the suggestion of *ratī* is the main idea (*vākyaārtha*) of this verse.<sup>1</sup>

The second variety called *uttama* is defined by Jagannātha thus—यत्र व्यङ्ग्यमप्रधानमेव सञ्चमत्कार-  
Uttama. कारणं तद्वितीयम्,<sup>2</sup> that which becomes a source of literary appeal when the suggested sense is subordinate to some other thing (the expressed idea). This is illustrated by the verse—

‘राघवविरहज्वालासन्तापितसहस्रशैलशिखरेषु ।

शिशिरे सुखं शयानाः कपयः कुप्यन्ति पवनतनयाय ॥’

‘The monkeys get angry with (Hanumān) the son of wind-god when they were living happily in the cold

<sup>1</sup> R. G., pp. 10 and 11.

<sup>2</sup> In this definition the *nipāta eva* restricts the scope of *uttama* by excluding certain *kāvya*s in which one *vyaṅgya* element is subordinate to another *vyaṅgya* sense but *viśeṣya* of the expressed idea. The word *चमत्कारकारणं* excludes from the scope of *uttama* the *linavyaṅgyakāvya*s having no suggested sense clearly known and the *vācyacitrakāvya*s in which the *vācyārtha* is the source of charm.



autumn on the summits of the Sahya mountain which had been very hot by the flames of the fire-like separation of Rāma (from Sītā)'.<sup>1</sup>

Here the suggested idea is that Rāma's fire-like separation is quenched by the happy tidings of Sītā's safety at Laukā brought by Hanumān; and this suggested sense, though subordinate to the expressed idea of the monkeys' anger to Hanumān, possesses some inexpressible charm just like a beautiful queen having to slave through adverse fate. So in this instance the beautiful suggested idea is subordinate to the expressed idea and is therefore an instance of *uttamakāvya*.<sup>1</sup>

The third variety, *madhyama*, is defined thus:—

**Madhyama.** यत् व्यङ्ग्यचमत्कारासमानाधिकरणो वाच्यचमत्कारस्तत्तृतीयम्—that which has a beautiful expressed idea becomes a source of appeal, independent of the beauty of the suggested idea therein. Under this and the *uttama* varieties are grouped all *guṇībhūtavyaṅgyas* and poems with important *arthālaṅkāras* like *samāsokti* and *aprastutaprasāmsā*. This variety is illustrated by the passage taken from Jagannātha's *Yamunāvarṇanākhyāyikā*—

‘तनयमैनाकगवेषणलम्बीकृतजलधिजठरप्रविष्टहिमगिरिसुजायमानाय  
भगवत्या भागीरथ्यास्सखी ।’

Here the figure *Utprekṣā* which consists in the poetic supposition of the Jumna as the companion of the great Ganges who looks like the mighty arm of the Himālaya stretched into the heart of the ocean in search of his son Maināka, is the expressed idea and is the chief

<sup>1</sup> R. G., p. 17.

source of poetic charm, though there are some suggested ideas like *śvāitya* (white colour) of the Ganges and its measureless depth (पातालतलचुम्बित्वम्).

The last variety, *adhama*, is defined as—

**Adhama.** यत्तार्थचमत्कृत्युपस्कृता शब्दचमत्कृतिः प्रधानं तदधमं चतुर्थम्—that which derives chiefly beauty from sounds only through the beauty of sense. This is illustrated by the verse—

‘मिलान्निपुत्रनेत्राय त्रयीशात्रवशसवे ।  
गोत्रारिगोत्रजत्राय गोत्रात्रे ते नमो नमः ॥’

Here the *śabdālaṅkāra* (alliteration) is no doubt prominent, yet there is also some beauty in sense (*arthacamatkāra*) expressed by words, which is quite subordinate to the *śabdālaṅkāra*. And Jagannātha concludes that the compositions which merely juggle with sounds, without any beauty in sense, are not at all *kāvyas* in that they do not satisfy the general definition of *kāvya*—

रमणीयार्थप्रतिपादकः शब्दः काव्यम् ।<sup>1</sup>

Jagannātha's *Rasa-sūtra* is the next important part of his *Rasaṅgādhara* in which are explained most of the interpretations of Bharata's *Rasa-sūtra*, as given by his predecessors, though he finally follows the interpretation of Abhinavagupta. It is, therefore, a more or less verbatim paraphrase of Abhinavagupta's commentary on the *Rasa-sūtra*. According to Abhinavagupta, *Rasa*-realisation comes only to the *sāmājika*. Among those who have commented on Bharata's *Rasa-sūtra* before Abhinavagupta,

<sup>1</sup> R. G., pp. 19 and 20.



only Bhaṭṭanāyaka has explained how the *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas*, etc., in a *kāvya* expressed by *abhidhāyakatva-vyāpāra* are stripped of their individualistic aspects like *Śakuntalātva* and *Duṣyantatva*, by the *bhāvakatva-vyāpāra* peculiar to a genuine *kāvya*. This important fact is further elaborated and systematised by Abhinavagupta as a vital point in Rasa-realisation.

Rasas are said to be nothing but the mental impressions of the *sāmājikas* when they become intensified and universalised. They are divested of all their individual aspects or characteristics by the *alaukikavyāpāra* in a *kāvya*, viz., *vyāñjanā* and in this sense they stand rather quite apart from the ordinary impressions. They are realised by the inner self, the knower, who is identical with self-luminous consciousness. In the realisation of Rasa by *sāmājikas* there is complete absorption (*cittanispandatā*), which is a blissful condition. Here Abhinavagupta and his predecessor Bhaṭṭanāyaka and their followers follow the *sāṅkhya* conception of *kaivalya* which is described to be complete cessation from all activities. This negative aspect of bliss in Rasa-realisation solves very well the great problem in connection with the *karuṇa* sentiment (pathos). How *karuṇa* becomes a real source of literary charm is a question of vital importance in the history of Sanskrit literary criticism. Abhinavagupta's explanation by the introduction of the *sāṅkhya* conception of *kaivalya* is highly satisfactory.

But later Ālaṅkārikas after Abhinavagupta, of whom Jagannātha is one, explain this problem with reference to the *positive* aspect of Rasa-realisation. The soul is said to be, as the Vedāntins hold, eternal consciousness and supreme happiness in itself. Whatever is lovable must be blissful and nobody can

love a thing which is adverse to his soul. To mankind the most lovable thing is the soul and as such, it is the most blissful object. The Ātman's very nature is 'bliss', the 'supreme consciousness'. Now when the mental impressions in the intensified and generalised *alaukika* form are presented to the soul, the veil of *āvaraṇa* is lifted up and the blissful Ātman is realised along with the realisation of the *sthāyibhāva*—*rati*, *śoka*, etc. Just as a light, while lifted up from its cover, reveals itself and the objects nearby, so also the illumined Ātman, when His veil *avidyā* is lifted up, reveals Himself and the *sthāyibhāvas* in association with their *vibhāvas*, etc., in as much as they are the mental conditions (अन्तःकरणधर्माः) illumined by the inner Caitanya. Hence Rasa is nothing but *sthāyibhāva* illumined by inner Caitanya when It is free from *āvaraṇa*; or Rasa is nothing but the inner Caitanya free from *āvaraṇa* and delimited by *sthāyibhāvas* like *rati*. Of these, the former view belongs to Abhinavagupta and Mammatabhaṭṭa while the latter is Jagannātha's own. In support of his view Jagannātha even goes to the extent of quoting two passages from the Taittirīyopaniṣad—

‘रसो वै सः, रसं ह्येवायं लब्ध्वा आनन्दी भवति’ ।

He also explains the nature of *Rasapratīti* as *aparokṣa-pratīti* though it is derived from *śabda* (Kāvya), since it stands on a par with the Vedāntic *akhaṇḍasākṣātkāra* as derived from the Mahāvākya—‘तत्त्वमसि’.

The *pramātā* cannot always absorb himself in his self-luminous bliss when he is chained. The inner self has for a moment to rise above all the individualistic features. This will be brought about by the removal of the veil of ignorance (*avidyā*) which completely cancels the *svarūpasukha*. This



removal can be effected by the *alaukikavyāpāra*, which is again a result of a suitable combination of the three elements in the *kāvya*—*vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *vyabhicāribhāvas*. These three are again called *alaukika* in the following way:—when we say that *Śakuntalā* is the *ālambanavibhāva* we should not consider her as the bride of Duṣyanta—that individualistic aspect is to vanish from the *sāmājika*'s mind—but as a lovely figure painted before the *sāmājikas* in a universal form. If the individualistic aspect does not vanish, she ceases to be the *ālambanavibhāva*; so also are the others. For such a universalised impression of these *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas*, etc., upon the *sāmājika*'s mind, the masterly hand of the poet-artist is mainly responsible; also the successful acting of the play by expert actors who personate the chief characters; and also the scenic arrangements, dancing, music, etc., which have very much to do with the successful performance of a drama. According to this view, the word '*saṁyoga*' in the *sūtra* means *vyājanā*—blissful suggestion which lifts the *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *vyabhicāribhāvas* above the common plane; and the word रसनिष्पत्ति is to be interpreted in the sense of the illumination of blissful self, delimited by *sthāyibhāva*.<sup>1</sup>

Jagannātha, after explaining his and Abhinavagupta's views on *Rasa*-realisation, gives a succinct summary of the view of Bhaṭṭanāyaka who, as an elder contemporary of Abhinavagupta, is believed to have criticised in his *Hṛdayadarpaṇa*, Ānandavardhana's doctrine of *dhvani*. Though his work has not yet seen

<sup>1</sup> R. G., pp. 22 and 23.

the light of day, his exposition of *Rasa*-doctrine on the basis of Bharata's *Rasa-sūtra* is quoted by Abhinavagupta in his *Abhinavabhāratī* and *Locana*, which later critics have copied with or without verbal modification.

Before Bhaṭṭanāyaka came Bhaṭṭalollāṭa and Śrī Śaṅkuka whose interpretations of Bharata's *Rasa-sūtra* may be noted here for a better understanding of the subject, though Jagannātha mentions their views as the fifth and the sixth in his exposition of the *Rasa-sūtra*.

Of those who have commented on Bharata's *Rasa-sūtra*—

विभावानुभावव्यभिचारिसंयोगादसनिष्पत्तिः—

Bhaṭṭalollāṭa comes first, and his interpretation of the *sūtra* as given in the *Abhinavabhāratī* and other works may be thus briefly stated:—*Rasa* is nothing but the *sthāyibhāva*—permanent mental condition—intensified by *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *vyabhicāribhāvas*. The word '*niṣpatti*' in the *sūtra* means *utpatti* (generation) in reference to *vibhāvas*; *anumiti* (inference) in reference to *anubhāvas*; and *puṣṭi* (nourishment) in reference to *vyabhicāribhāvas*; (i.e.) by the *vibhāvas* the *sthāyibhāvas* are generated; by the *anubhāvas* they are inferred by others and by the *vyabhicāribhāvas* they are nourished; similarly the word *saṁyoga* in the compound—विभावानुभावव्यभिचारिसंयोगात्—is taken by him in the sense of the three ideas—generation, inference and nourishment, which constitute the relation of the *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *vyabhicāribhāvas* to the *sthāyibhāva*. So if the *sthāyin* is intensified, it is *rasa* and if it is not, it is a *bhāva*.



This view has the support of Daṇḍin, an earlier *Ālaṅkārika* of eminence—

रतिः शृङ्गारतां याता रूपबाहुल्ययोगतः ।

आरुह्य च परां कोटिं कोपो रौद्रत्वमागतः ॥

*Śṛṅgāra* is nothing but *rati* (love) magnified through the combination of so many elements (*vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *vyabhicāribhāvas*); *Raudra* is but *kopa* (anger) intensified to its highest pitch.<sup>1</sup>

This *rasotpatticāda* of Bhaṭṭalollaṭa is criticised by Śrī Śaṅkuka, his successor, as follows:—(1) If *Rasa* is only the intensified *sthāyibhāva*, one has to accept various degrees of intensity according to different persons who realise *Rasa*; and in a less degree, one has to say that one has not realised *Rasa*. On the other hand, it is conceded by critics that the true *Rasa*-realisation of a *sahṛdaya* has no such degree of difference. Moreover, as the degrees of intensity are varied, several varieties under each *Rasa* are to be accepted. So Bharata's division of *Hāsyarasa* into *six* and *Śṛṅgāra* into *ten avasthās* would have no significance.

(2) It is not possible to say that, in all cases, *sthāyibhāva* is intensified. *Śoka*, for example, the *sthāyibhāva* of *Karunārāsa*, is always by itself a strong feeling and it slowly languishes by lapse of time and by other conditions.

(3) If *Rasa* is generated, it ceases to be *alaukika* and stands on a par with *laukikarāsānubhava* which may look even obscene and coarse.

<sup>1</sup> Vide the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, with the *Abhinavabhāratī*, Gaekwad Oriental Series, No. 36, Vol. I, p. 274.

(4) The important question—*who realises Rasa?*—is not scientifically tackled by Bhaṭṭalollaṭa. If it is accepted that the *sāmājika* realises it, the great question comes—*how can the causes that exist in the actor generate pleasure in the spectator?*—since the cause and the effect have to exist simultaneously in one and the same person. So he has to say that it is an invalid perception culminating in the realisation of unalloyed pleasure.

On these grounds, Śrī Śaṅkuka rejects Bhaṭṭalollaṭa's interpretation and gives his own theory of *Rasānumiti*. According to Śrī Śaṅkuka, a cultured spectator, while witnessing in a dramatic performance the successful imitation of the characters and their experiences by an expert actor, identifies the actor with the characters whom the actor personates and he (the spectator) is led to infer the permanent emotions of the character—*sthāyibhāvas*—as existing in the character. This inference is said to be the source of the spectator's pleasure. This inferential knowledge, for example, *रामोऽयम्*, *सीताविषयकरतिमान्* *सीतादिविभावादिमत्त्वाद्*—has the actor as *pakṣa*, the *vibhāvas*, etc., as *hetu* and love and other *sthāyibhāvas* as *sādhya*. The experience of the spectator—*रामोऽयम्*,—Śaṅkuka describes, does not come under the well-known divisions of cognitions and as such, it is to be accepted as a new variety; and it is, he explains, similar to the experience one has while looking at the picture of a horse (*citraturaga*); that is, when we look at a good coloured picture of the horse, it seems to us galloping and we attribute to it, for a while at least, all the qualities of the real horse; so also the spectator, when he is absorbed in the successful imitation of certain deeds of the original character by the actor, identifies the latter with the former



so long as his absorption lasts; and he considers that the actor possesses all the qualities of the original character. The *citraturaga* example emphasises one more point, viz., that the *sthāyibhāva* like love in the actor is only a *semblance* (*anukāra*) of the love of the original character. If it were not so, Śaṅkuka contends, Bharata would have said—*स्वायिनिष्पत्तिः*—instead of *रसनिष्पत्तिः* in the *Rasa-sūtra*. So, the semblance of love when inferred from the *vibhāvas*, etc., is Śṛṅgāra; and the inference—*रामोऽयं सीताविषयकरतिमान्*—for example, which has got the semblance of love as *sādhya* is known as the spectator's realisation of *Rasa*. So, according to Śaṅkuka, the word *saṁyoga* in the *sūtra* means *vyāpya-vyāpakabhāva*—the relation between the *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *vyabhicāribhāvas* on the one hand and *rasa* on the other; and the word *निष्पत्तिः* means *अनुमितिः* (inference). So the meaning of the *sūtra* is that through the relation of *vyāpyavyāpakabhāva* between the *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *vyabhicāribhāvas* on the one hand and *Rasas* on the other, the *sthāyibhāva* is *inferred* as existing in the character; that this *sthāyibhāva*, otherwise known as *Rasa*, is incessantly meditated upon by the spectator when he is said to be in the supreme state of the realisation of *Rasa* or *Rasa-carvaṇā*.

The explanation of *Rasānubhava* as *Rasānumiti* and *Rasa-carvaṇā* meets well two objections that are generally raised against it. One objection is that true pleasure is derived by the spectator from his unreal or invalid knowledge—*रामोऽयम्*: invalid, since the spectator mistakes the actor for the original character on the successful imitation of the latter by the former. This is well answered by the fact that a valid inferential knowledge can arise from an invalid cognition of the *hetu* as

explained above, just as the valid inference—*पर्वतो वह्निमान्*—arises from the invalid perception of the column of smoke at the sight of the column of dust. The other objection is—how does the inferential knowledge of the spectator give him pleasure? This also is answered by Śrī Śaṅkuka. No doubt, the inferential cognitions we have in the world are not sources of pleasure; yet the *kāvya-numiti*, the inference in a *kāvya*, which possesses charming *sthāyibhāvas* as its *viśaya*, is a fountain of joy and delight. He argues that the capacity to create delight or sorrow does not depend upon the nature of the cognition but upon the object of it; and so the *sthāyibhāvas* while inferred from the *hetu*—the charming *alaukika vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *vyabhicāribhāvas*—possess an exquisite charm and as such, are capable of generating delight in the spectator.

It may be observed here that the *rasānumitivāda* as explained by Śrī Śaṅkuka was the model for the *anumiti* theory of Mahimabhaṭṭa, the exponent of one of the *anti-dhvani* schools.<sup>1</sup>

If Bhaṭṭalollaṭa's *rasotpattivāda* was criticised by Śrī Śaṅkuka, Śrī Śaṅkuka's *rasānumitivāda* also has been refuted by later writers of whom probably the earliest is Bhaṭṭatauta (one of the teachers of Abhinavagupta and the author of the *Kāvya-kautuka*) whose views are summarised by Abhinavagupta in his commentary on the *Nāṭya-śāstra*. One of the many objections against the *Rasānumitivāda* is this: if, according to Śaṅkuka, the emotion inferred as existing in the actor be an

Bhaṭṭatauta's  
criticism on  
Śrī Śaṅkuka's  
view.

<sup>1</sup> The *Nāṭyaśāstra*, *ibid.*, pp. 274 and 275.



*anukāra* (semblance) in the sense of an imitation of an emotion of the original character, it should be such either from the stand-point of the spectator, or from that of the actor. None of these alternatives can be satisfactorily explained. It is accepted that every case of imitation has to satisfy two conditions: (1) the previous experience of the original—the object imitated and, (2) the onlooker's experience of the imitator as possessing some attributes similar to those in the object imitated. Neither the actor, nor the spectator, has experienced the emotions of the characters, say, the love of Rāma to Sītā, either in this birth or in any one of his previous births. Nor can it be satisfactorily explained that the actor possesses the mental conditions of the original characters in the play, though he puts on suitable costumes to produce an impression on the audience that he is the character himself. This is the main charge against the *rasānumiti* theory. Some more objections like the impossibility of the *anukāranumiti* are also explained by Bhaṭṭatauta and his followers.<sup>1</sup>

Though Bhaṭṭatauta criticises the view of Śrī Śaṅkuka, he does not however give his own interpretation of the *Rasa-sūtra*. Most probably, what Abhinavagupta has explained was based on the interpretation of Bhaṭṭatauta.

Next comes Bhaṭṭanāyaka, the elder contemporary of Abhinavagupta. His interpretation, as Jagannātha gives under his *Rasa-sūtra*, may be thus briefly noted: Both the theories of *rasotpatti* and *rasānumiti* are untenable in that they suffer from a common defect that the permanent emotions or *sthāyibhāvas* are

<sup>1</sup> The *Nāṭyaśāstra*, *ibid.*, pp. 275-278.

described by both the schools as existing in the actor or in the original character, and not in the spectator who must be considered by all as the realiser of *Rasa*. Moreover, he has no *vibhāvas*—the generating agents of *Rasa*,—without which no realisation of *Rasa* takes place in the spectator. So he expounds the theory of *Rasa-bhukti* by the spectator. He speaks of three *vyāpāras* in a *kāvya*—(1) *abhidhā* or *abhidhāyaka*, (2) *bhāvanā* or *bhāvakatva*, and (3) *bhoga* or *bhojakatva*. The *abhidhā*'s chief function is to convey ideas like the *vibhāvas* and the *anubhāvas*. The *bhāvanā*'s function is universalization by removing the individualistic traits of the characters; that is, Sītā is cognised not as the wife of Rāma, but as a lovely maiden—कान्ता, so much so that it successfully removes the obstacles of Saṅkuka's realisation of *Rasa* by giving him no scope for cognising सीता as अगम्या. So also is Rāma, the *ālambanavibhāva*, cognised; and similarly the *uddiṣṭanavibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *vyabhiṣāribhāvas* are presented to the spectator's mind in a generalised form. Then, by the *bhoga-vyāpāra* the spectator completely forgets his own individual traits on account of the two *guṇas* of the mind, *rajas* and *tamas*, being completely suppressed by the other *guṇa*—*sattva*—the preponderance of which produces illumination of the mind and happiness to man. Here, Bhaṭṭanāyaka has closely followed the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy which explains the mind as a compound of the three *guṇas*—*sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*—the preponderance of *sattva* giving illumination, that of *rajas* unsteadiness, and that of *tamas* inactivity. This enjoyment of *Rasa* by the spectator is impersonal and so is different from the enjoyment of pleasure in the outside world. It is also different from that of a Yogin who sees *Ātman* only. Still the spectator's



pleasure is described as an approach to the *Ātmānanda* of the *Yogin*. According to this view the word 'निष्पत्तिः' in the *sūtra* means *bhukti* (enjoyment) resulting from the suppression of *rajas* and *tamas* and from the preponderance of *sattvaguna*; the word *saṁyoga* expresses the idea of *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa* (universalisation) by the *Bhāvakatvavyāpāra*.<sup>1</sup>

After the elucidation of Bhaṭṭanāyaka's view, Jagannātha explains the view of the Navyas' view. The Navyas do not accept the function of a Kāvya—साधारणीकरणम्; but they consider *sahṛdayatva* as a defect in the spectator which makes him, while witnessing a play, meditate upon the original character and identify himself with the latter, so much so that there arises in him for a while an *anīrvacanīya* love and other mental conditions just like the *anīrvacanīya* silver on the nacre. This culminates in the blissful realisation of *Rasa*. It lasts so long as his meditation (साधना) continues. The expounders of this view, however, accept the *vyāñjanāvyāpāra* which, they say, suggests to the spectator through the *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas*, etc., described in the play, the love of the hero to the heroine, and kindles his defect of *sahṛdayatva* to action, which leads him to the identification of himself with the character and to the blissful realisation of *Rasa*.

The objection how an *anīrvacanīya śoka* gives pleasure is answered by this school of critics by the explanation that there is a great difference between the actual and literary worlds and that in the latter the *anīrvacanīya* grief produces only pleasure in the spectator, whereas in the former that might result

in real grief to the person concerned. That is the greatness, they say, of literature which affords pleasure to all alike through the extraordinary power, *vyāñjanā*:

‘अयं हि लोकोत्तरस्य काव्यव्यापारस्य महिमा, यद्ययोज्या अरमणीया अपि शोकादयः पदार्था आह्लादमलौकिकं जनयन्ति । विलक्षणो हि कमनीयः काव्यव्यापारज आस्वादः प्रमाणान्तरजादनुभवात् ॥’

In this view, the word *saṁyoga* in the *sūtra* means *bhāvanā* (meditation) and रसनिष्पत्तिः is to be taken in the sense of the generation of the *anīrvacanīya rasi* of Duṣyanta—रसस्यानिर्वचनीयदुष्यन्तरस्याद्यात्मनो निष्पत्तिरूपत्तिः।<sup>1</sup>

After the Navya view, Jagannātha deals with other views in the interpretation of the Others' views. *Rasa-sūtra*, which are of minor importance. The exponents of some of these views do not accept the *vyāñjanāvyāpāra* and *anīrvacanīyakhyāti* and say that the spectator, by virtue of his *sahṛdayatva*, on witnessing the successful personation of the *ālambanavibhāvas* like Duṣyanta and Śakuntalā by an expert actor, identifies himself with the original character, Duṣyanta, in his love to Śakuntalā and that the realisation or mental experience of this identification gives him a thrill of pleasure. They also emphasize that such an identification and its blissful realisation would not take place in the ordinary world or in a dream. In this view, the word 'saṁyoga' in the *sūtra* would mean knowledge of the *vibhāvas*, etc., and the compound 'रसनिष्पत्तिः' also would mean the generation of a knowledge of the identity of the spectator with the original character.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> R. G., pp. 25-27.

<sup>2</sup> R. G., p. 27.

<sup>1</sup> R. G., pp. 23-25.



After dealing with the various interpretations of the *Rasa-sūtra*, Jagannātha establishes *Śānta*—a separate Rasa. *Śānta* as a separate Rasa even in *nāṭya* on the authority of Bharata. Some critics hold that *Śānta* and its *sthāyibhāva*, *śama*, cannot be staged and that the dramatic accompaniments—music, dancing, etc.—go against the nature of *śama* (calmness) which is characterised by detachment from worldly affairs. On the basis of the fact that the actor does not realise Rasa and that he has by his costumes and action to generate on the audience an extraordinary kind of emotional awakening, the author of the *Saṅgītaratnākara*, however, emphasises the importance of *Śānta* in *nāṭya* as the other eight Rasas:—

‘अष्टावेव रसा नाट्येविविक्ति केचिदच्युतम् ।  
तद्वच्चरु यतः कश्चिन्न रसं स्वदते नटः ॥’

That the importance of *Śānta* as a separate Rasa in a *Kāvya* has been well borne out by the great epic, the *Mahābhārata*, has been emphasised by Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta, Mammaṭabhaṭṭa and their followers.<sup>1</sup>

While giving the *sthāyibhāvas* and other details connected with the nine Rasas, Jagannātha explains the *sthāyibhāvas*, *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *vyabhicāribhāvas*. *Sthāyibhāvas* are permanent emotions. Though emotions are generally transient, they are manifested again and again in a *Kāvya* by means of *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas*, etc. They are in this respect

<sup>1</sup> R. G., pp. 29 and 30.

in contrast with *vyabhicāribhāvas*, the manifestation of which resembles that of a lightning. Hence *sthāyibhāvas* become Rasas when they are enduringly associated with *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *vyabhicāribhāvas*. The difference between Rasa and *sthāyibhāva* stands on a par with that between ether delimited by a pot and a pot, when we follow the interpretations of the *Rasa-sūtra*, according to Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Abhinavagupta. In the interpretation of the *Navyas* it is to be explained as in the case of a real silver and an *anirvacanīya* silver (produced in the instances of invalid perception). In the last view noted above, the difference between Rasa and *sthāyibhāva* is like that between a cognition and its object.

These *sthāyibhāvas* become *vyabhicāribhāvas* when their *vibhāvas*, etc., are not very effective. In *Virarasa krodha* (anger), the *sthāyibhāva* of *Raudra* Rasa, becomes a *vyabhicāribhāva*; similarly in *Raudra utsāha*, the *sthāyibhāva* of *Vīra*, becomes a *vyabhicāribhāva*; so *hāsa*, the *sthāyibhāva* of *Hāsyā*, becomes a *vyabhicāribhāva* of *Śṛṅgāra*. *Rati*, the *sthāyibhāva* of *Śṛṅgāra*, is otherwise known as *preman* (love) that subsists between a man and a woman. The love of a person to his teacher, to a deity or to his son, etc., is only a *vyabhicāribhāva*. *Śoka* (grief), the *sthāyibhāva* of *Karuṇa*, should not be confounded with that of a pair of lovers in their separation, which ultimately leads to their re-union. In this case, grief is a *vyabhicāribhāva*. When one of the lovers is dead and when there is not even a ray of hope for their re-union, even by some divine blessing as in the case of *Mahāśvetā*, *śoka* becomes *sthāyibhāva* and *rati* is only a *vyabhicāribhāva* in those cases. Some accept a separate Rasa called *Karuṇa-vipralambha* in those instances in which even



on the demise of one lover there is a chance of re-union by the intervention of a divine agent. *Nirveda*, the sthāyibhāva of *Śānta*, is nothing but renunciation of and dissociation from the worldly objects, leading to a knowledge of the ultimate Reality. *Krodha*, the sthāyibhāva of *Raudra* Rasa, is the burning indignation caused by great crimes like the murder of elders or kinsmen. If it is caused by a trifle, then it is a vyabhicāribhāva, *amarṣa*. *Utsāha*, the sthāyibhāva of *Vīra*, is feeling one's own dignity at the recollection of other's fall in status or in power. *Vismaya*, the sthāyibhāva of *Adbhuta*, is wonder generated by the sight of some supernatural event, person or thing. *Hāsa*, the sthāyibhāva of *Hāsyā*, is laughter at the sight of some grotesque features of the body or action of a man. *Bhaya*, the sthāyibhāva of *Bhayānaka*, is mental uneasiness or terror about some impending calamity like the approach of a wild tiger. *Jugupsā*, the sthāyibhāva of *Bībhatsa*, is disgust produced by witnessing a loathsome thing.

These sthāyibhāvas are known to be existing in some nāyakas and nāyikās in the actual world; they are known in the *Kāvyā* and *Nāṭya* by vyañjanā-vyāpāra and so nāyakas and nāyikās are alaukika and are called *ālambanavibhāvas* (mainsprings). So also are the *uddīpanavibhāvas* (excitants). The *anubhāvas* (ensuants) are the effects that follow these emotions or that make one infer the existence of these emotions. The *vyabhicāribhāvas* (evanescent emotions) that rise and fall like the waves of the ocean and accompany every now and then the permanent emotions.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> R. G., pp. 30-33.

After enumerating the vibhāvas, anubhāvas and vyabhicāribhāvas of each Rasa, Jagannātha illustrates each Rasa. *Saṁbhoga-śṛṅgāra* is illustrated by the verse—

शयिता सविधेऽप्यनीश्वरा  
सफलीकर्तुमहो ! मनोरथान् ।  
दयिता दयिताननाम्बुजं  
दरसीलद्वयना निरीक्षते ॥

This has already been elaborately explained under the classification of Kāvyas.<sup>1</sup>

*Vipralambhaśṛṅgāra* is illustrated by the verse—

वाचो माङ्गलिकीः प्रयाणसमये जल्पत्यनल्पं जने  
केलीमन्दिरमारुतायनमुखे विन्यस्तवक्त्राम्बुजा ।  
निःश्वासग्लपिताश्वरोपरि पतद्गम्पाद्रवक्षोरुहा  
बाला लोलविलोचना शिव ! शिव ! प्राणेशमालोकते ॥

This is the leave-taking of a departing husband from a young damsel. Unlike other kinsmen who speak much while taking leave, she looks through a window at him, heaves heavy sighs and sheds volumes of tears. The words 'शिव शिव' suggest well that the separation is heart-rending to her and speaks volumes of her unbearable agony which expressed itself by her eager looks, heavy sighs and volumes of tears. This is a typical instance of the *Vipralambhaśṛṅgāra-dhvani*, which is based on the combination of the *ālambanavibhāva*, the nāyaka, on the anubhāvas, the heavy breaths and tears of the nāyikā and on the vyabhicāribhāvas, the mental agony,

<sup>1</sup> See ante; p. 89 and 90.

'May the royal prosperity come to a stop; may the sharp weapons fall upon (me and my people); may the God of Death take away my head; still my mind would not go a step away from dharma (righteous path)'—if the last word *dharmāt* is altered by *satyāt* it would be an illustration of *satyavīra*, which would be accepted as a fifth variety. If it is said that *dharma* includes *satya* also, then *dāna* and *dayā* would also come under it, so that the separate mention of these two is not necessary. Similarly *pāṇḍityavīra*, *kṣamā-vīra* and *balavīra* may be mentioned as additional varieties if these varieties are recognised.

*Adbhuta* is illustrated by the verse—

*Adbhutadhvani.* चराचरजगज्जालसदनं वदनं तव ।  
गलद्गगनगाम्भीर्यं वीक्ष्यासि हृतचेतना ॥

'I fall unconscious while seeing your face deep as the sky and the abode of the animate and inanimate worlds.'

This is the statement of Yaśodā when she saw the whole universe in the mouth of her son Kṛṣṇa. Here, Kṛṣṇa's face is the *ālambanavibhāva*, Yaśodā's seeing the whole world is the *uddīpana* and her being stunned, horripilation, throbbing of the eyes, etc., are the *anubhāvas*, and her fear etc., are the *vyabhicāribhāvas*.

*Hāsyā* is illustrated by the verse—

*Hāsyadhvani.* श्रीतातपादैर्विहिते निबन्धे  
निरूपिता नूतनयुक्तिरेषा ।  
अङ्गं शवां पूर्वमहो ! पवित्रं  
न वा कथं रासभधर्मपत्न्याः ॥

'In the work written by (my) revered father the following new argument is made:—The front part of the body of the cows is pure and sacred; why is that of a female ass not pure?' Here the son of a logician is the *ālambana*, his assertion without a tinge of doubt is the *uddīpana*, the exhibition of his teeth, etc., are the *anubhāva*, and his mental uneasiness, etc., are the *vyabhicāribhāvas*—all these contribute to the suggestion of *hāsyā rasa*.

*Bhayānaka* is illustrated by the verse—

*Bhayānaka-* श्येनमम्बरतलादुपागतं  
*dhvani.* शुष्यदाननबिलो विलोकयन् ।  
कम्पमानतनुराकुलेक्षणः  
स्पन्दितुं न हि शशाक लावकः ॥

'Seeing the vulture coming nearby from the sky, the *lāvaka* (a bird) with its pale face, throbbing body and anxious looks, could not stir out.'

The vulture is the *ālambanavibhāva*, its eager flight is the *uddīpana*, the paleness of the face of the bird is the *anubhāva* and mental uneasiness, etc., are the *vyabhicāribhāvas*. Hence it has the suggestion of *Bhayānaka Rasa*.

*Bibhatsa* is illustrated by the verse—

*Bibhatsa-* नखैर्विदारितान्त्राणां शवानां पृथशोणितम् ।  
*dhvani.* आननेष्वनुलिम्पन्ति हृष्टा वेतालयोपितः ॥

'The female ghosts become happy when they drink the blood from the corpses with intestines completely dislocated and torn off with nails.'

Here the suggestion of *Bibhatsa* is based on the corpses, the *ālambanavibhāvas*, the tearing of the intestines, the *uddīpana*, the closing of the eyes,



horripilation, etc., due to happiness are the *anubhāvas*, impatience, eagerness, etc., are the *vyabhicāribhāvas*.<sup>1</sup>

Before closing this section Jagannātha discusses the possibility of recognising *bhakti* as a separate *Rasa*. He says that *Bhakti* is a *bhāva* only. when the *Bhāgavata* and other *Purāṇas* are studied, the devotees enjoy the *bhaktirasa*, the realisation of which is based on the God in view as the *ālambana*, the horripilation, shedding tears, etc., as the *anubhāvas*, pleasure, etc., as the *vyabhicāribhāvas*; and that *rati*, the devoted love for God, is the *sthāyī-bhāva*, which being inimical to *vairāgya* (renunciation), cannot be identified with *śānta*. This is not met on satisfactory grounds. The distinction between *śṛṅgāra* and *bhakti* is maintained in that in the former *rati* is *sthāyībhāva* while in the latter it is *vyabhicāribhāva*; and Bharata has not recognised *Bhakti* as a separate *Rasa*. So, like most of his predecessors Jagannātha concludes that *bhakti* is not a separate *Rasa* but only a *bhāva*.<sup>2</sup>

In the question of the combination of conflicting *Rasas* in a literary work, Jagannātha is a close follower of the *aucitya* dictum as enunciated by Ānandavardhana, which is followed and systematised by Kṣemendra in his *Aucityavicāracarcā*. *Aucitya* is nothing but the propriety and adaptability of various elements in a *kāvya*. Here he gives rather a broad analysis of how *Rasas* can be harmoniously blended in a *kāvya*. He suggests the possibility of the happy combinations of *Vīra* and *Śṛṅgāra*, *Vīra* and *Adbhuta*, *Vīra* and *Raudra*, *Śṛṅgāra*

<sup>1</sup> R. G., pp. 35-45.

<sup>2</sup> R. G., pp. 45-46.

and *Adbhuta* and *Śṛṅgāra* and *Hāsyā*. And he does not sanction under ordinary circumstances the combinations of *Śṛṅgāra* and *Bībhatsa*, *Śṛṅgāra* and *Karuṇa*, *Vīra* and *Bhayānaka*, *Śānta* and *Raudra* and *Śānta* and *Śṛṅgāra*, in view of the fact that the unrestricted delineation of two antagonistic *Rasas* (as grouped above) impedes the progress of each other in a *prabandha*. We see, however, in Kālidāsa's works the happy admixture of *Vipralambhaśṛṅgāra* and *Karuṇa* and of almost all *Rasas* in Bhavabhūti's *Mālatīmādhava*. This success depends upon the masterly skill of the artist who chooses one as the main sentiment and other sentiments, as accessories to the main.

In this connection Jagannātha indicates how two or more *Rasas* in a *kāvya* should not be combined: for instance, (1) when a hero is delineated to be the *ālambanavibhāva* of two antagonistic *Rasas*,—*Vīra* and *Bhayānaka*, etc., and (2) when the realisation of one *Rasa* obstructs that of the other.

Jagannātha also shows how the disagreeableness merges into agreeableness when two conflicting *Rasas* are delineated as existing in two different characters: for example, Rāma, the hero of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, is described as an ideal of heroism, which is more exemplified when he is described as the destroyer of Rāvaṇa, the counter-hero, possessing great fear for Rāma. Here the delineation of *Vīra* and *Bhayānaka* *Rasas* in two different *ālambanavibhāvas* solves to a great extent the question of their disagreeableness.

When, in the delineation of two *Rasas* opposed to each other, another agreeable *Rasa* intervenes, the disagreeableness of the combination is not felt as in



ordinary circumstances. Here Jagannātha cites a concrete example from his *Ākhyāyikā* (probably, the *Yamunāvarṇana*, which is now lost): there at the outset the saintly qualities of Śvetaketu at the hermitage of Kaṇva are described so as to impress on the readers' minds the elements of calmness and serenity, dissociation from temporal pleasures and final renunciation—*sānti*. At the end of this the element of wonder (*adbhuta*) is strikingly suggested by the passage—

‘किमिदमनाकलितपूर्वं रूपम् ; कोऽयमनिर्वाच्यो वचनरचनाया मधुरिमा’ ॥

‘What a figure is this which has not yet come within human comprehension; extraordinary sweetness does (her) speech possess!’

After this comes a beautiful description of a damsel, who is made by the poet the object of love in the story.

Similarly through the intervention of *Virarasa* in the admixture of *Śṛṅgāra* and *Bibhatsa* in a *kāvya*, there is no room for disagreeableness as in the example—

‘सुराङ्गनाभिराश्लिष्टा व्योम्नि वीरा विमानगाः ।  
विलोकन्ते निजान्देहान्केरुनारीभिरावृतान्’ ॥

‘The heroes sitting in the aerial cars in the sky, being embraced by divine damsels, look at their own bodies surrounded by she-jackals’.

Here between *Śṛṅgāra* and *Bibhatsa* which have the divine damsels and dead bodies as their *ālambana-vibhāvas*, is introduced *Virarasa* indicated by the ascendancy of the heroes into heaven. Hence the *virodha* is removed.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> R. G., pp. 46-47.

Again, the disagreeableness of combining two or more antagonistic Rasas disappears when one of them is made the main and the rest are accessories. Even if two *aṅgarasas* opposed to each other are related to one main agreeable Rasa, the *virodha* of *aṅgarasas* vanishes.<sup>1</sup>

In the delineation of Rasa, the poet has to take particular care not only in unifying opposed Rasas in his prabandha but also in avoiding expression of Rasas by their terms like *śṛṅgāra*. Undesirable things in poetry, to be avoided by the poet.

*Suggestion is the vital point of Rasa*; and its realisation by a *sahṛdaya* will be successfully effected only by its blissful suggestion by *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *vyabhicāribhāvas* in a *kāvya*. So the expression of a Rasa by its own name results in the poetic demerit—*vamana* (vomiting). Not only is Rasa to be suggested but also all the *vyabhicāribhāvas* and *sthāyibhāvas*.

Similarly, *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas*, etc. are to be presented to the readers or to the audience in such a way that the knowledge of these conditions would immediately result in the realisation of Rasa by them without any hindrance. Any undue delay in their realisation by the spectator would obstruct his realisation of Rasa. The main Rasa is therefore to be developed in such a way that there might be no obstruction or suppression in the middle; and, there would be no full and unobstructed realisation of it by the spectator if it is first given life and then revived after effecting its total obstruction by the introduction of a thing quite irrelevant or antagonistic to the main Rasa. Such an obstruction followed by the revival of the main Rasa would bring in the poetic defect—*विच्छिन्नदीपनम्* ।

<sup>1</sup> R. G., pp. 48-49.



Similarly, the poet should not delineate Rasa under unsuitable circumstances, nor obstruct its development when obstruction is of no avail. The description of the love between a pair of lovers eagerly waiting for their secret meeting would be, for example, out of place in a context of the description of sacred dharma like the worship of *sandhyā* and the performance of sacrifices to please devas, etc. Similarly, to make a heroic Nāyaka describe the efficacy of dharma like the worship of *sandhyā*, etc., when his enemies beat their drums and announce that they are visible, is detrimental to the main Rasa. The description of the achievements of the *pratīnāyaka* (counter-hero) should be of such a nature as would bring to light and enhance the greatness of the *nāyaka* who kills the former at the end.

In the development of the plot, the poet should not introduce any incident going against the main Rasa, lest it should result in *rasa-bhaṅga*. In the characters also, both main and lower, the descriptions should be true to nature or reality. All these mainly depend upon the extraordinary skill of the poet who has, as a conscious artist, to choose and knit such an *itivṛtta* and delineate such characters as would finally result in the success in the delineation of Rasa, which alone contributes to the *sahyodaya*'s enjoyment of aesthetic pleasure in poetry.<sup>1</sup>

The next important topic in the *Rasagaṅgādhara* is the discussion of *guṇas*—poetic merits. *Guṇas* are merits in poetry when they are conducive through the *saṅghaṭanā* or combination of select letters, words and phrases even, to the development of Rasa. Or

<sup>1</sup> R. G., pp. 50-53.

*saṅghaṭanās* depend on the poetic merits both of sense and sound and they, while revealing the sweetness, lucidity and vigour, suggest fully to the readers the developed Rasas—Śṛṅgāra, Vīra or other Rasas as the case may be. This is what Ānandavardhana has propounded about the *guṇas* and *saṅghaṭanās* in a *kāvya*, in the following verse—

‘गुणानाश्रित्य तिष्ठन्ती माधुर्यादीन्व्यनक्ति सा ।

रसांस्तन्निमित्ते हेतुरौचित्यं वक्तृवाच्ययोः’ ॥<sup>1</sup>

And he emphasises that the principle of *aucitya* in both *vaktṛ* (speaker) and *vācya* (thing spoken of) in a *kāvya* is to be fully observed by the poet in successfully developing a Rasa through a *saṅghaṭanā*. Adhering to this dictum of *aucitya*, Jagannātha classifies *guṇas* into three—*mādhurya* (sweetness), *dīpti* (brightness or vigour) and *prasāda* (lucidity). This threefold classification is accepted by Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta.

In his *Locana*, Abhinavagupta explains the three *guṇas* as nothing but the *cittavṛttis*—*वृत्ति*, *दीप्ति* and *विकास*, and adds that the terms—*माधुर्य*, *ओजस्* and *प्रसाद*—primarily convey these *cittavṛttis*, and by *lakṣaṇā*, the respective *rasadharmas* in that the *kārya* is identified with the *kāraṇa* and by *lakṣitalakṣaṇā*, the *śabda* and *artha* which help the suggestion of those Rasas. Jagannātha closely follows this view and he criticises the other view held by Mammaṭabhaṭṭa and others that *guṇas* rest in Rasas and produce these *cittavṛttis*.<sup>2</sup>

In assigning these three *guṇas* to various Rasas, Jagannātha seems to have followed Abhinavagupta. According to Abhinavagupta, *mādhurya* and *dīpti* are

<sup>1</sup> vide the *Dhvanyāloka*, III Udyota, Kārikā 6 (N. S. edn. p. 134)

<sup>2</sup> vide the *Locana* (N. S. edn. 1911), pp. 79, 80 and 82.



opposed to each other and as such *mādhurya* exists in Karuṇa, Vipralambhaśṛṅgāra and Sambhogaśṛṅgāra while *dīpti* exists in Raudra, Vīra and Adbhuta. The degree of *mādhurya* in Karuṇa is the greatest; that in Vipralambhaśṛṅgāra is greater than that in Sambhogaśṛṅgāra. In Hāsyā, an accessory of Śṛṅgāra, there is a happy admixture in equal degree of *mādhurya* and *dīpti*. In Bhayānaka and Bibhatsa *dīpti* is found in abundance while *mādhurya*, only to a lesser extent. In Śānta, varying with circumstances, *dīpti* and *mādhurya* are found, sometimes to a high degree and sometimes to a lesser degree. And *prasāda* is the vitally important *guṇa* in the nine Rasas.<sup>1</sup>

But Mammāṭabhaṭṭa and others assign these *guṇas* to various Rasas in a slightly different way. *Mādhurya* is found in Karuṇa, Vipralambhaśṛṅgāra and Śānta, its prominence being greater in the second than in the first and much more intense in the third than in the first two. So also *ojas* is characteristic suggestive of Bibhatsa, Vīra and Raudra, its intensity being greater in the latter than in the former. Some view that Adbhuta, Hāsyā and Bhayānaka possess *mādhurya* and *ojas* while others think that they too like other Rasas possess only *prasāda* which is a *guṇa* common to all Rasas.<sup>2</sup>

In this connection, Jagannātha gives a detailed exposition of the ten *guṇas* pertaining to both śabda and artha, as expounded by Jarattaras—Daṇḍin and other ancient Ālaṅkārikas.<sup>3</sup> He further enumerates all that is not desirable in a *saṅghaṭanā* on which depends the delineation of one or more of the sentiments by the artist-poet in a kāvya or drama.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Locana, *ibid.*, p. 82.

<sup>3</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 55-66.

<sup>2</sup> R. G., pp. 53 and 54.

<sup>4</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 66-74.

## CHAPTER V

### *As a Literary Critic (continued)*

MOST critics of the dhvani and post-dhvani periods have in detail dwelt upon the classification of dhvani, without which the full elucidation of the *dhvani doctrine* is not complete. Like Ānanda-  
vardhana and Abhinavagupta in the  
Classification of dhvani. dhvani period and Mammāṭabhaṭṭa, Vidyānātha and Viśvanātha in the post-dhvani period, Jagannātha Paṇḍita, the last of the great exponents of dhvani in the post-dhvani period, has given in his *Rasagaṅgādhara* a brief yet up-to-date classification of dhvani with suitable illustrations.

It is admitted that the most important variety of dhvani is the *Rasa-dhvani* without which no *kāvya* is a source of pleasure. It is in this sense that the *Rasa-dhvani* is called the *viśrāntidhāman*—the chief contributor of pleasure in the form of complete cessation of restlessness. The other two well-known varieties of dhvani—*Vastudhvani* and *Ālaṅkāradhvani*—do not stand on a par with the *Rasa-dhvani* in that they are not themselves *viśrāntidhāmans*, but are described as *anyaśābdavailakṣaṇyakārins* (i.e.), as different from the *vācyārtha* (primary sense) and the *lakṣyārtha* (secondary sense) and lead, as suggested senses, to a *pāryantikarasadhvani*—culmination in a



Rasadhvani.<sup>1</sup> This three-fold classification is based on the nature of the suggested sense—*Rasa* (or *Bhāva*) *Vastu* and *Alaṅkāra*. The term *vastu* in the compound *Vastudhvani* is so general as to include within its abhidheyārtha both *rasa* and *alaṅkāra*; but it is generally taken to mean any *vastu* (idea) other than *rasa* and *alaṅkāra*. In the compound *alaṅkāradhvani* there is a paradox—an *alaṅkāra* as *alaṅkāra* cannot be a *dhvani* and *vice versa*—, which is generally answered by the application of the *brāhmaṇaśramaṇanyāya*; that is, just as a *brāhmaṇa* cannot be a *śramaṇa* but one, once a *brāhmaṇa*, may afterwards become a *śramaṇa*, so the *alaṅkāra*, once an *alaṅkāra*, becomes now a *dhvani*.<sup>2</sup>

Another well-known classification of *dhvani* is based on the *vyāñjakas*—*śabda* and *artha*, the former expressing the latter by the two potencies—*abhidhā* and *lakṣaṇā*. The two main varieties of the *dhvani* (on the basis of the *abhidheyārtha*), popularly known as

<sup>1</sup> vide the *Locana* (N. S. edition 1911), p. 27—  
'तेन रस एव वस्तुत आत्मा, वस्त्वलङ्कारध्वनी तु सर्वथा रसं प्रति पर्यवस्येते  
इति वाच्यादुक्त्यै तावित्यभिप्रायेण ध्वनिः काव्यस्यात्मेति सामान्येनोक्तम्' ॥  
vide the *Dhvanyāloka* (N. S. edition 1911), p. 28—  
'प्रतीयमानस्य चान्यप्रभेददर्शनेऽपि रसभावमुखेनैवोपलक्षणम्, प्राधान्यात्' ।  
vide the *Locana*, *ibid.*, p. 28—'प्राधान्यादिति—रसपर्यवसाना-  
दित्यर्थः । तावन्मात्रविश्रान्तावपि चान्यशाब्दवैलक्षण्यकारित्वेन वस्त्वलङ्कार-  
ध्वनेरपि जीवितत्वमौचित्यादुक्तमिति भावः' ॥

<sup>2</sup> vide the *Locana*, *ibid.*, p. 15—'यः पूर्वं कापि वाक्यार्थो  
ऽलङ्कारभावमुपमादिरूपतया अन्वभूत्, इदानीन्तनलङ्काररूप एवान्यत्र गुणी-  
भावभावात्पूर्वप्रत्यभिज्ञानबलादलङ्कारध्वनिरिति व्यपदिश्यते ब्राह्मणश्रमण-  
न्यायेन ; तद्रूपताभावेन तूपलक्षितं वस्तुमात्रमुच्यते' ॥

*vivakṣitānyaparavācyadhvani*, are the *asāmlakṣyakrama-*  
*dhvani* and the *sāmlakṣyakramadhvani*. The first of  
these two possesses many varieties—*rasadhvani*, *bhāva-*  
*dhvani*, *rasābhāsadhvani*, *bhāvābhāsadhvani*, *bhāvaśānti-*  
*dhvani*, *bhāvodayadhvani*, *bhāvasandhidhvani*, *bhāvaśaba-*  
*latādhvani*, etc., where the chief point of interest lies  
in the fact that it is *akrama*—devoid of any perceptible  
sequence of time between the cognitions of the abhi-  
dheyārtha and the *vyāñgyārtha*. In the instance of  
Rasadhvani, the *vācyārtha* would immediately lead one  
to the realisation of *Rasa*; (*i.e.*) when the *vibhāvas*  
and *anubhāvas* of the *Rasa* in question are beautifully  
described by the poet and when the chief *vyabhicāri-*  
*bhāvas* are successfully suggested by their own *vibhāvas*  
and *anubhāvas*, the blissful suggestion of *Rasa* takes  
place all at once and this leads a true *sahṛdaya* to the  
enjoyment of what is called *aesthetic* pleasure.

Jagannātha, after explaining elaborately the *dhvanis*  
of the nine *Rasas*, elucidates in detail the *bhāvadhvanis*,  
giving the definitions and suitable illustrations of the  
thirty-four *vyabhicāribhāvas*.<sup>1</sup> He observes, on the  
authority of Bharata that since *rati* which has  
reference to *guru*, *deva*, *nṛpa*, *putra*, etc., is included in  
the *vyabhicāribhāvas*, there is no need for recognising  
*vātsalya* (which has reference to *putra*) as a separate  
*Rasa*.

After illustrating the *bhāvadhvanis*, *rasābhāsa-*  
*dhvanis*, *bhāvaśāntidhvani*, *bhāvo-*  
*dayadhvani*, *bhāvasandhidhvani* and  
*bhāvaśabalatādhvani*, he expresses  
the opinion<sup>2</sup> that the varieties of

<sup>1</sup> vide the *Rasagaṅgādhara*, *ibid.*, pp. 76–98.

<sup>2</sup> vide *R. G.*, *ibid.*, p. 104.



*dhvani* like *bhāvaśānti*, *bhāvodaya*, *bhāvasandhi* and *bhāvaśabalatā* are varieties or representations of *bhāva-dhvani* only, since in such cases *bhāva* is to be given the chief place in the body of suggestion, though its particular stages, *śānti*, etc., are like the *bhāvas* the sources of pleasure. If *śānti* etc., of the *bhāvas* are given prominence in the suggestion, then Jagannātha contends that in the instance—

क्षमापणैकपदयोः पदयोः पतति प्रिये ।

शेमुः सरोजनयनानयनारुणकान्तयः ॥

in which *śama* is expressed by the verb '*śemuḥ*' the *bhāva*—*roṣa* (anger)—is suggested by the compound—'*नयनारुणकान्तयः*'; and it would not therefore have been called an instance of *bhāvaśānti-dhvani*. The argument that the word *śemuḥ* expresses *śama* (subsidence) of *nāyanārūṇakānti* (the red hue of the eyes) and not that of *anger* suggested, falls to the ground in view of the fact that in such examples quoted above the *sahṛdayas* recognise *bhāvaśānti-dhvani* even when *śama* is *vācya*. And it is accepted that *bhāva*, suggested in those cases, is the chief source of pleasure and *śama*, etc., as the expressed ideas, are subordinate to *bhāva*; and the particular stages of *bhāva* like *śama* and *udaya* are presented as determinating attributes of the *bhāva* in its aesthetic experience (*carvaṇā*).

These *dhvanis* become *asāmlakṣyakramadhvanis* under three conditions: (1) a clear context, (2) the easy understanding of *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *vyabhicāri-bhāvas* described by the poet and (3) the cultured *sahṛdaya* who, as soon as he understands the *vācya* *rtha*, is led to the blissful realisation of *Rasa*, *bhāva* or any other suggested idea.

If the context is not clear but is to be known after careful consideration of many facts, Jagannātha says, the suggestion of *bhāva* arising there is only an instance of *sāmlakṣyakramadhvani*. Here he quotes his own verse that he has already cited as an instance of *uttamottamakāvya*—

‘तल्पगतापि च सुतनुः श्वासासङ्गं न या सेहे ।

संप्रति सा हृदयगतं प्रियपाणिं मन्दमाक्षिपति ॥’

Here the context is in a general way indicated by the word *सम्प्रति*, but it is to be investigated and known—whether the change in the behaviour of the *nāyikā* is due to the change of conduct in the *nāyaka* or whether she effects such a change, as described, owing to circumstances over which she has no control. From the author's explanation of the context, it is clear that the *nāyaka* is on the eve of his departure to a distant place, and her slow removal of the *nāyaka*'s hand from her bosom at the night previous to his parting is nothing but the outcome of her mental agony at the thought that she would be soon separated from her lover for a long time. The understanding of this context would take a long time. Hence it is called an instance of *sāmlakṣyakramadhvani*.

This explanation of a *bhāvadhvani* as *sāmlakṣyakrama* is accepted by Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta. In the verse taken from Kālidāsa's *Kumārasam-bhava*—

‘एवं वादिनि देवपौ पार्थे पितुरधोमुखी ।

लीलाकमलपत्राणि गणयामास पार्वती ॥

they explain the suggestion of the *bhāva*—*lajjā* (modesty) of *Pārvatī* which is to be understood by



taking into account the context, viz., the speech of the sage Aṅgiras to her father Himavān about her marriage with Siva. The suggestion of *lajjā*, though a *bhāvadhvani*, is therefore an instance of *samlakṣyakramadhvani* in that it takes some time for one to understand the context fully. Pārvaṭi's counting of the lotus-petals makes it clear that it is due to her modesty only, especially when sage Aṅgiras opened the topic of her marriage to her father Himavān.

This suggestion of *bhāva* as an instance of *samlakṣyakramadhvani* is further explained by Jagannātha as none other than a *vastudhvani*, since in such instances, there is no full scope for the realisation of the *bhāva* from its causes—*vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas*, etc., directly. The blissful realisation of a *bhāva* or *Rasa* by a *sahṛdaya* from the understanding of its *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas*, etc., is immediate in all instances of *asamlakṣyakramadhvani*. The explanation of the *samlakṣyakramabhāvadhvani*, etc., as a *vastudhvani* is also acceptable to Abhinavagupta, for he classifies the *arthaśaktimūlānuraṇādhvani*, a main variety of *samlakṣyakramadhvani*, into twelve—six *vastudhvanis* and six *alaṅkāradhvanis*—on the basis of six kinds of *vācārthas*, each suggesting a *vastu* and *alaṅkāra*,—स्वतः संभविस्तु, कविप्रौढोक्तिनिष्पन्नवस्तु, कविनिबद्धवस्तुप्रौढोक्तिनिष्पन्नवस्तु, स्वतः सम्भव्यलङ्कार, कविप्रौढोक्तिनिष्पन्नलङ्कार and कविनिबद्धवस्तुप्रौढोक्तिनिष्पन्नलङ्कार; and no *dhvani* of *Rasa*, *bhāva*, etc., is included in the scheme of classification of the *artha-samlakṣyakramadhvani*.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> R. G., *ibid.*, p. 107.

In the elucidation of the *samlakṣyakramadhvani* Jagannātha discusses various view-points regarding the scope of *vyāñjanā*—*vyāpāra*—the power of suggestion—which is the most vital feature in poetry. Before he gives his own view he explains the views of some *prācīnas*.

One school says that in the use of homonyms *Prācīna View I.* one may naturally understand more than one meaning; but when only one meaning would suit the context, the other is not conveyed by the word by its *abhidhāśakti*, since the cognition of the context or of the intention of the speaker completely obstructs that of the other meanings by the hearer; and then by *vyāñjanāvyaṁpāra* these śabdās convey the non-contextual sense (the *aprākaraṇikārtha*).

According to this school it is to be noted that there arises on the basis of प्रकरणज्ञान or तात्पर्यज्ञान a recollection (उपस्थिति) presenting the contextual idea, which finally leads to the verbal cognition of the same. Another *upasthiti* presenting a non-contextual idea from the same word by a separate *abhidhā* cannot take place, since it is admitted that the knowledge of the context or of the intention of the speaker through the context obstructs it. The same cannot be said in the case of *vyāñjanā* by which the same word suggests the non-contextual sense, in view of the fact that the scope of *vyāñjanā* cannot be controlled or restricted by the knowledge of the context, or the knowledge of *vyāñjanā* is called an *uttejaka* (i.e.) the knowledge of *vyāñjanā* is the obstacle of the obstacle, viz., the knowledge of the *prakaraṇa*.

This view is based on the oft-quoted Kārikā—  
'शब्दार्थस्यानवच्छेदे विशेषस्तृप्तिहेतवः';



that is, when there is a doubt as to the nature of the sense of a word (by *abhidhā*), context, etc., are helpful in generating a recollection presenting the contextual sense only. So the non-contextual sense of the homonyms is known only through *vyāñjanā*. This view has been explained by Mammataḥaṭṭa in his *Kāvya-prakāśa*, II, 19—

‘अनेकार्थस्य शब्दस्य वाचकत्वे नियन्त्रिते ।

संयोगाद्यैरवाच्यार्थधीकृद्वापृतिरञ्जनम् ॥

When the *saṃyoga*, etc., restrict the *abhidhāśakti* (the primary significative potency) of a homonym to a particular sense, the knowledge of the non-primary sense (non-contextual sense) is derived from the *śabda* by its *vyāñjanāvyāpāra*.<sup>1</sup>

Another school gives practically the same explanation with the difference that the **Prācīna View II.** *padārthopasthiti* arising from the knowledge of a homonym presents the contextual and the non-contextual senses alike and that the knowledge of the context does not obstruct that of the non-contextual sense. And it emphasizes that though the *padārthopasthiti* presents both contextual and non-contextual senses, it generates on the basis of the *tātparyajñāna* a verbal cognition presenting the contextual sense only; and that the verbal cognition of non-contextual sense would arise from those homonyms by *vyāñjanāvyāpāra*.

According to this view, the *prācīnakārikā* is to be interpreted thus:—that context, etc., help one to understand the intention of the speaker—*tātparyanirṇaya*, and thus arises a verbal cognition presenting only the contextual sense.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> R. G., *ibid.*, pp. 110 and 111. <sup>2</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 111 and 112.

A third school holds that both the contextual and non-contextual senses of a homonym can be known from it by its *abhidhāśakti* itself. It rejects the first view that the *śābdabodha* of one sense (of a homonym)—contextual—should be based on the recollection presenting only that sense of the word, on the ground that the *śābdabodha* of one sense of the homonym—contextual—arises on the basis of the hearer's knowledge of the context and of the intention of the speaker, even when he recollects more than one sense from the word. It adds that the knowledge of the context or the knowledge of the speaker's intention need not be considered an obstruction for the hearer's recollection of the other sense—non-contextual—of the homonym, since nowhere it is experienced that a recollection is obstructed when its causes—impressions and their invoking agents—are present. Men of experience who have understood the different senses of homonyms recollect from them both contextual and non-contextual senses in spite of their knowledge of the context and they enlighten others who do not know the context in statements like ‘*payah ramanīyam*’ made in reference to milk, that the word *payah* primarily means only milk and not water, though the word *payah* conveys by its *abhidhāśakti* both milk and water.

It also discards the second view that, after the *śābdabodha* of the contextual sense, on the basis of the hearer's knowledge of the context, etc., that of the non-contextual sense arises from the word by means of *vyāñjanā*. In this connection, two alternatives favouring the employment of *vyāñjanā* are raised and discarded:—Whether *vyāñjanā* is to be accepted in all cases of homonyms or whether it is only in some instances. If the first alternative be accepted, the



knowledge of the intention of the speaker need not be accepted as a necessary condition of the *śābdabodha* presenting the contextual sense, in view of the fact that the *śābdabodha* arising from a homonym takes as its object both the contextual and non-contextual senses; and the *tātparyajñāna* is helpful only in the understanding of the correct usage of the word. The second alternative is untenable on the ground that nothing can be definitely said as the invariable condition of the adoption of *vyāñjanā*. The *tātparyajñāna* cannot be said to be the basis of *vyāñjanā*, since the expounders of *vyāñjanā* accept it as even suggestive of *atātparyārthas*. Nor can it be affirmed that the cultured reader possesses an extraordinary *śakti* by which he can appreciate the suggestiveness of poetry in the case of beautiful *nānārthaśabdās*, in view of the fact that the *śakti* of the *sahṛdaya* can as well be said to be helpful in the revival of the *abhidhā* of the homonym in the non-contextual sense that has been obstructed by the knowledge of the intention of the speaker, etc.; and so in the instances of beautiful *nānārthaśabdās*, it cannot be held that the second idea is always known by *vyāñjanā*.

Even the argument that some homonyms convey vulgar ideas by *vyāñjanā* as in the example—

‘जैमिनीयमलं धत्ते रसनायामयं द्विजः’ ।

which cannot be conveyed by *abhidhāśakti* on account of the *bādhapratyaya* (as in the instances—‘बहिना सिञ्चति’—) falls to the ground since in such instances of *bādhapratyaya* arises (invalid) *śābdabodha*; otherwise no instance of *atiśayokti* like

“सौधानां नगरस्यास्य मिलित्यर्केण मौलयः” ॥

(which involves such *bādhā*) can be satisfactorily explained in its primary sense.<sup>1</sup>

Jagannātha's own opinion on this question is that there is definite scope for *vyāñjanā* in *nānārthaśabdās* if there is *upamā*—similarity and parallelism—between the contextual and non-contextual senses *to be suggested*.

Jagannātha further argues that the power of *vyāñjanā* in a Kāvya can be clearly exemplified by the *yogarūḍha* words when they are used in their derivative senses. In such instances neither by *abhidhā*, nor by *lakṣaṇā*, do the words convey the derivative sense, but they do so by *vyāñjanā*. It is an admitted fact that the *yogarūḍhaśabdās* convey by their *abhidhāśakti* such derivative senses as are restricted by *rūḍhi*: for example, the word *pañkaja* conveys the idea of *lotus produced from mud* and not of other species like the lily originating from mud. Nor can it be argued that the derivative senses are conveyed by those words by the power of *lakṣaṇā*, since there is no ground for *lakṣaṇā*, viz., absurdity of the primary meaning in the context. So the adoption of a third potency of *śabda*, viz., *vyāñjanā* is essential to explain the mere derivative senses of the *yogarūḍha*. Jagannātha sums up this discussion in this verse—

‘योगरूढस्य शब्दस्य योगे रूढ्या नियन्त्रिते ।

धियं योगस्पृशोऽर्थस्य या सूते व्यञ्जनैव सा’ ॥

‘When the derivative sense of *yogarūḍhaśabda* is restricted by *rūḍhi*, the purely derivative sense of that word is to be conveyed by *vyāñjanā*.’ He illustrates it by the verse—

<sup>1</sup> R. G., *ibid.*, pp. 112–116.



‘अबलानां श्रियं हत्वा वारिवाहैः सहानिशम् ।  
तिष्ठन्ति चपला यत्र स कालस्समुपस्थितः’ ॥

‘That time is come when the lightnings which have robbed the beauty of handsome females, shine incessantly in the company of clouds.’

Here the words ‘*abalā*’, ‘*vārivāha*’ and ‘*capalā*’, all *yogarūḍha* words, when they are taken in their derivative senses, suggest the idea that some women of easy virtue who have taken the wealth of people that cannot resist them, wander in the company of water-carriers.

Jagannātha has thus analysed the scope of *vyāñjanā* both in the *nānārthāśabdās* and in the *yogarūḍhāśabdās* and justified the *prācīna* view accepting the employment of *vyāñjanāvyaṅgyāpāra* in instances of the *nānārthāśabdās* not only for the suggestion of *upamā* and other *alaukīkārās* but also for that of the non-contextual senses, by the statement that the employment of *vyāñjanā* in such cases would save much trouble in the understanding of the non-contextual meaning, though this would not help in establishing *vyāñjanā* (suggestion) as the vital element in a Kāvya.<sup>1</sup>

In connection with the explanation of homonyms, Jagannātha, just like Mammaṭabhaṭṭa, Condition deciding the contextual sense of homonyms. enumerates fourteen conditions by which the abhidheyārtha of a homonym in a sentence is to be determined. They are given in the oft-quoted Kārikās—

‘संयोगो विप्रयोगश्च साहचर्यं विरोधिता ।

अर्थः प्रकरणं लिङ्गं शब्दस्यान्यस्य सन्निधिः ॥<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> R. G., *ibid.*, p. 116-118.

<sup>2</sup> Bhartṛhari, *Vākyapadiya*, II, 317.

सामर्थ्यमौचित्यं देशः कालो व्यक्तिः स्वरादयः ।  
शब्दार्थस्यानवच्छेदे विशेषस्मृतिहेतवः ॥<sup>1</sup>

Their purport (as given in the latter half of the second verse) is that they help one to understand the really intended idea of the word if there is doubt about its nature.

(1) *Sāmyoga* is the relation or property that is well-known as belonging to a particular object conveyed by the homonym by its *abhidhāśakti*; not only that, it should not be also known as belonging to any other object conveyed by that word by its *abhidhāśakti*. In the example ‘*सशङ्खचक्रो हरिः*’ the relation, *viz.*, the contact of one with the two symbols—*śaṅkha* and *cakra*, which are well-known as belonging to Viṣṇu and none else, determines the sense of the homonym ‘*Hari*’ as *Viṣṇu*.

(2) *Viprayoga* is *viśleṣa*—removal of that property (described under *sāmyoga*). In the example ‘*अशङ्खचक्रो हरिः*’ the idea expressed by the compound, the removal of the two symbols *śaṅkha* and *cakra* once existing, determines the meaning of the homonym *Hari* as *Viṣṇu*.

(3) *Sāhacarya* is mutual contact or dependence in a common cause. For example, in the compound ‘*रामलक्ष्मणौ*’ both *Rāma* and *Lakṣmaṇa* are spoken of as mutually related (by birth and in a common cause); and this relation determines the meaning of the homonym *Rāma* as the son of Daśaratha.

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, II, 316 runs thus (on the same point)—

‘वाक्यात्प्रकरणादर्थौचित्याद्देशकालतः ।

शब्दार्थाः प्रविभज्यन्ते न रूपादेव केवलात्’ ॥



(4) *Virodha* has two aspects: (1) the well-known enmity and (2) incompatibility. The first is generally illustrated by the example—‘रामार्जुनगतिसन्धयोः’—which refers to two people whose behaviour resembles that of Rāma and Arjuna. Hence the word *Rāma* refers to *Paraśurāma* (and none else) the great enemy of *Kārtavīryārjuna*. The second is illustrated by the example—‘छायातपो’. Here the incompatibility between shade and light is so well-known that it determines the sense of the ambiguous word *chāyā*.

(5) *Artha* is the fruit conveyed by the dative case, infinitive, etc. In the example—‘स्थाणुं भज भवच्छिदे’ the idea conveyed by the dative case in the word, viz., the fruit in the form of the destruction of the tie of saṁsāra, determines the sense of the word—*Sthāṇu*—to be *Śiva*.

(6) *Prakarana* is the context known to both the hearer and the speaker. In the instance ‘सर्वे जानाति देवः’ when it is said by a servant to a king, the word *deva* can only mean *king*. Hence the exact meaning of the word *deva* is decided by the context.

(7) *Linga* is a symbol or a particular property. It also, when expressed by a word, determines the meaning of a *nānārthaśabda*. This is illustrated by the example—‘कुपितो मकरध्वजः’—the meaning of the word *कुपितः* (angry) determines that of the other word *मकरध्वजः* to be *cupid* and not the ocean.

(8) *Anyāśabdasamīdhi* is the usage of two *nānārthaśabdas*, each determining the meaning of the other. In the example—‘करेण राजते नागः’—the words ‘करेण’ and ‘नागः’, both homonyms, determine their senses to be *trunk* and *elephant* respectively in that the elephant

alone shines with its trunk, and not others like the serpent.

(9) *Sāmarthyā* is interpreted as causation. In the example—‘मधुना मत्तः कोकिलः’ (the cuckoo is elate in Spring), the cause is the advent of spring. So the word *madhu* means only *Vasanta ṛtu* (spring season).

(10) *Aucitī* is propriety and fitness. It is illustrated by the passage—‘पातु वो दयितामुखम्’. Here the word *mukha* means the face of the beloved in a happy mood, which alone is capable of pleasing love-lorn people.

(11 and 12) *Deśa* and *kāla* are place and time which also determine the meaning of a *nānārtha* word in a sentence. In the instance—*भात्यत्र परमेश्वरः*—the word *atra* referring to a particular place—kingdom or city—determines the sense of the word *Paramēśvara* to be the king of that place. Similarly, in the example—*चित्रभानुर्दिने भाति*—the word *दिने* meaning *in day-time* helps one to make out the sense of the word *चित्रभानु* as the sun.

(13) *Vyakti* is explained as the gender of a word. In the instances ‘मित्रो भाति, मित्रं भाति’, the masculine gender of the word *मित्र* suggests its intended sense—the *sun*—and the neuter gender, a *friend*.

(14) *Scara* is the accent of a word. In the famous Vedic example—*इन्द्रशत्रुर्वधस्व*—the *antodāttaśvara* and the *pūrvaśvara* determine the kind of compound; (i.e.) if it is *antodātta*, it is *tatpuruṣa* in the sense of *destroyer of Indra*, and if it is *ādyudātta*, it is *bahuvrīhi* in the sense of *one whose destroyer is Indra*.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> vide the *Rasagaṅgādhara*, *ibid.*, pp. 118-126.



After the elucidation of the fourteen conditions which determine the meaning of a homonym, Jagannātha further elaborates the classification with illustrations of the *samlakṣyakramadhvani*, one of the two main varieties of *abhidhāmūlakadhvani*. It is first divided into *śabdaśaktimūladhvani*, *arthaśaktimūladhvani* and *ubhayaśaktimūladhvani*. The first is divided into *vastudhvani* and *alaṅkāradhvani* and the second has eight varieties—four *vastudhvanis* and four *alaṅkāradhvanis*—on the basis of स्वतः संभविवस्तु, कविप्रौढोक्तिनिष्पन्नवस्तु, स्वतः सम्भव्यलङ्कार and कविप्रौढोक्तिनिष्पन्नलङ्कार. The other four varieties on the basis of कविनिबद्धवस्तुप्रौढोक्तिनिष्पन्नलङ्कार and कविनिबद्धवस्तुप्रौढोक्तिनिष्पन्नलङ्कार are, Jagannātha says, nothing but कविप्रौढोक्तिनिष्पन्न and they do not therefore deserve special mention as separate varieties.<sup>1</sup>

The *śabdaśaktimūlālaṅkāradhvani* is illustrated by the example—

‘करतलनिर्गलदविरलदानजलोह्रासितावनीवलयः ।

धनदाग्रमहितमूर्तिर्जयतितरां सार्वभौमोऽयम् ॥

‘This emperor flourishes with his person respected as the foremost among bounteous men, in that the entire circle of earth is shining with water incessantly flowing from his palm while engaged in charity’.

In this verse the words *kara*, *dhanada* and *sārva-bhāuma* have double meanings and though the context restricts their scope of conveying one meaning, yet they suggest another idea—that Indra, the lord of

<sup>1</sup> R. G., *ibid.*, p. 110.

the gods, who is even respected by Kubera, shines more and more with his mighty elephant, Airāvata, from whose trunk flows incessantly the rut, the smell of which spreads far and wide on the earth. Unlike the figure *samāsokti*, in which the suggested non-contextual idea adds beauty to the contextual idea, in this instance of *śabdaśaktimūladhvani*, there is the suggestion of *upamā* between the contextual and non-contextual ideas, lest the reference to the non-contextual idea on the basis of *śabdas* should be out of place. This *dhvani* is thus differentiated from *śleṣālaṅkāra*:—though there is the common element of *abhedādhyavasāna* of the two ideas due to their being conveyed by identical *śabdas* (एकपदोपात्तत्वं), yet in the former (*dhvani*) one sense is conveyed by the word by its *abhidhāśakti* and the other, by *vyañjanā* and they are known at different times; while in the latter (*śleṣa*) the knowledge of the two senses is simultaneous and is derived from the *śabda* by *abhidhāśakti*. Just like *upamādhvani*, there arises the *dhvani* of other figures of speech also like *virodha*.<sup>1</sup>

Though Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta are of opinion that all the instances of *śabdaśaktimūladhvani* are instances of *alaṅkāradhvani* only,<sup>2</sup> yet Jagannātha, like some of his post-dhvani predecessors, recognises the *śabdaśaktimūlavastudhvani* in the example—

‘राज्ञो मत्प्रतिकूलान्मे महद्भयमुपस्थितम् ।

बाले वारय पान्थस्य वासदानविधानतः ॥

<sup>1</sup> R. G., *ibid.*, pp. 126-130.

<sup>2</sup> *vide* the *Dhvanyāloka* with *Locana*, *ibid.*, pp. 95-100.

‘आक्षिप्त एवालङ्कारः शब्दशक्त्या प्रकाशते ।

यस्मिन्ननुक्तः शब्देन शब्दशक्त्युद्भवो हि सः ॥

‘अत एवालङ्कारध्वनिरयमिति युक्तम्’—*Locana*, p. 100.



'Oh young damsel! by giving abode to me, a traveller, remove the great fear I had entertained from the rājan (the king) who is a great enemy of mine'.

Here the word 'राजः' suggests the idea of the moon from whom the speaker entertained fear. This does not at all suggest *upamā* between king and the moon but suggests the idea that the damsel may be pleased to allow him to enjoy her company and satisfy his craving. Hence it is only a *vastudhvani*.<sup>1</sup>

In this way Jagannātha illustrates the varieties of *arthaśaktimūladhvani* (mentioned above), the *ubhayaśaktimūladhvani* and the two well-known varieties of *lakṣaṇāmūladhvani* (*avivakṣitavācya*),—*jahatsvārthāmūla* and *ajahatsvārthāmūla*, otherwise known as *atyanta-tiraskṛtavācya* and *arthāntarasāṅkramitavācya*.<sup>2</sup>

After the elucidation of the dhvanis, Jagannātha discusses the two *śabdavṛttis*—*abhidhā* and *lakṣaṇā*—on which dhvani is based. He defines *abhidhā* as the particular relation called *śakti* that subsists between a word and its sense. The Mīmāṃsakas and

**Abhidhā and  
lakṣaṇā—  
their varieties.**

<sup>1</sup> vide the *Rasagaṅgādhara*, p. 130. Here the possibility of calling this an instance of *alaṅkāradhvani* is denied by Jagannātha—

‘न चात्र नृपचन्द्रयोरुपमानोपमेयभावः, भेदापोहरूपरूपकं वा तथास्त्विति वाच्यम् । इह नृपरूपस्यार्थस्य चन्द्ररूपार्थगोपनमात्रार्थमुपात्तत्वेन युगपदुल्लसितोपमानोपमेयकयोरुपमारूपकयोस्तात्पर्यविषयताया अयोगात् । . . . . आच्छादकप्रतीतिसमये आच्छाद्याप्रतीतिः, आच्छाद्यप्रतीतौ चाच्छादकन्यग्भाव एवेति ॥

<sup>2</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 131-140.

•Vaiyākaraṇas consider it a separate category. The Naiyāyikas however assert that it is the will of God that a particular word should convey a particular sense—‘अस्मात्पदादयमर्थो बोद्धव्य इतीश्वरसङ्केतः शक्तिः’. Others favour the former view on the ground that there is no *vinigamaka*—special reason—to choose between the two alternatives the will of God and the knowledge of God.<sup>1</sup>

*Abhidhā* is divided into three—*kevalasamudāyaśakti* (potency based on the word as a whole), *Abhidhā's varieties.* *kevalāvayaśakti* (potency based on the derivation) and *samudāyāvayaśaktisāṅkara* (a combination of the two). The first is illustrated by proper names like *Diṭṭha*. The second is illustrated by words like *pācaka* (a cook), where its derivative sense is fully taken into account and not its conventional meaning. The third is illustrated by the word *pañkaja*, where there is a combination of both—the derivative sense and the conventional meaning. These three kinds of *abhidhā* are popularly known by the terms *rūḍhi*, *yoga* and *yogarūḍhi*.

About words like *aśvagandhā*, *aśvakarṇa*, *maṇḍapa*, *nīśānta*, *kuvalaya*, Jagannātha says, different opinions have prevailed. Some say that the word *aśvagandhā* by its *rūḍhiśakti* means a particular plant, but it also conveys a stable by its *yogaśakti*; so the word is sometimes *yaugika* and sometimes *rūḍha* is not *yogarūḍha*, since in no case does it convey the combined idea like the word *pañkaja*. Others say that words like *aśvagandhā* are neither *yaugika* nor *rūḍha* but are *yogarūḍha*, which, however, admits of two divisions—*yogarūḍha* and *yaugikarūḍha*.

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 140-141.



The word *pañkaja* is an example of *yogarūḍha*s where the two senses—*yoga* and *rūḍhi*—are combined in a single word. The Naiyāyika however admits *yaugikarūḍha* as a fourth variety of *śaktapada*. Others, probably the Vaiyākaraṇa metaphysicians, hold that there is only one variety of *śaktapada*, viz., *rūḍha* and that the division of a *pada* into *prakṛti* and *pratyaya* and that of *samāsa* into *padas* is only conventional and as such, untrue.

It is true that in instances like—

“गीष्पतिरप्याङ्गिरसो गदितुं ते गुणगणान्सर्वो न ।

इन्द्रः सहस्रनयनोऽप्यद्भुतरूपं परिच्छेत्तुम्” ॥

the words *गीष्पतिः* and *सहस्रनयनः* convey as *yogarūḍha*-*śabd*s a double meaning so that the words *आङ्गिरसः* and *इन्द्रः* are superfluous; but it is accepted that the *yogarūḍha* words in such instances do not convey a double sense by *abhidhā* but only the derivative sense by *lakṣaṇā* and the other word conveys the *rūḍhi* sense, with the result that in such instances there is left sufficient scope for the suggestion of some novel and beautiful ideas conducive to the pleasure of the readers. If one uses the word *pañkajākṣī* (lotus-eyed one), for example, to address a person whose eyes do not at all resemble the lotus-petals, it conveys only the *rūḍhi* sense, viz., the person addressed to, and the derivative idea is not taken into account since the speaker has no such intention. But if another word capable of conveying the *rūḍhi* sense is used as in the example—*इन्द्रः सहस्रनयनः*—the *yogarūḍha* word conveys the derivative sense and the other, the *rūḍhi* sense, both helping the suggestion of many ideas on the basis of the context. So there is no question of superfluity of a word in instances like ‘*इन्द्रः सहस्रनयनः*’.

The senses connoted by words through *abhidhāśakti* are of four kinds—*jāti* (generality), *guṇa* (quality), *kriyā* (action) and *yādṛcchika* (some attribute assumed by the speaker).

(1) The generality *gotva* (cowness) which is manifested by the physical structure of the cow is the idea conveyed by the *gośabda* through *abhidhā*. Here Jagannātha follows the *jātiśaktivāda* of the Mīmāṃsakas and not the *viśiṣṭaśaktivāda* of the Naiyāyikas. How one derives knowledge of the individual from the cognition of the word ‘*gauḥ*’ is explained in two ways: (a) the *gośabda* in the sentence—*गामानय*—conveys the individual through *lakṣaṇā* (the secondary significative potency), which is resorted to on the ground of the incompatibility of the *abhidheyārtha*—*gotvajāti*—as related to the *ānayanakriyā*; (b) it is accepted that the generality connoted by a word necessarily leads to a verbal cognition in which the substratum (*vyakti*) of the generality is also presented. The *jāti* (generality) is the life-giving essence (*prāṇa-prada*) of the word and its sense. So runs the *vākyapadiya*—‘The cow is not a cow by its form, nor is it a non-cow; but it is called cow because of its relation to the *gotva* (cowness).’ This explains well that the usage *gauḥ* is based not on the individual possessing certain peculiar physical features but on the generality—*gotva*.

(2) The quality like white colour is the primary sense conveyed by the word *śukla*. The *śuklaguṇa* in all white objects is one and the same and this oneness of the white colour helps one to extend one’s *śaktigrāha* to other white substances which one has not experienced during the time of one’s first *śaktigrāha*.

(3) The action like motion from one place to another is the primary sense known from the word



*cala*. Here also it is accepted that on the ground of *lāghava* (parsimony), the action, *viz.*, *calana* is one and the same belonging to different moving objects.

(4) Some peculiar property is assumed by the speaker as the *pravṛttinimitta* (the sole condition of usage), of words like *ḍiṭṭha*—a *yādyecchika śabda*. About the nature of this property there are different views: One view is that it is nothing but the *sphoṭa* manifested by the last varṇa of the word, which is found in the individual denoted by the word through an indirect relation. Another is that it is the group of varṇas possessing a sequence, which is also to be connected with the individual through an indirect relation. Yet another is that it is the individual itself beside whom nothing is known as the meaning of the word *ḍiṭṭha*. According to the first two views, the cognition arising from that of the *yadyecchā śabda* is a *determinate* cognition (*viśiṣṭajñāna*) where the *viśiṣṭa* is cognised on the basis of the cognition of the *viśeṣaṇa* (adjunct). In the last one, it is an *indeterminate cognition* (*nirvikalpaka-jñāna*) of the very person—*ḍiṭṭha*. Thus is explained the fourfold usage of *śabdās* in different arthas through *abhidhā* generally followed by all schools of thought. Jagannātha explains another view that all *śabdās* can be grouped under one head—*jāti*—which is conveyed by all kinds of words alike. The words conveying quality and action connote only those generalities which belong to them; while the *yadyecchāśabdās* connote only the *jātis* belonging to those words themselves as uttered by different persons, or to their sense as belonging to different time.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> R. G., *ibid.*, pp. 141-145.

*Lakṣaṇā* is defined as the relation to the primary sense of a word. It is generally adopted on the basis of the unintelligibility (*anvayānupapatti*) of the primary sense of a word in the context. For example, in the instance—गङ्गायां घोषः—the word *Gaṅgā* primarily means *current*, which is incompatible in the context in that the *ghoṣa* (hamlet) cannot exist on the current; so the primary sense is set aside and the secondary sense—*bank*, being related to the current by its *proximity* (*sāmūpya*), is conveyed by the word *Gaṅgā*.

It cannot however be accepted that the incompatibility of the primary sense in the context is the sole condition of *lakṣaṇā*. In the example—काकेभ्यो दधि रक्ष्यताम्—the curd is to be protected from crows, there is no *vācyārthānupapatti*; but according to the intention of the speaker, the word *kāka* conveys by *lakṣaṇā* the sense of all those causing harm to the curd—*dadhyupaghātakas*. So the hitch in the intention of the speaker—*tātparyānupapatti*—is considered to be the primary condition of *lakṣaṇā*. It is also held that the secondary sense of a word is represented in *śābdabodha* with the delimiting adjunct of the *mukhyārthatā* (*mukhyārthatāvacchedaka*), so much so that the *mukhyārthatāvacchedaka* becomes the delimiting adjunct of the *tātparyaviśayānvayitā* (the state of being the related object of the intention or the intended sense of the speaker). In brief, in the example 'गङ्गायां घोषः' the current is not presented as current but the *bank* is cognised as current (*i.e.*), as possessing currentness (*gaṅgātva*), with the result that the hamlet on the bank of the Ganges comes to be associated with the properties of the current of the Ganges, *viz.*, coolness, sanctity, etc.




The relation between the primary sense and secondary sense is various: in the instance 'गङ्गायां घोषः' it is *proximity* of the current of the Ganges to its bank; in मुखं चन्द्रः or मुखचन्द्रः it is *similarity*; in the word *darśa* it is *virodha*—antithesis (*i.e.*), the word *darśa* by the derivation 'दृश्यते चन्द्रमा अस्मिन्' should mean through *abhidhā* the full-moon day, but it means the new-moon day, which is to be explained only through *viparītalakṣaṇa*; in the example 'आयुर्वृतम्' the relation is *causality*. In this way many other relations can be explained in secondary usages.<sup>1</sup>

*Lakṣaṇā* is divided into two—*nirūḍhā* and *prayojanavātī*. *Nirūḍhā* is generally based on time-honoured usage without any reference to its derivative sense. The words—*anukūla*, *pratikūla*, *anuloma*, *pratiloma*, *lāvaṇya*, etc.,—are the best examples of this variety. Jagannātha says that since there is unintelligibility of the primary sense of the word *anukūla*, viz., *kūlānugata* (that which is suitable to the bank), in the instance—अयमनुकूलः, it conveys through the relation of similarity the sense of *anugūṇa* (that which is suitable or favourable). So also words like *nīla* which convey by *abhidhā* *nīlatva*—the generality of *nīlagūṇa*—indicate by *lakṣaṇā* *nīlagūṇa* or *nīladravya*, as the case may be. Some hold that *nirūḍhā* has got two varieties—*śuddhā* and *gauṇī*, (pure and metaphoric).

*Prayojanavātī* is of two kinds—*gauṇī* and *śuddhā*. *Gauṇī* is of two kinds—*sāropā* (bi-laterally identifying) and *sādhyavasānā* (unilaterally identifying), both having supposititious identification as the basis.

<sup>1</sup> R. G., *ibid.*, pp. 145 and 146.

• *Śuddhā* is divided into four—*jahatsvārthā*, *ajahatsvārthā*, *sāropā* and *sādhyavasānā*. Thus eight main varieties of *lakṣaṇā* can be described, as the following table shows:



The difference between *sāropalakṣaṇā* and *sādhyavasānā* is said to be that in the former the two objects—compared and comparable—are separately mentioned and their identity is spoken of, while in the latter their identity is described even without the separate mention of *upamāna*.

*Sāropalakṣaṇā* is illustrated by 'मुखं चन्द्रः' (the face [is] moon). Here the word *candra* conveys by *lakṣaṇā* the sense *candrasadṛśa* (similar to the moon), which is related to face by way of *abheda* (identity), so much so that the verbal cognition arising from the statement 'मुखं चन्द्रः' has got *mukha* (face) as its *viśeṣya* (chief object of cognition), *candrasadṛśa* (similar to the moon) as its *prakāra* (adjunct) and *abheda* (identity) as the relation of the two ideas—*viśeṣya* and *prakāra*. The final *śābdabodha* (verbal cognition) runs thus—मुखं चन्द्र-सदृशाभिन्नम् (the face is identical with the object similar to the moon). This explanation is based on a generally accepted maxim in *śābdabodha*—नामार्थयोरभेदः संसर्गः—*abheda* (identity) is the relation between two senses conveyed by words denoting one and the same thing through different *pravṛttinimittas* (connoted attributes).

Now a question is raised in the example 'मुखं चन्द्रः'.

Different views  
on *Sāropalak-*  
*ṣaṇā*.

If the word *mukha* by *sāropalakṣaṇā* conveys the idea *mukhasadṛśa*, where is the difference between the two figures of speech—*upamā* (simile) and *rūpaka* (metaphor)? It is accepted generally that 'मुखं चन्द्रः' is a metaphor, while 'चन्द्रसदृशं मुखं' is a simile. The difference between these two may be explained thus:—in the former *candra* is not a *viśeṣaṇa* of *sadṛśa* while in the latter it is a *viśeṣaṇa*; and in the former, the relation, viz., *pratiyogitva*

between *candra* and *sadṛśa*, both as the parts of the secondary sense of the word—*candra*—(*candrapratyogikasādṛśyavat*) is known as the *śābdārtha*, while in the latter, it is known through *saṁsargamaryādā*—the juxtaposition of the two words. This explanation cannot help us to distinguish one figure of speech from another; otherwise, we shall have to see difference in 'चन्द्रसदृशं मुखम्' and 'चन्द्र इव मुखम्' both accepted examples of simile, on the basis of the difference in the *śābdabodhas* arising therefrom.<sup>1</sup>

For this problem the Prācīnas suggest different

solutions:—  
Prācīna View I.

(1) Though there is no difference between cognitions arising from statements involving metaphor and simile (as explained above), yet the difference between them lies in the fact that in *rūpaka* there arises a cognition of *tādrūpya* on the basis of *lakṣaṇā*, while in *upamā* there is no *tādrūpyapratyaya*. This cognition is nothing but the knowledge of the face (*viśaya*), in the example—'मुखं चन्द्रः', as possessing *candratva* (i.e.) knowledge of the face (the compared object) with *candratva*,

<sup>1</sup> In the instance 'चन्द्रसदृशं मुखम्' *abheda* (identity) is the relation between the two *nāmārtas*—चन्द्रसदृश and मुख, but in the instance 'मुखं चन्द्र इव' either *candra* is related to *sādṛśya* (the meaning of the word *iva*) by *pratiyogitva* known by *saṁsargamaryādā* and *sādṛśya* is related to *mukha* by *anuyogitva*, or the word *candraḥ* means by *lakṣaṇā* *candrapratyogikasādṛśyavān* as in the case of *rūpaka* and the relation between *candra* and *sadṛśa*, viz., *pratiyogitva*, is known as *śābdārtha*.



the delimiting adjunct of the *viṣayitā* (विषयितावच्छेदकम्), the special property of the standard of comparison. How does such a cognition arise when there is no means for it and when we have the valid perception presenting the difference between face and moon (*viṣaya* and *viṣayin*)? Here the *Prācīnas* explain the means of this kind of knowledge as *vyañjanā*, which can be however associated with the word 'चन्द्रः' as in the instances of *śleṣālankāra*; and they add that this cognition through *vyañjanā* is by no means obstructed by its contradictory perception (*pratyakṣabādhā*). Hence *tādrūpya* cognition is possible in *rūpaka*.

Again another objection is raised: no doubt, there arises a cognition which presents the *tādrūpya* between the (*candra*) *sadrṣa* and *candra* in that both of them are conveyed by the word *candra*; but how can one cognise *candratādrūpya* as related to face when it is known (as conveyed by the word *mukha* with *mukhatva* as its *śakyatāvacchedaka*) as possessing its own property, *mukhatva* (faceness)? In the famous instance of *rūpaka*—'वक्त्रे चन्द्रमसि स्थिते किमपरः शीतांशु-रुज्जृम्भते'—the *sahṛdayas* do however experience the *viṣayitādrūpya* in *viṣaya* (i.e.) the face as possessing the *tādrūpya* of the moon,—a fact which however requires a satisfactory explanation.

To this, the *Prācīnas* reply that there arises the cognition of the face as possessing *candratādrūpya* on the basis of the rule:—'तदभिन्नाभिन्नस्य तदभिन्नत्वम्'—if A is equal to B and if B is equal to C, then A is equal to C. The cognition presenting the identity between चन्द्रताद्रूप्यवत्त्वस्य and मुख leads to the cognition of identity between चन्द्रताद्रूप्यवत् and मुख.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 147 and 148.

- (2) An easier explanation is offered by some others to distinguish *upamā* and *rūpaka*. In the example of *rūpaka*—मुखं चन्द्रः—the word *candra* conveys by *lakṣaṇā* the sense of *candrasadrṣa* and thus leads to an *upasthiti* (recollection) with *mukha* as *viśeṣya* and *candrasadrṣatva* as *prakāra*; and on the basis of this *upasthiti* arises a *śābdabodha* presenting the identity of the object denoted by the word *mukham* (viz., face) with that indicated by the word *candraḥ* with *candratva* (viz., face). This explanation goes against the general rule in *śābdabodha* that both the *padārthopasthiti* and the *śābdabodha* should possess the same *viśeṣyas* and the same *prakāras*; but the exponents of this view restrict the application of this rule to those cases of *śābdabodha* in which *lakṣaṇā* is not employed. They also say that the knowledge of *lakṣaṇā* employed in a word leads to the *śābdabodha* with the *lakṣyārtha* as *viśeṣya* and the *śakyatāvacchedaka* as *prakāra*, so much so that in the well-known instance of *lakṣaṇā*—गङ्गायां घोषः—*taṭa* (bank) is first recollected from the word गङ्गा by *lakṣaṇā* with its property *taṭatva*; but the *śābdabodha* arising therefrom presents *taṭa* as possessing *gaṅgātva*; and this *śābdabodha* presenting *taṭa* with *gaṅgātva* leads to another cognition of *taṭa* with coolness, sanctity, etc., the properties generally associated with the Ganges. Similarly in the instance of *rūpaka*—मुखं चन्द्रः the cognition of *mukha* with *candratva* leads to another cognition of *mukha* with the properties like brightness, generally found in the moon. The *tādrūpya* explained in the instances of *rūpaka*, these *Prācīnas* add, is nothing but the possession of the well-known properties of the *viṣayin* by the *viṣaya*. Thus, this explanation is more satisfactory than the first in that it points out the



difference between *rūpaka* and *upamā* both from the point of view of the cognitions arising from the statements involving *rūpaka* and *upamā* and from that of the *tādrūpyapratyaya* arising from the statements involving metaphor and simile.

(3) Yet another opinion is that, in instances of *upamā*, *sādrśya* (similarity) is associated with *bheda* (difference), so that cognitions of *bheda* and *sādrśya* arise, while in those of *rūpaka*, it is not associated with *bheda* (i.e.) there is only one cognition with *sādrśya* as its object (like *candrasadrśa*).<sup>1</sup>

The Navīna view chiefly represented by Appayya Dīkṣita is as follows: In the instance of *rūpaka* 'मुखं चन्द्रः', there arises the verbal cognition of the identity between the two *nāmārthas*—face and moon—even without *lakṣaṇā* in the word 'candraḥ'. It is accepted that verbal cognition arises even when there has already been a valid contradictory cognition. That is why *śabda* is spoken of as possessing a unique power of generating a cognition presenting even a non-existing object—object whose absence is experienced. But in the instance—'वह्निना सिञ्चति'—'one sprinkles and wets with fire', no verbal cognition arises because there is no *yogyatājñāna*—cognition of congruity (i.e.) fire is not only previously unknown as the instrument of sprinkling and wetting but is also known as not admitting of it. In the instance—'मुखं चन्द्रः'—though the difference between face and moon is experienced, there arises an *āhāryayogyatājñāna*—a cognition arising from mere supposition or fancy—though the contrary is known to be true. And it is held that from such an *invalid yogyatājñāna* arises a *valid verbal* cognition presenting identity between face and moon.

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, p. 149.

Another alternative is suggested thus:—From such instances as 'मुखं चन्द्रः' arises *āhārya* (invalid) *śābdabodha* (verbal cognition), presenting identity between face and moon, in view of the fact that *yogyatājñāna* is not at all accepted as an invariable condition of *śābdabodha* and that the rule that *āhārya* kind of cognition is one kind of *perception* only is not accepted. In the well-known instance of *rūpaka* 'मुखं चन्द्रः' arises therefore an invalid cognition of identity between face and moon—the two primary senses of the words—*mukha* and *candra*, and not one primary sense and one secondary sense. The *Navīnas* add that even the *prācīnas* recognise in such instances of *rūpaka* identity between two *vācyārthas*; otherwise in the *rūpaka*—राजनारायणं लक्ष्मीस्त्वामालिङ्गति निर्भरम्, the Goddess of Wealth closely hugs King-Nārāyaṇa—the embrace of Goddess *Lakṣmī* cannot be described unless the identity between the King and Nārāyaṇa (God Viṣṇu) is cognised; and in the *upamā*—

‘पादाम्बुजं भवतु मे विजयाय मन्त्रु

मञ्जीरशिक्षितमनोहरमम्बिकायाः’ ।

‘May the lotus-like foot of Goddess Ambikā which is beautiful by the sounds of the handsome anklet, be for your victory!’—the beauty of the foot (due to the sounds of the anklets) cannot be explained in reference to the lotus, if we split the compound ‘पाद एवाम्बुजम्’ where the lotus, the meaning of the word—अम्बुज—, becomes the chief idea of the compound.

Moreover, the *Navīnas* raise a question against the *Prācīnas*: if, in *rūpaka*, the words denoting the standard of comparison convey the idea *tatsadrśa* by *lakṣaṇā*, it is to be accepted that the *lakṣyatāvaccchedaka* (the



delimiting adjunct of *lakṣyatā*) is *sādrśya* which is nothing but the common properties of the *upameya* and *upamāna*; then, is this *sādrśya* cognised with its particular properties or with the general properties? In the former case, in the instance—‘सुन्दरं मुखं चन्द्रः’ the word *candra* means *candrasadrśa* and as such conveys *sādrśya* with the special property—*sundaratva* (beautiffulness)—and the word *sundara* also conveys the same idea by its *abhidhāśakti*, so that there is the fault of repetition (पौनख्यम्) (i.e.) the same idea is conveyed by two words. In the latter case, since similarity is expressed by the word *candra*, it will be *upamā* and not *rūpaka*. It is held even by the Prācīnas that, in the well-known instances of *upamā*, similarity is conveyed by words either by *abhidhā* or by *lakṣaṇā*. Hence the Navīnas conclude that even the Prācīnas should accept that, in *rūpaka*, there arises invariably a valid or invalid cognition presenting the identity between *upameya* (compared object) and *upamāna* (the standard of comparison), the two *nāmārthas*. Even the view of the Prācīnas that, on the basis of *sadrśalakṣaṇā*, arises the *tādrūpyapratyaya* in *rūpaka* is criticised by the Navīnas, in view of the fact that the Prācīnas would have to accept *tādrūpyapratyaya* even when *sādrśya* is known from a statement like ‘तत्सदृश’.<sup>1</sup>

Now Jagannātha examines which of the aforesaid views is to be accepted. He adheres to the Prācīna view and points out the main defects in that of the Navīnas. The very argument of the Navīnas that, since in *rūpaka* a cognition of identity between two *nāmārthas*

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 149-151.

arises there is no necessity to make use of *lakṣaṇā*, is not acceptable in view of the fact that in *rūpaka* such an identification is not possible when the common beautiful qualities of those two objects are not previously known. In the instances of *rūpaka*—‘भारतं नाकमण्डलम्’, ‘नगरं विधुमण्डलम्’ the knowledge of *rūpaka* depends upon the knowledge of the common qualities possessed by *upamāna* and *upameya* which are conveyed by ambiguous words like *suparvālaṅkṛta*—ornamented by *suparvans* (Devas and Pandits); in the example ‘मुखं खन्द्रः’ the similarity between face and the moon is so well-known that it does not generally require any special mention or description. It is therefore to be accepted that in *rūpaka* there is recourse to *lakṣaṇāvṛtti* in arriving at the sense of *sadrśa* from the words conveying *upamāna*—a fact which does not in any way depend on the cognition of identity. And it is said that the statements of the unreal or non-existing relation of two objects do not depend on anything like *sādrśya* and its cognition; but those which contain a metaphor are based on the knowledge of the special or general qualities of the objects, the compared and the comparable, and the *abheda* cognised in *rūpaka* is nothing but the *tādrūpya* cognised on the basis of *vyañjanā*.

The difference between *rūpaka* and *upamā* is that, in the former, *sādrśya* is not cognised as associated with *bheda* (difference) between the compared and comparable, while in the latter it is cognised as associated with *bheda*. In the example—राजनारायणम्—the compound conveys (by *lakṣaṇā*) the idea नारायणसदृश (similar to Nārāyaṇa), with *Nārāyaṇatva* as the delimiting adjunct of *lakṣyatā*, so much so that there is no absurdity of the primary sense of the



part—लक्ष्मीस्त्वामालिङ्गति—the embrace of Kṛṣṇa by Lakṣmī. If the *viśeṣaṇasamāsa* is accepted in the example—पदाम्बुजम्—the secondary sense of the word *ambuja*, viz., *ambujasadyā* with *ambujatva* as the delimiting adjunct of *lakṣyatā* would be the chief idea of the compound; and there would be the *anupapatti*—absurdity of the primary sense of the compound—मञ्जीरशित्तमनोहरम्; but if it is accepted as an *upamitasamāsa*, (i.e.) the compound conveying the idea अम्बुजसदृशपाद, then the chief sense of the compound is that of the last component element of the compound (i.e.) the foot of the Goddess, which has natural beauty on account of the sounds of the anklets.<sup>1</sup>

Patañjali's explanation of usages involving imposed identity under four heads:—*tātsthya*, *tāddharmya*, *tatsāmīpya* and *tatsāhacarya*—supports the Prācīna view that there is *sāropa lakṣaṇā* in *rūpaka*.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> vide the R. G., *ibid.*, pp. 152–155.

<sup>2</sup> Patañjali in his *Bhāṣya* on the sūtra—‘पुनोपादाख्यायाम् (IV. 1. 48) says—‘भिन्नानामभेदाभावात् कथं पुनस्तस्मिन् इत्येतद्भवति? चतुर्भिः प्रकारैस्तादृष्यमारोप्यते, न तु मुख्यम् । तात्स्थ्यात्, तादृम्यात्, तत्सामीप्यात्, तत्साहचर्यात् इति । तात्स्थ्याद्यथा—मञ्जा हसन्ति । तादृम्याद्यथा—जटी ब्रह्मदत्तः । ब्रह्मदत्ते यानि कार्याणि जटिन्यपि तानि क्रियन्ते । तत्सामीप्याद्यथा—गङ्गायां घोषः । तत्साहचर्याद्यथा—कुन्तान्प्रवेशय इति’ ।

‘Since different objects do not possess identity, how is one thing spoken of as identical with another? This identity can be imposed under four conditions: (1) *tātsthya*—resting upon one another; (2) *tāddharmya*—possessing the same qualities; (3) *tatsāmīpya*—

The *sādhyavasānā* variety of *lakṣaṇā* is illustrated by ‘चन्द्रराजी विराजते’ (there shines a row of moons). Some hold that from the word *candra* arises by the power of *lakṣaṇā* a verbal cognition of face as the moon though the *padārtho-pasthiti* presents it as face. This is possible if we do not accept the rule that the recollection of the senses of the words and the *śābdabodha* of those senses need not have the same *prakāras*. Others hold that the word *candra* conveys ‘face’ first by *lakṣaṇā* with *faceness* as the delimiting adjunct of *lakṣyatā* and that the face is subsequently cognised through *vyāñjanā* as *candra* (i.e.) with *candratva* as the delimiting adjunct of *vyāṅgyatā*. In either case *face* is known as *face*; and this is the feature that distinguishes *sādhyavasānā* from *sāropā*. Some others hold that *face* is not known as *face* but is known as *candra*, as in an invalid perception, and the distinctive feature of this is the non-cognition of the *face* as *face* (i.e.) of the object compared (*mukha*) with *mukhatva* as the delimiting adjunct of *viśayatā*.

neighbourhood, and (4) *tatsāhacarya*—(association). The *tātsthya* is illustrated by मञ्जाः हसन्ति—the cushions smile, (where the identity between the cushion and the people on the cushion is imposed; the *tāddharmya* by जटी ब्रह्मदत्तः—where the actions of Brahmadatta are found in the matted-haired man and as such, the identity of *Jaṭī* and *Brahmadatta* is imposed; *tatsāmīpya* by गङ्गायां घोषः and *tatsāhacarya* by कुन्तान्प्रवेशय where the identity between spears and the persons holding them is imposed’. Vide Nāgēśabhaṭṭa's *Tikā*, *Marmaparakāśa*, *ibid.*, pp. 155–156.



Jagannātha however contends that in certain examples, of *sādhyaśānā*, *sahṛdayas* have a cognition presenting *viśaya* (face) in both the capacities of *viśaya* and *viśayin* (face and moon). Thus he adheres to the views of the Prācīnas.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Vide the *R. G.*, *ibid.*, p. 156.

## CHAPTER VI

### *As a Literary Critic (continued)*

AFTER elucidating the nature and scope of the two *śabdavṛttis*—*abhidhā* and *lakṣaṇā*—on which the operation of *vyāñjanāvṛtti* is based, Jagannātha discusses in his *Rasagaṅgādhara* the next important subject, *viz.*, *alaṅkāras*. He first lays down the general principle underlying the conception of *alaṅkāra* in a *kāvya*, namely, that it is conducive to the development of *ramaṇīyatva* (beauty) of a *kāvya* which has the *vyāṅgya* sense, chiefly *Rasa*, as its soul. Abhinavagupta in his *Locana*<sup>1</sup> explains the term *alaṅkāra* as applied to *upamā* and other figures of speech as that which creates in *śabda* and *artha* an extraordinary power by which they become the chief means (*vyāñjakasāmagrī*) of the suggestion of *Rasa* or of any other sense. Thus an *alaṅkāra*, a figure of speech, ornaments the body of the *Kāvya*, *viz.*, *śabda* and *artha* only when they, so ornamented, lead to the suggestion of *Rasa* (the soul of poetry); and if there is no element of suggestion, it ceases to be an *alaṅkāra*, just as a diamond necklace on a dead body is not called an ornament in that it does not contribute to its beauty.

<sup>1</sup> “उपमया यद्यपि वाच्योऽर्थोऽलङ्कियते तथापि तस्य तदेवालङ्करणं यत् व्यङ्ग्यार्थोभिव्यञ्जनसामर्थ्याधानमिति । वस्तुतो ध्वन्यात्मैवालङ्कार्यः । कटककेयूरादिभिरपि हि शरीरसमवायिभिः चेतन आत्मैव तत्तच्चित्तवृत्तिविशेषौचित्यसूचनात्मतया अलङ्कियते । तथा हि—अचेतनं शवशरीरं कुण्डलाद्युपेतमपि न भाति, अलङ्कार्यस्याभावात् । . . . . वस्तुत आत्मैवालङ्कार्यः । अहमलङ्कृत इत्यभिमानात्” ॥

(N. S. Edition, 1911, pp. 74-75)



Of all *alaṅkāras upamā* (simile) is the most important in that it is the source of many other *alaṅkāras*.<sup>1</sup> Hence it is explained first in most *Alaṅkāra* treatises.

Jagannātha defines it as—‘सादृश्यं सुन्दरं वाक्यार्थोपस्कारकं उपमालङ्कृतिः’—‘*Upamālaṅkāra* is similarity leading to the realisation of aesthetic pleasure by *sahṛdayas*, in that it beautifies the chief idea of the *Kāvya* (in question)’. He explains further that similarity becomes the chief source of pleasure in *upamā* and not in other *alaṅkāras* like *ananvaya*, where negation of a second similar object becomes the chief element of literary beauty though there is *upamā* associated with it; so in *vyatireka* does the negation, *viz.*, the description of the inability of the *upamāna* to stand along with the *upameya*. In *rūpaka*, *apaknuṭi*, *pariṇāma*, *bhrāntimat*, *ullekha*, etc., based on the conception of identity between *upamāna* and *upameya* and in *dṛṣṭānta*, *prativastūpamā*, *dīpaka*, *tulyayogitā*, etc., based on the

<sup>1</sup> Vide the *Citramīmāṃsā*, N. S. Edn., 1907, p. 5—

‘उपमैका शैलूषी

संप्राप्ता चित्रभूमिकाभेदान् ।

रञ्जयति काव्यरङ्गे

नृत्यन्ती तद्विदां चेतः ॥

.....

एवमनकालङ्कारविवर्तवतीयमुपमा ।

तदिदं चित्रं विश्वं

ब्रह्मज्ञानादिवोपमाज्ञानात् ।

ज्ञातं भवतीत्यादौ

निरूप्यते निखिलभेदसहिता सा’ ॥

conception of difference between *upamāna* and *upameya*, the conception of *sādrśya* is only an approach to metaphor and other figures of speech contributing to *camatkāra* and as such, is not the chief source of literary charm. Both the figures of speech—*pratīpa* and *upameyopamā*—in which *sādrśya* is the source of *camatkāra*, are only varieties of *upamā*. In the instance—

‘त्वयि कोपो ममाभाति सुधांशाविव पावकः’ ।

where the *upamāna*, *viz.*, the fire in the disc of the moon, is known as the poet’s invention, which leads finally to the realisation of *camatkāra* by *sahṛdayas*. This kind of *upamā* called *Kalpītopamā*, some hold, is a new *alaṅkāra*, since it emphasizes the fact that there is no well-known *upamāna* other than the *Kavikalpita* (invented by the poet); but Jagannātha contends that it is only a variety of *upamā*, since the reality (*satyatva*) of the *upamāna* and *upameya* is not emphasized in the definition of *upamā*. Besides, *upamālaṅkāra* is illustrated by instances where *upamāna* and *upameya* do not in reality possess any *sādrśya*, but are viewed on the basis of *abhedādhyavasāya* as possessing common attributes or as identical.<sup>1</sup>

Jagannātha illustrates *upamālaṅkāra* by the verse—

“गुरुजनभयमद्विलोकनान्तः

समुदयदाकुलभावमावहन्त्याः ।

दरदलदरविन्दसुन्दरं हा

हरिणदृशो नयनं न विस्मरामि ॥”

‘Oh! I cannot forget the moving beautiful lotus-eye of the deer-eyed damsel whose mind is agitated by the fear of elders and by (the longing to) look

<sup>1</sup> vide the *R. G.*, *ibid.*, pp. 157-160.




at me!' According to Jagannātha, this verse is a good example of that kind of *upamālaṅkāra* which leads to the suggestion of *vipralambhaśṛṅgāra*—*rasopaskārikopamā*. This *Rasa*-suggestion is effected in a fitting manner on the basis of (1) the *vyabhicāribhāva*, viz., recollection (conveyed by the two words 'na' and 'vismarāmi') which is mainly beautified by the *upamā* contained in the compound—*दरदलदरविन्दसुन्दरम्*; (2) the suggestion of *bhāvasandhi*—admixture of two *bhāvas*, *trāsa* (fear) and *autsukya* (anxiety) as given in the first half of the verse; and (3) the mental suffering (*santāpa*) suggested by the word 'hā'.<sup>1</sup>

Following mainly Mammataḥṭṭa, the author of the *Kāvyaaprakāśa*, Jagannātha classifies *upamā* into *twenty-five* varieties and illustrates them by suitable illustrations of his own. The following table will show the principle underlying the classification of *upamā*:—<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, p. 160.

<sup>2</sup> *ibid.*, p. 163.

### उपमा



\* To these twenty-five seven varieties are added, by some : three under *Vācakalūptā*, one under *Upamānalūptā*, one under *Dharmopamānalūptā*, one under *Vācakopamānalūptā*, and a new variety called *Vācakopamānalūptā*, thus making a total of thirty-two. (Vide the *Rasagangādhara*, *ibid.*, p. 169.)



Each of these twenty-five varieties may be further, classified under five heads—व्यङ्ग्यवस्तूपस्कारिका, व्यङ्ग्यालङ्कारोपस्कारिका, रसभावाद्युपस्कारिका, वाच्यवस्तूपस्कारिका and वाच्यालङ्कारोपस्कारिका; thus *upamā* has one hundred and twenty-five varieties.<sup>1</sup>

On the basis of different aspects of *sādhāraṇa-dharma*, *upamā* is classified (1) with अनुगामिधर्म; (2) with बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बभावापन्नधर्म; (3) with *dharma* described under (1) and (2); (4) with बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बभावापन्नधर्म associated with वस्तुप्रतिवस्तुभाव; (5) with *dharma* which, though non-existing, is known on the basis of *upacāra*—superimposition and (6) with *dharma* which is nothing but a common expression.<sup>2</sup> Similarly another classification of *upamā* is also made—केवलनिरवयवा, मालारूपनिरवयवा, समस्त-वस्तुविषयसावयवा, एकदेशविवर्तिसावयवा, केवलश्लिष्टपरम्परिता, मालारूपश्लिष्टपरम्परिता, केवलशुद्धपरम्परिता and मालारूपशुद्धपरम्परिता.<sup>3</sup> Jagannātha explains all these varieties and illustrates by suitable verses of his own, of which we may note here a few only:—The *vyāṅgyavastūpaskārikā* is illustrated by the verse—

‘अनवरतपरोपकरणव्यग्रीभवदमलचेतसां महताम् ।  
आपातकाटवानि स्फुरन्ति वचनानि भेषजानीव’ ॥

‘The words of the great whose hearts are pure in that they are bent upon doing good to others incessantly, shine like medicines which are bitter to taste.’ Here the simile (*i.e.*), the comparison of the words of the great to medicine, helps in the suggestion of the idea that the words of the great, though bitter to hear,

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 172-4. For those who accept thirty-two varieties, *upamā* has 160 varieties on the basis of this five-fold classification.

<sup>2</sup> *ibid.*, p. 174.

<sup>3</sup> *ibid.*, p. 181.

would result in happiness just as the bitter medicine cures disease and ensures good health.<sup>1</sup> In the verse—

‘आलिङ्गितो जलधिकन्यया सलीलं  
लम्नः प्रियङ्गुलतयेव तरुस्तमालः ।  
देहावसानसमये हृदये मदीये  
देवश्रकास्तु भगवानरविन्दनाभः’ ॥

‘Gracefully embraced by Lakṣmī, the daughter of the ocean, just like a tamāla tree entwined by a *priyaṅgu* creeper, may the great God Viṣṇu shine in my mind at the time of death!’—there is *vastuprativastubhāva* between आलिङ्गितत्व and लम्नत्व in that the same idea is expressed by different words in reference to different objects. This depends upon the *bimbapratibimbabhāva* between जलधिकन्यया, the daughter of the ocean and the *priyaṅgu* creeper. Hence this is an example for the variety of *upamā* in which *bimbapratibimbabhāva* is associated with *vastuprativastubhāva*.<sup>2</sup>

The *mālārūpaniravayavā* is illustrated by the verse—

‘आह्लादिनी नयनयो रुचिरैन्दवीव  
कण्ठेकृतातिशिशिराम्बुजमालिकेव ।  
आनन्दिनी हृदि गता रसभावेनैव  
सा नैव विस्मृतिपथं मम जानु याति’ ॥

‘Pleasing to the eyes like the moon-light, highly agreeable when put round the neck like a lotus-garland with cold petals and delightful to think like the relish of Rasa, she (the damsel) does not at all pass away from my recollection.’ Here are three similes independent of one another. Hence it is called मालारूपनिरवयवोपमा ।<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, p. 172. <sup>2</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 174-5. <sup>3</sup> *ibid.*, p. 182.



**Nature of verbal cognitions in the examples of Upamā.**

After illustrating all varieties of *upamā*, Jagannātha, following mainly the Naiyāyikas, elucidates the *śābdabodhaprakāra* in propositions involving *upamā*. He assumes first that *sādrśya*—similarity—is a separate category. In the proposition—अरविन्दसुन्दरम्, he says, the part अरविन्द in the compound conveys by *abhidhā* lotus only; and that since the word इव in the *vigrahavākya* 'अरविन्दमिव सुन्दरम्' is elided, the word अरविन्द itself conveys by *lakṣaṇā* on the basis of *tātparyajñāna* the sense—अरविन्दनिरूपितसादृश्यप्रयोजक—that which contributes to similarity with lotus, and that the part of the sense of the word अरविन्द, viz., *prayojaka*, is related to the part of the sense of the word सुन्दर viz., सुन्दरत्व, through *abheda* (identity). So the whole sense of the proposition is that (the face is) identical with the object of beauty which is contributory to similarity with lotus—अरविन्दनिरूपितसादृश्यप्रयोजकाभिन्नसौन्दर्यवदभिन्नम्. This explanation of two *nāmārthas* as identical is based on the generally accepted dictum:—निपातातिरिक्तनामार्थयो-  
रभेदः संसर्गः—the senses conveyed by two *nāmas* other than *nipātas* like *iva*, are related to each other through *abheda*—identity; and their relation cannot be anything involving distinction (*bheda*). The objection that one *nāmārtha*—(अरविन्दनिरूपितसादृश्य)प्रयोजक—is directly related to the adjunct of the other *nāmārtha*, viz., सुन्दरत्व, may be easily answered by taking it as an exception to the general rule—पदार्थः पदार्थेनान्वेति न तु पदार्थैक-  
देशेन. In instances like देवदत्तस्य नत्ता (—the grandson of Devadatta—) Devadatta, the meaning of the stem, is related to the sense of the genitive case—*sambandhin*; and this sense of *śaṣṭhī* cannot be related to the chief

sense of the other *nāmārtha*—*napṭṛ* (i.e.), पुत्रपुत्र but only to पुत्र, the first part of the sense of the word *napṭā*.

Some hold that अरविन्दसुन्दरम्, as a compound, has a special *abhidhāśakti* to convey the whole sense (described above). Others are of opinion that the word अरविन्द in the compound conveys by *lakṣaṇā* the whole sense and that the other word सुन्दर is *tātparyagrāhaka*—helpful to make one understand the intention of the speaker.

\* If the expression containing *upamā* is not a compound but like अरविन्दमिव सुन्दरम्, Jagannātha says, the same may be understood from it by adopting a slightly different method of explanation. The sense *lotus*, a *nāmārtha*, is related to *similarity*, the sense of the *nipāta* *iva* by *nirūpitatva* (cor-relatedness) and similarity is associated with beauty (*saundarya*) by the relation *prayojakatva*. Hence the whole sense that (the face is) identical with the object of having beauty which contributes to similarity with lotus—अरविन्दनिरूपितसादृश्यप्रयोजकसौन्दर्यवदभिन्नम्. This explanation is based on a general rule that except in the expressions with *nipātas* in which *nāmārthas* may be related to the sense of *nipātas*, either as *viśeṣya* or *prakāra*, the *nāmārthas* are to be related mostly to *kāraṅkas* conveyed by the case-suffixes used after them. So in the present example with *nipāta* *iva*, the *nāmārtha*, lotus, is related to the *nipātārtha*—similarity—by the *nirūpitatva* (cor-relatedness) and the same *nipātārtha* to the other *nāmārtha*, beauty, by *prayojakatva*, the relations in both cases involving the element of *bheda*. The *nipātārtha*, viz., सादृश्य, is described in this instance both as *viśeṣya* and *viśeṣaṇa*, with reference to different *nāmārthas*.



In the example—अरविन्दमिव भाति—the *nipātārtha*, viz., *sādrśya*, is related to *jñāna*, the sense of the root *bhā* in भाति, by *prakāratva*. So the whole sense is अरविन्द-निरूपितसादृश्यप्रकारकधीविशेष्यम्—(the face is) the chief object of knowledge with similarity as its adjunct, which is correlated to lotus. If the same proposition has one additional word सौन्दर्येण to convey the common attributes between the *upamāna* and *upameya*, the *śābdabodha* is to be explained thus—the sense of the instrumental case, viz., *prayojyatva*, is either to be related to the knowledge, the sense of the root, or to similarity, the meaning of the *nipāta*. Hence the whole verbal cognition takes this form सौन्दर्यप्रयोज्यारविन्दनिरूपित-सादृश्यप्रकारकधीविशेष्यः.

Similarly, in propositions with *nipātas* like गज इव गच्छति, the word गजः expressing *upamāna*, conveys by *lakṣaṇā* the action of the *upamāna*, viz., गजगमन, which is related to the *nipātārtha*—*sādrśya*—by *nirūpitatva*, which is again related to the *dhātvartha* *gamana*—by *āśrayatva*. This *dhātvartha* is associated with its *viśeṣya kṛti* (volition), the meaning of the personal ending *ti*, by the relation of *anukūlatva*, and this *kṛti* with the *upameya* conveyed by a substantive in nominative case, by the relation of *āśrayatva*. Hence the whole *śābdabodha* has this form—‘गजगमनसदृशगमनानुकूलकृत्याश्रयः (राजा)’.

In the proposition ‘अरविन्दतुल्यो भाति’, the word *tulya* conveys by *lakṣaṇā* the sense, *tulyatvaprakāraka*, which is in its turn related to knowledge—*bhāna*—the meaning of the root *bhā* through *abheda*. So the whole sense would be अरविन्दनिरूपिततौल्यप्रकारकाभिन्नधीविशेष्यः.

In the instance ‘अरविन्दवत्सुन्दरम्’, the suffix *vati* expresses by *abhidhā* the idea ‘similar’ but conveys by *lakṣaṇā* ‘similarity’, which is related to the idea, ‘beauty’ (सुन्दरत्व), through *prayojakatva*. The whole sense is therefore the same as in the proposition—अरविन्दमिव सुन्दरम्. The only difference is that in the former *upamā* is *ārthī* and in the latter it is *śrautī*.

Here Nāgeśabhaṭṭa raises an objection to Jagannātha’s explanation. He says on the authority of the Mahābhāṣyakāra and his commentators that the sūtra ‘तेन तुल्ये क्रिया चेदतिः’ enjoins the suffix *vati* in the sense of similarity between two actions; so, it is explained in the proposition ‘ब्राह्मणवदधीते’ that the stem ब्राह्मण after which *vati* is enjoined, conveys by *lakṣaṇā* the action of the brahmin, viz., his study (*adhyayana*). So, in the present instance the verb *asti* is to be supplied on the basis of the generally accepted dictum—‘अस्तिर्भवन्तीपरः सर्वत्राप्रयुज्यमानोऽप्यस्ति’; and the word अरविन्द conveys by *lakṣaṇā* सुन्दरारविन्दभवनम्—the existence of the beautiful lotus—which is related to ‘similarity’, the sense of *vati*. So the whole sense is that the existence of the beautiful face is similar to that of lotus—सुन्दरारविन्दभवनसदृशं सुन्दरमुखभवनम्. He adds that when the existence of two beautiful objects is known, their beauty and mutual similarity are also known by means of *vyāñjana*.

What is said in ‘अरविन्दवत्सुन्दरम्’ holds true even in ‘अरविन्दवत्सुखम्’ with the difference that the *śābdabodha* in this instance arises even without *lakṣaṇā*—अरविन्द-निरूपितसादृश्यवदभिन्नम्.



In the expression अरविन्दवत्सौन्दर्यमस्य, the word अरविन्द\* conveys by *lakṣaṇā* the idea अरविन्दसौन्दर्य which is related to *sādrśya*, the subordinate sense of the suffix *vati*, by *nirūpitatva*; the genitive suffix in *asya* means *sambandhitva*. Hence the *śābdabodha* has this form:—अरविन्दसौन्दर्यनिरूपितसादृश्याधिकरणमेतत्सम्बन्धि सौन्दर्यम्—the beauty of this object possesses the similarity correlated to the beauty of lotus. Here the beauty of face and of lotus is known from the expression and this leads to the conception of the super-imposed identity between the similarity of the face and that of the lotus and through this, to the ultimate experience presenting similarity between the face and the lotus.

Here also Nāgeśabhaṭṭa reviews Jagannātha's explanation as incorrect. He argues that in cases of *vati*-suffix enjoined by the sūtra—‘तत्र तस्येव’—the suffix conveys by *abhidhā* *sādrśya* only, just like *iva*, but by *lakṣaṇā* the sense of *prayojaka*. So the word अरविन्दवत् would mean by *lakṣaṇā* अरविन्दसादृश्यप्रयोजक which may be related to *saundarya*, the primary sense of the word सौन्दर्यम्. Hence the explanation that the part अरविन्द in the word ‘अरविन्दवत्’ conveys by *lakṣaṇā* the idea—अरविन्दसौन्दर्य—is baseless.

In the proposition ‘अरविन्देन तुल्यम्’ the instrumental case after the stem ‘अरविन्द’ means *nirūpitatva* which is related to the subordinate idea of the word तुल्यम्, viz., *sādrśya*. So the *śābdabodha* is—‘अरविन्दनिरूपितसादृश्याश्रयाभिन्नं मुखम्’—‘face is identical with the object possessing similarity correlated to the lotus. Here the explanation of the identity between face and object possessing similarity (मुखम् and तुल्यम्) is based on the well-known rule—नामार्थयोरभेदस्त्वसर्गः. If we add the

word सौन्दर्येण to ‘अरविन्देन तुल्यम्’ सौन्दर्येण would mean सौन्दर्यप्रयोज्य, which may be related to *sādrśya*—the subordinate idea of the word तुल्यम्. Hence the whole sense would be—अरविन्दनिरूपितसौन्दर्यप्रयोज्यसादृश्यवदभिन्नम्.

In the example of *upamā*—अरविन्दमाननं च समम्—the word सम means सादृश्यवत्; so the *śābdabodha* runs thus—सादृश्यवदभिन्नम् अरविन्दम् आननं च. On the basis of this *śābdabodha* the similarity of one with the other is to be known afterwards by *vyāñjanā* or it is to be presented by a mental (non-verbal) cognition.

In the verse which contains *upamā* on the basis of विम्बप्रतिविम्बभावापन्नधर्म—

‘कोमलातपशोणाभ्रसन्ध्याकालसहोदरः ।

कुङ्कुमालेपनो याति कापायवसनो यतिः’ ॥

‘The mendicant wearing the *kāṣāya* robe with his person besmeared with saffron-paste walks just like the twilight with soft sun-light and red clouds’—arises a cognition of identity between the mendicant possessing the saffron-paste, etc., and the object similar to the twilight possessing the soft sunshine, etc. Then arises another cognition on the basis of *adhyavasāna* presenting the identity between the adjuncts of mendicant and the twilight, which form the ground of their similarity. Thus the adjuncts become common to both and they are related to *similarity*—a part of the sense of the word *sahodara*—by *prayojyatva*. Thus Jagannātha has explained *śābdabodha* in almost all probable examples of *upamā*.

If *sādrśya* is not considered a separate category but only the common attributes of two or more similar objects, then the *śābdabodha*, Jagannātha says, is to be explained in these similes in a



slightly different manner. In the example 'अरविन्दसुन्दरं वदनम्' the word अरविन्द, conveys by *lakṣaṇā* the properties of lotus (अरविन्दवृत्तिधर्म), and they are related to 'sundaratva', the subordinate part of the sense of the word 'sundara', so that the whole sense would be—अरविन्दवृत्तिधर्माभिन्नसुन्दरत्वाश्रयं वदनम्. In the proposition 'अरविन्दमिव सुन्दरम्' the word इव conveys 'similarity' which is nothing but the common attribute of the lotus and the face; the lotus—the meaning of the word अरविन्द—is related to the meaning of the word इव by *ādheyatva* and the sense of *iva* is related to *sundaratva*, the subordinate part of the meaning of the word सुन्दरम् by *abheda*, so that the whole sense would be 'अरविन्दवृत्तिसमानधर्माभिन्नसुन्दरत्वाश्रयं वदनम्'. In the proposition—'सौन्दर्येणारविन्देन समम्'—the instrumental case in the word सौन्दर्येण means *abheda* as in the instance 'धान्येन धनवान् (धान्याभिन्नधनवान्)', and that in the word अरविन्देन means *nirūpitatva* (cor-relatedness), so that the verbal cognition would have this form—अरविन्दनिरूपितसौन्दर्याभिन्नसाम्यवत् वदनम्.

In the cases of *luptopamās* like 'नारीयते सपत्नसेना' the suffix *kyan* means *ācāra* which is the common attribute of the *upamāna* and *upameya*. The word expressing *upamāna*, viz., नारी, conveys by *lakṣaṇā* the sense—'नारीनिरूपितसादृश्य'—similarity with the woman, which is related to the idea *ācāra*, the sense of the suffix *kyan*, through *prayojakatva* if *sādrśya* is accepted as a separate category, or through *abheda* if *sādrśya* is nothing but the common attribute between *upamāna* and *upameya*; and this sense of *ācāra* is related to the other *nāmārtha* सपत्नसेना, the *viśeṣya*; so the whole sense is नारीनिरूपितसादृश्यप्रयोजकाचारवती सपत्नसेना or नारीनिरूपितसादृश्याभिन्नाचारवती सपत्नसेना.

In this connection, Jagannātha mentions different views regarding *upasargas* and other *nipātas*. The words इव, etc., are *nipātas*; like *upasargas* they are *dyotakas* and not *vācakas*, and their *dyotakatva* (as explained by the *Vaiyākaraṇas*) consists in that they are *tātparyagrāhakas* (accessories to make one understand the intended sense) of the words with which they are associated. This is the view of the *Vaiyākaraṇas*. But the *Naiyāyika* holds that some *nipātas* like इव are *vācakas*, though *upasargas* are accepted as *dyotakas* only; and that every *nipāta* is not a *dyotaka*. But in this connection, Nāgeśabhaṭṭa asserts that all *nipātas* are *dyotakas* only, in view of the fact that in examples like साक्षात्क्रियते दयिता, the personal suffix *te* would convey the *karma* of the *sākṣātkāra*, viz., *dayitā*, only if the *nipāta* 'sākṣāt' is accepted as *dyotaka*, and so *nipātatva* is to be taken as the *dyotakatāvācchedaka* in all these instances; hence no *nipāta* can be taken to be *vācaka*.<sup>1</sup>

Next to *upamā* Jagannātha elucidates *upameyopamā*.

**Upameyopamā—**  
only a variety  
of *upamā*.

He considers that it is not a new *alaṅkāra* but only a variety of *upamā*. He however defines it—तृतीयसदृशव-

च्छेदबुद्धिफलकवर्णनविषयीभूतं परस्परमुपमानोप-

मेयभावमापन्नयोरर्थयोस्सादृश्यं सुन्दरमुपमेयोपमा— 'Upameyopamā' is similarity of two objects standing in the relation of *upamāna* and *upameya* with each other and this similarity is the main theme of a description resulting in the negation of a third similar object and becomes charming in its own way.

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, p. 191.



He illustrates it by the verse—

‘कौमुदीव भवती विभाति मे  
कातराक्षि ! भवतीव कौमुदी ।  
अम्बुजेन तुलितं विलोचनं  
लोचनेन च तवाम्बुजं समम्’ ॥

‘Oh fair-eyed ! you shine like moonlight and moonlight like yourself. Your eye resembles the lotus which also resembles your eye.’ In this instance both the *moonlight* and the *damsel* are described as standing in mutual relation as both *upamāna* and *upameya*; so also the lotus and the damsel’s eye. When one is compared to the other, it goes without saying that the other object resembles the first. The specific effort of comparing two objects with each other therefore results chiefly in the *negation of a third similar object*. Here the common attribute is one and the same, *viz., shining*, though the objects described are transposed in the process of comparison.

In the *parasparopamā*—

‘तटिदिव तन्वी भवती  
भवतीवेयं तटिलता गौरी’ ।

‘You are tender as lightning and the creeper-like lightning is as fair as yourself.’—The lightning and the damsel are described as both *upamāna* and *upameya*, but the common attributes in the two descriptions—*tenderness* and *whiteness*—are different. This mutual comparison on the basis of different common attributes in the *parasparopamā* is described as not aiming at the negation of a third similar object. The *upameyopamā* however consists in the description of two similar objects, both *upamānas* and *upameyas*, on the basis of one common attribute with a view to the negation of

a third similar object, which is the chief source of charm.<sup>1</sup>

After *Upameyopamā*, Jagannātha elucidates *Ananvaya*.

He defines it thus—‘द्वितीयसदृशव्यवच्छेदफलक-  
*Ananvaya*. वर्णनविषयीभूतं यदेकोपमानोपमेयकं सादृश्यं तदनन्वयः’

—*Ananvaya* consists in the description of similarity of one and the same object as *upamāna* and *upameya*, leading to the negation of a second similar object. From this definition it is clear that all descriptions of one and the same object as *upamāna* and *upameya* cannot come under the category of *ananvaya*, unless the main result, *viz., the negation of a second similar object*, is obtained. In the example—

‘लोहितपीतैः कुसुमै-  
रावृतमाभाति भूशृतः शिखरम् ।  
दावज्वलनज्वालैः  
कदाचिदाकीर्णमिव समये ॥

‘The summit of the mountain covered with red and yellow flowers shines like the same enveloped erstwhile in the flames of forest-fire’, the description of the same mountain in comparison with itself containing some special feature at a particular time, does not lead to the negation of a similar object; hence it is not an instance of *ananvaya*.

Similarly in *Kalpitopamā*—

‘स्तनाभोगे पतन्भाति कपोलाकुटिलोऽलकः ।  
सुधांशुविम्बतो मेरौ लम्बमान इवोरगः’ ॥

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 196-198.

though one may make out the *negation of a second similar object*, which actually exists, from the fact that the *upamāna* is a pure invention of the poet; yet one and the same object is not described as both *upamāna* and *upameya* and so it should not be mistaken for *ananvaya*. This idea is emphasized by the part of the definition—एकूपमानोपमेयकम् ।

Jagannātha illustrates *ananvaya* by a verse taken from his famous *Gaṅgālaharī*—

‘कृतश्रुद्राघौघानथ सपदि सन्तसमनसः  
समुद्धर्तुं सन्ति त्रिभुवनतले तीर्थनिवहाः ।  
अपि प्रायश्चित्तप्रसरणपथातीतचरिता-  
न्नरान्रीकर्तुं त्वमिव जननि ! त्वं विजयसे ’ ॥

‘There are in this three-fold world many sacred waters to purify all at once the worst sinners who have suffered much, but to receive heartily those whose actions are inexpressible, O mother! you are ever ready like yourself’. Here the unique superiority of the Ganges-water is explicit.

In the example—

‘इयति प्रपञ्चविषये  
तीर्थानि क्रियन्ति सन्ति पुण्यानि ।  
परमार्थतो विचारे  
देवी गङ्गा तु गङ्गेव ’ ॥

‘In this world how many sacred waters are there? But as a matter of fact, on reflection, the divine *Gaṅgā* (will be seen to) resemble *Gaṅgā* (herself)’. The superiority of the Ganges to other rivers consists in her being of the nature of God Viṣṇu and it is suggested by the particle *tu*. In both of these verses cited above, *ananvaya* resulting in the negation of a

second similar object is an *alaṅkāra* in view of the fact that it adorns and vivifies the chief idea, *viz.*, the poet's great devotion to Goddess Ganges.<sup>1</sup> But when it is a *dhvani*, it ceases to be an *alaṅkāra*. The *ananvayadhvani* is illustrated by a verse (found in the *Bhāminivilāsa*)—

‘वृष्टाः खलु परवृष्टाः  
परितो दृष्टाश्च विटपिनस्सर्वे ।  
भेदेन भुवि न पेदे  
साधर्म्यं ते रमाल ! मधुपेन ’ ॥

‘The cuckoos were asked; all the adjoining trees were seen; Oh Mango tree! nowhere on this earth was discovered by the honey-drinking bee an object similar to you and different from you’. Here the words *भेदेन*, *न* and *पेदे* suggest the *ananvaya*; while in the verse taken from the *Gaṅgālaharī*—

‘नगेभ्यो यान्तीनां कथय तटिनीनां कतमया  
पुराणां संहर्तुः सुरधुनि ! कपर्दोऽधिरुहः ।  
कथा वा श्रीभर्तुः पद्मितरयाक्षालि सलिलै-  
स्तुलालेशो यस्यां तव जननि ! दीयेत कविभिः ’ ॥

‘O Ganges! say which river flowing from mountains had mounted the matted hair of Śiva, the destroyer of the three cities? By whom else had the foot of the Lord of Lakṣmī been washed with water? O Mother! to which of these rivers could poets compare you—even distantly?’—many words suggest *ananvaya* which consists in the fact that the Ganges washing with her water the foot of Lord Viṣṇu is comparable to herself and that she is second to none in greatness.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 203 and 204. <sup>2</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 209 and 210



After *ananvaya* Jagannātha explains the figure *asama*.

**Asama.** Just like *upamā* in examples of *rūpaka* and *dīpaka*, *asama*, even when suggested, becomes a beautiful vehicle of *ananvaya*; in such cases it is not a separate figure of speech. When it is *vācya*, it is a separate *alaṅkāra* in that it becomes the chief source of *camatkāra*.

It is defined thus—सर्वैर्दोषमानिषेधोऽसमाख्योऽलङ्कारः—  
Asamālaṅkāra consists in the complete negation of similarity of an object with all other objects. It is illustrated by the verse eulogising the Delhi emperor, Shah Jahan—

‘भूमीनाथ ! शहाबदीन ! भवत्सुखो गुणानां गणे-  
रेतद्भूतभवप्रपञ्चविषये नास्तीति किं भूमहे ।  
आता नूतनकारणैर्यदि पुनः सृष्टिः वा भावये-  
त् स्यादेव तथापि तावत्कुलार्कसं दधानो नरः’ ॥

In this verse, the complete negation of similarity of the King with all other objects—past, present and future—is emphasized; hence it is *asama*. It is not an example for *upamānaluptā* (in which *upamāna* is not given), in view of the fact that in the former complete negation—आत्यन्तिकनिषेधः—is intended while in the latter no negation of *upamāna* is viewed. Moreover, in all *upamās* the description of *asādhya* leads to poetic beauty—*camatkāra*—and that being completely negated in *asama*, it cannot be identified with *luptopamā*.

It becomes an *alaṅkāra* not only when it is expressed (*vācya*) but also when it is suggested (*vyjyamāna*). Jagannātha illustrates this by the verse—

‘मयि त्वदुपमाविधौ वसुमतीश ! वार्ष्णेय-  
न वर्णयति मामयं कविरिति कुपं मां कृपाः ।  
चराचरमिदं जगज्जनयतो विधेर्मानसे  
पदं न हि दधेतरां तव सङ्गु द्वितीयो वरः’ ॥

‘Oh lord of earth! while drawing comparison between you and any other person, I become speechless; so, do not get angry with this poet (myself) that he is not describing you.’ A second person like you among his creations did not find a place in the mind of the creator of the world, both animate and inanimate.’ In this verse the poet means that the king described is an incomparable person in that he could not find any body equal to him (the king). The idea of negation of a similar object in all times and climes, which is not expressed by words, is suggested and it enhances the beauty of the main idea, the greatness of the king.<sup>1</sup> Hence it is *vyāṅgyāsamālaṅkāra*.

It also becomes a *dhvani*, which is of two kinds:

**Asama—** (1) by the negation of *upamāna*, and (2) by the negation of *upamā*. The first is illustrated by the verse—

‘सदसद्विवेकरसिकै-  
रालोक्य समस्तलोकमय कविभिः ।  
गणिता गगनरुतादे-  
र्गणनायां तन्वि तव सदृशी’ ॥

‘By poets who take delight in discriminating the real (*sat*) from the unreal (*asat*), the entire world is exhausted and oh tender lady! one like you happens to be taken into account, (only) when taking into account the creeper in the sky and the like’. Here the *asamadhvani*

<sup>1</sup> The particle *नञ्* in the verse above expresses the negation of *padadhāraṇa* and not that of *upamāna*. Hence it is called *asamadhvani*. Similarly, the perfect form *दधेतराम्*, when associated with *नञ्*, expresses the negation in past time only; yet it is called *asama* in view of the fact that the negation of *upamāna* in all times can be well inferred from the expressed negation in past time.

consists in the suggestion of the negation of a similar object, which is effected by the *upamāna* being classed among non-existent objects. The second is exemplified by the verse—

‘पूर्णमसुरै रसातल-

ममरैः स्वर्गो वसुन्धरा च मरैः ।

रघुवंशवीरतुलना

तथापि खलु जगति निरवधार्यम् ॥

‘The netherland is filled with Asuras; the heaven with Devas; the earth with men. Still to compare the heroes in Raghu’s family is an impossibility.’<sup>1</sup>

*Udāharāṇa* is defined by Jagannātha thus:—‘सामान्येन निरूपितस्यार्थस्य सुप्रसिद्धिपूर्वकं लक्षणेन निरूप्य *Udāharāṇa*. तयोरेवयवावयविभाव इत्येवमात्रं उदाहरणम्’—If when a general class is mentioned a particular instance of it is described for easy understanding and the relation between such particular and general is further expressly stated, then it is *udāharāṇa*. This is illustrated by the verse—

‘अमितगुणोऽपि पदार्थो

दोषेणैकेन निन्दितो भवति ।

निखिलरसायनराजो

गन्धेनोग्रेण लक्षुण इव ॥

‘An object may possess many good qualities but it becomes undesirable for one defect, as in the instance of the garlic—the best of elixirs, with its nasty smell’. The word *iva* is not used in this verse in the sense of *sādrśya* as in cases of *upamā*. It conveys by *lakṣaṇā* the sense of *sāmānyaviśeṣabhāva*, the relation between the general and the particular. Similarly, words like *yathā* and *nidarśanam* are found used in the examples of *udāharāṇālankāra*.

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 210–213.

The *Prācīnas* argue that *udāharāṇa* is nothing but *upamā* since words like *iva* express *sādrśya* between two concrete objects (*viśeṣapadārthas*) though the relation of *sāmānyaviśeṣabhāva* is known at the outset. Against this view Jagannātha asserts that in the examples of *udāharāṇa* words like *iva* do not convey the sense of *sādrśya* but convey *sāmānyaviśeṣabhāva*, unlike in the examples of *upamā*. Jagannātha explains also the difference between *arthāntaranyāsa* and *udāharāṇa*, thus:—there are two ways in which the *viśeṣavākya* substantiating the *sāmānyavākya* can be distinguished—one in which the subject in the particular proposition refers to a particular case with the predicate in general terms, and the other in which both the subject and the predicate in the particular proposition refer to particular cases. The first kind is *udāharāṇa* while the second is *arthāntaranyāsa*. In the *udāharāṇa* example—

‘अमितगुणोऽपि पदार्थो

दोषेणैकेन निन्दितो भवति ।

the predicate ‘निन्दितो भवति’ conveys the idea of *निन्दितत्व* in general terms in respect of garlic, while the subject refers to a particular case. But in the instance of *arthāntaranyāsa* a general statement is substantiated by a particular statement as in—

‘उपकारमेव कुस्ते विपद्गतः सङ्गुणो नितराम् ।

मूर्च्छां गतो मृतो वा रोगानपहरति पारदः सकलान् ॥

Here, in the illustrative statement the subject and predicate specify particular parallels.



If the reading should be changed into—

‘मूर्च्छां गतो मृतो वा निदर्शनं वीरस्य सः’

then the predicate would convey its sense in a general manner—उपकारकरण. Jagannātha observes that this distinction is a sufficient ground to distinguish *udāharāṇa* from *arthāntaranyāsa*; and he retorts against the Prācīnas that if this distinction is not accepted by them, they would have to classify *prativastūpamā* under *dr̥ṣṭānta* and *atiśayokti* under *rūpaka* and even the *alaṅkāras* like *smaraṇa*, *bhrāntimat* and *sandeha* would have to be brought under *ārthi upamā*.<sup>1</sup>

After *udāharāṇa* Jagannātha elucidates *smaraṇā-lāṅkāra*. He defines it as—‘सारस्व-  
Smarāṇālāṅkāra. ज्ञानोद्बुद्धसंस्कारप्रबोधं कारणं स्मरणालङ्कारः’—

‘*Smaraṇālāṅkāra* consists in the description of recollection resulting from the impression roused up by a knowledge of similarity’. It is illustrated by the verse found in the extant *Prāṇābharaṇa*—

‘दोर्दण्डद्वयकुण्डलीकृतलसत्कोदण्डवन्दन-  
ध्वस्तोद्दण्डविपक्षमण्डलमथ त्वां वीक्ष्य मध्येरणम् ।

बलाद्वाग्निद्वयमुक्तकाण्डबलयश्चाकाशकीपाण्डव-  
भ्रश्यस्त्राण्डवस्तृपाण्डवमहो ! को न क्षितीशः सरेत्’ ॥

‘Alas! which king will not recollect the Pāṇḍava enraged at the sight of *Khāṇḍava* escaping from the rising flames emitted from the fusillade of (fiery) arrows darted from the galloping *gāṇḍīva*, when he looks at you who drove all your foes by the roaring sound of (your) brilliant bow drawn and bent by (your) two arms.’ Here the *smaraṇālāṅkāra* consists in the description of a king’s recollection, at the sight of *Prāṇanārāyaṇa* on the battlefield, of Arjuna who is known

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 213-216; pp. 472 and 473.

‘as an embodiment of heroism. It is called *recollection* in that it is produced by the impressions roused up by the knowledge of common attributes between Arjuna and *Prāṇanārāyaṇa*, as fancied by the poet. It is called an *alaṅkāra* in that it ornaments and gives life to the *Kavirati* (the poet’s devotion to his patron), the main theme of this verse. It is argued that it may be a good example for the suggestion of *वीररस*; but it is held that, like the *smaraṇālāṅkāra*, the *वीररस* becomes subordinate to the *Kavirati* and as such is only a ‘रसबलङ्कारः’. In some verses like—

‘इत एव निजालयं गताया

वनिताया गुरुभिः समावृतायाः ।

परिवर्तितकन्धरं नतभ्रु

स्मयमानं वदनाम्बुजं स्मरामि’ ॥

‘When the damsel went to her house from here and when she stayed there in the circle of elders, I remember, her smiling lotus-like face with neck turned round and with eye-brows a bit bent down’—remembrance is described as the result of impression roused up by anxiety (*cintā*) and not by the knowledge of *sādṛśya*. Hence it is not an instance of *smaraṇālāṅkāra*. It cannot be called a *bhāva* in that the latter is necessarily to be suggested.


As in *upamā*, the common attributes, which form the basis of recollection, may be *upādeya* (mentionable), *anupādeya* (unmentionable) or *upādeyānupādeya* (both mentionable and unmentionable) and on the basis of these differences, different varieties of *smaraṇālāṅkāra* can be mentioned.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 216 and 217.

*Rūpaka* heads the list of *alaṅkāras* involving the idea of *abheda*. It has been defined thus:— 'उपमेयतावच्छेदकपुरस्कारेणोपमेये सम्बन्धनिश्चीयमानमुपमावसादकं रूपकम् ; कदेवोपस्कारकत्वविशिष्टं अलङ्कारः'—*Rūpakālaṅkāra* is an explicit and positive identification of the object of comparison (*upameya*) with the standard of comparison (*upamāna*), the determinant (*avacchedaka*) of the *upameyatā* (the state of being the object of comparison) being specifically kept in view; and it becomes an *alaṅkāra* when it beautifies something else. Jagannātha explains the purpose of each part of the definition, as follows: the phrase in the definition—*उपमेयतावच्छेदकपुरस्कारेण*—differentiates *rūpaka* from the *alaṅkāras* of *apahnuṭi*, *bhrāntimat*, *atiśayokti* and *nidarśanā*: in *apahnuṭi* the *upameyatāvacchedaka* is negated in the *upameya*; in *bhrāntimat*, the causes of *bhrānti* obstruct the knowledge of the existence of the *upameyatāvacchedaka* in *upameya*; in *atiśayokti* and *nidarśanā*, *upameyatāvacchedaka* is not at all known, since both involve *sādhyavasānalakṣaṇā*. The word 'निश्चीयमान' in the definition differentiates *rūpaka* from *utprekṣā* which involves *sambhāvanā* (probability) and not *nīścaya* (certainty).<sup>1</sup>

*Rūpaka* is classified into three—*सावयवम्*, *निरवयवम्* and *परम्परितम्*, the first again divided into *समस्तवस्तुविषयम्*, *एकदेशविचर्ति*, the second into *केवलम्* and *मालारूपकम्* and the third into *केवलशुद्धपरम्परितम्*, *केवलशुद्धपरम्परितम्*, *मालाशुद्धपरम्परितम्* and *मालाशुद्धपरम्परितम्*, as the following table shows:—

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 224 and 225.



This eight-fold classification of *rūpaka* has been accepted by Mammatabhāṭṭa. Jagannātha illustrates all these varieties and we shall presently take up the illustration of the *समस्तवस्तुविषयसावयवरूपक* in the verse—

‘सुविमलमौक्तिकतारे  
धवलांशुकचन्द्रिकाचमत्कारे ।  
वदनपरिपूर्णचन्द्रे  
सुन्दरि ! राकासि नास सन्देहः’ ॥

‘There is no doubt, Oh beautiful, in the fact that you are the moon-lit night with the full moon as your face, with the bright moon-light as your white garment and with stars as purely white pearls’. Here the lady addressed is identified with *rākā* by the statement ‘(स्व) राका असि’ and the adjectives substantiate on the basis of super-imposition this identification in every detail.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 230 and 231.

<sup>2</sup> *ibid.*, p. 231.



Of all these varieties the variety—*रूपपरम्परितरूपकम्*—deserves our notice. It is illustrated by verses which contain one *dropa* (superimposition) as the basis of another, and it is in this sense that it is called *परम्परित*; and it is known as *śleṣa* in that the substantiating statement involving superimposition employs equivoques. The variety of *मालाक्षिपरम्परितरूपकम्* is illustrated by the verse—

‘कमलावासकासारः क्षमाधृतिरणीकरः ।  
अयं कुवलयस्येन्दुरानन्दयति माधवात्’ ॥

‘This king pleases people, as the moon of the *kuvalaya* (the circle of earth and lilies), the king of serpents—*śeṣa*—by virtue of *kṣamādhṛti* (by possessing patience and by bearing earth) and a lake which is *kamalāvāsa* (the seat of Lakṣmī and of lotuses)’. Here the identifications of the king with the moon, with the *Śeṣa* and with the lake on the basis of superimposition are based on verbal identification through equivokes like *कुवलय*.<sup>1</sup>

It is objected that by *śleṣa* the identity of two ideas as conveyed by one expression is known even without superimposition, a necessary factor in *rūpaka*: superimposition—*dropa*—so much so that there is no *dropa* leading to another *dropa*, in the verse—*कमलावासकासारः*, etc.; and that nobody would accept the view that knowledge of identity or identification is superimposition, in view of the fact that instances of *atiśayokti* involve only identification on the basis of the suppression of *upameya* (*विषयनिर्गमम्*) without any

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, p. 234.

•superimposition. The *śleṣa* in the expression *कमलावास* generates only a knowledge of identity between the two ideas—*सरोजाश्रयत्व* and *लक्ष्म्याश्रयत्व*—and on the basis of this knowledge of identity may arise another knowledge of the identity of two objects—the king and the lake—the *substrata* of these identified properties. So there is no chance of arriving at the knowledge of superimposition of the two objects—the king and the lake—on the basis of another superimposition of the two ideas—*लक्ष्म्याश्रयत्व* and *सरोजाश्रयत्व*. Hence it is no instance of *रूपपरम्परितरूपकम्* ।

Jagannātha meets this objection easily by saying that on the basis of the knowledge of identity of the two properties—*लक्ष्म्याश्रयत्व* and *सरोजाश्रयत्व*—arises a superimposition of the identity of these two properties which leads to the superimposition of the two *substrata*—the king and the lake—so that there is one superimposition based on another, in this example of *rūpaka*, as explained in its definition.

Even in the case of *परम्परितरूपकम्*—‘*सौजन्यचन्द्रिकाचन्द्रो राजा*’—the king is the moon with the moonlight of good heart—the superimposition of the moon on the king is based on the identification of the two properties—*सौजन्य* and *चन्द्रिका*—resulting from a superimposition of the identity of *candrikā* on *saujanya*.

Again, an objection is raised in instances of *rūpaka* like ‘*सौजन्यचन्द्रिकाचन्द्रो राजा*’ involving compounds, thus: in the *karmadhāraya* (*समानाधिकरणतत्पुरुषः*) compound—*सौजन्यचन्द्रिका*—within the compound—*सौजन्यचन्द्रिकाचन्द्रः*—*saujanya* is related to *candrikā* by *abheda* when *saujanya* is taken as

the adjunct of *candrikā*, and the knowledge of *candrikā* possessing the identity with *saujanya* cannot establish the metaphor that the thing is identical with the moon. There is a generally accepted rule that the conception of a thing related to A as identical with a thing related to B results in the conception of A's identity with B—*कर्मविविक्तसम्बन्धभेदः तस्मिन्सदभेदः—चन्द्रसम्बन्धविचित्रिकायां राजसम्बन्धसौजन्याभेदः, ततश्चन्द्रे राजाभेदः*.<sup>1</sup> According to this rule, the knowledge of *candrikā* (the *viśeṣya* in the compound) as identical with *saujanya* (the *viśeṣaṇa*):—i.e., the conception of *candrikā*, belonging to A, viz., *Candra* as identical with *saujanya*, belonging to B, viz., *Rājan* results in the conception of A's (*Candra's*) identity with B (*Rājan*). The conception of *candra* as identical with *rājan* is only a *rājarūpaka* and not a *candrārūpaka*. So also in all cases of *परम्परितरङ्गक* involving compounds one superimposition cannot be explained as substantiating another superimposition.

Even in the example of *समस्तवस्तुविषयतावयवक* cited above—'सुविमलमौक्तिकतारे', etc.—the statement 'सुन्दरि! राका असि' clearly indicates the *rākārūpaka*, but the other statements 'सुविमलमौक्तिकतारे', etc., explain the identity of the pearls with stars, etc., and not the identity of stars with pearls, so much so that these identifications of *tārā*, *candrikā* and *pūrṇacandra* as *viśeṣyas* with *mauktika*, *dhavalāṁśuka* and *vadana* as *viśeṣaṇas* do not help the identification of *sundarī* with *rākā*. It has already been said that in the *rūpakā-lāṅkāra* the *upameya* should be known as identical with *upamāna*—'उपमेयस्य शब्दादप्यतीयमानं उपमानतादात्म्यं रूपकम्', and not the *upamāna* as identical with *upameya*. Hence the explanation of *rūpaka* in the examples cited above is unsatisfactory.

This objection is answered as follows:—The relation of *abheda* connects the adjunct *Objection II* (विशेषणम्) with the chief concept answered. (*viśeṣya*) in *rūpaka*:—मुखं चन्द्रः—here *mukha*, the *viśeṣya*, is known as possessing identity of which *candra*, the *viśeṣaṇa*, is the correlative (*pratiyogin*). In the same way, in the example 'मुखचन्द्रः' the *abheda* with *candra* as its *pratiyogin* is known, though *mukha* becomes an adjunct of *candra*. The difference lies only in the *viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva* between *mukha* and *candra*. In either case is *mukha* the *anuyogin* of the relation *abheda* and *candra* the *pratiyogin*:—i.e., from the statement 'मुखं चन्द्रः' with *mukha* as *viśeṣya*, the *śābdabodha* arises in the form—चन्द्रप्रतियोगिकाभेदानुयोगि मुखम्; and in the compound 'मुखचन्द्रः' with *mukha* as an adjunct of *candra* the verbal cognition has the form—मुखानुयोगिकाभेदप्रतियोगी चन्द्रः. Similarly from सौजन्यचन्द्रिकाचन्द्रो राजा, the *śābdabodha* arises thus: 'सौजन्यानुयोग्यभेदप्रतियोगिनी चन्द्रिका'; this knowledge leads to another with *saujanya* as *viśeṣya*, *abheda* as its relation with *candrikā* as *pratiyogin*; and the latter becomes the basis of *candrārūpaka* with *candra* as the *pratiyogin* and *rājan* as the *anuyogin* of the *abheda*. So also in the verse—'सुविमलमौक्तिकतारे' etc., the *mauktikas*, etc., are the *anuyogins* of *abheda* with *tārās*, etc., as its *pratiyogin*. Such a knowledge, as explained above, substantiates the *rākā-rūpaka* with *Sundarī* (damsel) as the *anuyogin* of *abheda* and the *rākā* as its *pratiyogin*.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 235-237.



On this topic Nāgeśabhaṭṭa cites different opinions.  
 According to some *Alaṅkārikas*, rūpaka is of two kinds—*śābda* and *ārtha*,—the former in the compounds like मुखचन्द्रः from which rises a verbal cognition with mukha as *viśeṣya*, candra as *viśeṣaṇa* and abheda as *samsarga*; and the latter, in the compounds like 'मुखचन्द्रः' from which *candrābheda* with mukha as *viśeṣya*, candra as *viśeṣaṇa* and abheda as *samsarga*, is known through *arthāpatti* (presumption) or *anumāna* (inference); and it is on the basis of this *ārtharūpaka* that the 'मुखचन्द्रः' is called *candrārūpaka* with the relation abheda having candra as *pratiyogin* and mukha as *anuyogin*. It can also be said on the authority of the *Mahābhāṣyakāra*, Nāgeśabhaṭṭa continues, that the compound मुखचन्द्रः belongs to the type called *समपूर्वसमवायि*, which has the first component part conveying the chief sense of the compound; and thus, there would be no difficulty in explaining *candrārūpaka* in the instance 'मुखचन्द्रः'. Some others like Mammatabhaṭṭa explain rūpaka in examples like मुखचन्द्रः, taking the description of identity, with candra either as its *anuyogin* or as its *pratiyogin*. His definition of rūpaka runs thus—'समपूर्वसमवायि न समानोपमेययोः'; and this definition is so comprehensive as to embrace even instances with *upamāna* as the *anuyogin* of abheda.<sup>1</sup>

After dealing with another independent classification of *paramparītarūpaka* into *padārtharūpaka* and *vākyaārtharūpaka* in suitable illustrations, Jagannātha explains *śābdabodha* in instances of rūpaka. In *Vyastaprayogas* like 'मुखचन्द्रः' the word candra denoting *upamāna* conveys by

<sup>1</sup> *Rasagaṅgādhara-vyākhyā*, *ibid.*, pp. 237 and 238.

•*sāropalakṣaṇā* the sense—चन्द्रवृत्तिगुणवत्—that which possesses the properties of candra—which is related to mukha through abheda. Hence the *śābdabodha* is—चन्द्रवृत्तिगुणवदमित्रं मुखम्—face is identical with what possesses the properties of the moon. This is the view of the *Prācīnas*, including the *Alaṅkārasarvasvakāra*. Though the same *śābdabodha* is arrived at even in examples of *upamā*, the difference between *rūpaka* and *upamā* is maintained by the *Vaiyañjanikābheda* (i.e.), by the knowledge of identity between *upamāna* and *upameya* through *vyañjanā* (suggestion) consequent on the employment of *lakṣaṇā*. Since abheda is cognised by *vyañjanā*, its knowledge cannot be sublated by any contradictory cognition.

The *Navīnas* including Appayya Dīkṣita explain the *śābdabodha* in a slightly modified way: abheda is known even without the help of *lakṣaṇā* in instances of rūpaka on the basis of the rule—नामार्थयोरभेदः संसर्गः. The acceptance of *lakṣaṇā* by *Prācīnas* makes it very difficult for one to distinguish *rūpaka* from *upamā*. Generally in the instances of *upamītasamāsa*—मुखं चन्द्र इव—*upamā* is recognised and in those of *viśeṣaṇasamāsa*—मुखमेव चन्द्रः—there is *rūpaka*; and if the *uttarapadas* in both instances convey ideas by *lakṣaṇā*, no point of difference between *upamā* and *rūpaka* could be established.

Moreover, statements involving negation—मुखं न चन्द्रसदृशम्, अपि तु चन्द्र एव—face is not similar to the moon, but it is moon itself—negate similarity and this militates against the validity of the *Prācīnas*' view here. Again, according to the *Prācīnas*' view, the word candra in the first of the statements—'देवदत्तमुखं चन्द्र एव, यशदत्तमुखं तु न तथा अपि तु चन्द्रसदृशम्'—conveys by *lakṣaṇā* *candrasadṛśa*, so that the second

and third propositions would read—चन्द्रसदृशं तु न चन्द्र-  
सदृशम्, अपि तु चन्द्रसदृशम्—involving a self-contradiction.  
The sense of the negative particle *nañ* cannot be  
connected with the suggested idea, *abheda*, since  
at the time of *nañ-padārthajñāna*—(the knowledge  
of the sense of *nañ*)—arises no knowledge of the  
suggested sense, *abheda*. The *abhedajñāna*, as explained  
by the Prācīnas, is an *āhāryajñāna*—supposititious  
cognition—arising on the will of the speaker when  
he has a contradictory knowledge. Moreover, how  
can the knowledge of the suggested sense, *abheda*,  
arise on the basis of the secondary sense of the word  
चन्द्र (viz., चन्द्रसदृश)? Nowhere is it known that the  
knowledge of the identity between two objects with  
their common characteristic as the adjunct leads to the  
knowledge of the identity of those two objects with  
their particular characteristics as the adjunct. Though  
we have an experience of the identity between pot  
and cloth with *dravyatva*—substanceness—as the adjunct,  
we can well experience their non-identity with *ghaṭatva*  
(potness) and *paṭatva* (clothness) as adjuncts. The  
knowledge of the identity of two objects may lead to  
the knowledge of the general and special properties  
of those objects, just as in 'गङ्गायां घोषः' the knowledge  
of the identity of 'current' with 'bank' results in that  
of the former's properties—coldness, purity, etc.,—  
being ascribed to the latter.

So also in the verse—

‘कृपया सुधया सिद्ध हरे मां सापमूर्च्छितम् ।

जगज्जीवन तेनाहं जीविष्यामि न संशयः’ ॥

there arises first the knowledge of identity of कृपा  
(kindness) with अमृत (nectar) and then the knowledge of

कृपा as related to the सेक (sprinkling), which is after-  
wards known as related to जीवन (life) as the cause  
of *seka*. In the example—

‘गाम्भीर्येण समुद्रोऽयं सौन्दर्येण च मन्मथः’ ।

the *prācīnas* say that *prayojyatva* or *abheda*, the sense  
of the instrumental case in the word ‘गाम्भीर्येण’  
is related to *sādrśya*, a part of the *lakṣya* sense of  
the word—समुद्र—(समुद्रसादृश्यवत्), so that the verbal  
cognition has the form—‘गाम्भीर्यप्रयोज्यसमुद्रसादृश्यवदभिन्नो-  
ऽयम्’—this (king) is identical with one possessing the  
similarity of the ocean due to depth; or ‘गाम्भीर्याभिन्न-  
समुद्रवृत्तिधर्मवदभिन्नोऽयम्’—the king is identical with the  
person possessing the property, viz., depth of the  
ocean. The *Navīnas* explain the relation *abheda* without  
adopting *lakṣaṇā*, thus—गाम्भीर्यादिप्रयोज्यसमुद्राद्यभिन्नः—the  
king is identical with the ocean due to depth (with  
the ocean created in the poet's mind by the conception of  
depth). They say that the मुखचन्द्र and राजसमुद्र are the  
poet's mental creations—*antaḥkaraṇaparīṇāmas*—and as  
such, may be well identified with the objects well-  
known in the world. Hence the knowledge of identity  
between राजन् and समुद्र is explained. Or the instru-  
mental case in the word ‘गाम्भीर्येण’ conveys by *lakṣaṇā*  
the idea ‘ज्ञानजन्यज्ञानप्रकारत्वं’, just like by the ablative  
case in ‘वह्निमान् धूमात्’, so that the verbal cognition has  
this form—गाम्भीर्यज्ञानजन्यज्ञानप्रकारसमुद्राभिन्नः—the (king) is  
identical with the ocean which is presented as adjunct  
in a knowledge produced by the knowledge of depth.

When the *viśaya* and *viśayin* are expressed by words  
in the same case—समानाधिकरण—*abheda* is a *sāmsarga*  
only. In the example ‘बुद्धिदीपकः’, the verbal cognition is



बुद्धमिमा दीपकला. If they are not in the same case—  
व्यधिकरण—it becomes the *viśeṣya* (object) of the  
verbal cognition. In the verse—

‘आख्ये पूर्णशशङ्कता, नयनस्य लक्षणं विवक्षितम्  
किञ्चासीदमृतस्य भेदविमर्शः सार्वभौमस्य चरित्रकः’ ।

the words ‘शशङ्कता, तादात्म्यम्, भेदविमर्शः’, all in nomi-  
native cases, convey *abheda*, which thus becomes the  
chief concept of the verbal cognition, since the *pratha-*  
*māntārtha* (the meaning of the nominative), is taken  
generally as the leading concept (मुख्यविषय) of *śābda-*  
*bodha*. It becomes the *viśeṣya* (adjunct) of the verbal  
cognition in the line—

‘विधुभावमञ्जतितमां तद्वानयम्’,

the sense of the stem ‘विधुभाव’ which consists of  
*rūpaka* being an adjunct of the sense conveyed by the  
accusative case.<sup>1</sup>

After elucidating the *śābdabodha* in instances  
involving *rūpaka*, Jagannātha illustrates *sādhārana-*  
*dharma* under four main heads—अनुपपत्तिः, विम्वप्रतिविम्व-  
भावापन्न, उपचरित and केवलशशङ्कता; then he explains by  
suitable illustrations the *rūpakadoṣas*, which admits  
of two main varieties—शब्दस्य विम्वप्रतिविम्व-  
मूलरूपकदोषः and अर्थशक्ति-  
मूलरूपकदोषः; and then the *rūpakadoṣas* like *līṅgabheda*  
which is not sometimes a *doṣa* in instances like—  
‘सन्तापशान्तिकारिवाद्दत्तं तव चन्द्रमाः’ where the word  
conveying *upamāna* is in masculine while the word  
referring to *upameya* is in neuter.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Rasagaṅgādhara*, *ibid.*, pp. 239-242.

<sup>2</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 243-247.

*Pariṇāma* is defined thus—‘विषयी यत् विषयात्मतयैव  
प्रकृतोपयोगी न स्वातन्त्र्येण स परिणामः’—  
*Pariṇāma*: its definition. ‘*Pariṇāmāṅkāra* is that in which  
*upamāna* is doing its function in the  
context not independently—not in its own capacity—  
but in the capacity of the *upameya*.’ The main  
difference between *rūpaka* and *pariṇāma* consists in that  
in *rūpaka upameya* is identified through superimposition  
with *upamāna*, while in *pariṇāma upamāna* is identified  
with *upameya* through superimposition with some  
definite purpose in the context.

*Pariṇāma* is illustrated by the verse—

‘अपारे संसारे विषमविषयारण्यसरणौ  
मम भ्रामं भ्रामं विगलितविरामं जडमतेः ।  
परिश्रान्तस्यायं तरणितनयातीरनिलयः  
‘समन्तात्सन्तापं हरिनवतमालस्त्रियतु’ ॥

‘May the new Tamāla of God Hari on the bank of  
the Jumna, the daughter of the Sun-god, destroy all  
my sufferings! I have been foolishly wandering  
without rest all over this boundless world which  
contains a route only to the wild forest of sense-objects’.  
In this verse the *tamāla* tree—the *upamāna*—is identi-  
fied with *Hari*—the *upameya*—, so that it is described  
as capable of relieving the speaker from his sufferings  
in this world.<sup>1</sup>

The verbal cognition arising from the example of  
*pariṇāma* may be thus described:—the expression  
*हरितमालः* is explained as *हर्यभिमतमालः* having *abheda* as  
the relation between *upameya* and *upamāna* with *Hari*  
as *pratiyogin* and *tamāla* as *anuyogin*. So also in

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, p. 248.

the example involving a *samāsa*—‘आवं आवं वचस्सुवाम्’—the śābdabodha is thus—‘वचोऽभिप्रसुधाविषयकभवणम्’. In the example of *rūpaka*—‘पावं पावं वचस्सुवाम्’—*vacas* is the anuyogin of *abheda* and *sudhā* is the pratiyogin, so that the verbal cognition has the form—वचोनिष्ठाभेद-प्रतियोगिसुधाकर्मकपानम्. Thus the distinction is maintained in the śābdabodha arising from passages involving *pariṇāma* and *rūpaka*.

In the *vyadhikāraṇa* instances of *pariṇāma* like ‘अहीनचन्द्रा लसताननेन’ the instrumental case in the word ‘आननेन’ conveys *abheda*; so the śābdabodha arising therefrom has the form—लसदाननाभिन्नहीनेतरचन्द्रयुक्ता. In such cases of *rūpaka* like—

‘मीनवती नयनाभ्यां

.....।

.....

सुरसेयं सुन्दरी सरसी’ ॥

the śābdabodha has the following form—नयनाभ्युपयोगिका-भेदप्रतियोगिमीनयुक्ता—since it has the *sarasīrūpaka*.<sup>1</sup>

*Pariṇāma* sometimes becomes a *dhvani* and it is illustrated by the verse—

*Pariṇāma*—  
a *dhvani*.

‘इन्दुना परसौन्दर्येसिन्धुना वन्धुना विना।

ममायं विषमस्तापः केन वा शमयिष्यते’ ॥

‘By whom, except my friend, the moon, an ocean of great beauty, will my unbearable anguish be quenched?’ Here the speaker, a forlorn lover, views the moon as identical with the face of his beloved

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 252 and 253.

and it is only in this capacity that the moon is viewed as the cause of cooling the heat of love in the speaker. Here the suggestion consists in the identification of the moon with face, with a view to cooling the speaker’s anguish. This variety is known as *अर्थशक्तिमूलपरिणामध्वनि*. The other variety—*शब्दशक्तिमूलपरिणामध्वनि*—is illustrated by the verse—

‘पान्थ ! मन्दमते ! किं वा सन्तापमनुविन्दसि ।

पयोधरं समाशास्त्र येन शान्तिमवाप्नुयाः’ ॥

‘Oh wanderer! fool! Why do you suffer? Pray to reach the *payodhara* (the cloud and the breast of the damsel), so that you can cool yourself!’ Here the cloud, though full of water, is not capable of cooling the heat of the lover, so it is identified with the breast of the damsel with a definite purpose. This suggestion is based on the ambiguous word *पयोधर*; so it is called *śabdaśaktimūla*.<sup>1</sup>

After *pariṇāma*, Jagannātha deals with the figures<sup>2</sup>

of *sasandeha*, *bhrāntimat* and *ullekha*. *Apahnuti*—its definition. which are omitted here. After them *apahnuti* is taken up for elucidation. It is defined thus:—‘उपमेयतावच्छेदकनिषेधसामानाधिकरण्येनारोप्यमाण-उपमानतादात्म्यमपहृतिः—*apahnuti* is that in which along with the negation of the उपमेयतावच्छेदक—the determinant of *upameyatā*—there is superimposition of the identity of the *upameya* with *upamāna*.’ In this figure the *virodha*—antagonism—of the determinants of उपमेयता and उपमानता is known; and this fact marks its distinction from *rūpaka*.

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, p. 256.

<sup>2</sup> *vide ibid.*, pp. 256-277.



It is divided into सावयव and निरवयव; and the निरवयव variety is illustrated by the verse taken from the *Bhāminīvilāsa*, (II, 76):—

‘इयामं सितं च सुदृशो न रसोऽस्त्वस्मिन्  
किन्तु स्फुटं गरलमेतदवाच्यतम् ।  
नो चेत्कथं निपतनादनयोस्तद्वै  
मोहं मुदं च नितरां दधते युवावः’ ॥

‘The eyes of the beautiful damsel are not merely blue and white in appearance but they are evidently poison and nectar; otherwise, how do the youth swoon and joy when her eyes fall upon them?’ Here *śyāmasitatva* (both blueness and whiteness) of the eyes is negated and *garalāmṛtatva* (both poisonness and nectarness) is superimposed on them, with the explanation of a reason. Hence it is *hetvapahnuti*. In this example the negation of उपमेयतावच्छेदक is effected by a separate sentence involving the particle *nañ*, and the superimposition of the *upamānatādrūpya*, by another. Hence there is *vākyabheda* (sentence-split) which need not be taken here as a serious defect. But in instances having words like मित्र, छद्म, छल, कैतव, these two factors of *apahnuti* (negation and superimposition) are referred to in one and the same sentence.

On the basis of these two factors *apahnuti* admits of many varieties:—(1) with the negation of *upameyatāvacchedaka* preceding the superimposition of *upameya*’s identity with *upamāna*; (2) and the reverse. Under these two varieties may come several sub-varieties—(1) the negation may be effected by words and superimposition may be inferable and (2) *vice versa*; (3) both may be known from words, (4) both may be inferable; (5) both may be *vidheyas*—to be predicated; and (6) both may be *anuvādyas*—

• already known. In the first line of the verse taken from the *Bhāminīvilāsa*, (II, 74) cited as an instance of सावयवप्राप्ति—

‘सितं नैतकिन्तु प्रकृतिरमणीयं विकसितम्’—

‘this is not smile but the naturally beautiful blossoming (of the creeper)’—the negation of the damsel’s smile that it is *not smile* precedes the superimposition of the blossoming of the creeper on the smile; both negation and superimposition are known from words constituting two sentences and they are predicated (विधेय).

In the second line of the verse—

‘मुखं ब्रूते मूढः कुमुदमिदमुत्पत्तिमलम्’ ।

“a fool calls (this) ‘face’; this is a lily with sweet fragrance”—, since the person who takes the *upameya* viz., the face, for the ‘face of the damsel’ is called a fool, it is implied that it is *not face*; hence the negation of the *upameyatāvacchedaka* is only implied (*ārtha*), while the superimposition of *upamānatādrūpya* is explicit (*śābda*). The other facts—the *vākyabheda* (the sentence-split), *vidheyatva*, etc.,—are all the same as in the former instance.

In the fourth line of the verse—

‘लता रम्या सेयं भ्रमरकुलनम्या न रमणी’,

‘this is a beautiful creeper bent down by a swarm of bees; it is not a damsel’—the superimposition of the beautiful creeper on the damsel as identical precedes the negation of *upameyatāvacchedaka* in the *upameya*; and both are known from words and predicated in two separate propositions. In the verse—

‘बद्धने विनिवेशिता मुञ्चन्ती  
विमुक्तानां रसनाभिरेव चात्रा ।

अथवा कथमन्यथावकीर्तः

न हि जीवन्ति जना संन्यासिन्नाः ॥

'A serpent is placed by the creator in the mouths of the wicked under the pretext of their tongue; otherwise how do people not survive when they are bitten by it and have nothing to save them (a spell or a saving device)'—both negation and superimposition are only implied in one and the same sentence and as such, they are not predicated.

The word आरोप्यमाणम् in the definition is to be understood in the sense of that which becomes the object of an *āhāryaniścaya*. This marks well the distinction between *apahnuti* and the *bhrāntimat* and *sasandeha* *alaṅkāras*. *Bhrāntimat* is based upon an *anāhāryaniścaya* (based on some defects of the observer, etc.), presenting an object as identical with its similar one and *sasandehālaṅkāra* is based on a *dubitative cognition* different from *niścaya*, a certainty and *sambhāvanā* (supposition), both based on similarity.<sup>1</sup>

After *apahnuti*, Jagannātha elucidates *utprekṣā* which he defines thus:—तद्विषयत्वेन तद-  
Utprekṣā—its  
definition.

तद्विषयत्वेन वा सम्भावनामुपेक्षा—'Utprekṣā is the fanciful supposition of one thing as another, while the two things are known to be really different; or it is the fanciful supposition of a thing as having an attribute which is really known not to belong to it. In the former case, such a supposition rests upon connection with a charming attribute belonging to the other thing; and in the latter case, it rests upon connection with some charming attribute coexistent with the fancied attribute

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 278 and 279.

The purpose of each part of the definition is explained in detail. The part—'तद्विषयत्वेन प्रमितस्य'—makes clear that the thought—*sambhāvanā*—is *āhārya* (supposition). In the instance—

'लोकोत्तरप्रभाव ! त्वां मन्ये नारायणं परम्'—

'Oh king of extraordinary valour! I consider you the great Nārāyaṇa', there arises a kind of supposition (and not a valid knowledge) of the *vyāpti* (invariable concomitance) between extraordinary valour and *nārāyaṇatva*, and on the basis of this supposition arises another about the great probability of the person in question being Nārāyaṇa—नारायणेनानेन प्रायशो भवितव्यम्. This second supposition is not *āhārya*, in view of the fact that no knowledge to the contrary has arisen; but in the examples of *utprekṣā*, the supposition is characterised as *āhārya*, by the phrase—तद्विषयत्वेन प्रमितस्य. The same part of the definition explains the difference of *utprekṣā* from the figures of *sasandeha* and *bhrāntimat* in that the latter do not produce an *āhāryajñāna*.

The part—तद्वर्गसम्बन्धनिमित्तकम्—points out that, in *utprekṣā*, supposition is based on the common attributes of the *upameya* and *upamāna*; so instances without such common attributes are to be differentiated from those of *utprekṣā*. The word रमणीय indicates the important position of *utprekṣā* in a *kāvya* in view of the fact that the best cases of *utprekṣā* are delightful creations of good poetic fancy. Dry *sambhāvanās*, presenting *viśayas* and *viśayins* with common attributes, such as 'प्रायः स्वायुजानेन भवितव्यम्'—do not therefore constitute *utprekṣālaṅkāras*. The word संभावना in the definition shows its difference from *rūpaka* based on *āhāryaniścaya*.



*Utprekṣā* is of two kinds:—(1) *dharmyutprekṣā* in which the supposition of the identity of *viṣaya* with *viṣayin*, and (2) *dharmotprekṣā* in which the supposition of *viṣaya* as possessing the property of *viṣayin* through some relation involving difference. These two varieties are kept in view in the definition of *utprekṣā*.

Each of the two varieties admits of further classification—(1) *vācya*, and (2) *pratīyamānā*. The *vācya* *utprekṣā* is to be found in examples with words—इव, नूनम्, मन्ये, जाने, अवैमि, चाहे, etc., indicating *utprekṣā*; and the *pratīyamānotprekṣā* in those in which the conditions of *utprekṣā* are expressed by words, but the idea of *sambhāvanā* is suggested. And instances without the conditions of *utprekṣā*, such as the common attributes of the *viṣaya* and *viṣayin*, are mere suppositions—*sambhāvanāmātram*—and not cases of *utprekṣā* *laikāra*.

These two varieties—*vācya* and *pratīyamānā*—admit of three sub-varieties—(1) *स्वरूपोपेक्षा*, (2) *हेतुपेक्षा*, and (3) *फलोपेक्षा*. Each of these has a good number of varieties when the object fancied is taken to be a *jāti*, *guṇa*, *kriyā*, *dravya*, etc. If they are viewed either as a *hetu* or a *phala*, they are called *हेतुपेक्षा* or *फलोपेक्षा*.

Jagannātha illustrates the *jāti* *varūpotprekṣā* by the passage taken from his *Yamunāvarṇanākhyāyikā*—‘तनयमैनाकगवेषणलम्बीकृतजलधिजठरप्रविष्टमगिरिभुजावमानाया भगवत्या भागीरथ्याः सखी’. Here the Ganges, the *upameya*, is supposed to be identical with the object possessing the generality—*bhujatva* (handness)—viz., *bhūja* of the Himālaya. Hence it is called *जलधिविजठरप्रविष्टमगिरिभुजावमानाया*.

The Ganges naturally possesses the attributes—white colour, coolness, tendency to fall down (लम्बत्व), and the quality of entering into the heart of the ocean (जलधिजठरप्रविष्टत्व)—and in order to base the *sambhāvanā* on those attributes, they are said to exist in the *upamāna*—the hand of the Himālaya. The first two attributes—शैत्य and शैत्य—are not described here, because they are naturally found in the Himālaya; the last two—लम्बत्व and जलधिजठरप्रविष्टत्व—can be said to exist in the hand on the basis of *phalotprekṣā* contained in the part—तनयमैनाकगवेषणलम्बीकृत. To search for his son Maināka in the heart of the ocean is impossible without his stretching out his hand into the ocean. So the two attributes—लम्बत्व and जलधिजठरप्रविष्टत्व—of the *upameya*, the Ganges, are by means of *abhedādhyavasāna* identified with those of the *upamāna*, the hand of the Himālaya. The *phalotprekṣā* mentioned above does not debar this passage from becoming an instance of the *jāti* *varūpotprekṣā*, in that the former prepares the ground—the common attributes between the *upamāna* and *upameya*—for the latter. This example is also characterised by the absence of *nigaraṇa* (suppression) of the *upameya*, some attributes being described and some undescribed.

Jagannātha illustrates other varieties as well and makes a final remark that all these varieties, though acceptable to the Prācīnas, do not deserve such a high place as the three varieties—*स्वरूपोपेक्षा*, *फलोपेक्षा*, and *हेतुपेक्षा*.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 285–296.

After the classification of the *utprekṣā*, Jagannātha gives the views on *utprekṣā* of some **Others' views on *utprekṣā* discussed.** Prācīnas, chiefly Mammaṭabhaṭṭa and Ruyyaka. In all kinds of *utprekṣā*, the relation between *upameya* and *upamāna* is *abheda* only. In the examples of *dharmisvarūpotprekṣā* like 'मुखं चन्द्रं मन्ये'—'I fancy your face as the moon'—the relation between the face and the moon is identity. In the example of *dharmasvarūpotprekṣā*—अस्यां मुनीनामपि मोहमूहे—'I fancy even saints are infatuated with this (Damayanti)'—the behaviour of saints, (the *upamāna* which is not mentioned here) is identified with infatuation by means of *adhyavasāna*. In the famous example of *utprekṣā*—'लिम्पतीव तमोऽङ्गानि वर्षती-वाञ्जनं नमः'—the *śābdabodha* is explained, following mainly the *vaiyākaraṇas*, thus—तमः कर्तृकमङ्गकर्मकं लेपनं सम्भावनाविषयः—the painting which has got body as its *karman* and darkness as its *kartr* is the chief object of *utprekṣā* (fancied supposition). This supposititious knowledge cannot be said to present *lepanakartṛtva* (being the agent of painting) as related to darkness, the *prathamāntārtha* (the sense of the stem with nominative suffix), through *āsryatva*, (a relation involving *bheda*) in view of the fact that the sense of being the agent (*kartṛtva*) is conveyed by the *ākhyātapratyaya*, always as an adjunct of *kartr*, *kartṛtva* *viśiṣṭakartṛ* being the sense of *ākhyātapratyaya*. Nor can it present the agent of painting as related to *prathamāntārtha* through *abheda*, since the sense of *ākhyātapratyaya*, viz., the agent (of painting), is always related to the sense of *dhātu* (root), which is the chief concept (*mukhyaviśeṣya*) in the *śābdabodha*. Similarly in 'वर्षतीवाञ्जनं नमः'—the *śābdabodha* has the form—'नमः कर्तृकमङ्गनकर्मकं वर्षणं सम्भावनाविषयः'—the showering which

has got the sky as its *kartr* (agent) and the black unguent as its *karman* (object) is the chief object of *utprekṣā*. In both instances cited above, the *upameya*, the spread of darkness, is not expressed by any word but suppressed; so also the *nimittadharmas* like *śyāmi-karatva* are not expressed. Hence these are instances of अनुपात्तविषयधर्मस्वरूपोत्प्रेक्षा.

Mammaṭabhaṭṭa defines *utprekṣā* thus—

संभावनमथोत्प्रेक्षा प्रकृतस्य समेन यत् ।—

*utprekṣā* is supposition of the *upameya* as any of its similar objects. He adds a note in connection with the above example—'लिम्पतीव'—'स्यापनादि लेपनादिरूपतया संभावितम्'. This indicates well that in all cases of *utprekṣā* there is the *sambhāvanā* of *upameya* as *upamāna*, be it *dharmin* or *dharma*.

In a review of the views of the *Prācīnas*, Jagannātha points out some defects therein. Their statement that the relation between *viṣaya* and *viṣayin*, in the supposition is *abheda*, cannot be accepted, in view of the fact that *abheda* need not always be the relation. In the instance—अस्यां मुनीनामपि मोहमूहे—the relation may be one involving *bheda* also. In the example—'लिम्पतीव'—the object of supposition is not *lepana* (painting) but *lepanakartṛtva* (the agency of painting) which is fancied as existing in darkness. The personal suffix in 'लिम्पति' conveys कर्तृत्व which is interpreted as nothing but the action of the agent. It is related to 'darkness' conveyed by a substantive with the nominative case-suffix and not to the sense of the root—*dhātvartha*—, as explained by the *Prācīnas*. The statement of Yāska—



‘भावप्रधानमाख्यातम्’—is to be interpreted that the *ākhyāta* (the personal suffix) conveys action (*vyāpāra*), if the word प्रधान in the dictum is taken in the sense of *abhidheya*, as in the other famous dictum of Yāska—‘सर्वप्रधानानि नामानि’. The root therefore conveys only the sense of *phala*. Or the root conveys both *phala* and *vyāpāra* and the *ākhyātapratyaya*, the sense of the seat (*āśraya*), (of *vyāpāra* in the active voice or of *phala* in the passive voice). In the example—देवदत्तः पचति—there arises the cognition of *abheda* between देवदत्त and पाककर्तृ, since the sense of *ākhyāta*, viz., आश्रय (कर्ता) is related through *abheda* to Devadatta, the sense of the substantive with nominative case-suffix; and the sense of the root gets linked with *āśraya*, the meaning of the personal ending, through some relation of non-identity (*bhedasambandha*). This explanation of the relation between *dhātvartha* and *ākhyātārtha* is based on the generally accepted maxim—‘प्रत्ययार्थे प्रकृत्यर्थो विशेषणम्’—‘that the meaning of the (personal or case) suffix would be the leading concept in reference to that of the root or the stem.’ The *Nirukta* passage in question is to be interpreted in the sense that the *ākhyāta*—root, in the instances like पचति—conveys *bhāva*, viz., *bhāvanā* (volition). This view, no doubt, goes against the *siddhānta* of the grammarians who hold that the sense of the root, chiefly, action, is the leading concept of the main *śābdabodha* arising from a proposition. But this is no fault if the *Alaṅkārasāstra* stands on its own legs. It is certain that there is no *utprekṣā* or supposition of the suppressed sense of the root, viz., the spread of darkness—तमोव्यापन—as identical with the sense of the root—lepana—as explained by the *Prācīnas*, in view of the fact that in all instances of *utprekṣā* the

sense of the words like इव, viz., *sambhāvanā*, is *vidheya*—to be predicated. Otherwise *utprekṣā* would have been accepted in statements like ‘तमःकर्तृकं लेपनमिव’ in which there is no expression to convey the *uddeśya* without which no *utprekṣā* can be conceived of.

Ruyyaka in his *Alaṅkārasarvasva* defines *adhyavasāya* thus:—‘विषयनिगरणेनाभेदप्रतिपत्तिर्विषयिणोऽध्यवसायः’—‘*Adhyavasāya* consists in the experience of identity of *viṣayin* with *viṣaya* by means of the suppression of the latter. He classifies it into two—*siddha* and *sādhya*: the *siddha* is that which gives prominence to the suppressive thing that is superimposed (*adhyavasita*), while the *sādhya* gives prominence to the process of suppressive superimposition. The first constitutes *Atiśayokti* and the second, *Utprekṣā*. *Utprekṣā* is illustrated by the example—

‘सैषा स्थली यत्र विचिन्वता त्वां

अष्टं मया नूपुरमेकमुत्थाम् ।

अहदयत त्वच्चरणारविन्द-

विशेषदुःखादिव बद्धमौनम्’ ॥

‘This is the place where one anklet of yours dropped by you on earth was seen by me while I was searching you—the anklet observing silence as if by the pain of separation from your lotus-foot’. Here *utprekṣā* consists in the supposition of pain as the cause of the silence of the anklet, a supposition based on the conception of silence as identical with the noiselessness of the anklet, by means of *adhyavasāna*. This *utprekṣā* is called *abhedagarbhā* in that it is based on the *adhyavasāna* of the identity of the silence with noiselessness. In the example of *dharmotprekṣā*—किम्पतीव तमोऽङ्गानि—the supposition of darkness as the agent of painting is based on its spreading which has been suppressed.

This explanation of *utprekṣā* by Ruyyaka is characterised by Jagannātha as self-contradictory. In the example—*सैष स्थली*—the supposition of pain does not present *abheda*, and the *adhyavasāya* that presents the identity of silence with the noiselessness of the anklet leads only to *atiśayokti* in view of the fact that the *viśaya*—noiselessness of the anklet—is suppressed by the *viśayin*—silence. Moreover, silence is considered by Ruyyaka to be the very basis (*nimitta*) of *utprekṣā* and not the object of *utprekṣā*. In the instance—*किम्पतीव*—Ruyyaka has said, the *adhyavasāya* of *lepana* has the idea of *vyāpana* suppressed. It is therefore *siddhaviśaya* and as such would be an example of *atiśayokti* and not of *utprekṣā*, according to him. The statement that *vyāpana* is the *nimitta* of *kartṛtvotprekṣā* debars *vyāpana* from being the object of *utprekṣā*. Hence Jagannātha concludes that Ruyyaka's explanation of *utprekṣā* is not at all satisfactory.

Jagannātha further remarks that Ruyyaka's conception of *adhyavasāna* itself is fundamentally defective. He raises a vital question: what kind of *adhyavasāya* is to be explained in the example of *utprekṣā*—‘नूनं मुखं चन्द्रः’, where the *viśaya* is not suppressed but expressed? Moreover, he asserts that there is no sufficient reason to accept the *sādhyavasāna* that had been explained by Ruyyaka in the examples of *utprekṣā*, mainly because there is no scope for adopting *adhyavasāya*, (a variety under *lakṣaṇā*), in the predicates of the instances of *utprekṣā*. It has already been said that in the cases of *dharmyutprekṣā* there arises a supposititious (*dhārya*) kind of verbal cognition presenting the identity between *viśayin* and *viśaya*, even without making use of *lakṣaṇā*. In the example of *hetūtprekṣā*—*विशेषदुःखादिव बद्धनीवम्*—the ablative case conveys *hetu*

to which the sense of the stem *viz.*, *विशेषदुःख*, is related as an adjunct through *abheda*, and the idea of *hetu* is related to *sambhāvanā*, the sense of *iva*, through *prayojyatva*, so that the *śābdabodha* will have the form—*विशेषदुःखाभिन्नहेतुप्रयोज्यसम्भावना*. If the ablative case does not mean *hetu* but only *prayojyatva*, then *nirūpitatva* (correlatedness) is the relation between the senses of the stem and the suffix and the sense of the suffix, *prayojyatva*, is related to *sambhāvanā* through *āśrayatva*, so that the *śābdabodha* has this form:—*विशेषदुःखनिरूपितप्रयोज्यत्वाश्रयसम्भावना*. In the instance of *phalotprekṣā*—

‘दिवानिशं वारिणि कण्ठदग्ने  
दिवाकराराधनमाचरन्ती ।  
वक्षोजतायै किमु पद्मलाक्ष्याः  
तपश्चरत्यम्बुजपङ्क्तिरेषा ॥

the dative case in the word ‘वक्षोजतायै’ expresses *phala* to which the *prakṛtyartha*—the sense of the stem—is related through *abheda*; and this *phala* is again related as an adjunct to *sambhāvanā*, the meaning of the word *किमु*, through *sādhanatva*; so the whole verbal cognition will be thus—‘वक्षोजताभिन्नफलसाधनसम्भावना’. In all these instances, *utprekṣā* is to be mainly associated with the *viśayin* which is the *vidheya* after which it is generally named. So in the example—‘विशेषदुःखादिव बद्धनीवम्’—*utprekṣā* is associated with pain (*duḥkha*) as existing in the anklet; but it is called by the name of the *hetu*—*विशेषदुःख*—in view of the fact that the former is the *anuvādyā* and as such is only an accessory.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 296-304.



After *utprekṣā* Jagannātha elucidates *atiśayokti*.

He defines it as—'विषयिण विषयस्य निरूपण-  
*Atiśayokti*—its definition.

मतिशयः ; तत्त्वोक्तिः'—*Atiśayokti* consists in the statement of *atiśaya* which is nothing but the suppression of *viśaya*. The suppression lies in the fact that the word expressing *viśayin* conveys by *lakṣaṇā* the *viśaya* as possessing the special property of *viśayin*; and the employment of *lakṣaṇā* in the expression of *viśayin* helps one to derive therefrom a verbal knowledge which has the *lakṣya* (the secondary sense) viz., the *viśaya* as *viśeṣya* and the *śakyatāvachhedaka* (the determining adjunct of the primary sense) as attribute (*prakāra*). This fact well differentiates *atiśayokti* from *rūpaka* in that in the latter the *upameyatāvachhedaka* is presented on the verbal cognition, while in the former it is the *lakṣyatāvachhedaka* and as such, is not presented. *Atiśayokti* is illustrated by the verse—

‘नयनानन्दसन्दोहतुन्दिलीकरणक्षमा ।

तिरयत्वाशु सन्तापं कापि कादम्बिनी वयम्’ ॥

‘May the extraordinary row of clouds capable of flooding with pleasure, the eyes (of the onlookers), remove at once all (my) sufferings!’ Here the *viśaya*—the lovely form of God Viṣṇu—is suppressed and the word expressing *viśayin* conveys by *lakṣaṇā* the *viśaya* as possessing the determining adjunct of *viśayitā*. So in *atiśayokti* there arises no cognition presenting the identity between *viśaya* and *viśayin*, whereas in *rūpaka* there is the experience of such an identity. The statements of the Ālaṅkārikas that *atiśayokti* has identity (*abheda*) as its chief idea are to be interpreted that *abheda* means *bhedābhāva*—the non-existence of difference—which is again said to be nothing but the determining adjunct of *bhedapratyogitā*—भेदाभावात्

भेदप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकधर्मरूपत्वम्—, so much so that in instances of *atiśayokti* as in those of *rūpaka*, *abheda* is the determining adjunct of *viśayitā*—भेदस्य विषयितावच्छेदकत्वम्. It is an accepted fact that in instances like—‘आस्ये पूर्णशशाङ्कता’—the *abheda* between the face and the full moon is *bhedābhāva* which is nothing but ‘शशाङ्कत्व’, according to the rule cited above.

*Atiśayokti* is of two kinds—सावयवा and निरवयवा. Its classification. If the main suppression is not based on another suppression, as in the example cited above, it is *निरवयवा*. If it is based on another, it is *सावयवा*. It is illustrated by the verse found in the *Bhāminivilāsa*, (IV, 4)—

‘कलिन्दगिरिनन्दिनीतटवनान्तरं भासयन्  
सदा पथि गतागतकुलमभरं हरम्प्राणिनाम् ।  
स्फुरत्कनककान्तिभिर्नवलताभिरावेक्षितो  
ममाशु हरतु श्रमानतितमां तमालद्रुमः’ ॥

“May the Tamāla tree—brightening the heart of the forest on the banks of (the Jumna), the daughter of Kalinda mountain, relieving the animate world of its fatigues while wandering to and fro on its different routes and encircled by new creepers endowed with the splendour of (liquid) gold—, remove immediately all my exhaustions”. Here the suppression of the *viśaya*—God Viṣṇu—by the *viśayin*—tamāla tree is based on a series of suppressed ideas in the first three feet of the verse: the births of people in different social ranks, etc., are suppressed by the idea—the wanderings of people resulting in great exhaustion; and the lovely damsels of cowherds are suppressed by the idea of golden creepers.

The Navinas explain *atiśayokti* in those instances which contain the description of *viṣaya* as possessing the *viṣayitāvachchedaka* and not as identical with *viṣayin*, so much so that they do not accept Appayya Dikṣita's explanation of the term *rūpakātiśayokti* as *atiśayokti* which possesses the varieties described under *rūpaka*—*abhedātiśayokti* and *tādrūpyātiśayokti*. The *Prācīnas*, however, accept the knowledge of the identity between *viṣayin* and *viṣaya* in *atiśayokti* as in *rūpaka*, with the *viṣaya* suppressed in the former.

Many other varieties of *atiśayokti* are also explained by Jagannātha by suitable illustrations, such as those describing *abheda* in cases where *bheda* is real, and *vice versa*. Different opinions of the *Ālankārikas* regarding these varieties are also discussed in this connection.<sup>1</sup>

After *atiśayokti* are discussed in the *Rasagaṅgadhara* the figures<sup>2</sup> of *tulyayogitā*, *dīpaka*, *prati-vyatiṛeka*, *vastūpanā*, *drṣṭānta* and *nīdarśana*, which are omitted here. Then *vyatiṛeka* is elucidated, and its definition runs thus—‘उपमानादुपमेयस्य गुणविशेषवत्त्वेन स्वतिरेकः’—*Vyatiṛeka* consists in the description of *upameya* as superior to *upamāna* in that the former possesses some qualities not found in the latter. The part of the definition—उपमानादुपमेयस्य गुणविशेषवत्त्वेन—means *vaidharmya* of *upameya*; and this points out the distinction of *vyatiṛeka* from *pratīpa* in which there arises only the cognition of *sādharmya*, viz., common attributes of *upamāna* and *upameya*, through the reversal of *upamānopameyabhāva* (i. e.), viewing *upamāna* as *upameya*. Neither the possession of more qualities by *upameya*, nor the inferiority of *upamāna* constitutes by itself the figure of *vyatiṛeka*, in that

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 307-311. <sup>2</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 317-346.

\* both of them would not be sources of poetic beauty unless they lead to the sense of the superiority of *upameya*. Nor can *vyatiṛeka* be explained as *sādrśyābhāva*—the absence of similarity (between *upamāna* and *upameya* in all points), since the same may exist even when the inferiority of *upameya* to *upamāna* is known. If this defect is removed by qualifying *sādrśyābhāva* by उपमेयोत्कर्षविशिष्टत्वं (i. e.), the absence of similarity leading to the superiority of *upameya*, then it would be better to accept the *viśeṣaṇa*, viz., उपमेयोत्कर्ष—the superiority of *upameya*—, as the chief feature of *vyatiṛeka*. This is illustrated by the verse—

‘अनिशं नयनाभिरामया

रमया संमदिनो मुखस्य ते ।

निशि निःसरदिन्दिरं कथं

तुल्यमः कलयापि पङ्कजम् ’ ॥

“How can we, even partly, compare your face which exults in the never-failing presence of Lakṣmi viz., splendour that is attractive to the eyes, to a lotus from which Lakṣmi departs during the night”. Here the damsel's face is described as always bright by its never-failing beauty and so, it cannot be compared to the lotus which is deprived of its brightness during the night. Hence the superiority of the *upameya*—the face of the damsel—to the lotus—the *upamāna*—is brought out by the description of the *vaidharmya*—the non-existence of the never-failing brightness in the lotus.

The *Prācīnas* explain twenty-four varieties of this *alankāra*. Jagannātha explains more varieties on the basis of those of *upamā* and illustrates them as far as possible. He further says that *vyatiṛeka* is *upamāgarbha*—implies *upamā*, though it appears



to be inimical to upamā—उपमाप्रतिपक्षः. *Sādrśya*, the essential basis of upamā, is apparently negated in *vyatireka*, while it is really implied. He adds that the negation of *sādrśya* on the basis of one or more qualities in an object does not entirely debar one from experiencing, on the basis of some other common attributes, *sādrśya* which is less prominent and less attractive than the sense of *upameyotkarṣa*.<sup>1</sup>

After *vyatireka*, Jagannātha elucidates the figures<sup>2</sup> of *sahokti* and *vinokti*. Then he explains *Samāsokti*. plains *Samāsokti*, one of the important figures of speech. He defines it thus—‘यत्र प्रस्तुतवर्तिको व्यवहारः साधारणविशेषणमात्रोपस्थापिताप्रस्तुतवर्तिकव्यवहाराभेदेन भासते सा समासोक्तिः’—*Samāsokti* consists in a description of something pertaining to the context seeming to be the description of something else not pertaining to the context, through common adjuncts only. He then explains the purpose of some important words in the definition. The word ‘मात्र’ differentiates *Samāsokti* from *śabdaśaktimūladhvani*, in which even the word expressing the *viśeṣya* (chief concept) conveys by *śleṣa* the non-contextual object (अप्रकृतवर्ती); but in *Samāsokti*, only the adjuncts are, by suggestion, the means of thinking the non-contextual object. The word ‘मात्र’ shows also the distinction of *Samāsokti* from *aprastuta-prāsaṁsā*, in which the entire non-contextual sense is expressly conveyed by the adjuncts and the chief word—*viśeṣaṇa* and *viśeṣya*. The words *prastuta* and *aprastuta* as adjectives of *dharmin* make out *Samāsokti* as distinct from *prakṛtaśleṣa* which has one chief object of description. In the verse taken from the *Prāṇābharāṇa*—

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 346 and 347.

<sup>2</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 357-366.

‘भावभास्यलकाभिरस्यसितमां खोलं रसाकाङ्क्षया  
लङ्कायावशतां तनोषि कुरुषे जङ्गललटाक्षतम् ।  
प्रत्यङ्गं परिमर्दनिर्दयमहो ! चेतस्समालम्बसे  
वामानां विषये नृपेन्द्र ! भवतः प्रागल्भ्यमत्यद्भुतम् ॥’

The first and foremost idea is the description of King *Prāṇanārāyaṇa* as a great conqueror of *Alakā*, *Cola*, *Laṅkā*, *Lāṭa* and *Aṅga*; and the secondary idea is that he enjoyed the company of damsels. Here the chief object of the primary and secondary descriptions is one and the same thing—King *Prāṇanārāyaṇa*. But in *Samāsokti* the chief objects (*viśeṣya*) of the contextual and non-contextual *vākyārthas* are different.

This *Samāsokti* is illustrated by the verse—

‘विबोधयन् करस्पर्शैः पद्मिनीं मुद्रिताननाम् ।  
परिपूर्णानुरागेण प्रातर्जयति भास्करः’ ॥

‘At day-break rises up gloriously in fully red hues the sun brightening with his rays the lotus-lake with (its) face completely locked up (with snow)’. Here, the sun is described as busy with his rays in brightening the locked-up lotus-lake—‘किरणस्पर्शकरणकमुकुलितपद्मिनीकर्म-कविकासानुकूलव्यापारवदभिन्नो भास्करः’. On the strength of the adjectives in the verse rises the knowledge of a *nāyaka* busy with his dallying hand in conciliating his cross *nāyikā*. The former idea is contextual and primary and the latter is non-contextual and secondary. Both these ideas come up in the mind of a *sahṛdaya* from such verses. *Bhāmaha*, *Udbhata* and other earlier *Ālaṅkārikas* explain the primary idea as derived from words by *abhidhā* and the secondary, by *ākṣepa* (presumption). But the later *Ālaṅkārikas*, chiefly *Ānanda-vardhana*, account for the non-contextual idea by

*vyāñjanā*, on the ground that the knowledge of the contextual idea does not invariably lead to that of the non-contextual idea.<sup>1</sup>

After *saṃśokti*, the figure *parikara* is defined by Jagannātha thus—‘विशेषजातं साभिप्रायत्वं परिकरः’  
**Parikara.** —*Parikara* consists in the use of appropriate and suggestive adjuncts with special propriety and utility (in the context). The word ‘साभिप्रायत्वं’ is further explained as ‘प्रकृतार्थोपपादकवस्तुकारिण्यर्थकत्वम्’—the adjunct being suggestive of a beautiful idea helpful to the main theme. This amplification distinguishes the figure *parikara* from *hetu* which has no such element of suggestion and from *dhvani* which possesses the suggested idea as the *vākyārtha*—the chief idea.

Jagannātha illustrates *parikara* by a verse taken from his *Gaṅgālaharī*—

“मन्त्रैर्मलितमौषधैर्मुकुलितं व्रस्तं सुराणां गणैः

व्रस्तं सान्द्रसुधारसैर्विदुषिणं नाकमलप्रापिभिः ।

वीचिक्षालितकालियाहितपदे ! स्वर्णककटोकिनि !

त्वं तापं तिरयाधुना भवभयव्याकाशहीनात्मनः” ॥

“The spells have become ineffective; the medicinal shrubs have ceased to work; the groups of devas have got themselves terrified; the sweet essence of nectar has spilt away; the (red) stones of Garuḍa have broken down. Oh River of heaven, who washes with her waves the feet (of Lord Kṛṣṇa), the foe of Kāliya, may you now extinguish the burning grief of


<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 367-370.

this person (Jagannātha) who has been bitten by the terrible serpent of the fear of re-birth!”. Here the chief idea consists in the prayer for the total removal of the speaker's sufferings owing to the bite of the serpent of re-birth, by the Goddess of the Ganges. The Ganges is well-known as the powerful remover of human sufferings. The sufferings due to the snake-bite, the *upamāna*, are here identified with the speaker's worldly sufferings, the *upameya*; and this is in keeping with the Ganges described as fit for removing the evil effects of the snake-bite. So the *vācyārtha* of the verse is complete with the help of the *pariṇāmā-lāṅkāra*; yet the qualifying adjunct—वीचिक्षालितकालियाहितपदे—further beautifies the Ganges by suggesting the idea that the foot of Lord Kṛṣṇa which has, by His dance on the mighty hood of Kāliya, completely destroyed the power of the serpent, possesses the unique power of removing poison and that this power was spread all over the Ganges while she washed the feet of Lord Kṛṣṇa by her waves. The *upapāda* (i.e.) the suggested idea's helpfulness to the main idea may be either उपस्कारकत्व—adding fresh life to the contextual idea, or निष्पादकत्व or वाच्यसिद्धांतत्व—serving as the basis of the main *vastu*, without which the latter does not come into existence. All these varieties Jagannātha illustrates by verses of his own and he remarks that in some instances of *parikara* the suggested sense supporting the main *vastu* is वाच्यव्ययमान—no way better than *vācya*.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 386 and 390.



After Paṅkara śleṣa is elucidated in detail. It is defined—‘श्रुत्यैकया अनेकार्थप्रतिपादनं श्लेषः’—‘śleṣa consists in conveying many ideas by one word or sound’. It is classified as shown in the table:



In all varieties of *prakṛtamātraśleṣa* and *aprakṛtamātraśleṣa*, the words conveying the chief concept of the vākyārtha (viśeṣya) may or may not have śleṣa; but in the varieties of *prakṛtāprakṛtaśleṣa*, only the adjuncts can have śleṣa. If words conveying the viśeṣya are also śliṣṭa, the scope of śleṣa would overlap that of śabdaśaktimūladhvani. In śleṣālaṅkāra the adjectives should have śleṣa and the chief concepts—viśeṣyas—both contextual and non-contextual—should be separately mentioned. This fact marks the distinction of śleṣālaṅkāra from samāśokti in which the chief non-contextual concept—अप्रकृतधर्मी—is not

separately mentioned or conveyed by its expression. So śleṣālaṅkāra may be thus mainly classified and defined:—  
‘प्रकृतमात्रविशेष्यकानेकार्थविशेषणं यत्र स एकः । एवमप्रकृतेत्यादिर्द्वितीयः ।  
पृथगुपासप्रकृताप्रकृतोभयविशेष्यकनानार्थविशेषणं तृतीयः । एतदन्यतमत्वं  
च लक्षणं पर्यवसितम् ।’<sup>1</sup>

Jagannātha illustrates each variety of śleṣa by his own verses and he illustrates the *abhaṅga-prakṛtaśleṣa* by the verse—

‘करकलितचक्रघटनो नित्यं पीताम्बरस्तमोरातिः ।

निजसेविजाख्यनाशनचतुरो हरिस्तु भूतये भवताम्’ ॥

‘May Lord Viṣṇu—possessing the wheel (sudarśana) in (His) hand, always wearing a yellow garment, the enemy of Rāhu, and capable of removing the ignorance of His devotees—bring you prosperity! May the Sun-god—whose rays spread in the circle (of time), who makes the sky look yellowish, the remover of darkness and capable of curing the diseases of His worshippers—bring you prosperity!’ In this verse the words conveying the chief and subordinate senses are *ambiguous* and these ideas are conveyed by the same expressions—*hari*, *kara*, *cakra*, *ambara*, *tamas* and *jādyā*; hence it is an *abhaṅgaśleṣa*; and it is *prakṛta*, since the speaker refers to both Lord Viṣṇu and the Sun-god.

On the question of śleṣa as a distinct alaṅkāra,

Scope of śleṣa—  
Different views  
expounded.  
View I.

Jagannātha cites the views of three sets of earlier Ālaṅkārikas. Udbhata's view is as follows:—Śleṣa is always associated with other alaṅkāras. It does not, however, exist independently as other alaṅkāras exist independent of śleṣa.

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 390–393.

So instances of *śleṣa* though they are associated with some other *alaṅkāras* can be cited as instances of *śleṣa* in view of the fact that *śleṣa* does not and cannot find a distinct place as other *alaṅkāras* do. It is true that in the cases of the descriptions of two contextual ideas or two non-contextual ideas associated with *śleṣa* as a subordinate element, the figure *tulya-yogitā* can be illustrated; similarly in those of one contextual and other non-contextual ideas associated with *śleṣa* as a subordinate element, the figure *dīpaka* can be explained. But it is to be said that these are instances of *śleṣa* only and that they give rise only to the false knowledge of other *alaṅkāras* like *tulyayogitā* and *dīpaka*. So also instances of *śleṣa* associated with *rūpaka*, *upamā* and *utprekṣā* as subordinate elements are to be cited as exclusive cases of *śleṣa* and they are said to be the sources of a false knowledge of other *alaṅkāras* as well—‘उपमादि-प्रतिभोत्पत्तिहेतुः श्लेष एव स्वविषये सर्वालङ्कारः’ । This view is based on the maxim—‘येन नाप्राप्ते य आरभ्यते स तस्य बाधकः’—if when a general rule finds application in a particular instance, another rule is framed only for that particular instance, the latter obstructs the operation of the former.

Others do not accept Udbhaṭa's view. They argue that verses like ‘सर्वदोमाधवः पातु यो गङ्गां समदी-  
View II. धरत्’ can be cited as exclusive instances of

*śleṣa* in which no other figure is known. The description of two contextual ideas in this verse cannot lead to the conception of *tulyayogitā* since *tulyayogitā* is based on the knowledge of similarity between two objects described. In this verse the sense of similarity between उमाधव and माधव (Hara and Hari) is not at all aimed at; there is only *śleṣa* which is involved in the collocations of words—सर्वदोमाधवः and योगद्वय—

conveying two different senses. So *śleṣa* cannot be called *apavāda* of other *alaṅkāras*, as Udbhaṭa held. It is not also correct to say that in some instances of *śleṣa* other *alaṅkāras* like *upamā* do not really exist and we get only a false knowledge of those figures of speech. Even to possess common expressions can be considered the common characteristic (समानधर्म) of *upameya* and *upamāna*, leading to the conception of *upamā*, as in the cases of common qualities or common actions. So, it can even be argued that in the instances involving *śleṣa* and other figures of speech like *utprekṣā*; *utprekṣā* is real and *śleṣa* is unreal or is the object of a false cognition—प्रातिभासिक. Moreover, instances of *pūrṇopamā* involve one or other kind of *śleṣa* and as such, *pūrṇopamā* will have no scope, separate from that of *śleṣa*; and it can therefore be said that by the rule—येन नाप्राप्ते य आरभ्यते स तस्य बाधको भवति—these instances of *pūrṇopamā* with *śleṣa* are those of *pūrṇopamā* only and not of *śleṣa*. So also in instances of *virodha* associated with *śleṣa*, *virodha* is the leading, real figure while *śleṣa* is *prātibhāsika* and unreal. If *śleṣa* associated with other *alaṅkāras* swallows the scope of those other *alaṅkāras*, then those other *alaṅkāras* will have very little scope and combined figures like श्लेषपरम्परितरूपक and श्लेषसमासोक्ति where *śleṣa* occupies a place subordinate to *rūpaka* and *samāsokti* respectively, can hardly be recognised. So, in such instances, only the combination of those figures with *śleṣa*—संकीर्णत्व—is to be accepted.

The third set of *Ālaṅkārikas* explain the scope of *śleṣa* in another way. An *alaṅkāra* is so  
View III. called because it chiefly ornaments or beautifies the chief element in a *kāvya*; otherwise it ceases to be an *alaṅkāra*.



In the verse—

‘रराज भूमौ वदनं सुगाहया  
नभोविभागे हरिणाङ्गविम्बम्’ ।

we have the chief figure *dīpaka*, with parallel descriptions of a contextual idea and a non-contextual idea; but if it is read as

‘राजते वदनं तन्व्या बभसीव निशाकरः’—

the chief *ālāṅkāra* is *upamā*. So we have to call an instance by the name of the chief element in it—‘प्रधानेन व्यपदेशा भवन्ति’—and not by the names of the subordinate elements. Hence instances of figures associated with *śleṣa* as a subordinate element are named after the leading figures of speech and are not called *śleṣa*.

After *śleṣa*, *aprasūtāprāśamsā* is elucidated. It is defined thus—‘अप्रस्तुतेन वक्ष्यमाणेन सादृश्यादि-वक्ष्यमाणप्रकारान्यतमप्रकारेण प्रस्तुतवस्तुवहारे यत्र प्रशस्त्यते सा अप्रस्तुतप्रशंसा’—*Aprasūtāprāśamsā* is that in which the description of a non-contextual object leads to the experience of the contextual idea through *sādrśya*, or such other things. This is just the reverse of *samāsokti* where the knowledge of the contextual idea leads to that of a non-contextual sense. This has five main varieties: (1) that in which the description of the non-contextual sense leads to the knowledge of the contextual sense, on the basis of their mutual similarity; (2) that in which the description of effect leads to the knowledge of its cause; (3) the reverse of the second; (4) that in which the description of an object in its general aspect leads to the experience of the same in its particular aspect and (5) the reverse of the fourth. These classifications are accepted by all earlier *Ālāṅkārikas*. Jagannātha

suggests another subdivision under the first: that, in which both the ideas may be contextual (प्रकृत) and that the knowledge of one idea leads to the suggestion of the other. Such examples like

‘मल्लिनेऽपि रागपूर्णा

विकसितवदनामनस्यजल्पेऽपि ।

त्वयि चपलेऽपि च सरसां

अमर ! कथं वा सरोजिनीं त्यजसि’ ॥

contain two ideas which may be considered contextual, if it is taken to be addressed by the companion of a *nāyikā* in the context of जलक्रीडा, when bees and the lotus-lake are in front of the speaker and when the *nāyaka* does not love the *nāyikā*. The term ‘अप्रस्तुत’ in the definition is to be interpreted in the sense of that which is other than the intended sense of the speaker—‘मुख्यतात्पर्यविषयीभूतार्थातिरिक्तः’. It must be said that all these varieties have ideas, contextual or non-contextual and their mutual relation would be, as stated above, either *sādrśya*, *kāryakāraṇabhāva* or *sāmānya-viśeṣabhāva*, so much so that the scope of *dhvani* is not overlapped by *aprasūtāprāśamsā*.

The explanation of *aprasūtāprāśamsā* that it can have both contextual ideas helps Jagannātha in bringing down the figure *prastutāṅkura* under this variety of *aprasūtāprāśamsā*, though some earlier *ālāṅkārikas* including Appayya Dikṣita, have recognised it in instances having two contextual ideas, one suggesting the other.<sup>1</sup>

Jagannātha further remarks that in instances of *aprasūtāprāśamsā* where the non-contextual sense is explicitly conveyed by words (*vācya*), the *abhidhā* of the words has not functioned adequately in the context

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 402-407.

and thus forcibly drags to the suggested contextual sense; hence these would not be instances of *dhvani*; if, however, the expressed and suggested senses are contextual, it would be a case of *dhvani*. These two varieties come under *sādrśyamūlaka*. The other four varieties—two on the basis of *kāryakāraṇabhāva* and two on that of *sāmānyaviśeṣabhāva* are only varieties of *guṇabhūtavyaṅgya*. On this point, Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta hold a slightly different view. According to them, in the varieties of *aprastutaprasāmsā* involving *sāmānyaviśeṣabhāva* and *nimittanaimittikabhāva*, both the contextual and non-contextual senses have equal prominence. If, in the variety involving *sādrśya*, the expressed sense (*vācya*) does not contain any element of improbability, the *vācya* sense is more prominent and charming than the suggested sense; but if the *vācya* sense involves an element of improbability like an inanimate being functioning as an animate being, then the *acetanavṛttānta*, though it is expressed by words, culminates necessarily in the suggested sense, which thus becomes more prominent and delightful than the expressed sense. Hence it becomes an instance of *dhvani*.<sup>1</sup>

Next to *aprastutaprasāmsā*, Jagannātha defines *paryāyokta* thus—‘विनक्षितस्वार्थस्य भङ्गवन्तरेण Paryāyokta. प्रतिपादनम्’—*Paryāyokta* is the description of an intended idea by a beautiful, striking and clever turn of expression. This is illustrated by the verse—

‘सूर्याचन्द्रमसौ यस्य दासो रजपतः करैः ।  
अङ्गरागं सृजत्यमिह वन्दे परमेश्वरम् ॥’

Here, the idea that Parameśvara is ‘गगनाम्बर’ is conveyed in a devious way, that his dress is coloured

<sup>1</sup> Vide the *Dhvanyāloka* and *Locana*, (N. S. edition, pp. 42-44).

by the rays of the Sun and the Moon; and the idea that his body is besmeared with ashes is likewise conveyed in a devious way that his bodily paste is created by (the sacred) fire.

The term ‘*paryāyokta*’ is interpreted by Ālaṅkārikas in different ways. Some *Prācīnas*, including Mammata-bhaṭṭa, explain that the figure is called *paryāyokta* since the suggested sense is conveyed here in a peculiar manner (पर्यायेण भङ्गवन्तरेण), the peculiarity being that it is suggested in a form different from that in which it is explicitly expressed—‘अस्यां च गम्यस्य येनाकारेण गम्यता तदतिरिक्ताकारेण वाच्यता’. Mammatabhaṭṭa explains it further that one and the same idea may be both expressed and suggested in different forms and this does not involve any conflict, as the two forms may be species of the same genus. The Ālaṅkārasarvasvakāra (Ruyyaka) describes it as the expression of the suggested sense in a strikingly peculiar manner. In the well-known example of *paryāyokta*—

‘चक्राभिघातप्रसभाज्ञयेव  
चकार यो राहुवधूजनस्य ।  
आलिङ्गनोदामविलासवन्ध्वं  
रतोत्सवं सुम्बनमात्रशेषम् ॥’

the suggested idea *viz.*, Kṛṣṇa’s action of cutting Rāhu’s head, is in a strikingly devious way indicated in the latter half of the verse, by its own effect (कार्यं), *viz.*, Kṛṣṇa’s action in depriving the enjoyment of Rāhu’s wife of the transporting joy of embrace and reducing it to mere kissing. Hence पर्यायेण, कार्यदिमुखेन, उक्तमिव आक्षिप्तम्, पर्यायोकम्—*paryāyokta* consists in inferring the cause from the effect, etc., (as found in the above verse). Abhinavagupta explains the term



thus—'पर्यायेण वाच्यादतिरिक्तप्रकारेण व्यवहारेण विवक्षितो-  
पर्यायोक्तम्'—*paryāyokta* is that in which the primary sense  
is made out in association with the suggested sense.  
Jagannātha explains the distinction between these  
three views, thus:—in the first, the *dharmin* is *vyāṅgya*;  
in the second, since the *dharmin* is *vācya*, it does not  
form part of the *vyāṅgya*; in the third, the *vācya*  
sense is invariably associated with the *vyāṅgya* sense.  
If these explanations are adopted, he adds, the well-  
known example of *dhvani*—'वार्ता वाचुषिणी कथायां न पुन-  
स्तस्याधमस्यान्तिकम्'—would fall under the category of  
*paryāyokta*, in view of the fact that either the *dharmin*,  
viz., *dūtī* (the messenger) is expressed (*vācya*) as not  
having gone to the wretched (*adhama*) *Nāyaka*, and at  
the same time, she is suggested as having gone to  
him; or the *Nāyaka* is referred to as having the  
attribute *baseness* (*adhamatva*), which is explicit (*vācya*),  
and as having the suggested (*vyāṅgya*) attribute—  
illicit intimacy with the messenger.

Jagannātha does not therefore accept these expla-  
nations. He explains the term *paryāyokta* as—'भङ्गयन्त्रेण  
प्रतिपादनम्'—(as given in its definition) and he takes  
the expression 'भङ्गयन्त्र' in the sense—'येन करेण विवक्षितो-  
ऽर्थः तदतिरिक्तः प्रकारो भङ्गयन्त्रम्, आक्षेपो वा'. Thus, accord-  
ing to Jagannātha, the expression 'भङ्गयन्त्र' in the  
definition may refer to a different attribute or form,  
or it may refer to the indirect process of suggestion  
(*ākṣepa*), which is different from *abhidhā*. He makes  
a distinction between *paryāyokta* and *aprasutaprasānsā*  
that in the former, the suggested sense is subordinate  
to the *vācya* sense, while in the latter, the *vācya* sense  
would lead to the suggested sense, which is more  
prominent and delightful.

It is argued by some that the earlier Ālaṅkārikas  
like Bhāmaha and Udbhaṭa prior to Ānandavardhana  
have not used the terms *dhvani*, *guṇibhūtavyāṅgya*, etc.,  
in their works and that they have not therefore  
accepted the *Dhvani doctrine*. Against this Jagannātha  
maintains that they have brought some varieties of  
*guṇibhūtavyāṅgya* under figures like *saṃśokti*, *vyājastuti*  
and *aprasutaprasānsā*, and all other kinds of  
suggested sense under *paryāyokta*. So all the varieties  
of suggested sense are also known to and accepted  
by the earlier Ālaṅkārikas, though they have not  
made use of the term *dhvani* in the sense in which  
Ānandavardhana and his followers understand it.

This *paryāyokta* is classified under three heads:—

- (1) that in which effect is suggested on  
*Paryāyokta*—the basis of the expressed cause—  
its classifi- कचिक्कारणेन वाच्येन कार्यस्य गम्यत्वम्; (2) the  
cation. reverse of the first—कचिक्कार्येण कारणस्य  
and (3) that in which one related object is suggested  
on the basis of another related object—कचिदुभयोदासीनेन  
सम्बन्धिमात्रेण सम्बन्धिमात्रस्य ।<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 409-412; 414-416.

After *paryāyokta* the following figures of speech  
also are explained by Jagannātha in his *Rasayāṅgādhara*,  
but they are omitted here:

- |                     |                  |                             |
|---------------------|------------------|-----------------------------|
| १. व्याजस्तुतिः     | २. आक्षेपः       | ३. विरोधमूलाः (३-१३) विरोधः |
| ४. विभावना          | ५. विशेषोक्तिः   | ६. असङ्गतिः                 |
| ७. विषमः            | ८. समः           | ९. विचित्रम्                |
| १०. अधिकम्          | ११. अन्योन्यम्   | १२. विशेषः                  |
| १३. व्याघातः        | १४. शृङ्खलामूलाः | — कारणमाला                  |
| १५. एकावली          | १६. सारः         | १७. काव्यलिङ्गम्            |
| १८. अर्थान्तरन्यासः | १९. अनुमानम्     | २०. यथासङ्गमम्              |
| २१. पर्यायः         | २२. परिहृतिः     |                             |

२३. परिसङ्ख्या	२४. अर्थापत्तिः	२५. विकल्पः	२६. समुच्चयः
२७. समाधिः	२८. प्रत्यनीकम्	२९. प्रतीकम्	३०. प्रीतिः
३१. कलितम्	३२. प्रहर्षणम्	३३. विषयम्	३४. उल्लासः
३५. अवज्ञा	३६. अनुज्ञा	३७. तिरस्कारः	३८. लेखः
३९. तद्वृत्तिः	४०. अतद्वृत्तिः	४१. नीकितम्	४२. सामान्यम्
४३. उत्तरः	...	...	...

By the middle of the *uttarāṅkara*, the extant *Rasagaṅgādhara*, both in print and Ms., breaks off; and the exact length of the second *Ānana* of the *Rasagaṅgādhara* is not yet known. Some critics are of opinion that the work, as a pun in the title indicates, is intended to have five *Ānanas*.

## CHAPTER VII

*Jagannātha Paṇḍita and Other Writers on Literary Criticism*

## 1. Appayya Dikṣita

APPAYYA Dikṣita, one of the literary geniuses of South India, flourished in the Sixteenth Century.

His contributions to literary criticism in his *Citramīmāṃsā*, *Kuvalayananda* and *Vṛttivārttika* are as great and valuable as those to the *Advaita* and *Saivādvaita* systems of Indian Philosophy; and he is one of the first-rate *post-dhvani* literary critics, such as Mammaṭabhaṭṭa, Vidyānātha, Viśvanātha and Jagannātha Paṇḍita.

Jagannātha Paṇḍita, in his *Rasagaṅgādhara* and *Citramīmāṃsākhaṇḍana*<sup>1</sup> refutes some important views of Appayya Dikṣita elucidated in his *Citramīmāṃsā* and other works. In one of the introductory verses of the *Citramīmāṃsākhaṇḍana*, he emphasizes the logic of his refutations of his opponent's views and calls for cogent arguments to meet them, if possible.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The *Citramīmāṃsākhaṇḍana* (which, according to the *Kāvyamālā* edition, extends to the end of *Apahnuti*.) is mostly a compilation of Jagannātha Paṇḍita's refutations of Appayya Dikṣita's views, contained in the *Rasagaṅgādhara*. Cf.

‘रसगङ्गाधरे चित्रमीमांसाया मयोदिताः ।

ये दोषास्तेऽत्र संक्षिप्य कथ्यन्ते विदुषां मुदे’ ॥

(*Citramīmāṃsākhaṇḍana*, verse 2)

<sup>2</sup> Vide *ibid.*, verse 3—

‘सूक्ष्मं विभाव्य मयका समुदीरितानां

अप्यप्यदीक्षितकृताविह दूषणानाम् ।

निर्मत्सरो यदि समुद्धरणं विदध्यात्

अस्याहमुज्ज्वलमतेष्वरणौ बहामि’ ॥



But Nāgeśabhaṭṭa, a commentator, who flourished in the first half of the ninth Century, tries (as will be shown) to elucidate Appayya Dikṣita in certain instances, yet many of Jagannātha's criticisms are among students of Literary Criticism.

The first and foremost of these two authors is that of Appayya Dikṣita's interpretation of an instance of *Rasadhvani* criticised by Jagannātha.

Rasadhvani is that of a verse from the *Amaruśataka*—

निशेषव्युत्तचन्दनं स्तनतटम्  
नेत्रे दूरमनसने तनुः ।  
मिथ्यावादिनि शरीरागमे  
वापी वापि तस्या-

The simple meaning of the verse is—'Oh messenger! your breasts are completely free from sandal paste; your lower lip is devoid of red colour; your eyes are destitute of black pigment; your body is all in horripilation. Oh liar! you have gone to the anguish of your dear friend, who has gone only to the tank for a moment and has not accursed person.'

An *abhisārikā*<sup>2</sup> *nāyikā* had been with her husband, and since she was

<sup>1</sup> The *Amaruśataka* (N. S. edition), pp. 2 and 3; the *Rasagāṅadhara*, *ibid.*, p. 12.

<sup>2</sup> An *abhisārikā* is one who either goes to her lover's house at night or expects her lover at her residence, at the appointed hour.

her servant to him as a messenger. The messenger actually went to him and dallied with the *nāyaka* and betrayed her mistress. On her return from the *nāyaka*, the *nāyikā* fully realised that her messenger had returned fresh from the embraces of the *nāyaka* and addressed her not in plain language but in somewhat ambiguous terms.

Appayya Dikṣita argues that though this verse superficially means that the messenger went to the tank and not to the *nāyaka*, yet it may well be interpreted in the sense that the messenger went to the *nāyaka* and dallied with him. In doing so, he takes up all the adjuncts in the verse for further scrutiny. The phrase—निशेषव्युत्तचन्दनं स्तनतटम्—means that only the upper part of the breasts is completely free from sandal paste; the phrase—निशेषव्युत्तचन्दनं स्तनतटम्—means that only the lower lip is completely devoid of red colour; the phrase—नेत्रे दूरमनसने—means that the eyes are destitute of black pigment only at the ends; the phrase—पुलकिता तन्वी तवेयं तनुः—means that the body though horripilated is much fatigued. The word *adhama* is appropriate to the context, where it is interpreted in the following manner:—the *nāyikā*, though an *abhisārikā*, yet possessing some virtues, had been very considerate to forget all his past lapses and she sent her messenger to him; but the fact that in spite of the *nāyikā*'s forgiveness, the *nāyaka* dallied with the very messenger, was beyond her comprehension. Hence to her the *nāyaka* was an *adhama*—very low and mean, not in birth but in action. So, according to Appayya Dikṣita, all the words in the verse, when rightly interpreted, specifically help the suggestion of *sambhoga śṛṅgāra* which, in its state of not being subordinate to another, is fully realised by a true *sahṛdaya*.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Vide the *Citramīmāṃsā*, (N. S. edition), pp. 2 and 3; the *Rasagāṅadhara*, *ibid.*, p. 12.

Jagannātha refutes this interpretation very easily. He puts forward two main objections to Appayya Dikṣita's view—(1) *prācīnagranthavirodha*, and (2) *upapattivirodha*. The first consists in that Appayya Dikṣita's explanation of this verse as a typical instance of *Rasadhvani*, an *uttamakāvya*, goes against the essential nature of the *Dhvani doctrine* established by Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta of the *Dhvani* period and by Mammatabhaṭṭa of the *Post-dhvani* period, whom both Appayya Dikṣita and Jagannātha Paṇḍita have followed. One great principle to be observed in a *Dhvani kāvya*, according to Ānandavardhana, is that adjuncts in it are to be so *ambiguous* (*sādhāranya*) as to be interpreted alike in the light of the primary or secondary sense (as the case might be) and of the suggested sense. Moreover, if the *asādhāranya* (exclusiveness) of the adjuncts is said to be the characteristic of *dhvani*, it (*dhvani*) would be not the suggestion peculiar to *kāvya* but the inference which is arrived at by the *asādhāranya*—invariable concomitance of a *hetu* in relation to a *sādhya*. If this is followed by Appayya Dikṣita, Jagannātha contends, he would be bringing into this illustration of the *uttamakāvya* the two antagonistic views of *dhvani* and *anumāna*.

To explain *upapattivirodha* (want of cogency in argument), Jagannātha takes up the suggested idea in the verse as explained by Appayya Dikṣita. According to him, the suggested idea in the verse consists in the messenger having gone to the *nāyaka* purposely to dally with him—‘तदन्तिकमेव रन्तुं गतासि’. For convenience, Jagannātha splits this statement into two—*tadantikagamanam* (her going to the *nāyaka*) and *tatphalam ramaṇam* (its fruit, viz., dalliance). For the explanation of these two ideas, Jagannātha contends,

‘there is no necessity for introducing *vyāñjanāvṛtti* (power of suggestion) into this verse. The first idea can be well brought home to the readers even by *lakṣaṇā* by which a *śabda*, on the unintelligibility of the primary sense in the context, is capable of conveying an idea which is allied or even opposed to the primary sense. According to Appayya Dikṣita, many words like *tata* in the verse would be fully significant only when they are interpreted in support of the messenger's behaviour, viz., her going to the *nāyaka* and secret dalliance with him. Hence, Jagannātha contends, it can convey the idea by *viparīta-lakṣaṇā* that she has gone to that low-bred *nāyaka*.

That the second idea, viz., the messenger's dalliance (*ramaṇa*), is suggested cannot hold good. It can very well be conjectured or presumed—*arthāpattivedya*—from the *nāyikā's* attitude towards her husband especially when she addresses this verse to the messenger after her return from him. Her very reference to her husband in the verse as *adhama* makes one understand that he then became contemptible by his action (his secret dalliance with the messenger). That the *nāyikā* sent the messenger to her husband bears out the important fact that she, as an *uttama nāyikā*, would not dare to speak ill of her husband in public.

Another *upapattivirodha* is also explained by Jagannātha here. The suggested sense in this verse—the *sambhoga śṛṅgāra*—as explained by Appayya Dikṣita, would be only explanatory to the primary sense, for without the former the latter would be absurd. Hence the verse becomes an example of *guṇābhūtavyaṅgya-vācya-siddhyaṅga*—only and not of *Rasadhvani*, as expounded by ancient Ālaṅkārikas.

To support the traditional view that this verse is an instance of *Rasadhvani*, Jagannātha's interpretation. Jagannātha gives the primary sense of the verse in a different way. He considers that the messenger neither went to the *nāyaka*, nor to the river for a bath, but only to a small tank in the neighbourhood where in the midst of many youths she had not full scope for a full bath, so that only the upper part of her breasts was free from sandal paste, since she had to keep her two arms crosswise upon her breasts; so also, only the lower lip was devoid of the reddish colour on account of spitting water while cleansing the teeth; only the upper parts of her eyes were destitute of the black pigment; her tender body was horripilated on account of her bath in cold water. The word *adhama* also expresses the idea that the *nāyaka* who did not realise the other's sufferings caused her mental pain and anguish—an idea which being taken as common to both *vācyārtha* and *vyāṅgyārtha* is in keeping with the nobility, *vaidagdhya*, of the speaker, *nāyikā*,—who would not dare to speak ill of her husband even to her messenger. And Jagannātha concludes that, since the adjuncts in the verse are common to both *vācyārtha* and *vyāṅgyārtha*, this verse can well be taken as an instance of the suggestion of *śṛṅgāra* as the main idea, and this suggested idea cannot be in any way brought out by *lakṣaṇā*, in view of the fact that there is no basis for *lakṣaṇā*, *anupapatti* (incompatibility or unintelligibility of the primary sense in the context).<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The *Rasagaṅgādhara*, *ibid.*, pp. 13-17.

The next instance where both Appayya Dikṣita and Jagannātha Paṇḍita hold different opinions is another well-known verse taken from the *Amaruśataka*—

Appayya Dikṣita's instance of *Guṇībhūta-vyāṅgya* criticised by Jagannātha.

‘प्रहरविरतौ मध्ये बाहूः ततोऽपि परेण वा  
किमुत सकले याते बाह्वि प्रिय ! त्वमिहैष्यसि ।  
इति दिनस्तत्राप्यं देशं प्रियस्य वियासतो  
हरति गमनं बालालापैः सबाष्पगलज्जलैः’ ॥<sup>1</sup>

‘Would you, my lord! be back to this place on the expiry of a *prahara*, or at noon, or even later, or at sunset—with such child-like bewailings attended with suppressed and flowing tears, a lady prevents her husband from his journey to a place reachable in hundred days.’

Appayya Dikṣita holds that, in this verse, the *vācyārtha*, viz., the prevention of the husband from his journey, is well supported by the suggested sense, viz., that the lady cannot bear her life any longer after the expiry of the whole day, and that as such, it is an instance of *guṇībhūtavāṅgya*—*vācyasiddhyāṅga*.<sup>2</sup>

But Jagannātha asserts that this verse is a beautiful instance of *Rasadhvani* (i. e.), Jagannātha's interpretation. the suggestion of *vipralambhaśṛṅgāra* which is effected by the three-fold conditions of *vibhāvas* like the *nāyikā* and the *nāyaka*, of *anubhāvas* like tears and of *vyabhi-cāribhāvas* like mental anxiety. And he adds that the *vācyārtha*—the prevention of the *nāyaka* from his journey—is completed by *vācyārthas* like *ālāpas* (bewailings) and as such does not lean upon any suggested sense.

<sup>1</sup> The *Amaruśataka*, verse 12.

<sup>2</sup> The *Citramīmāṃsā*, *ibid.*, p. 4.



The instrumental case in the word—*ālāpaiḥ*—well indicates that the bewailings of the lady (the meaning of the stem) are the main instrument to dissuade her husband from his journey.

To argue that the suggested sense that the lady cannot survive even for one day her husband's departure, supports the *vācya* sense is suicidal, in view of the fact that such a reasoning would result in the acceptance of some aspect of the *guṇībhūtavyāṅgya* even in the well-known instances like—'विदोषव्युत्तचन्दनम्', for the suggested sense in that verse, viz., the messenger's dalliance with the *nāyaka*, can be taken as strengthening the *vācya* sense of the word *adhama*, so that the verse may be cited as an instance of *guṇībhūtavyāṅgya* (*vācyaśiddhyāṅga*).

Jagannātha finally remarks that although one accepts the support of *vācya* by the suggested sense, yet one cannot deny in this verse the realisation of the beautiful sentiment—love in separation—by all *sahṛdayas*, a fact which indubitably secures to it the position of *uttamottamakāvya*.

Nāgesabhaṭṭa, however, justifies Appayya Dikṣita's explanation that the verse in question can be taken as an instance of *guṇībhūtavyāṅgya* without any prejudice to its being called a *Rasadhvani*, in view of the fact that it contains a *vyāṅgya* element quite subordinate to the *vācya*. And he adds that Appayya Dikṣita's citation of this verse as an instance of *guṇībhūtavyāṅgya* has got reference to an intermediate stage of suggestion (*āntarālikadhvani*) and that such citations as the above do occur in Mammaṭabhaṭṭa's *Kāvyaopraśa*.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The *Rasagāṇadhara*, *ibid.*, pp. 18 and 19.

In connection with the classification of *kāvya* into *dhvani*, *guṇībhūtavyāṅgya* and *citra*, Appayya Dikṣita's instance of Appayya Dikṣita has in his *Citra-ubhayacitra mīmāṃsā* (p. 4) illustrated one variety of *citrakāvya*—*ubhayacitra*—by the reviewed by Jagannātha. verse—

‘वराहः कल्याणं वितरतु स वः कल्पविरमे  
विनिर्मुच्यतु मुदकमुर्वीमुदवहत् ।  
सुराघातशुभ्रकुलशिशिरिकटप्रविलुठ-  
च्छिलाकोटिरुहोदस्पृष्टघटितमङ्गल्यपटहः’ ॥

In his *Citramīmāṃsākhaṇḍana*, (p. 6, N. S. edition), Jagannātha asserts that this verse contains a good number of poetic demerits and as such, should not be given as an illustration of the *citrakāvya* even. He mentions *saṃāptapunarāttatva* as one great defect which consists in that the former half of the verse containing two ideas—one, the poet's prayer to the Divine Boar to shower on his readers Its choicest blessings and the other, Its diving deep in the water of the oceans at the time of deluge and rescuing the earth therefrom—does not depend on the latter half for its completion. He mentions other *doṣas* like *vyāhatārthatva*. He also asserts that such verses as the above should not be selected by critics as illustrations of the inferior type of *kāvya* even, since no kind of *aesthetic pleasure* is derived therefrom by a *sahṛdaya*.

Another instance where these two critics have considerably differed is Kālidāsa's famous *maṅgalāśloka* in his *Raghu-vaṃśa*—

‘वामांशविषं संतुष्टौ वामार्धप्रतिपत्तये ।  
अमलः वितरी चन्दे पार्वतीपरमेष्ठरी’ ॥

Appayya Dikṣita's explanation of Kālidāsa's verse criticised by Jagannātha.

'For the understanding of words and (their) senses' I prostrate before Pārvati and Parameśvara, the parents of the world, ever-united (like one speech) and artha (its sense).'

This verse is cited by Appayya Dikṣita as an instance of *Rasadhvani*—the suggestion of the supreme love of the Divine couple, Pārvati and Parameśvara. But Jagannātha refutes it on the ground that the *rati* of the divine couple is in this instance subordinate to the main *vākyārtha*, viz., (the poet's devotion to God); that the idea of *vandana* in the verse suggests the devotion of the poet as the chief sense of the *maṅgala-sloka* and that the suggestion of the love of the divine couple in subordination to the *vākyārtha* is only a *rasavadalaṅkāra* and not a *rasadhvani*.<sup>1</sup>

In the *Vṛttivārttika*, Appayya Dikṣita defines *abhidhā* as 'शब्दा प्रतिपादकत्वमभिधा'—Appayya Dikṣita's definition 'abhidhā is the significativeness (of *abhidhā* criticised by Jagannātha. *Abhidhā* is the power of *śabda* by the cognition of which one derives the recollection of its meaning from a word. प्रतिपादकत्व

<sup>1</sup> Vide the *Rasagaṅgādhara*, *ibid.*, p. 34. *Rasavadalaṅkāra* is that in which the suggested *Rasa* becomes subordinate to the *vākyārtha* or some other element, while *Rasadhvani* is that where the suggested *Rasa* is the prominent factor. This is an important point specially emphasized by Ānandavardhana in his *Dhvanyaloka*—

‘प्रधानेऽन्यत्र वाक्यार्थे यत्राहं तु रसादयः ।

काव्ये तस्मिन्नलङ्कारो रसादिरिति मे मतिः’ ॥

(Uddyota II, verse 5)

is nothing but the capacity of *śabda* being a condition of *pratipatti* (recollection); and the knowledge of this capacity of *śabda* (in a general manner) is not the cause of *pratipatti*. How then, Jagannātha contends, can this *pratipādakatva* be *abhidhā*? If it is argued that *pratipādakatva* is nothing but the power of *śabda* which, while cognised, generates *pratipatti* and that this power of *śabda* is *abhidhā*, the definition of *abhidhā* would then read—‘अभिधया प्रतिपादकत्वमभिधा’—a definition which puts even the thing to be defined into the body of the definition; hence the fallacy of *ātmāśraya*. And there is no *pramāṇa* (authority) for accepting *śakti* (the knowledge of which is a cause of verbal cognition) as distinct from *abhidhā*.<sup>1</sup>

In the *Citramīmāṃsā*, Appayya Dikṣita gives two definitions of *upamālaṅkāra*:—(1) ‘उप-मिति क्रियानिष्पत्तिमत्सादृश्यवर्णनमदुष्टमग्न्यङ्गयसुप-मालङ्कारः’ (2) ‘स्वनिषेधापर्यवसायिसादृश्यवर्णनं तथा’—(1) ‘*Upamālaṅkāra* consists in a description of similarity that culminates in comparison, and it should be both devoid of any poetic flaw and different from the suggested sense; (2) it is the description of a similarity which never culminates in its own negation.’ These two definitions Jagannātha sets aside, for want of precision in thought and in language. He asserts that the word *varṇana* in the body of the definition may mean either an expression in a particular setting or a particular kind of cognition; it cannot therefore be the meaning of a word and be the *arthālaṅkāra*—*upamā*. He adds that

<sup>1</sup> Vide the *Vṛttivārttika*, (N. S. edition) p. 1, and the *Rasagaṅgādhara*, *ibid.*, pp. 140-1.

since *varṇana* never comes under the category of suggestion, the adjunct *avyāṅgya* in the definition is superfluous. If the definition is modified as the similarity which becomes the object of *varṇana* (description), then the statement—यथा गौस्तथा गवयः—as the cow, so the *gāvaya*—conveying the similarity between *go* and *gāvaya* described would be an instance of *upamālaṅkāra*. It may be argued that the word *varṇana* means description leading to *camatkāra* and that the comparison contained in the statement—यथा गौस्तथा गवयः—does not produce *camatkāra* in the minds of the hearers and that it does not therefore fall within the scope of the definition of *upamālaṅkāra*. Jagannātha accepts this argument, but raises another objection that the part of the definition, viz., 'उपमितिक्रियानिष्पत्तिरूपमा' become superfluous, since *camatkāra* does not arise from a description of superficial similarity and does necessitate for its experience the description of a well-founded *sādrśya*. Thus he drives his opponent to accept the great principle—*camatkāra*—which by itself is of great importance in estimating the place of figure of speech in poetry. If the principle of *camatkāra* is accepted and if the word *varṇana* implies *camatkāra* also, Jagannātha adds, the part—उपमितिक्रियानिष्पत्तिरूपमा—in the second definition becomes superfluous; the part, if it is in the body of definition, is intended to distinguish *upamālaṅkāra* from *vyatireka* and *ananvaya*; the description of *sādrśya* effectuates the negation of some points of similarity in the instances of *vyatireka* and the negation of a second similar object in those of *ananvaya*; and this element of negation and not *sādrśya* is considered the chief source of *camatkāra* in those two figures of speech, while *sādrśya* itself is the source of *camatkāra* in *upamālaṅkāra*. Again, these two

definitions are considered defective in that they are applicable also to instances like—

‘स्तनाभोगे पतन्भाति कपोलाकुटिलोऽलकः ।

शशाङ्कबिम्बतो मेरौ लम्बमान इवोरगः’ ॥

in which *upamā* is the chief concept—*mukhyavākya* and not an *alaṅkāra*. The argument that instances like the above do come within the scope of these definitions falls to the ground since the word अव्यङ्ग्य in the definition clearly indicates that the definitions embrace only *upamālaṅkāra* and not *upamā* as *mukhyavākya*, either expressed or suggested. And finally Jagannātha adds that the inclusion of the word ‘सादृश्य’ in the body of the definition is of no significance since उपमितिक्रियानिष्पत्तिरूपमा itself can be considered a satisfactory definition.<sup>1</sup>

To supply the defect that the part ‘avyāṅgya’ in the definition excludes even the subordinate suggested *upamā* from the scope of *upamālaṅkāra*, Nāgeśabhaṭṭa interprets the term *avyāṅgya* by qualifying it with ‘*prādhānyena*’, which then would mean that which is different from the chief suggested sense, so that the *pratiyamānopamā* may also be included in the definable *alaṅkāra*.<sup>2</sup>

In the classification of *luptopamā* Appayya Dikṣita includes under the varieties of *dharmaluptā* certain cases of reduplication like पदपदुपेक्षः where reduplication conveys the sense of similarity. Jagannātha rejects this

<sup>1</sup> Vide the *Cītramīmāṃsā*, *ibid.*, p. 17 and the *Rasagaṅgādhara*, *ibid.*, p. 161.

<sup>2</sup> Vide the *Rasagaṅgādhara*, *ibid.*, p. 162.



view. First, instances like *upamā* are also the elision of *upamāvacakāśabda*, and they should be termed *vācakadharmaluptā*. And *dharmaluptā*, he contends, generally means the place where there is elision of *dharma* only; and the separate mention of varieties with the number of one, two or more would be of no significance. Secondly, the statement that the reduplication of the word 'पदु' conveys similarity goes against the authority of Patañjali and Kaiyaṣa who have explained the sūtra—प्रकारे गुणवचनस्य—as enjoining reduplication of a word denoting qualities when similarity is to be suggested (*dyotyā*) only.

Here again Nāgesabhaṭṭa vindicates Appayya Dikṣita by characterising Jagannātha's criticism as baseless. He argues that the elision of *upamāvacaka* does not take place even where similarity is *dyotyā* by reduplication, as what is implied by words like इव and सुहृत् in the examples 'चन्द्र इव सुखम्' and 'चन्द्रसुहृत्सुखम्'. Hence in cases where *dyotakaśabdas* like *nipātas* and reduplication are present, there is no scope for *vācakaluptā*.<sup>1</sup>

In illustrating the *vācakaluptopamā* Appayya Dikṣita cites the verse—

Appayya Dikṣita's illustration of *vācakaluptopamā* criticised by Jagannātha.

रूपयौवनकादम्बरद्वयं नृणां कृतिः ।  
पुरतो हरिणाक्षीणमेव नृणां वीर्यं ॥

Jagannātha considers this *apaśabda-  
duṣṭa*—bad example containing ungrammatical expression. The word 'पुरतः' he contends, means 'from the city' if

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, p. 170. [p. 228 *Mat. Ben. ed.* (1983)]

the word is taken as the *पुरतश्च* with *tasīl* suffix; but this sense does not suit the context. The form 'पुरः' as a substitute for the word 'पूर्व' in the sense 'in front of' may be correct; but the form 'पुरतः' is incorrect in that sense. On the basis of this explanation he has even set aside as *apaśabdas* many popular usages of this word in the sense 'in front of'.

Nāgesabhaṭṭa rightly defends Appayya Dikṣita on this topic. First he says that some accept 'पुरतः' as an independent *nipāta*. Another suggestion is that after the stem पुर the suffix—*atasuc*—is enjoined on the strength of the sūtra—'दक्षिणोत्तराभ्यामतसुप्'—which enjoins the suffix even after other stems like *pura* in addition to those two mentioned in the sūtra. Nāgesabhaṭṭa's own view is that the word is derived from the root *pura*—to go in front of—; that it belongs to the tenth conjugation and that when it has no *nic* suffix, the suffix *ka* is operated and then the *tasī* suffix; hence the form पुरतः is acquired.<sup>1</sup>

Classifying *upamā* under three main varieties, Appayya Dikṣita mentions one variety called *uktārthopapādanaparā* (i.e.), that which substantiates an idea already described. He illustrates this variety criticised by Jagannātha. by the verse from Kālidāsa's *Kumāra-sambhava*—

अनन्तरत्नप्रभवस्य यस्य हिमं न सौभाग्यविलोपि जातम् ।  
एको हि दोषो गुणसन्निपाते निमज्जतीन्दोः किरणेष्विवाङ्कः ॥

'Whose countless wealth of natural gems is not  
Too deeply blemished by the cruel snow;  
One fault for many virtues is forgot,  
The moon's one stain for beams that endless flow.'

—(RYDER).

<sup>1</sup> R. G. and R. G. Vyākhyā, *ibid.*, pp. 171 and 712.

In the latter half of this verse it is stated that one defect will dwindle into insignificance in the midst of many good qualities; and to justify this the poet has woven out the fine simile—‘इन्दोः किरणेष्विवाङ्कः’.

Jagannātha, however, contends that the verse—अनन्तरप्रभवस्य—is an instance of a separate *alaṅkāra*, *udāharāṇa*. He argues that the general statement that a flaw among many good qualities does not seem to be a flaw cannot be complete unless it is exemplified in a particular case which is however supplied by—इन्दोः किरणेष्विवाङ्कः. Again, the particular is not to be accepted as a different entity from the general; so here there is no idea of difference to make out a clear case of *upamā*. Hence this is not the citation of an *upamāna*.

Nāgēśabhaṭṭa, however, on the authority of earlier *Ālaṅkārikas*, explains *upamā* in the verse—‘अनन्तरप्रभवस्य’. He says that the distinction between *upamāna* and *upameya* is to be understood by taking the different properties, one general and one particular, as it is generally explained in the instance of अभिन्नधर्मिकोपमा by the two determining adjuncts of *upamānatā* and *upameyatā*. Thus he goes even to the length of saying that *udāharāṇa* is not a separate *alaṅkāra*.<sup>1</sup>

Jagannātha further argues that Appayya Dikṣita's explanation and illustration of this variety of *upamā* are not exhaustive, since the verse—

‘नयने शिशिरिकरोतु मे  
शरदिन्दुप्रतिमं मुखं तव’।

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 180 and 181.

does not exactly come under the variety described above. In this instance, however, the simile contained in the compound—शरदिन्दुप्रतिमं—substantiates the main *vastu*. Hence he suggests another variety—*vācyavastū-paśkārikā*—to include this instance, in case this main division of *upamā* is to be accepted. But Nāgēśabhaṭṭa explains away this difficulty by interpreting the phrase—उक्तार्थोपपादनपरा—as उक्तार्थस्य, उक्तार्थे उपपादनपरा, so that the instance ‘नयने शिशिरिकरोतु’ in which the *upamā* in the compound शरदिन्दुप्रतिमं substantiates the main *vācyavastu*—मुखकर्तृकनयनकर्मकशिशिरिकरण.

While giving the varieties of the two main divisions of *upamā*—*pūrṇā* and *luptā*—Appayya Dikṣita's view on the varieties of *Luptopamā* criticised by Jagannātha. Appayya Dikṣita has given seven kinds under *pūrṇā* on the basis of different aspects of *sādhāraṇadharmā* (beginning with *sādhāraṇadharmānugāmītā*) and he adds that these seven varieties cannot be explained under *luptā*, in view of the fact that the *sādhāraṇadharmā* is to be *anugāmin* in all cases of *luptā*. Jagannātha, however, fancies that even without the *anugāmīdharmā*, varieties of *luptā* are found as in the *pūrṇā* on the basis of *bimbapratibimbabhāva*.<sup>1</sup> In the instance—

‘मलय इव जगति पाण्डुः

वस्मीक इवाधिपराणि भूतराष्ट्रः’।

(like the *Malaya* (shines) *Pāṇḍu* in the world and like

<sup>1</sup> *Bimbapratibimbabhāva* is explained thus:—  
‘वस्तुतो भिन्नयोर्धर्मयोः परस्परसादृश्यादभिन्नत्वा अन्वयवर्तितयोः द्विरुपादानं बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बभावः’—*Bimbapratibimbabhāva* consists in the separate description of two properties which are in reality different but are superimposed as identical on the basis of mutual similarity.

ant-hill is *Dhṛtarāṣṭra* on earth), the common attributes between *Malaya* mountain and *Pāṇḍu* and between the ant-hill and *Dhṛtarāṣṭra* are not known; but on the strength of *ārthabimbapratibimbabhāva* (i.e., *bimba-pratibimbabhāva* based on *arthāpatti* (presumption), the sandalwood and the Pāṇḍavas in one instance and the serpent and the Kauravas in the other—are known as identical. And in addition to the traditional classification of *lupatopamā* into seven main varieties (which are further classified into 19 or 26), Jagannātha gives *Upamā* like *rūpaka* eight separate varieties with illustrations—केवलनिरवयवा, मालारूपनिरवयवा, वनस्पदस्तुविषय-सादृश्यवा, एकदेशविवर्तिसादृश्यवा, केवलकृत्रिमरूपवा, मालारूपकृत्रिमपरम्परिता, केवलशुद्धपरम्परिता, मालारूपशुद्धपरम्परिता ।<sup>1</sup>

In his *Citramīmāṃsā*, Appayya Dikṣita defines *upameyopamā* thus—

Appayya Dikṣita's definition of *upameyopamā* explained.

‘अन्योन्येनोपमा बोधवा  
व्यक्त्या वृत्त्यन्तरेण वा ।  
एकधर्माश्रया वा स्वात्  
सोपमेयोपमा मता ’ ॥

*Upameyopamā* consists in the description of mutual similarity between *upamāna* and *upameya*, which is known either by suggestion or by any other significative power of *śabda* on the basis of one common attribute. He explains it further as different from the *ubhayaviśrāntopamā* thus: in the latter similarity is to be known from words by *abhidhā* and *अन्योन्यावृत्ति-योगिकत्व* is to be conveyed by words by *vyāñjanāvṛtti*, so that both the *vṛttis* operate depending upon each other, while in the former both the ideas—similarity and its relation—are known from words either by *abhidhā*

<sup>1</sup> Vide R. G., *ibid.*, p. 181.

or by *vyāñjanā* independently, as explained by the word वा in the definition. And the phrase—एकधर्माश्रया—emphasizes the fact that while in the *parasparopamā* two objects mutually change their *upamānopameyabhāva*, their common attributes become different and do not therefore aim at the negation of the third similar object; but in the *upameyopamā* they are one and the same and so they result in the *trītyasadrśavyavaccheda* (the negation of the third similar object) which is considered by all Ālaṅkārikas the chief source of pleasure in it.<sup>1</sup>

Even with this explanation of *upameyopamā* Jagannātha finds fault and says that *ekadharmāśrayatva* can be explained in an illustration of उभयविश्रान्तोपमा—

‘अहं लतायास्सदृशीत्यखर्वं  
गौराङ्गि ! गर्वं न कदापि बायाः ।  
गवेषणेनालुमिहापरेषा-  
मेवापि तुल्या तव तावदस्ति ’ ॥

‘Oh fair-limbed one ! do not ever be puffed up with vanity that you resemble a creeper; enough with the search for similar objects; among other objects this creeper also resembles you’. Here *tānava* (tenderness) is the common attribute (between the *upameya* and the *upamāna*) on the basis of which the two groups of expressions—‘अहं लतायास्सदृशी’ and ‘एवापि तुल्या तव’—convey the *parasparopamā* by one *vṛtti* only—*abhidhā*; yet this verse is not accepted as an instance of *upameyopamā* as it does not negate the third similar object. It however emphasizes the fact that there are

<sup>1</sup> Vide the *Citramīmāṃsā*, *ibid* pp. 38-40.



many objects similar to the damsel and the creeper, the search of them, however, being of no avail. It is not however possible to assert that both the ideas—*upamā* (similarity) and its relation, *anyonyapratiyogitva*, are known from words by one kind of *śabdavṛtti* (i.e.), *abhidhā* or *vyañjanā*, for in the well-known instance of *upameyopamā*—‘खमिव जलं जलमिव कम्’—the idea of similarity is expressed by *abhidhā* by the word इव and the relation, *pratiyogitva*, is to be known through *saṁsargamaryādā* (mere juxtaposition of words) and not by a *śabdavṛtti*. It is accepted by all *Śāstrakāras* that the relation of *padārthas*—senses of words—is not conveyed by a word by a *vṛtti*—‘वृत्तिवेदायां वदन्त्यां संसर्गः वृत्त्यवेद्य इत्यभ्युपगमात्’.<sup>1</sup>

Nāgesabhaṭṭa tries to vindicate Appayya Dikṣita in his usual way. He says that by ‘व्यवस्था वृत्त्यन्तरेण वा बोध्या’, Appayya Dikṣita does not mean that *upamā* (similarity) and its relation are to be conveyed (by a word or words) by one kind of *vṛtti* only, but that they are not to be conveyed by two kinds of *vṛttis*, so that the relation *pratiyogitva* can be known through *saṁsargamaryādā*. Or it may be said that *upamā* and its relation may be cognised on the basis of one *śabdavṛtti* only in as much as the words convey the *padārthas* (*sādrśya*) by *abhidhā* and their relation (*pratiyogitva*) through *saṁsargamaryādā*.<sup>2</sup>

In the section dealing with *ananvaya* in his *Citramīmāṃsā*, Appayya Dikṣita states that the *ananvaya* becomes sometimes suggested, and this has been illustrated by the verse—

<sup>1</sup> vide the *R. G.*, *ibid.*, pp. 198–200.

<sup>2</sup> vide the *Rasagāṅgādhara-vyākhyā*, *ibid.*, p. 200.

‘अथ या मम गोविन्द जाता त्वयि गृहागते ।  
कालेनैषा भवेत्प्रीतिस्तवैवागमनात्पुनः’ ॥

He explains that Vidura (the speaker in this verse) means that the particular kind of pleasure that he enjoys in the presence of Lord Kṛṣṇa in his house is unique and that the same pleasure can be derived at another time only from his arrival again; and that this leads therefore to the suggestion that the pleasure derived from Kṛṣṇa's arrival is similar to itself and not to anything else.

This explanation is not accepted by Jagannātha. He raises an objection that in the verse are mentioned two pleasures, one at the time referred to by the speaker and the other, on another occasion, and that one can be well compared to the other; and so it never becomes an instance of *ananvaya*. He adds that Appayya Dikṣita has stated in the *upamā* section—‘स्वस्मिन्सादृश्यस्यान्वयाभावादनन्वयः’—*Ananvaya* is so called because to compare one object to itself is not possible; so this explanation of the verse—अथ या मम—contradicts the text in the *upamā* section.<sup>1</sup>

In his *Citramīmāṃsā*, Appayya Dikṣita defines *smaraṇālāṅkāra* thus—  
Appayya Dikṣita's definition of *smaraṇālāṅkāra* criticised by Jagannātha.

‘स्मृतिः सादृश्यमूला या वस्तुस्मरणसमाभवा ।  
स्मरणालंकारः सा स्यादव्यङ्ग्यत्वविशेषिता’ ॥

‘*Smaraṇālāṅkāra* consists in the recollection of another object—similar or dissimilar—based on similarity and that it should not be known through suggestion’.

<sup>1</sup> vide the *Citramīmāṃsā*, *ibid.*, pp. 42 and 43 and the *Rasagāṅgādhara*, *ibid.*, pp. 208–9.

Jagannātha does not approve the definition of Appayya Dikṣita. The word 'अपहनुते' in the definition includes the recollection of *sādrśya* along with that of *sādrśapadārthas*, within the scope of *smaraṇā-lankāra*. 'सादृश्यमूला स्मृतिः' however emphasizes the fact that the recollection of other objects must be based on *सादृश्य*. It does not at all mean that the object recollected should also be a *सादृश्य* object. In both the instances of *smaraṇā-lankāra* cited by Appayya Dikṣita, *sādrśya* is the main basis of *smaraṇa*—recollection produced (1) by the impression roused up by the knowledge of *sādrśya* in one instance—'अपि दुरगसमीपादुत्पतन्तं' and (2) by the impression roused up by the recollection of another similar object which is produced by the impression roused up by the knowledge of *sādrśya*, in another—'दिव्यानामपि कृतविसर्गा दुरस्ताव'; hence the part 'अपहनुते' in the definition is of no use. Even Appayya Dikṣita's explanation of the word—अपहनुते in the definition is out of place. The recollection referred to in the verse—'सौमित्रे ननु सौमित्रा' is not the *vyāṅgya alankārya*—the chief suggested by Appayya Dikṣita, but only an *ālambana* of the main *Rasa*—*vipralambha*—which has its *ālambana-vibhāva*, the night-time as the *uddiṣṭa* of Rāma and Rāma's mental uneasiness—*unmāda*—as the *śāstrībhāva*.<sup>1</sup>

In the section dealing with *rūpaka* in his *Citra-māmāṃsā*, Appayya Dikṣita defines it as follows:—

Appayya Dikṣita's definition of *rūpaka* criticised by Jagannātha.

'विम्बाविशिष्टे निदिष्टे विम्बाविशिष्टे ।  
उपरञ्जकतामेति विवक्षी' ॥

<sup>1</sup> *Citra-māmāṃsā*, *ibid.*, p. 43 and 218-220.

He explains this definition by giving the propriety of each part of the definition, thus:—the word 'विम्बाविशिष्टे' distinguishes *rūpaka* from *nidarśanā* which has invariably *विम्बाप्रतिबिम्बाभाव*. The word 'निदिष्टे' differentiates *rūpaka* from *atiśayokti* in that the latter is associated with *निगरण*—suppression of *viśaya*. Again, 'अपहनुते' explains the absence of 'nihnava' (negation) in *rūpaka* and this points out its distinction from *apahnuṭi*. The part—'उपरञ्जकतामेति'—means *आहार्यताद्वयनिश्चयगोचरतामेति*—that in which arises a *supposititious* cognition of identity; and this distinguishes *rūpaka* from *sasandeha*, *utprekṣā*, *saṃśokti*, *pariṇāma* and *bhrāntimat*: in *sasandeha* and *utprekṣā* the cognition that arises is in the form of a *doubt* or involves *probability*; and so it is not *niścaya*; in *saṃśokti* and *pariṇāma* there is no *viśayitādrūpya* (identification with *upamāna*), and in *bhrāntimat* the cognition is not *supposititious*.

This definition as explained by Appayya Dikṣita is not accepted by Jagannātha Paṇḍita. He says that there is *bimbapratibimbabhāva* even in *rūpaka*, so that the part 'विम्बाविशिष्टे' cannot differentiate *rūpaka* from *nidarśanā*. If the word 'निदिष्टे' is taken in the sense—उपमेयतावच्छेदकरूपेण शब्देनाभिहिते—then this part itself distinguishes *rūpaka* from *atiśayokti* and *apahnuṭi*, since in the first the *upameya* is suppressed and in the second it is negated and is not expressed by any *śabda* with the determinant of the *upameyatā* being kept in view. So the word 'अपहनुते' is superfluous in the definition. Even the qualifying part—आहार्य in *आहार्यताद्वयनिश्चय* is unnecessary, in view of the fact that in the instances of *bhrāntimat*, the cognition does not present the *upameyatāvacchedaku* as one of its

adjuncts since it is sublated by the defects of the cogniser.<sup>1</sup>

Appayya Dikṣita cites the following illustration for rūpaka even in *vaiyadhikarāṇya*—

Appayya Dikṣita's illustration for rūpaka in *vaiyadhikarāṇya* wrongly quoted and criticised by Jagannātha.

‘तारानायकशेखराय जगदाधाराय धाराधर-  
च्छायाधारककन्दराय निरिवास्तवैकशृङ्गारिणे ।  
नद्या शेखरिणे दत्ता तिलकिने नारायणेनास्त्रिणे  
नामैः कङ्कणिने नगेन कुङ्किने नायाय सेयं नतिः’॥

While Jagannātha Paṇḍita quotes this citation wrongly in his *Rasagaṅgādhara*—नद्याय(य)दीक्षितैर्वैयधिकरण्येन परिणामे उदाहृतम्—‘तारानायकशेखराय’—that Appayya Dikṣita gives the verse—‘तारानायकशेखराय०’—as an illustration for *pariṇāma* in *Vaiyadhikarāṇya*.

According to Appayya Dikṣita, this verse chiefly explains the greatness or overlordship of Lord Śiva (before whom the poet prostrates) and with that purpose Lord Śiva is qualified by adjuncts like ‘नद्या शेखरिणे’. He calls it ‘वैयधिकरण्येन रूपकम्’, because the words denoting the *upameya* and *upamāna*—नदी and शेखर, दत्त and तिलक, etc., do not possess one and the same case-suffix, and it is *rūpaka* in as much as the *upameyas* like नदी are known through superimposition as identical with the *upamānas* like शेखर.

Jagannātha's explanation of this verse as an instance of *rūpaka* is as follows: Lord Śiva is called in this verse a *śṛṅgārīn* and to appear as *śṛṅgārīn*, He requires ornaments like *śekhara*. Hence we have शेखरतादात्म्यारोप on नदी in नद्या शेखरिणे. He explains it

<sup>1</sup> vide the *Rasagaṅgādhara*, *ibid.*, pp. 226 and 227.

as an instance of *rūpaka*, thus:—in all cases of स्वधिकरणरूपक like मीनवती नयनाभ्याम्, the instrumental case does not convey *abheda* but conveys by *lakṣaṇā* अभेदप्रतियोगित्व, so much so that the verbal cognition arising therefrom has the form—उपमेयनिष्ठाभेदप्रतियोगि उपमानम्, while in *pariṇāma* it is उपमेयप्रतियोगिकाभेदबहुपमानम्. In the instance नद्या शेखरिणे in which we have the शेखरतादात्म्यारोप on नदी, the verbal cognition has the form—नदीनिष्ठाभेदप्रतियोगि-शेखरत्वम्. Hence it is an instance of *rūpaka* only. He adds, to call it an instance of *pariṇāma* the *śekhara* is to be known in the capacity of नदी (i.e.) नदीप्रतियोगिकाभेदत्वम् शेखरः, and no purpose is served by superimposing नद्यभेद on *śekhara*, since Lord Śiva is referred to as *śṛṅgārīn*.

While reviewing the views of Appayya Dikṣita and Jagannātha Paṇḍita, Nāgesabhaṭṭa's review of the views of Appayya Dikṣita and Jagannātha Paṇḍita. first observes that Jagannātha has wrongly quoted Appayya Dikṣita's citation and then asserts that in no case can this verse be called an instance of *rūpaka*. According to him, in all cases of *rūpaka* the verbal cognition would have the *upameya* as the *viśeṣya* and (उपमानप्रतियोगिक) अभेद as the *prakāra* or as the *samśarga* between the *viśeṣya* (*upameya*) and the *viśeṣaṇa* (*upamāna*), as the case may be; in the instance ‘नद्या शेखरिणे’, the cognition arising therefrom is नदीप्रतियोगिकाभेदबहुशेखरत्वम् and the *śekhara* (*upamāna*) is identified with नदी (*upameya*). So it is an instance of *pariṇāma* only. He contends that Jagannātha's explanation that Lord Śiva is called *śṛṅgārīn* and that He requires ornaments like *śekhara* (crest) cannot be applied to the instance—नारायणेनास्त्रिणे,—since a *śṛṅgārīn* does not require any *astra* (weapon).



Thus Nāgeśabhaṭṭa concludes that the adjuncts are intended to heighten the image of Śiva as an overlord even among the celestial beings, and that this would be fully accomplished if the Lord Śiva is portrayed with the *śekha*—the crest of an ordinary being—but that in fact the majestic celestial river—the Ganges—has been explained would be given in other instances, etc.<sup>1</sup>

Again in his *Citramīmāṃsā* Appayya Dikṣita criticises the *pariṇāma*-*dhvani* given by Vidyādhara in his *Ekāvali*—

‘नरसिंह ! वराणां विजृम्भते ।  
अपि राजानमाकाङ्क्षति विजृम्भते ॥’

Appayya Dikṣita's criticism on Vidyādhara's illustration of *Parīṇāma-dhvani*.

The simple meaning of this verse is this:—Oh Narasimha! lord of earth! how (competent) to describe you! Your fame has reached even the region of the moon and shines in its splendour. In this verse, according to Vidyādhara's *parīṇāmadhvani* consists in the fact that the primary sense of the word *rājan*—the moon (the *upameya*)—is identified through superimposition with its suggested sense—the (enemy) king (the *upamāna*)—for the purpose that King Narasimha's fame may be justly associated with आक्रमण (invasion) having the enemy king as a fit object (कर्म). Appayya Dikṣita, however, argues that the *upamāna*—नृप (king)—is known as the *karma* of आक्रमण with नृपत्व as its अवच्छेदकधर्म and not with चन्द्रत्व, the उपमेयतावच्छेदक. If this is accepted, Appayya Dikṣita questions—how can one expect in this verse

<sup>1</sup> R. G. and R. G. Vyākhyā, *ibid.*, pp. 249 and 250.

a *parīṇāma* which demands the उपमेयतावच्छेदकारोप (i.e.) the identification of *upamāna* (नृप) with *upameya* (चन्द्र) through superimposition?

But Jagannātha maintains Vidyādhara's view. He says that आक्रमण does not merely mean the invasion of the enemies' territories but a total subjugation—न्यग्भाव, and that this is to be taken along with विजृम्भण which is not only प्रागल्भ्य—ability to conquer the enemy king but also greatness by its ever-shining purity without a rival. These two senses—subjugation and ever-shining purity of King Narasimha's fame—necessitate the identification of the *upamāna*—the enemy king—with the *upameya*—the moon,—since the moon alone is associated with natural and ever-shining purity and splendour. So the full meaning of the verse would be this: Just as King Narasimha's fame is noteworthy for his never-failing valour which ultimately brings him triumph over his enemy kings, so also his fame is unrivalled by its ever-shining purity and splendour manifested by its transcendence of *rājan*—the bright moon which is considered to be the *upamāna*—the standard of comparison—of fame.

Nāgeśabhaṭṭa however takes the words राजानं and विजृम्भते as homonyms; and so the stem *rājan* conveys by *abhidhā* both the (enemy) king and the moon and the word विजृम्भते expresses as its primary sense both ability and greatness, in view of the fact that there is no authority like the context (प्रकरण) to restrict the scope of *abhidhā* of these expressions. Hence he views that it is an instance of pure *śleṣa* like सर्वदोषादयः पातु, that there is no *parīṇāma* in this verse and that the

word राजा does not suggest the sense of the (enemy) king. He further argues that even supposing that there is scope for superimposition in this verse, no one can definitely say that *candra* (moon) is the *upameya* and that the (enemy) king (the suggested sense) is the *upamāna*.<sup>1</sup>

Again, Appayya Dikṣita illustrates *pariṇāmadhvani* by the verse—

Appayya Dikṣita's illustration of *pariṇāmadhvani* criticised by Jagannātha.

‘चिराद्विपहसे तापं चित्त ! किन्तां परित्यज ।  
नन्वस्ति शीतलः शौरिः पादाब्जनखचन्द्रमाः’ ॥

In this verse *pariṇāmadhvani* is explained by the fact that the mind of the person which is thirsty after suffering the extreme heat of this wide *samsāra*, has to seek permanent shelter under the moon of the nails of the lotus-like feet of Lord Viṣṇu. Here the moon, the *upamāna*, cannot give cooling sensation and relief to the mind of the person suffering from the extreme heat of this phenomenal world; so the moon is identified through superimposition with the nails of the feet of Lord Viṣṇu, which are known as the great saviours of Lord Viṣṇu's devotees. *Pariṇāma* therefore consists in the identification through superimposition of the moon (the *upamāna*) with the nails (the *upameya*) for the definite purpose of giving permanent relief to the suffering mind of the person, which is advised finally to seek refuge under the divine feet of Lord Viṣṇu.

Jagannātha easily finds fault with Appayya Dikṣita's explanation of this verse as an illustration of *pariṇāmadhvani*. He admits that there is *pariṇāma* in this verse but argues that there is no scope for a

<sup>1</sup> R. G. and R. G. Vyākhyā, *ibid.*, pp. 254 and 255.

full *pariṇāmadhvani*, for, one part of *pariṇāma*, viz., the identification of the *upamāna* through superimposition with the *upameya* is expressed by *abhidhā* by the compound पादाब्जनखचन्द्रमाः, though the other part of *pariṇāma*, viz., प्रकृतोपयोग, can be said as being suggested. Even Appayya Dikṣita's definition of *pariṇāma*—‘अरोप्यमाणस्य विषयात्मकत्वेन प्रकृतोपयोगे परिणामः’—emphasizes two parts:—(1) the identification of the *upamāna* through superimposition with the *upameya* and (2) the definite purpose of such an identification in the context. Hence this verse cannot be a good instance of *pariṇāmadhvani*.<sup>1</sup>

Again in his *Kuvalayānanda* Appayya Dikṣita comments on the verse

Appayya Dikṣita's view on *paryastāpahnuti* explained and criticised by Jagannātha.

‘अन्यत् तस्यारोपार्थः पर्यस्तापहृतिस्तु सः’ ।

and accepts the variety of *apahnuti* called *paryastāpahnuti* in cases—

‘नायं सुधांशुः किन्तर्हि सुधांशुः प्रेयसीमुखम्’ ।

But Jagannātha criticises Appayya Dikṣita's view in that it goes against the very nature of *apahnuti* as explained by Mammāṭabhaṭṭa and other eminent Ālaṅkārikas. According to them, *apahnuti* consists in the negation of *upameya* on which *upamāna* is superimposed. In the example—‘नायं सुधांशुः’—there is no negation of the *upameya*—the damsel's face—and there is only the superimposition of *upamāna* on *upameya* (face). So this is only an instance of *rūpaka* on the basis of superimposition. And there are express statements in the *Vimarśinī*, a commentary on the *Ālaṅkārasarvasva*, that in such instances as the above, the figure is *rūpaka* and not *apahnuti*. Probably

<sup>1</sup> R. G., *ibid.*, p. 255.

Ratnākara whom Appayya Dikṣita criticises the particular variety of *apahnuti* which Jagannātha contends, explain the reason this variety of *apahnuti* and *upameya* can even be urged that *apahnuti* would be *rūpaka* only. Moreover, the above instance of *apahnuti* which has only the negation of *upameya* is brought under *rūpaka*, as defined by Appayya Dikṣita.<sup>1</sup>

Again, Appayya Dikṣita criticises *apahnutidhvani* by the verse—

Appayya Dikṣita's illustration of *apahnutidhvani* criticised by Jagannātha.

‘त्वदालेखे दीपकस्य चन्द्रोदयेऽपि ।  
विषादेका वदन्ति त्वत्पुण्डरीकस्य ।  
अपि स्त्रियस्तस्मात्पुण्डरीकस्य ।  
करे यत्नं वदन्ति त्वत्पुण्डरीकस्य ।’ ॥

and explains it as containing two suggestions, one, on the basis of the painting of *Garuda* by one woman, of not an ordinary bird, but of God Kṛṣṇa (नायं साधारणः पुरुषः, किन्तु पुण्डरीकाक्षोऽपि), and the other, on the basis of the painting of *Garuda* by another, of not even Kṛṣṇa but of Cupid (नायं पुण्डरीकाक्षोऽपि, किन्तु मन्मथः). Jagannātha does not accept this explanation. He asserts that *apahnuti* possesses in all instances two parts—(1) *upameyanīṣedha* (the negation of *upameya*) and (2) *upamānāropa* (the superimposition of *upamāna* on *upameya*). On the basis of this assertion he points out the defect that the first suggestion given in the verse cannot be accepted, in view of the fact that there is only the suggestion of *upamānāropa* that this person is Lord

<sup>1</sup> vide the *Kuvalayānanda* (N. S. edition), p. 27. and the *Rasagaṅgādhara*, *ibid.*, pp. 280 and 281.

Kṛṣṇa, by the painting of the *cakra* and *suparṇa*, the two associates of Lord Viṣṇu and that there is nothing in the verse to suggest *upameyanīṣedha*, another part of *apahnuti*. He adds that it cannot be argued that *upamānāropa* is invariably associated with *upameyanīṣedha*, so that there need not be any suggestive element of *upameyanīṣedha*, for, this would lead us in the great trouble of removing *rūpaka* from the sphere of *alaṅkāras*. In the well-known examples of *rūpaka* like ‘मुखं चन्द्रः’, *upamānāropa* cannot be effected without *upameyanīṣedha*. The argument that in the examples of *rūpaka* like ‘मुखं चन्द्रः’, there is no *upameyanīṣedha* (i.e.), there is no negation of ‘मुखत्व’, and that along with ‘मुखत्व’, ‘मुख’ is cognised as possessing ‘चन्द्रत्व’ through superimposition, would drive us to accept the present verse also as an instance of *rūpaka*, in view of the fact that along with ‘साधारणपुरुषत्व’, the king addressed can be cognised as possessing ‘पुण्डरीकाक्षत्व’ through superimposition. So also Jagannātha calls defective the second suggestion in the verse—‘नायं पुण्डरीकाक्षोऽपि, किन्तु मन्मथः’—in that there is no suggestion of the part of *apahnuti*, viz., *prakṛtanīṣedha*, (the negation of the contextual object, viz., the king), though it contains the suggestion of the negation of *puṇḍarikākṣatva* on the basis of the removal of *cakra* and *suparṇa* from the picture. Appayya Dikṣita's own definition of *apahnuti*—‘प्रकृतस्य निषेधेन यदन्यत्प्रकल्पनम्’—contains the phrase ‘प्रकृतस्य निषेधेन’ which has further been interpreted by him as ‘विषयं निषिध्य’; so *upameyanīṣedha*, even according to Appayya Dikṣita, is a part of *apahnuti*. Mammatabhaṭṭa too in his *Kāvyaaprakāśa* gives the definition of *apahnuti*, thus :—‘प्रकृतं यद्विषयान्वत्साध्यते सा त्वपह्नतिः’. He further



makes a comment on the phrase—*अपह्नुति* 'as' *उपमेयमसत्त्वं कृत्वा*. This makes clear that *apahnuti* contains *उपमेयनिषेध*.

Nāgēsabhaṭṭa, however, justifies Appayya Dikṣita's explanation. He asserts that while giving this verse as an instance of *apahnutidhvani*, Appayya Dikṣita explains the view of Daṇḍin whose definition of *apahnuti* *अपह्नुतिरपह्नुत्य किञ्चिदन्यार्थसूचनम्*—does not contain the negation of *upameya*. It is to be observed here that a close study of the *Citramīmāṃsā* (*apahnuti* section) would convince us that the citation of the present verse as an instance of *apahnutidhvani* is only to illustrate his own definition and not that of Daṇḍin.<sup>1</sup>

Again, in his *Kuvalayānanda*, Appayya Dikṣita mentions two new varieties of *atiśayokti*—*रूपकातिशयोक्ति* and *अपह्नुतिगर्भातिशयोक्ति*. He adds a note that *रूपकातिशयोक्ति* is so called because it has all varieties of *rūpaka*, viz., *अभेदातिशयोक्ति* and *तादृश्यातिशयोक्ति*, and that *अपह्नुतिगर्भातिशयोक्ति* is so known because it involves or is based on *पर्यस्तापह्नुति*. Jagannātha sets aside these explanations. It has already been said<sup>2</sup> under *atiśayokti* that, according to Jagannātha, there is no *अभेदप्रतीति* in the instances of *atiśayokti* as there is in those of *rūpaka*; so *atiśayokti* cannot be said to be admitting of those two divisions of *rūpaka*. So also his view that *paryastāpahnuti* cannot be accepted as a separate variety of *apahnuti* since it comes under *rūpaka*, has been explained above.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> R. G., *ibid.*, pp. 282–285.

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, p. 208. <sup>3</sup> See *ante*, pp. 255 and 256.

Again, Appayya Dikṣita's explanation of the illustration of *संबन्धातिशयोक्ति*—*सौधा-प्राणि पुरस्यास्य स्पृशन्ति विधुमण्डलम्*—is objected to by Jagannātha. He puts a question—what would be the *alāṅkāra* if the verse is modified—*स्पृशन्तीवेन्दुमण्डलम्*? The answer is that it would be an instance of *utprekṣā*. Then, Jagannātha argues, it would be appropriate to say that it is an instance of *गम्योत्प्रेक्षा* since it is accepted as an instance of *उत्प्रेक्षा* when the *nipāta* इव is added. And he adds that one cannot find any distinction between the accepted instances of *गम्योत्प्रेक्षा* like

*‘त्वत्कीर्तिर्भ्रमणश्रान्ता विवेश स्वर्गनिगमाम्’*।

and the present instance

*‘सौधाप्राणि पुरस्यास्य स्पृशन्ति विधुमण्डलम्’*।

This point has been further elaborated by Jagannātha in his *Rasayānādhara*.

Nāgēsabhaṭṭa retorts that if this kind of argument is advanced, then it may be argued also that the adding of the word *नूनं* to the instances of *rūpaka* like *‘मुखं चन्द्रः’* makes it an instance of *utprekṣā* and the removal of the same word makes it an instance of *गम्योत्प्रेक्षा* and not that of *rūpaka*.

Again, in his *Kuvalayānanda*, Appayya Dikṣita, following Ruṣṣyaka, quotes the famous verse—*‘रक्तस्त्वं न वपल्वैरहमपि श्लाघ्यैः प्रियाया गुणैः’* Appayya Dikṣita's view on *vyatireka* criticised by Jagannātha.

as an example of *vyatireka* in which the inferiority

of the *upameya* to the *upamāna*, viz., the *aśoka* tree is expressed; and this *vyatireka* heightens *vipralambha-dhvani* in this verse. Jagannātha, however, holds that to heighten the *vipralambhadhvani* the *upamā-lāṅkāra* that is developed between the speaker and the *aśoka* tree is suddenly broken off in the last foot of the verse. He adds that this explanation has been based on what Ānandavardhana has said in regard to the development of *Rasa* in a *kāvya*. Mammatabhaṭṭa explains *vyatireka* only in instances which emphasize the superiority of the *upameya* to the *upamāna*. So Jagannātha concludes that the verse is not an example of *vyatireka*.

If *vyatireka* is to be accepted even when inferiority of *upameya* to *upamāna* is known, Jagannātha contends, another verse is to be given as illustration:—

‘जगज्जगत्त्राणधृतव्रतस्य क्षमातलं केवलमेव रक्षन् ।

कथं समारोहसि हन्त राजन् ! सहस्रनेत्रस्य तुलां द्विनेत्रः’ ॥

In this verse the king addressed is called *द्विनेत्र*—one with two eyes; even though he protects the entire earth, he, a *dvineṭra*, cannot bear comparison with the *सहस्रनेत्र*, Lord Indra, with one thousand eyes who has taken a vow to protect the *threefold world*. Here the inferiority of the king is brought home to the readers by his *द्विनेत्रत्व* and *क्षमातलमात्ररक्षण*, yet the fact that the king is equal to Lord Indra in all other respects is also experienced by all *sahydayas*. So, the instances of *vyatireka* implying *upameyanūnatā*, Jagannātha argues, should lead to the blissful experience of other noble qualities common to *upameya* and *upamāna*.

Nāgeśabhaṭṭa maintains Appayya Dikṣita's view that the verse ‘रक्तस्त्वं’ contains *vyatireka* involving *उपमेयापकर्ष*, the realisation of which is blissful inasmuch

as the love-lorn speaker prefers his being an inanimate object like the *aśoka* tree free from sufferings to his being a *sahydaya* full of self-mortifying amorous feelings. The word ‘सशोकः’ which explains the contrast between the speaker and the *aśoka* tree and the other attributes—‘रक्तः’ etc., which speak of their common characteristics heighten the *vipralambha*—the main *Rasa* developed in the verse. So Nāgeśabhaṭṭa concludes that it can be well cited as an instance of *vyatireka* in which *उपमेयन्यूनता* is brought to light along with the characteristics common for *upameya* and *upamāna*.<sup>1</sup>

Again, Appayya Dikṣita in his *Kuvalayānanda* gives a third variety of *vyatireka*—*अनुभयपर्यवसायी*—not culminating into the superiority or inferiority of *upameya* to *upamāna*; and he illustrates this variety by the verse—

‘दृढतरनिबद्धमुष्टेः कोशनिषण्णस्य सहजमलिनस्य ।

कृपणस्य कृपाणस्य च केवलमाकारतो भेदः’ ॥

In this verse the miser (*कृपण*) is compared to the sword (*कृपाण*) and their similarity is explained by means of *śleṣa* by the three adjectives—*दृढतरनिबद्धमुष्टेः*, etc. The miser is strongly holding in tact his *handful* wealth (*मुष्टि*) and the sword is very strong in its *handle* (*मुष्टि*); the miser is again sitting always in his treasury (*कोश*) to watch his wealth and the sword is lying inside its sheath (*कोश*); again, the miser looks by nature dirty (*मलिन*) and the sword is *black* (*मलिन*) by nature. Their distinction or dissimilarity is described by the

<sup>1</sup> R. G., *ibid.*, pp. 353-355.

word 'आकारतः' which means (1) by form and (2) by the long *akāra* (after the sound *p* in the word कृपाण). The description of the dissimilarity and similarity between the miser and the sword does not emphasize the superiority or inferiority of the *upameya*—the miser—to the *upamāna*—the sword. Hence, according to Appayya Dikṣita, this verse is an instance of अनुभयपर्यवसायिभ्यतिरेक.

Jagannātha offers a different explanation. He argues that the description of the dissimilarity between *upameya* and *upamāna* does not constitute the figure *vyatireka*; on the other hand, it strengthens the main figure *upamā* based on *śleṣa*. The description of the similarity between the miser and the sword as explained by the three adjectives by means of *śleṣa* is not made ineffective by that of the dissimilarity expressed by the word 'आकारतः', in view of the fact that the dissimilarity is fancied to have been contributed only by the long *akāra* in the expression कृपाण. If *vyatireka* is to be accepted as the main figure in this verse, the *śleṣa* in the word 'आकारतः' as explained above is not only unnecessary but also works against *vyatireka*, for, the dissimilarity can be brought to light by an expression like 'दीर्घाक्षरात्' and the *śleṣa* works out only a kind of identity between the properties of *upameya* and *upamāna* through superimposition (साधारणीकरण). Hence Jagannātha concludes that *śleṣopamā* is the figure in this verse and not *vyatireka*.

Nāgeśabhaṭṭa accepts Jagannātha's explanation that *śleṣopamā* is the figure in this verse; but he tries to vindicate Appayya Dikṣita in his usual way by asserting that there is अनुभयपर्यवसायिभ्यतिरेक in this verse though it does not rise up to the level of an

, *alāṅkāra*—a beautifying agent—producing *camatkāra* in the minds of *sahṛdayas*.<sup>1</sup>

Again, in his *Kuvalayānanda*, Appayya Dikṣita following mainly *Ruyyaka*, the author of the *Alāṅkārasarvasva*, observes under Appayya Dikṣita's view on *śamāsokti*: in *śamāsokti* the description of something pertaining to the context on the basis of common adjuncts or of similarity produces a superimposed knowledge presenting the contextual object as *viśeṣya* and the description of the non-contextual object (अप्रस्तुतव्यवहार) as *prakāra*, since it is presumed that the description of something non-contextual would have some bearing on the contextual idea. So in *śamāsokti* the superimposition of the *aprastutavyavahāra* as possessed by the *prastutaviśeṣya* is the chief source of *camatkāra* and not the superimposition of some beautiful property of the non-contextual chief object on the contextual chief object, as we generally find in the instances of *rūpaka*. In the famous example of *rūpaka*—'मुखं चन्द्रः'—provision is made for the superimposition of *candratva* (चन्द्रत्वारोप) on *mukha* by the separate mention of the *upamāna* by the word 'चन्द्रः', but there is no such provision in the instance of *śamāsokti*—'रक्तशुम्बति चन्द्रमाः'—for the superimposition of *jāratva* on *candra*; nor do we find in this instance of *śamāsokti* any direct suggestive element for the suggestion of *jāra*, as we find it in the instance of आक्षिप्तरूपक—

'निरीक्ष्य विद्युच्चयनेः पयोदो

मुखं निशायामभिसारिकायाः' ।

in which निरीक्षण (seeing) with the aid of bright eyes is expressly stated—a fact which well implies the

<sup>1</sup> R. G., *ibid.*, pp. 355 and 356.



Dikṣita has to accept the inclusion of चार in the body of अप्रस्तुतव्यवहार as an adjunct, as he has explained the *bodha* thus—चारसम्बन्धितारशुभनक्षत्रव्यवहारमप्यचन्द्रः.

Moreover, the *gamaka* element is of two kinds—आक्षेपक (presumptive) and व्यञ्जक (suggestive); in the former the presumptive element cannot exist or cannot be satisfied without the presumed element as in the instance—‘निरीक्ष्य विभुजनैः पयोदः’—in which the presumptive element—निरीक्षण with eyes—will be satisfied only when it implies its *substratum*, the person who sees—द्रष्टृपुरुष, while in the latter there is the process of suggestion as in the instance—‘मनोऽस्मकं मातीन्दुः’ in which the suggestion of many beautiful ideas under different contexts is made even without any inconsistency of the expressed sense. The second, *viz.*, suggestion marks the special feature of *vyañjanā* as distinct from *arthāpatti* (presumption). So since the knowledge of *jāra* is indispensable on the basis of *vyañjanā* and not on *arthāpatti*, Jagannātha contends, it is better to accept as explained above the superimposition of *jāra* on *candra* by the relation of *abheda* in the instance—‘रक्तचुम्बति चन्द्रमाः’, with the result that the reader does not for the moment experience the distinction between them and feel anything indecent.

Jagannātha further argues that it is an accepted fact that in instances like

‘अयमैन्द्रीमुखं पश्य रक्तचुम्बति चन्द्रमाः’

the feminine gender of the word ‘ऐन्द्री’ and the masculine gender of the word ‘चन्द्रमाः’ coupled with the sense of मुखचुम्बन suggest respectively the senses of a *nāyikā* and of a *nāyaka*; but in examples like ‘निशा-मुखं चुम्बति चन्द्रिकेया’, ‘अहमुखं चुम्बति मानुषिम्बन्’ the feminine gender and the neuter gender in the words ‘चन्द्रिका’ and ‘मानुषिम्बन्’ do not suggest a *nāyaka* and

the neuter gender of the word अहन् is not suggestive of the sense of a *nāyikā*. So there should be on the basis of स्त्रीत्व and पुंस्त्व known from these words the superimposition of नायिकात्व on निशा and of नायकत्व on चन्द्र and not the superimposition of the अप्रस्तुतव्यवहार on the प्रस्तुतविशेष्य—the chief contextual object, as Appayya Dikṣita explained. Jagannātha adds that both the *Alaṅkārasarvasvakāra* and his commentator on whom Appayya Dikṣita chiefly relies, speak of the superimposition of the *aprastutadharmin* on *prastutadharmin*—‘अविनाभावादप्रकृतव्यवहारेणाक्षितेन धर्मिणैव प्रस्तुतो धर्म्यवच्छिद्यते’ (विमर्शिनी). If the sense of the *nāyaka* suggested by चुम्बन is not directly related to चन्द्र but is considered only an adjunct of अप्रस्तुतव्यवहार, Jagannātha contends, then there would be no superimposition of *nāyikā* on *nīśā* on the basis of *strī*त्वा, so much so that the मुख and मुखचुम्बन described in the verse cannot be satisfactorily explained, in reference to निशा, since निशा as an inanimate object, cannot boast of a face.

That such a superimposition of something non-contextual on something contextual is highly essential in *samāsokti* can be well appreciated if we take another illustration—

‘निर्लङ्गीकामव्याधी प्रतीची याति भास्करे ।

प्रिये विपक्षरमणीरके का मुदमञ्जति ’ ॥

This verse describes Bhāskara, the sun-god, as leaving the eastern direction and going to the western direction. Here the words प्राची and प्रतीची, being in feminine gender, suggest that they are two *nāyikās* courting the lover Bhāskara on different occasions. When he turned to *Pratīcī* (the West), *Prācī* (the East) grew jealous of her rival and became pale (निर्लङ्गीका). This idea has been substantiated by a general statement in the latter

half of the verse—which woman would derive pleasure when she actually witnesses her loving husband (प्रिय) particularly attached to her rival? This general statement contains a reference to *Bhāskara* by the general term प्रिय—a lover attached to a beautiful woman (रमणीरक्त) and these statements can be satisfactorily explained only if the superimposition of *nāyikā* on *prācī* and *prācī* and of *nāyikā* on *Bhāskara* is effected in the former half of the verse.

Jagannātha further advances another argument for the refutation of Appayya Dikṣita's view that in *saṃśokti* the अप्रकृतव्यवहार is superimposed on the *prakṛta viśeṣya* by a relation involving *bheda*. He suggests two alternatives in this connection: whether the *aprakṛtavavyavahāra* which is superimposed on the *prakṛta viśeṣya* is known as distinct from *prakṛtavavyavahāra*, or it is known as identical. In the first alternative, it is to be admitted that there arises a cognition which presents the *prakṛtavastu* as *viśeṣya* and the *prakṛta-bhāvavahāra* and the *aprakṛtavavyavahāra* as two *prakāras* (as related to one *viśeṣya*). This is not possible, in view of the fact that the *aprakṛtavavyavahāra* which does not belong to the *prakṛtaviśeṣya*, cannot be the *prakāra* of the *prakṛtaviśeṣya*. In the second alternative according to which the *aprakṛtavavyavahāra* is known through superimposition as identical with *prakṛtavavyavahāra*, it is necessary to double the process of superimposition to identify the *aprastutavavyavahāra* with the *prastutavavyavahāra* and to relate the *aprastutavavyavahāra* to *prakṛtaviśeṣya* by a *bhedasambandha*. So it is better, Jagannātha argues, to simplify the process of superimposition to one element, viz., *abheda* so much so that the *prakṛtavavyavahāra* which is known through superimposition as identical with the *aprakṛtavavyavahāra*, is related to the *prakṛtadharmin* which is

also known through superimposition as identical with this *aprakṛtadharmin*, and that the *aprakṛtavavyavahāra* becomes therefore a beautifying element of the *prakṛtārtha*.

— The process of superimposition in *saṃśokti* is thus to be explained:—it is not possible, as in the instance of *vākyārtharūpaka*, to have the superimposition of a *viśiṣṭa*, viz., some chief object with its attributes not pertaining to the context, on some chief object with its attributes pertaining to the context. The cognition of certain *padārthas* like चन्द्र and निशा, in the instance—'रक्तः चुम्बति चन्द्रमाः'—leads to the superimposed identification (on the basis of some suggestive elements) with the *aprakṛtapadārthas* like the *nāyaka* and the *nāyikā*; and then arise two separate cognitions presenting the *avāntaravākyārthas*—the sum-total or the mutual relation of one *padārtha* to another pertaining to the context and also not pertaining to the context, and finally, on the basis of the cognitions of the *padārthas*, both contextual and non-contextual and of the *avāntaravākyārthas*, arises the *mahāvākyārtha*, the chief verbal cognition presenting the identity between the two descriptions—contextual and non-contextual.<sup>1</sup>

Again, in his *Kuvalayānanda*, Appayya Dikṣita illustrated *saṃśokti* on the basis of similarity by the verse taken from the *Uttararāmacarita*—

Appayya Dikṣita's view on the *saṃśokti* on the basis of *sādrśya* explained and criticised by Jagannātha.

पुरा वन्न स्रोतः पुलिनमधुना तन्न सरितां

विपर्यासं यातो घनविरलभावः क्षितिर्हाम् ।

बहोर्दृष्टं कालादपरमिव मन्ये वनमिदं

निवेशः शैलानां तदिदमिति बुद्धिं द्रवयति ॥

Here the contextual idea consists in the description of

<sup>1</sup> vide, the *Kuvalayānanda*, pp. 67-70 and R. G., *ibid.*, pp. 373-377.

the *daṇḍaka* forest having undergone a complete transformation, of the river into a dry plane and of the trees once thickly grown up, into trees now growing in wane. It suggests on the basis of similarity the non-contextual idea of the description of family people who, once very rich and happy in the midst of children and wealth, were by the lapse of time reduced to utter poverty and harrassed by many a domestic calamity. Jagannātha does not accept Appayya Dikṣita's explanation. He says that the verse 'पुरा यत्र०' cannot be an instance of *samāsokti*, since there is no विशेषणसाम्य—adjuncts common for contextual and non-contextual chief objects; and he does not accept *samāsokti* on the basis of mere similarity (*sādrśya*). He argues further that it is an accepted fact, as explained above, that in all instances of *samāsokti* the description of something pertaining to the context is to be known through superimposition as identified with that of something not pertaining to the context. From the present verse, he contends, there arises no cognition presenting the contextual sense—the transformation of the river and trees in the forest as identified with the non-contextual idea—the transformation of wealth and children. He adds that even Appayya Dikṣita has to accept that in *samāsokti* the description of the non-contextual idea is known through superimposition as existing in the chief contextual idea, so much so that the chief contextual idea, viz., forest, should have been known as possessing the धनसन्तानविपर्यास—the transformation of wealth and children,—as its adjunct.

Jagannātha's own view is that the present verse is an instance of *aprastutaprasāmsā* and not of *samāsokti*. He interprets the term *aprastutaprasāmsā* as that in

which the *aprastuta* being either *vācya* (expressed by words) or *vyāṅgya* (suggested) beautifies the *prastuta* which may be either *vācya* or *vyāṅgya* and counts the present instance 'पुरा यत्र०' as that of *aprastutaprasāmsā* in that the *aprastutavyavahāra* being suggested beautifies the *prastutavyavahāra*.

Nāgeśabhaṭṭa objects to Jagannātha's explanation. He discusses the exact meaning of the term प्रशंसा in the compound अप्रस्तुतप्रशंसा—whether it means उत्कर्षाधानम्—beautifying the *prastuta* by means of *aprastuta* or प्रतीतिमात्रम्—whether the *aprastuta* produces merely the knowledge of *prastuta*. He asserts both of them are not found satisfactory. If the first interpretation is adopted, in many instances of *aprastutaprasāmsā* in which the *prastuta vyavahāra* and the *aprastuta vyavahāra* are not known as identical through superimposition, the *aprastuta* cannot be said as beautifying the *prastuta*. Hence that interpretation is not acceptable. If the second interpretation is accepted, it cannot be held that the *aprastuta*, when known, leads to the knowledge of the *prastuta*, for in the present instance—पुरा यत्र०—the *prastuta* is *vācya* (expressed by words) independent of the suggested sense. Hence it is an instance of *samāsokti* on the basis of common adjuncts.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> vide the *Kuvalayānanda*, pp. 66 and 67 and *R. G.*, *ibid.*, pp. 382-384.

For other important references to Appayya Dikṣita's views and Jagannātha's criticisms on them, vide the *Rasagāṅadhara*, *ibid.*, pp. 239; 259 and 260; 261; 263; 267-269; 272; 301; 333-337; 388 and 389; 397-400; 407-409; 412-414; 419; 420; 425 and 426; 431; 433-435; 442 and 443; 447 and 448; 450-451; 455 and 456; 460-461; 464; 469; 470; 474-475; 480; 481; 487; 499; 502; 505; 517.



2. *Mammatabhaṭṭa*

Rājānaka Mammatabhaṭṭa, the author of the *Kāvya prakāśa* (and the *Śabdavyākhyāna*) flourished in the latter half of the eleventh century just after Abhinavagupta, the author of the *Dhvanyālokalocana* and before Rājānaka Ruyyaka, the author of the *Alaṅkārasarvasva*. In the fourth ullāsa of his *Kāvya prakāśa*, Mammata quotes Abhinavagupta whose literary activity falls between A. D. 990 and 1020.<sup>1</sup> Ruyyaka who flourished in the former half or in the middle of the twelfth century,<sup>2</sup> quotes Mammata and his *Kāvya prakāśa* in his *Alaṅkārasarvasva* and he is even said to have written a commentary called *Saṅketa* on the *Kāvya prakāśa*. These and such other evidences as the date of Padmagupta's *Navasāhasāṅkacarita* (i.e.) about A. D. 1020, from which Mammata cited some verses in his *Kāvya prakāśa* and the date of Māṇikyācandra's commentary on the *Kāvya prakāśa* which is *samvat* 1216<sup>3</sup> (i.e.) A. D. 1159-1160 fix the upper and lower limits of the date of Mammata and confirms the view that he flourished in the latter half of the eleventh century.

From the introductory verses<sup>4</sup> of the *Sudhāsāgara*, also known as *Sudhodadhi*, a commentary on the *Kāvya prakāśa*, by Bhīmasena Dikṣita of the eighteenth century, it is known that Mammata was an incarnation of the Goddess of

<sup>1</sup> vide P. V. Kane's *The History of Alaṅkāraśāstra*, p. LXXI.

<sup>2</sup> vide, *ibid.*, p. CXI.

<sup>3</sup> रसवक्त्रप्रहाशीशवत्सरे (1216) मासि माघे ।

काव्ये काव्यप्रकाशस्य सङ्केतोऽयं समर्पितः ॥

<sup>4</sup> Verses 4, 5 and 6.

Learning—*Sarasvatī*—, that he was the eldest brother and teacher of Kaiyaṭa, the author of the *Mahābhāṣya-pradīpa* and of Uvaṭa, the celebrated commentator of the *Rg-vedaprātiśākhya* and that he, though a Kashmirian by birth, had his education at Benares, the highest seat of learning and culture in India. From one of the introductory verses of Kaiyaṭa in his *Pradīpa*,<sup>1</sup> it is to be understood that Kaiyaṭa's father was Jaiyaṭa. Mammata's father's name is nowhere mentioned. So whether Mammata was the brother of Kaiyaṭa or of Uvaṭa or of both is a matter of controversy. Uvaṭa says in his *Bhāṣya* on the *Vājasaneyi Samhitā*<sup>2</sup> that he was the son of Vajraṭa and that he composed the *Mantrabhāṣya* when King Bhoja was reigning. From the statement of Uvaṭa P. V. Kane concludes that there is nothing improbable in Mammata's being a brother of Uvaṭa, the son of Vajraṭa and that he cannot then be the brother of Kaiyaṭa, the son of Jaiyaṭa and he dismisses the evidence of Bhīmasena (who lived six centuries after Mammata) as simply fanciful and based probably on the similarity of sounds in the three names—Mammata, Kaiyaṭa and Uvaṭa.<sup>3</sup> Dr. S. K. De however sets aside the view of Mammata's relationship with Uvaṭa as untenable.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> महाभाष्यार्णवावारपारीणं विवृतिप्लवम् ।

यथागमं विधास्येऽहं कैयटो जैयटात्मजः ॥ — Verse 5.

<sup>2</sup> ऋष्यादींश्च पुरस्कृत्य अवन्त्यामुवटो वसन् ।

मन्त्रभाष्यमिदं चक्रे भोजे राज्यं प्रशासति ॥

आनन्दपुरवास्तव्यवज्रटाख्यस्य सुनुना ।

मन्त्रभाष्यमिदं क्लृप्तं भोजे पृथ्वीं प्रशासति ॥

<sup>3</sup> P. V. Kane's *History of Alaṅkāra Literature*, p. CV.

<sup>4</sup> *History of Sanskrit Poetics*, Vol. I, p. 159.

In the introduction of his edition of the *Kāvya-prakāśa*, A. B. Gajendragadkar cites two verses of Uvaṭa found in two Mss. of his *Mantrabhāṣya* on the *Vājasaneyi Saṁhitā*, of which one records that Uvaṭa was the son of Jaiyaṭa while another says that he was the son of Vajraṭa. On the basis of these two verses of Uvaṭa and on the strength of Bhīmasena's statement that these three authors were brothers and that Mammaṭa, the eldest, was the teacher of the other two, Gajendragadkar assumes: (1) as Bhīmasena gives Jaiyaṭa as the name of Uvaṭa's father, "it appears to be the correct form of the name and Vajraṭa is probably its corrupt form or a scribe's mistake for Jaiyaṭa; (2) Or Uvaṭa's father may have borne two names—Jaiyaṭa and Vajraṭa—; (3) or Uvaṭa, a son of Jaiyaṭa, may have been adopted by Vajraṭa who was probably some relative of his."<sup>1</sup> Though these assumptions on the basis of Uvaṭa's statement are probable, yet Bhīmasena's account that Mammaṭa was the teacher of Kaiyaṭa deserves investigation in view of the fact that Kaiyaṭa, in one of the introductory verses of his *Pradīpa*,<sup>2</sup> mentions one Maheśvara and not Mammaṭa as his guru.

Mammaṭa's *Kāvya-prakāśa*, though only a compilation, is one of the most popular treatises on *Kāvya-prakāśa*. in the *Alaṅkāraśāstra* for its brevity of language and clearness of thought. Its authoritativeness and popularity can be easily discerned from the fact that no other work in this *Śāstra* has been commented on by a large number of commentators,

<sup>1</sup> Gajendragadkar's edition of the *Kāvya-prakāśa* (1939), introduction, p. XIII.

<sup>2</sup> पदवाक्यप्रमाणानां पारं यातव्यं धीमताः ।

गुरोर्महेन्द्रस्वामि कृता चरणचन्दनम् ॥

—Verse 4.

Some of whom are great authorities on this and other *śāstras*. It has a division of ten *ullāsas* and deals with all topics in literary criticism except dramaturgy.

The *Kāvya-prakāśa* contains *kārikās*, sometimes known as *sūtras*, the *ṛtti* or prose commentary on those *kārikās* and the illustrative verses mostly taken from well-known poetic works. Some later commentators<sup>1</sup> of the *Kāvya-prakāśa* ascribe these *kārikās* or *sūtras* to Bharata, the author of the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, on the ground that some verses in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, have been found in this work. Many later writers including Jagannātha Paṇḍita<sup>2</sup> affirm that the *kārikās* and the *ṛtti* thereon are Mammaṭa's work. So also some commentators express the dual authorship of the *Kāvya-prakāśa* that the first nine *ullāsas* and the portion ending with the figure of *parikara* in the tenth *ullāsa* belong to Mammaṭa and the remaining portion of the tenth *ullāsa*, to one Allāṭa.

In many places in his *Rasagaṅgādhara* Jagannātha refers to Mammaṭabhaṭṭa and his *Kāvya-prakāśa*—both *Kārikās* and prose-commentary with select illustrations—,<sup>3</sup> sometimes to support his own arguments and sometimes for the refutation of the latter's views. Some such references have already been dealt with

<sup>1</sup> Maheśvara Nyāyālaṅkāra in his *Kāvya-prakāśa-darśa* says—कारिकाभिः संक्षिप्य भरतमुनिः प्रणीतवान्. So also Vidyābhūṣaṇa, the author of the *Sāhitya Kaumudī*.

<sup>2</sup> vide the *Rasagaṅgādhara*, pp. 30, 221, 297, 345-6.

<sup>3</sup> vide the *Rasagaṅgādhara*, *ibid.*, pp. 5 (प्राचः); 8 and 9; 13; 17; 20 (केचित्); 22; 23; 30; 46 (प्राचः); 47; 54 (प्राचः); 58; 111; 131-132; 162; 221; 297; 316; 324; 344; 345; 354-355; 394; 396; 401; 403; 410; 439; 456; 480; 481; 519.

and a few important of the rest are now taken up here for appreciating Jagannātha's criticism on them.

While classifying *kāvya* (poetry) into four kinds—*uttamottama*, *uttama*, *madhyama* and *adhama*, Jagannātha refers to and criticises the traditional three-fold classification of *kāvya*—*uttama*, *madhyama* and *adhama*, adopted by Mammatabhaṭṭa who followed Ānandavardhana on this matter. Jagannātha's contention is that if the three-fold classification is adopted, no distinction can be made out between *śabdacitra* and *arthacitra*, since both come under the main variety of *citra* or *adhamakāvya*, according to the traditional classification; but a *sahdaya* does realise their distinction and the superiority of the *arthacitrakāvya* to a *śabdacitrakāvya*. The illustrations cited by Mammatabhaṭṭa for *arthacitra*—

‘विनिर्गतं मानदमात्ममन्दिराद्’,

‘स च्छिन्नमूलः क्षतजेन रेणुः’,

Jagannātha contends, are distinctly better types of poetry than the instances of *śabdacitra*—

‘स्वच्छन्दोच्छलदच्छकच्छकुहरच्छातेतराम्मच्छदा-

मूर्च्छन्मोहमहर्षिहर्षविहितस्नानाहिकाहाय वः ।

In the first type in which the alliterative sounds, if any, occupy a subordinate place, the *arthālaṅkāras* like *upamā* are the chief beautifying agents of poetry while in the second the *anuprāsas* constitute the major charming features of poetry. If this distinction between *śabdacitra* and *arthacitra* is not recognised, Jagannātha argues, there would be no need for recognising the distinction between a *dhvānikāvya* and a *guṇābhāṭa-ryāṅgya*, both having the suggested sense in common, one, having the suggested sense as the chief element and the other having it as a subordinate element.

Jagannātha's own view on this important matter is that a *kāvya* which has only some alliterations without a beautiful idea or sense, is no *kāvya* at all and that it cannot be brought even under the *adhamakāvya*. If sound and sense are so harmonized in a fitting manner that the poetic charm rests on both equally, then it can be called a *madhyama kāvya* though it possesses some puns or alliterations. He illustrates this *madhyama* variety in which sound and sense are equally prominent—*समप्रधान*, by the verse taken from his *Sudhā-laharī* (which has already been explained under *Sudhā-laharī*)—

‘उल्लासः फुल्लपङ्केरुहपटलपतन्मत्तपुष्पन्धयानां

निस्तारः शोकदावानलविकलहृदां कोकसीमन्तिनीनाम् ।

उत्पातस्तामसानामुपहतमहसां चक्षुषां पक्षपातः

सङ्घातः कोऽपि धान्नामयमुदयगिरिप्रान्ततः प्रादुरासीत् ॥’

In this verse the *ṛtṭyanuprāsas* and the *rūpakālaṅkāra* or *hetvalaṅkāra* are equally prominent. The *anuprāsas* manifest and heighten the *dīptiguṇa* and thus produce pleasure in the minds of the readers in an equal measure as the *rūpakālaṅkāra* which manifests *prasādaguṇa*. Hence the equal prominence of these two *alaṅkāras*—*ṛtṭyanuprāsa* and *rūpaka* in this verse.<sup>1</sup>

In the *upamā* section of the *Rasagāṅgādhara* Jagannātha criticises Mammatabhaṭṭa's definition of *upamā*—*साधर्म्यमुपमा भेदे*. He says that this definition can be applied to *vyatireka* in that *साधर्म्य*—similarity—*and भेद*—the distinction—(between *upameya* and *upamāna*) are found in *vyatireka*. The modification that *sādharmya* is the chief

<sup>1</sup> vide the *Rasagāṅgādhara*, *ibid.*, pp. 20 and 21.



source of pleasure in *upamā* may be accepted, but the part 'अदे' becomes superfluous, though it is intended to differentiate *upamā* from *ananvaya* which has the negation of a second similar object (द्वितीयसदृशव्यवच्छेद) as the chief source of literary beauty.<sup>1</sup>

### 3. *Rājānaka Ruyyaka and Jayaratha*

Rājānaka Ruyyaka, also known as Rājānaka Rucaka, refers to the *Kāvyaṣaṅkṣa-kāra* and is referred to as his teacher by Maṅkhaka in his *Śrīkaṇṭhacarita*. So he can be safely assigned to the twelfth century between Maṃmatabhāṭṭa and Maṅkhaka. Besides his *Alaṅkārasūtras*, he has written many other works; the most important of them are the *Vyaktivivekavicāra*, the *Harṣacaritavārttika*, the *Sāhityamīmāṃsā* and the *Śrīkaṇṭhastava*. Mr. P. V. Kane is of opinion that Ruyyaka is the author of the *Alaṅkāra sūtras* and the *vṛtti* on them. This view has the main support of Jayaratha who flourished nearly seventy years after Ruyyaka. While commenting on the introductory verse of the *vṛtti* he adopts the reading—'निजालङ्कारवृत्तानां वृत्त्या तात्पर्यमुच्यते'—thereby suggesting that the *sūtras* and the *vṛtti* are the productions of the one and the same author. Besides, Jayaratha, as a Kashmirian and as one of the earlier commentators, would be in a better position to know and preserve the tradition. The other view, as the T. S. S. edition of the work with Samudrabandha's commentary goes, is that Ruyyaka is the author of the *sūtras* on which his disciple Maṅkhaka has written the *vṛtti*. This fact has been proved well by the quotations in the *vṛtti*

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 162 and 163.

from Maṅkhaka's *Śrīkaṇṭhacarita* with the prefatory remark—अद्या मदीये श्रीकण्ठचरिते. Most probably, as Mr. P. V. Kane himself has suggested, Ruyyaka might have written a *vṛtti* which his disciple Maṅkhaka cared much to popularise by adding illustrative verses from his work; and this fact may account for the view that Maṅkhaka is the author of the *vṛtti*.<sup>1</sup> Jagannātha, as evident from his citations, is of opinion that the author of the *sūtras* is also the author of the *vṛtti* thereon.<sup>2</sup>

Jayaratha, otherwise known as the *Vimarśinikāra*, is the earliest commentator on the *Alaṅkārasarvasva*. In the section of the *Rasagaṅgādhara* dealing with *alaṅkāras*, Jagannātha refers to the *Alaṅkārasarvasvakṛt*, viz., Ruyyaka and his work *Alaṅkārasarvasva*,<sup>3</sup> sometimes with Jayaratha's *Vimarśinī*<sup>4</sup> also, both in favour of his arguments and for criticism. Some of them have already been dealt with and only a few important instances in which Jagannātha differs from Ruyyaka and the *Vimarśinikāra* are elucidated here.

<sup>1</sup> vide P. V. Kane's 'The History of Alaṅkāra Literature'—Introduction to his edition of the *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, Poona edition 1923, pp. 108-110.

<sup>2</sup> vide the *Rasagaṅgādhara*, *ibid.*, p. 251—'अलङ्कार-सर्वस्वरस्तु . . . . . सूत्रयित्वा . . . . . व्याख्यातवान् । Also see pp. 342-343.

<sup>3</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 200; 208; 220; 221-222; 251; 269; 280; 301; 318; 342-343; 352-353; 372; 383-384; 402; 410; 418; 422; 425; 426; 435; 452; 470; 474; 480; 482; 487; 488; 514.

<sup>4</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 201, 227, 259, 281, 313, 325, 337, 352-353, 380, 387, 418, 442, 452, 474.

In the *upameyopamā* section in his *Rasagaṅgādhara*,<sup>\*</sup> Jagannātha criticises the definition of *upameyopamā* given by Ruyyaka and further explained by the *Vimarsinikāra*. Ruyyaka defines *upameyopamā* thus:—  
**Ruyyaka's definition of *upameyopamā* criticised by Jagannātha.** 'द्वयोः पर्यायेण तस्मिन्नुपमेयोपमा।'

Firstly, Jagannātha says that the word 'द्वयोः' in the definition is of no use. If it has any purpose, he contends, it would differentiate the *upameyopamā* from *ananvayā-lāṅkāra* in that the *upamānopameyabhāva* in the former is mutually between two objects while in the latter it rests on one single object. But the word 'पर्यायेण' in the body of the definition explains that the mutual *upamānopameyabhāva* is not simultaneous (i.e.), when one is considered the *upamāna*, it is not the *upameya*; this indicates well that the *upamānopameyabhāva* in *upameyopamā* is mutually between two objects and that this can be effected only in two separate *vākya*s. This mutual similarity in cases where there is *vākya*bheda cannot be explained in *ananvaya*. So the utility of the word 'द्वयोः' (i.e.) to differentiate the scope of *upameyopamā* from that of *ananvaya* cannot be established.

The *Vimarsinikāra* views that the verse—

**Jayaratha's view criticised by Jagannātha.** 'रजोभिः स्यन्दनोद्धूतैः गजेभ्यः वनसज्जिभिः ।  
 भुवस्तलमिव द्योम कुर्वन्मयोमेव भूतलम् ॥'

is an instance of *upameyopamā* in which the *vākya*bheda is *śabda*. This is criticised by Jagannātha. He holds that the verse cannot be an instance of *upameyopamā* since it does not negate the third similar object which is considered to be its important feature. Moreover, in all instances of *upameyopamā*, the common attributes of the *upamāna* and *upameya* would be one

and the same; but in this instance (in which the sky is compared to the earth on account of the column of dust—*rajas*—raised from the surface of the earth while the chariots were moving very rapidly and the earth is compared to the sky on the appearance of cloud-like elephants moving very rapidly from one direction to another), the common attributes are different; in the first, the column of dust, the अनुगामिधर्म, is the basis of *upamā* while in the second, the clouds and elephants viewed as identical by *bimbapratibimbabhāva*, are the basis of *upamā*.<sup>1</sup>

In the *Alaṅkārasarvasva*, the figure *smaraṇa* is defined thus—'सदृशानुभवाद्दृष्टवन्तरस्मृतिः'. Ruyyaka's definition of *smaraṇālaṅkāra* is that in which the remembrance of one object arises from the experience of another similar object. This Jagannātha calls defective in that it does not include instances like—'सन्त्येवासिजगति बहवः पक्षिणो रम्यरूपाः'—in which the remembrance of Lord Kṛṣṇa arises from the remembrance of the similar object, viz., cloud, which arises again at the sight of the *cātaka* bird. He suggests therefore the slight modification of 'सदृशानुभवात्' into 'सदृशज्ञानात्', so that instances like the above can be well explained as good examples of *smaraṇālaṅkāra*, in that *smaraṇa* also is a kind of ज्ञान (cognition) though it is not *anubhava*.<sup>2</sup>

Again, *Parināma* is defined by the *Alaṅkārasarvasvakāra* thus—आरोप्यमाणस्य प्रकृतोपयोगित्वे परिणामः. He further explains it thus—'आरोप्यमाणं रूपके प्रकरणोपयोगित्वाभावात्प्रकृतोपरजकत्वेनैव केवलेनान्वयं भजते, परिणामे तु

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 200 and 201.

<sup>2</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 221-222.

प्रकृतात्मतया आरोप्यमाणस्योपयोग इति प्रकृतमारोप्यमाणतया परिणमति ”

Ruyyaka's  
definition of  
*pariṇāma*  
criticised by  
Jagannātha.

—in *Rūpaka* the superimposition heightens the beauty of the thing described and the question of the utility does not arise while in *Pariṇāma* the superimposition of the *upamāna* on the *upameya*

finds its special utility in the context and the *upameya* is said to be transformed into the superimposed *upamāna*. Here Jagannātha discusses the exact meaning of the phrase—‘आरोप्यमाणस्य प्रकृतोपयोगः’. He suggests two alternatives—प्रकृतकार्ये उपयोगः or प्रकृतविषयात्मतयोपयोगः. In the first alternative, Jagannātha questions the propriety of Ruyyaka's citation of the verse—

‘दासे कृतागसि भवत्युचितः प्रचूर्णं  
पादप्रहार इति सुन्दरि ! नास्मि ह्ये ।  
उद्यत्कठोरपुलकाङ्कुरकण्टकाग्रै-  
र्यस्त्रिचते तव पदं ननु सा न्यथा मे ’ ॥

as an example of *rūpaka* and not of *pariṇāma*, in view of the fact that this verse contains the superimposition on *pulaka* (horripilation) of *kaṇṭakas* (thorns) with the definite purpose that the *pulaka* becomes the cause of *vyathā* (pain). In the second alternative, Jagannātha contends that the example cited by Ruyyaka for *vyadhikaraṇapariṇāma*—

‘अथ पक्विमतामुपेयिवजिः  
सरसैर्बन्धप्रपथामितैर्व्योमिः ।  
क्षितिभर्तुरुपायनं चकार  
प्रथमं तत्परतस्तुरङ्गमाद्यैः ॥ ’

cannot be justified in that the *upamāna* viz., *upāyana*, (presents to the king), though identified through superimposition with the *upameya*—sweet words—, has the

special utility in the context as *upāyana* and not as ‘words’. On the other hand it may be urged that the sweet words, the *upameya*, may be identified through superimposition with *upāyana*, the *upamāna*. Hence this verse can be cited as an instance of *vyadhikaraṇa-rūpaka*.<sup>1</sup>

Again, Ruyyaka explains *Vyatiṛeka* even in instances which describe the inferiority of *upameya* to *upamāna*. To him *vyatiṛeka* consists in the description of distinction (between *upamāna* and *upameya*). This is illustrated by the verse—

‘क्षीणः क्षीणोऽपि शशी भूयो भूयोऽभिवर्धते सखम् ।  
विरम प्रसीद सुन्दरि ! यौवनमनिवर्ति यातं तु ’ ॥

Jayaratha, the author of the *Vimarśinī*, a commentary on the *Alaṅkārasaṁśaya*, explains further that the *vyatiṛeka* in this verse is nourishing the main *Rasa* (*vipralambha*) in that youth (*yauvana*), unlike the moon, would never come back when it once began to disappear; and so the damsel referred to in this verse might be pleased not to show her anger to her lover. But Jagannātha takes this verse as an illustration for *vyatiṛeka* emphasizing the superiority of *upameya* to *upamāna*, as it is always the case of *vyatiṛeka*. He fancies that the moon appears in full splendour every now and then and so is easily accessible, but youth, when it once disappears, never comes back and is therefore inaccessible and great, since all generally inaccessible objects are considered to be great.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 251.

<sup>2</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 352-353.



4. *Alaṅkāra Ratnākara*

*Alaṅkāra Ratnākara* or *Ratnākara* is the name of an *alaṅkāra* work and also of a writer quoted by Jagannātha in his *Rasagaṅgādhara*.<sup>1</sup> Some references definitely relate to the author<sup>2</sup> and most probably Jagannātha would have called the author by the name of the work. It is known from other sources that one Śobhākara is the author of the *Alaṅkāraratnākara*,<sup>3</sup> which, as Jagannātha remarks, has been followed by Appayya Dikṣita.<sup>4</sup>

Ratnākara defines *upamā* thus—‘प्रसिद्धगुणेनोपमानेना-  
प्रसिद्धगुणस्योपमेयस्य सादृश्यमुपमा’. Jagannātha discards it as unsatisfactory in that this definition cannot be applied to cases of *śliṣṭopamā* which is purely the poet's invention and as such, is devoid of any well-known *upamāna*.<sup>5</sup>

Again Ratnākara explains *upameyopamā* thus—  
‘परस्परमुपमानोपमेयवद्’—and illustrates it by the verse—  
‘सविता विधवति विधुरपि  
सवितरति दिनन्ति यामिन्यः ।  
यामिनयन्ति दिनानि च सुख-  
दुःखवशीकृते मनसि ॥’

Jagannātha characterises this illustration as unsuitable in that it does not negate the third similar

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 163, 202, 206–207, 209, 211, 221, 225, 281, 313, 480, 492.

<sup>2</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 207, 211, 225, 281.

<sup>3</sup> *vide* Index of works and authors in P. V. Kane's edition of the *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, *ibid.*, p. 162.

<sup>4</sup> *vide* the *Rasagaṅgādhara*, *ibid.*, p. 281.

<sup>5</sup> *ibid.*, p. 163.

object—तृतीयसदृश्यवच्छेद—which is the chief aim of *upameyopamā*. He also asserts that Ratnākara's illustration goes against his own statement—‘स चोपमानास्तर-निवेशार्थः’. Jagannātha adds that the present verse is a good instance of *परस्परपमा* in which the mutual similarity of the two objects referred to is alone aimed at and not the negation of the third similar object.<sup>1</sup>

Again, Ratnākara classifies *ananvaya* by suitable illustrations into three—the first containing the *upameya* itself fancied as the *upamāna*, the second with one part of the *upameya* as *upamāna* and the third, having the *upameya* as *upamāna* identified on the basis of *bimbapratibimbabhāva*. In this connection Jagannātha puts a pertinent question—what exactly constitutes the figure *ananvaya*? A mere negation of a similar object cannot be taken as the distinguishing feature, since the same can be explained in the instance of *Kalpītopamā*—‘स्तनाभोगे पतन्भाति’. Moreover, as the term *ananvaya* implies, the negation of a second similar object is considered to be the chief feature of this figure and this special feature is not found in instances involving one part of the *upameya* as the *upamāna* and another part as the *upameya*, as explained by Ratnākara in the second variety of *ananvaya*.<sup>2</sup>

Again Jagannātha sets aside the illustrative verse of *asama* cited by Ratnākara—

Ratnākara's definition of *asama* criticised by Jagannātha.  
‘दुण्डुलन्तो मरीहसि कण्टककलिभाङ्गं केभङ्गणाङ्गं ।  
मालङ्कुसुमसरिच्छं भमर भमन्तो न पावहसि ॥’

in that it does not describe the negation of all *upamānas*. He further remarks that the verse is

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, p. 202.

<sup>2</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 206 and 207.

an instance of *upamānaluptopamā* and that the statement in the latter half of the verse that the bee, though wandering, would not attain an object similar to the *mālātī* flower, does not invariably imply the negation of all similar objects which would be done by a statement like 'मालतीकुसुमसमं नास्ति'.<sup>1</sup>

### 5. Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta

Ānandavardhanācārya whom he calls *dhvanikṛt* and *Alaṅkārasaraṇivijayavasthāpaka*<sup>2</sup> is quoted by Jagannātha in his *Rasagaṅgādhara*, mostly in support of his discussions.<sup>3</sup> One instance in which Jagannātha differs from Ānandavardhana is the verse—*प्रत्यक्षीरे कस्यात्*—which Ānandavardhana has explained as an illustration for *rūpakadhvani* while Jagannātha contends that it is an instance of *bhrāntimad-dhvani*.<sup>4</sup>

Abhinavagupta is cited as an eminent authority along with Ānandavardhana in determining whether a *kāvya* is a *dhvani* or *guṇibhūtaavyaṅgya*.<sup>5</sup> The important references to these writers have already been noted.

### 6. Vidyānātha

Vidyānātha, the author of the *Pratāparudrīya*, is also cited by Jagannātha for criticism.<sup>6</sup> His definition of *upamā*—'स्वतः सिद्धेन भिन्नेन'—is called defective in as much as it can well be applied to instances of *vyatireka* involving the negation of *sādrśya*.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, p. 211.

<sup>2</sup> *ibid.*, p. 425.

<sup>3</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 13; 52; 107; 247; 263; 354; 396; 400; 414; 425.

<sup>4</sup> *ibid.*, p. 247.

<sup>5</sup> *ibid.*, p. 263; see also p. 418.

<sup>6</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 162, 255 (referred to as पर).

<sup>7</sup> *ibid.*, p. 162.

Besides these Bhāmaha,<sup>1</sup> Daṇḍin,<sup>2</sup> Vāmana,<sup>3</sup> Udbhaṭa (and his followers called Audbhaṭas),<sup>4</sup> commentators on the *Kāvya prakāśa*—Śrīvatsalāñchana<sup>5</sup> and Tikākāra<sup>6</sup>—and some other Prācīnas<sup>7</sup> (without exact references) are cited and criticised by Jagannātha Paṇḍita.

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, p. 414.

<sup>2</sup> *ibid.*, p. 55 (referred to as Jarattara).

<sup>3</sup> *ibid.*, p. 439.

<sup>4</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 393-394, 400, 401 (*Audbhaṭa*) and 414.

<sup>5</sup> *ibid.*, p. 39.

<sup>6</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 104, 123, 128 and 415; commentators on the *Kāvya prakāśa*, p. 131.

<sup>7</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 43, 108, 159, 174, 215, 239, 241, 295, 296, 310, 328, 406, 425, 458 and 460.

## CHAPTER VIII

*Jagannātha Paṇḍita as a Grammarian*

**P**ANDITARĀJA Jagannātha is not one of the foremost writers on Sanskrit Grammar. His only work so far partly available in the field of Sanskrit Grammar is the *Manoramākucamardini* or *mardana*.

**Jagannātha as a Grammarian:** his *Manoramākucamardini*.

It contains only his refutations of some views that Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita has expounded in his *Praughamanoramā* and *Śabdakaustubha*. From the title of the work it is possible to say that the work is intended to criticise his views elucidated in his *Praughamanoramā* only, but as the printed text of the *Manoramākucamardini*<sup>1</sup> goes, it advances now and then criticisms on his views expounded in his *Śabdakaustubha*<sup>2</sup> also. His main idea of writing this work is not to write a running commentary on the sūtras of Pāṇini, but to vindicate the unrivalled position, in the realm of Sanskrit Grammar, of his teacher's teacher, Śeṣa-Śrī-Kṛṣṇa whose views, as embodied in his work *Prakriyāprakāśa*, have been adversely criticised by Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita. Śeṣa-Śrī-Kṛṣṇa was Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita's teacher and Jagannātha considered it very unholy on the part of Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita to adversely criticise his teacher, Śeṣa-Śrī-Kṛṣṇa; so he called Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita a *gurudrut*—one who has done harm to his teacher.

<sup>1</sup> Vide Haridas Sanskrit Series No. 23: Benares (1934) the *Praughamanoramā* with *Śabdaratnā* and *Jyotsnā*; *Kucamardini*—Appendix pp. 1-26. The *Kucamardini* extends from the संहारप्रकरण to the end of विसर्गसन्धि.

<sup>2</sup> vide, *ibid.*, p. 9 and 21.

In the introductory note of his *Manoramākucamardini*, Jagannātha says that Śeṣa-Śrī-Kṛṣṇa has already been ably vindicated by Śeṣa Vireśvara's son (the grandson of Śeṣa-Śrī-Kṛṣṇa), yet he has considered it his sacred duty to criticise not only those points that Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita has raised against Śeṣa-Śrī-Kṛṣṇa but also his other explanations which are not considered to be highly satisfactory.<sup>1</sup> Thus Jagannātha brings *bhāṣyavirodha* in so many instances, in addition to the fact that Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita's explanations are not based on sound, logical arguments. From the able way in which he advocates his view-points, it is clearly seen that he is well versed in most of the authoritative treatises on Sanskrit Grammar, particularly the greatest authoritative work, the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali.

A few instances at random are taken here for elucidation to appreciate Jagannātha's criticism on Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita's exposition of *Sūtras*.

In his *Siddhānta Kaumudī* and *Praughamanoramā*, Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita pleads for the repetition (आवृत्ति) of the whole sūtra 'halantīyam', in order to avoid the fallacy

<sup>1</sup> लक्ष्मीकान्तपदाम्भोजं प्रणम्य श्रेयसां पदम् ।  
पण्डितेन्द्रो जगन्नाथः स्यति गर्व गुरुद्रुहाम् ॥

इह खलु केचिभिस्त्रिविद्वन्मुकुटमणिमयूखमालालितचरणकमलानां गीर्वाणगुरुगौरवप्राप्तमांसलमहिममण्डिताखण्डमहीमण्डलानां शेषवशावतंसानां श्रीकृष्णाख्यपण्डितानां चिरायार्चितयोः पादुकयोः प्रसादादासदित-  
शब्दानुशासनाः तेषु च पारमेश्वरं पदं प्रयातेषु कलिकालवशंवदीभवन्तः  
तत्रभवद्भिस्त्रिलसितं प्रक्रियाप्रकाशमाशयानवबोधनिबन्धनैः दुष्पणैः स्वयं  
निर्मितायां मनोरमायामाकुल्यकार्षुः । सा च प्रक्रियाप्रकाशकतां  
पौत्रैरखिलसालमहार्णवमन्वाचलावमानमानसानामसङ्गुदीरेभ्यरपण्डितानां  
तन्मयेदृष्टिता अपि समतिपरीक्षां पुनरस्माभिरपि निरीक्ष्यते ।

*Praughamanoramākucamardini*, *ibid.*, p. 1.



of interdependence (अन्योन्याश्रय). In this connection Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita gives other simpler explanations like तन्त्र and एकशेष and he dismisses them all in that none of them is satisfactory; and so he finally accepts the आवृत्ति of the whole sūtra.

Jagannātha calls this explanation of the sūtra by Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita's explanation. He manages to explain the sūtra without आवृत्ति. He however splits 'halantyaṃ' into two sūtras—'hal' and 'antyaṃ'. The sūtra 'antyaṃ' has got *l* at the end which is dropped by the rule—संयोगान्तस्य लोपः. It gets two words by the process of अनुवृत्ति—उपदेशे and इत् (from the sūtra उपदेशेऽजनुनासिक इत्). So the sūtra 'अन्त्यम्' means उपदेशेऽन्त्यं इत् इत् स्यात्—in *upadeśa* the last *l* is an *it*—an indicative sound. This rule is now to be applied to the sūtra 'हल्'—the last of the *Māheśvara* sūtras. It is an *upadeśa* and it contains *l* as the last sound; so *l* in this sūtra is known as an *it*. Now by the application of the rule 'आदिरन्त्येन सहेता' the *hal-pratyāhāra* is got by connecting *ha* in the sūtra—हयवरट्—with the *it-l*—in the sūtra—हल्—so that *hal* would mean all consonants enumerated in the *Māheśvara* sūtras beginning with हयवरट्. The other sūtra 'हल्' (just before अन्त्यम्) can be now interpreted along with words—उपदेशे, इत्—got by अनुवृत्ति and अन्त्यम् by *dehali-dipanyāya*, as उपदेशेऽन्त्यं इत् इत् स्यात्—the last consonant in an *upadeśa* is *it*—an indicative sound. This is the exact meaning of the sūtra 'हलन्त्यम्' which Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita gets by adopting the repetition of the whole sūtra while Jagannātha makes it into two

sūtras and explains practically the same meaning. Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita interprets first the sūtra—हलन्त्यम्—as हलिति सूत्रेऽन्त्यमिदं स्यात्—the last sound in the sūtra 'हल्' is called *it*. The same idea is brought about by Jagannātha by interpreting the sūtra 'अन्त्यम्' as उपदेशेऽन्त्यं इत् इत् स्यात्. Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita's other interpretation of the sūtra—'हलन्त्यम्'—उपदेशेऽन्त्यं इत् इत् स्यात्—is given by Jagannātha to the other sūtra—'हल्'—उपदेशेऽन्त्यं इत् इत् स्यात्. Thus Jagannātha thinks that to make 'halantyaṃ' into one sūtra and to repeat it go against the nature of Pāṇiniyan sūtras. He believes that to make it into two sūtras with the above explanations is a more satisfactory process than that Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita has adopted.

Jagannātha gives other explanations also. He says that 'halantyaṃ' need not be split into two sūtras like *hal* and *antyaṃ*; but he assumes after 'halantyaṃ' the sound *l* which is dropped by the rule 'संयोगान्तस्य लोपः'. He takes thus *halantyaṃ* as one sūtra and 'ल्' (which is dropped after it) as the other. The sūtra 'ल्' can be interpreted with the help of three words borrowed from the two previous sūtras, as उपदेशेऽन्त्यं इत् इत् स्यात्. Though the sūtra 'ल्' is not heard or is not pronounced in the *samhitāpāṭha* of the sūtras, it is to be admitted that it, even while it is dropped, can convey its sense on the basis of the assumption that it exists, for the utterance (उच्चारण) by a person is not one of the necessary conditions for a sound to convey its sense, since a person who observes silence can understand ideas by perusing a book, even without the utterance of words.

The third explanation has got reference to the sūtra 'हल्', the last of the *Māheśvara* sūtras. Jagannātha

fancies that the sound *l* in this *sūtra* is *anunāsika*\* and that this *l* can be called an *it* on the strength of its being *anunāsika* though it is not a vowel—*ac*—, by the rule उपदेशेऽजनुनासिक इत्. Hence *l* in the *sūtra* 'हल्' is an *it*.

According to the last two explanations, the *sūtra* 'हलन्त्यम्' means उपदेशेऽन्त्यं हल् इत् स्यात्, on the basis of *hal-pratyāhāra* got with the help of the *sūtra*—आदिरन्त्येन सहेता.

It is objected that the संयोगान्तलोप of *l* in the instance अन्त्यम् ल cannot be effected by the raised and rule—संयोगान्तस्य लोपः, since the rule re-answered. quires a संयोगान्तपद the last conjunct consonant of which is to be dropped—संयोगान्तं यत्पदं तदन्तस्य लोपः स्यात्. In the present instance the संयोगान्त is अन्त्यम् ल which is not a *pada*, though अन्त्यम् is a *pada* and ल is another *pada*. This objection is met as follows:—The *sūtra* 'संयोगान्तस्य लोपः' means संयोगान्तस्य सतः पदान्तस्य लोपः—any sound which is the last element of conjunct consonants and which is also the last element of a *pada* is to be dropped. In the instance अन्त्यम् ल, ल is the last of the conjunct consonants and it is the last element of a *pada*; hence it is to be dropped.

Jagannātha supports his explanation by further internal evidences. First he says that this explanation of the *sūtra* 'संयोगान्तस्य लोपः' is quite essential for effecting the elision of स् in 'अस्ति सिचस् स्' in the *sūtra*—अस्तिसिचोऽपृक्के—since अस्तिसिचस् is not a *pada*. In his *Śabdakaustubha* Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita gives the same explanation under the *sūtra* 'स्यानिवदादेशोऽनस्तिचो' to effect

'the lopa of स् in अस्तिसिचस्. In his *Prauḍhamanoramā* he has accepted the same explanation under the *sūtra*—'कर्मवत्कर्मणा तुल्यक्रियः'—to accomplish the lopa of स् in 'अत्यथो बहुलम् ल लिङ्याशिष्यङ्' by the *sūtra* 'संयोगान्तस्य लोपः'. The celebrated Bhāṣyakāra has accepted the same explanation while he speaks of the elision of स् in वृक्षस्सस् when the bases वृक्ष, वृक्ष have been dropped by the *sūtra*—'सरूपाणामेकशेष एकविभक्तौ'. Thus Jagannātha concludes that Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita's statement in his *Prauḍhamanoramā* 'लकारस्य संयोगान्तलोपो दुर्लभः'—that the elision of *l* by the *sūtra* 'संयोगान्तस्य लोपः' cannot be accomplished cannot be maintained.

It is again objected that the संयोगान्तलोप is prohibited in the instances of यण् by the *vārttika*—यणः प्रतिषेधो वाच्यः; or it is enjoined only in the instances of 'झल्' by taking the word झलः from the *sūtra* 'झलो झलि', so that in either case the lopa of *l* cannot be accomplished, *l* being यण् or not being a झल्. This objection is met by the application of the *vārttika*—बहिरङ्गलक्षणत्वाद्वा. It emphasizes the *antarāṅgatva* of the lopa and as such the elision of यण् would take place under any circumstances.

Jagannātha adds that since no *samāhōradvandva* between one word and another in the *sūtra* 'हलन्त्यम्' is contemplated, in the explanations given above, there is no need for सहविवक्षा.<sup>1</sup>

In the explanation of the *paribhāṣāsūtra*—'इको गुणद्वयी'—Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita adopts the एवोपस्थितिपक्ष in preference to other *pakṣas* like एवोपपक्ष, so that the

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 2-4.

*sūtra* would mean that the word 'इकः' (as पञ्चन्तः)• Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita's explanation of the *sūtra* 'षष्ठी स्थानेयोगा' criticised by Jagannātha. is to be taken to all *sūtras* operating गुण and वृद्धि by the words गुण and वृद्धि. But he does not adopt the same explanation in the *paribhāṣāsūtra*—'षष्ठी स्थानेयोगा'. This *sūtra*, according to Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita, explains the meaning of the genitive case in any *sūtra* to be स्थान or प्रसङ्ग if no definite sense like a सम्बन्धविशेष is known—'अनिर्धारितसम्बन्धविशेषा षष्ठी स्थानेयोगा बोध्या'. In other words, in the *sūtra*—'इको गुणवृद्धी'—पदोपस्थितिपक्ष is adopted while in the *sūtra*—'षष्ठी स्थानेयोगा', only अर्थोपस्थितिपक्ष is adopted. This difference in the explanation of the *paribhāṣāsūtras* Jagannātha does not approve and as far as possible, he ventures to give a uniform explanation of पदोपस्थितिपक्ष in most of the *paribhāṣāsūtras*. Thus, the *sūtra*—'षष्ठी स्थानेयोगा' is explained as follows:—'इह शास्त्रेऽनिर्धारितसम्बन्धविशेषा षष्ठी स्थानेशब्देन युज्यते । 'स्थाने' इति सप्तम्यन्तं तत्रोपस्थितं स्यादित्यर्थः' । In the Vyākaraṇa Śāstra, particularly in the Pāṇiniyan *sūtras*, if no specific sense of genitive case is known, then the word 'स्थाने' is to be taken along with the word in genitive case. This is what is known as the पदोपस्थितिपक्ष. This same explanation Jagannātha adopts in other *paribhāṣāsūtras*—'अलोऽन्यस्य', 'ङिङ्', 'आदेः परस्य', 'अनेकादिशतसर्वस्य', 'तस्मिन्निति निर्दिष्टे पूर्वस्य' and 'तस्मादित्युत्तरस्य' ।

While explaining the *sūtra*—'इको यणचि'—in his *Praughamanoramā*, Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita observes—'इकशब्देन षट्षष्टिवर्णां गृह्यन्ते, यण्-शब्देन सप्तैति नास्ति यथासंख्यम्'—by the word इक् are taken the eighteen varieties of each sound

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, p. 13.

इ, उ, ऋ and the twelve varieties of ए, making a total of sixty-six while by यण्, a total of seven only, so that there is no यथासंख्य between the *sthāni* and the 'इको यणचि' *ādeśa* (since there is no agreement in the totals of *sthāni* and *ādeśa*). Jagannātha sets aside this explanation on the ground that it goes against the *Bhāṣyagrantha* under the *sūtra*—'स्थानेऽन्तरतमः'. The Bhaṣya under that *sūtra* runs thus: 'किमुदाहरणम्? दध्यत्र । संख्यातानुदेशेनाप्येतत्सिद्धम्'—What is the example (of the *sūtra*—स्थानेऽन्तरतमः?) (It is suggested—) दध्यत्र (in which the sound इ in the word दधि is substituted by द्ध् which is in full agreement with इ in both *sthāna* and *prayatna*. The suggestion is not accepted by the *siddhāntin* and so he remarks that इ can be substituted by द्ध् (by the rule इको यणचि) if यथासंख्य is adopted, so that the rule—स्थानेऽन्तरतमः—need not be applied here.

Jagannātha's explanation of यथासंख्य in this *sūtra* is thus: according to the *jātipakṣa*, the words इक् and यण् convey (by *abhidhā*) *jātis* like इत्त्व and उत्त्व, so that the word इक् conveys four *jātis* and the word यण् also conveys four *jātis*, thus making possible the application of the यथासंख्य rule. He adds that the *Bhāṣyakāra* means this *jātipakṣa* only when he accepts यथासंख्य in this *sūtra*. The question of निरुद्धलक्षणा as suggested by Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita does not therefore arise in the *jātipakṣa*. The word 'आकृतिग्रहणात्' in the *Vārttika*—'सर्वेऽण्ग्रहणमपरिभाष्यमाकृतिग्रहणात्' (under the अनुविश्रुत)—expressly speaks of *jātipakṣa* in *pratyāhāras*.

Even according to the *vyakṭipakṣa* which necessitates the adoption of निरुद्धलक्षणा, Jagannātha contends,



यथासंख्य between *sthāni* and *ādeśa* can be explained in reference to the *śakyatāvachchedakas* like इत्थ and एत्थ of the *sthāni* and of the *ādeśa*. He adds that the rule 'स्थानेऽन्तरतमः' is also to be applied in this *sūtra* to eliminate *ananunāsika* varieties of यन् in the place of *anunāsika* इक्. So the rule of *yathāsankhya* is to be first applied and then the अन्तरतमपरिभाषा. This is the view, Jagannātha concludes, that has been accepted by the Bhāṣyakāra and other ancient commentators.<sup>1</sup>

While explaining the Vārttika 'स्वादीरेरिणोः' under the *sūtra*—'एत्थेयत्पूद्सु'—the author of the *Prakriyāprakāśakāra*'s explanation of the Vārttika 'स्वादीरेरिणोः' criticised by Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita. the *sūtra*—'एत्थेयत्पूद्सु'—the author of the *Prakriyāprakāśa* adopts the application of the लिङ्गविशिष्टपरिभाषा to get *vrddhi* in the form स्वरिणी. Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita criticises the *Prakriyāprakāśa* in that even without the application of लिङ्गविशिष्टपरिभाषा the form स्वरिणी which has ईरिन् as the base of ईप् can get *vrddhi* on the basis of ईरिन्शब्द following the word स्व.

Jagannātha does not accept Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita's explanation. He remarks that Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita has not understood the gist of the *Prakriyāprakāśa* text—लिङ्गविशिष्टपरिभाषया स्वरिणी. He gives a detailed exposition of the text of his teacher's teacher—Śeṣa-Śrī-Kṛṣṇa. The vārttika—स्वादीरेरिणोः—is to be interpreted thus:—*Vrddhi* is to be operated as an *ekādeśa* of अ and ई when the word स्व is followed by ईर or ईरिन् and when they become the *uttarapada* of the word स्व. This interpretation, Jagannātha asserts,

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 14 and 15.

is correct and necessary too, to avoid the operation of *vrddhi* in *samāsas* like स्वरज्ञान and स्वरमिय in which the word ईर is the *pūrvapada* of the words ज्ञान and मिय, so that it does not become the *uttarapada* of the word स्व. According to this interpretation, the word ईरिन्, the base of ईप् (in स्वरिणी) is not the *uttarapada* of the word स्व but only ईरिणी. So to get *vrddhi* in स्वरिणी the application of the लिङ्गविशिष्टपरिभाषा is highly essential.

It is objected that in the Vārttika 'स्वादीरेरिणोः' the word उत्तरपदे is not found, nor is it to be raised and answered. got by अनुवृत्ति; so the explanation given above with उत्तरपदे is not acceptable. This is met as follows: though the word is not found in the body of the vārttika, it is possible to presume that the words ईर and ईरिन् should be *uttarapadas* of the word स्व, since this *vrddhi* is to be operated only in *samāsa*—compound formation with स्व as the *pūrvapada* and ईर or ईरिन् as the *uttarapada*.

It is again objected that the words स्व and ईर in the compound 'स्वरज्ञान' have no एकार्थीभावसामर्थ्य (i.e.) they are not directly related to each other but the word स्व is directly associated with the word ज्ञान so that the *vrddhi* also cannot be operated though the word ईर comes just after the word स्व. This objection also is met by Jagannātha. He contends that nobody can prevent *vrddhi* in the *dvandva* compounds like ईरश्च घटश्च = ईरघटौ; स्वस्वरघटौ = स्वरघटौ in which the सामर्थ्य can be explained between the words स्व and ईर, though it is objected in other *samāsas*. Thus he justifies the statement of his Prācārya—'लिङ्गविशिष्टपरिभाषया स्वरिणी'.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 17 and 18.

Similarly Jagannātha sets aside as baseless Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita's criticisms on the *Prakriyāprakāśa* passages<sup>1</sup> under the *sūtras* 'सि गुक्' and 'उमो हस्वादचि कमुणिगलम्' and wonders how averse and unjust Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita was to his teacher, Śeṣa-Śrī-Kṛṣṇa, when he does not at all give any interpretation of the latter's statements in the work *Prakriyāprakāśa* and justify him, as he waxes eloquent in giving new interpretations of the texts of the *prācīnas* with whom he had nothing to do in his life-time—'बहो अयं महानस्य द्रोहोद्रेकः यदुदासीनानां प्राचां ग्रन्था आशयविशेषकल्पनेन समर्थन्ते, न च समर्थन्ते गुरुणामिति ।'<sup>2</sup> Thus in his *Manoramākucamardini* Jagannātha not only finds fault with Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita's explanations and criticisms on some *prācīna* texts but also gives in certain instances his own interpretations of *sūtras* and *vārttikas* (as indicated above), no doubt, on the basis of some Mahābhāṣya text and the commentary thereon. He also gives his own interpretations of the *prācīna* texts on the *sūtras* and *vārttikas* and justifies them wherever necessary.

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 24 and 25.

<sup>2</sup> *ibid.*, p. 24.

## CHAPTER IX

### Conclusion

THE foregoing pages contain an elaborate and careful study of Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha in all important aspects of his life and achievements. Born in an age of great literary stars of high magnitude,<sup>1</sup> of parents whose literary and other accomplishments were second to none,<sup>2</sup> it is no wonder that Jagannātha who was so fortunate as to study most of the Śāstras under his father Perubhaṭṭa, a well-reputed *Catuśśāstra-Paṇḍita*,<sup>3</sup> was able to maintain the high literary traditions of his family. Through the powerful influence of Asaf Khan, the brother of Nur Jahan, he had free access to the Mughal Court, most probably even at the time of Jahangir and enjoyed the patronage of that Mughal Emperor. Subsequently Shah Jahan and his son, Dara Shukkoh, highly patronised him. In recognition of his unrivalled literary attainments as a poet and as a literary critic, he received the honorific title of *Paṇḍitarāja* from Shah Jahan. Thus he enjoyed the Mughal patronage during his middle age in the Mughal Court and wrote most of his works including the *Rasaṅgādhara* in that period before he left for Assam.<sup>4</sup>

Jagannātha's name is also known to have been associated with the rare epithet—पद्मवाक्यप्रमाणपारावारीण— which is found in a colophon in the printed

<sup>1</sup> See *ante*, pp. 1-10.

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, pp. 11 and 12.

<sup>3</sup> See *ante*, p. 12.

<sup>4</sup> See *ante*, pp. 13-17.

Like Bhavabhūti again, Jagannātha was an ambitious and strong-willed man, though sometimes pulled down in life by adverse fate; so he asserts his superiority to many writers on Literary Criticism in view of his unique capacity to give illustrations of his own in his *Rasagāṅgādhara*.<sup>1</sup>

As has been explained by Abhinavagupta, the great literary critic of India—सरस्वत्यास्तरुं कविसङ्घद्वयं विलसतात्—the critic is the *alter ego* of the poet. India has been rich for long in such authors as have wonderfully combined in themselves the two faculties—the creative faculty of the poet and the appreciative faculty of the critic. If Vālmiki is the *Ādikavi* of *Bhāratavarṣa*, he is no doubt the *Ādisaḥṛdaya* also, being the father of the Rasa-school (on the practical side) in the history of the *Alaṅkāraśāstra*; so also are Vyāsa, the celebrated author of the *Mahābhārata*, and Kālidāsa, the greatest poet and dramatist of the Classical period of Sanskrit. Among those who have made themselves conspicuous as great poets and literary critics mention may be made here of Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin and Udbhaṭa in the Bhāmaha period, Ānandavardhana, Rājaśekhara and Abhinavagupta in the Dhvani period and Vidyādhara, Vidyānātha, Appayya Dīkṣita and Jagannātha Paṇḍita in the Post-dhvani period; and with Jagannātha Paṇḍita the race of the poet-critics is practically extinguished. And Jagannātha Paṇḍita, as a great poet and literary critic, is undoubtedly one of the foremost literary luminaries of the Seventeenth Century. The value and importance of the harmonious blending of the two faculties of the poet-critic—creative and

<sup>1</sup> See *ante*, pp. 78-80.

appreciative—cannot be better expressed than in the *maṅgalaśloka* of the *Upalocana* by my revered Ācārya Mahāmahopādhyāya Prof. S. Kuppuswami Sastriar—

‘परस्परसमास्वादप्रथमानसतत्त्वयोः ।

कविताश्रुयोर्योगं नमामि शिवयोर्यथा ॥’

END



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